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Abstract		 This	thesis	examines	how	states	develop	and	implement	urban	planning	 and	 governance	 policies	 and	 programmes	 in	 response	 to	segregation	 and	 socio-spatial	 inequalities.	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 has	 long	been	constructed	as	both	a	“marvellous	city”	and	as	strictly	“divided”	between	 the	 so-called	 formal	 city	 and	 the	 self-built	 favelas	 that	developed	 into	 “consolidated”	 neighbourhoods.	While	 never	 granted	full	legal	tenure	and	continuously	denied	basic	rights	as	guaranteed	in	the	 1988	 “Citizens’	 Constitution,”	 public	 policy	 in	 the	 late	 twentieth	century	 recognised	 the	 permanence	 of	 the	 favelas	 and	 state	interventions	 evolved	 from	 demolishing	 to	 “upgrading.”	 Since	 the	early	 2000s,	 the	municipal,	 state-province,	 and	 federal	 governments	have	 all	 pursued	 objectives	 to	 “integrate”	 the	 favelas.	 These	 include	participatory	 urban	 planning	 interventions,	 militarised	 occupation	and	 policing	 of	 favelas,	 implantation	 of	 social	 and	 cultural	infrastructure,	 and	 technocratic	 good-governance	 projects.	 I	 argue	that	 these	 combined	 efforts	 amount	 to	 a	 new	 paradigm	 of	 “favela	integration,”	 and	 I	 seek	 to	 understand	 how	 “favela	 integration”	 is	produced	 and	 contested;	 in	what	ways	 state	 interventions	meant	 to	“integrate”	the	favelas	transform	urban	space;	and	how	techniques	of	urban	 planning	 and	 governance	 establish	 favela	 space	 as	 legitimate	and	constitutive	of	the	city.	Based	 on	 18	 months	 of	 mixed-method	 qualitative	 fieldwork,	and	 drawing	 on	 the	 literatures	 of	 landscape	 and	 critical	mobilities,	 I	argue	that	“favela	integration”	is	hegemonically	defined	through	state	facilitation	 and	 regulation	 of	 flows	 of	 people,	 goods,	 and	 services	 in	and	out	of	the	favelas.	Discursively	produced	based	on	liberal	notions	of	 citizenship	 and	 favela	 residents’	 right	 to	 the	 city,	 I	 use	 critical	mobilities	 analysis	 to	 reveal	 how	 “favela	 integration”	 reproduces	spatial	 inequalities.	 I	 then	 consider	 the	 paradigm	 as	 a	 state	 spatial	
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strategy	of	 territory.	 I	build	on	contemporary	 theories	of	state	 space	and	 territory	 as	 effect	 and	 consider	 how	 planning,	 technocratic	governance,	 and	 infrastructure	 employ	 social	 technologies	 to	 bridge	the	favela/city	binary	and	produce	the	“integrated	city.”	I	engage	with	literature	concerning	state	spatiality	under	neoliberalism	to	examine	how	“favela	integration”	follows	hegemonic	socio-economic	ideology,	but	I	argue	for	a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	state	and	discuss	how	such	ideology	is	contested	at	various	scales.		
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Chapter	1	–	Introduction		Urban	 segregation	 and	 spatial	 inequality	 have	 emerged	 as	predominant	 concerns	 in	 what	 is	 now	 a	 globalised	 capitalist	 and	urban	 world.	 As	 cities	 expanded	 in	 both	 population	 and	 economic	importance	and	the	gap	widened	between	the	rich	and	poor,	invoking	Dickens’	 famous	 depiction	 of	 a	 “tale	 of	 two	 cities”	 as	 a	 descriptive	analogy	 of	 contemporary	 urbanity	 has	 become	 as	 tempting	 as	 it	 is	cliché.	This	is	especially	true	in	regard	to	sprawling	informal	housing	settlements,	 “slums”,	 or	 favelas	 throughout	 Latin	 America.	 Rio	 de	Janeiro	 is	 iconically	 “divided”	with	 favelas	antagonising	 the	so-called	“marvellous	 city”	 from	 nearly	 every	 viewpoint,	 including	 the	 white	sand	beaches	of	Copacabana	and	penthouses	in	even	the	most	“noble”	of	neighbourhoods.	Throughout	 the	 twentieth	 century	 and	 into	 the	 twenty-first,	politicians,	 scholars,	 urban	 planners,	 elites	 and	 populists	 have	debated	 the	 persistence	 and	 proliferation	 of	 the	 favelas	 as	 a	 social	problem	 plaguing	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 the	 450-year-old	 city	 that	 once	served	as	 the	capital	of	 the	Portuguese	empire,	 the	 federal	capital	of	Brazil,	and	the	postcard	of	 tropical	cosmopolitanism	(Perlman	1976;	A.	Leeds	and	Leeds	1978;	M.	C.	Abreu	1999;	Souza	1999;	J.	de	S.	e	Silva	and	 Barbosa	 2005;	 Gonçalves	 2013;	 B.	 McCann	 2014).	 The	 favelas	themselves	have	served	as	field-sites	and	objects	of	analysis	for	social	scientists	 of	 all	 disciplines	 concerned	 with	 socio-spatial	transformations	resulting	 from	societal	and	economic	modernisation	(Valladares	 2005).	 A	 non-exhaustive	 list	 of	 research	 topics	 includes:	rural	 to	 urban	migration	 and	 social	marginality,	 informal	 circuits	 of	economy	 and	 under-development,	 capitalist	 growth	 and	 uneven	development;	 urban	 violence,	 gang	 territorialisation	 and	 drug	trafficking;	 police	 violence	 and	 state	 abuse,	 place-based	 stigma	 and	
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social	 resilience,	 popular	 organising	 and	 resistance,	 advanced	 urban	marginality	under	neoliberal	capitalism,	socialised	housing	and	urban	planning	 solutions,	 informal	 architecture	 and	 unplanned	 urbanism,	and	 favela	 tourism	and	 the	 spectacularisation	or	 commodification	of	poverty	and	violence.1	This	thesis	benefits	from	the	rich	history	of	inquiry	and	current	scholarly	 debates	 even	 as	 it	 does	 not	 take	 the	 favelas	 or	 their	residents,	but	rather	the	urban	state,	as	its	principal	object	of	inquiry.	As	 policy	 makers,	 politicians,	 technocrats	 and	 advocates	 in	 civil	society	 attempt	 to	 finally	 end	 the	 socio-spatial	 dichotomy	 excluding	
the	favela	from	the	city,	I	dislocate	the	traditional	research	problem	of	the	 spatial	 manifestations	 of	 inequality,	 segregation,	 and	 failure	 of	planning	 and	 instead	 problematise	 the	 state’s	 attempt	 to	 transform	the	production	of	urban	space.	
1.1	Arrival	to	the	field	and	defining	the	problem	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 elites	 have	 long	 treated	 housing	 forms	 of	 the	working	 poor	 with	 suspicion,	 discrimination,	 and	 violence	 (J.	 M.	 de	Carvalho	 1987;	 Chalhoub	 1996;	 Batista	 2003).	 Favelas,	 the	 diverse	category	 referring	 to	 unregulated	 settlements	 of	 various	precariousness	 built	 on	 unused	 urban	 land,	 are	 simply	 the	 most	recent	 and	 prominent	 example.2	 Strict	 socio-spatial	 segregation	
																																																								1	A	discussion	of	 relevant	debates	and	 the	historical	development	of	 the	 favelas	 in	Rio	de	Janeiro	is	developed	in	Chapter	2.	2	 Definitions	 for	 the	 term	 favela	 have	 varied	 considerably	 throughout	 history	 and	across	Brazil.	 Similar	 to	 the	 “slum”	 (see	Gilbert	2007)	 favela	 is	 a	 culturally	 loaded	term	and	its	meaning	is	often	context	dependent.	Signifying	that	favela	has	more	of	a	cultural	rather	than	a	technical	meaning,	The	Brazilian	Institute	for	Geography	and	Statistics	 (IGBE)	uses	 the	 term	“subnormal	agglomerate,”	defined	as	more	 than	50	housing	structures	of	poor	construction	quality,	illegally	occupying	(currently	or	in	the	past)	 land	 in	a	dense	and	unordered	fashion,	and	 lacking	at	 least	one	essential	public	service	(such	as	water,	sanitation,	or	trash	collection)	(IBGE	2010,	18).	Based	on	that	definition,	the	IBGE	calculates	that	22	percent	of	municipal	residents	live	in	favelas	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro.	Researchers	such	as	Perlman	(2010),	understand	 favelas	more	 broadly	 based	 on	 a	 broad	degree	 of	 informality,	 planned	 or	 unplanned,	 and	includes	 both	 loteamentos	 (parcelled	 housing	 plots)	 and	 conjuntos	 habitacionais	
	 14	
intensified	during	the	mid-twentieth	century,	as	a	result	of	a	dramatic	shift	 in	 demographics.	Waves	 of	 impoverished	 immigrants	 from	 the	surrounding	states	and	North	East	Brazil	arrived	to	the	then	nation’s	capital	 searching	 for	 work	 and	 social	 mobility	 (Perlman	 1976;	 A.	Leeds	and	Leeds	1978;	Valladares	2005).	With	no	means	to	buy	 into	the	private	housing	market	and	no	viable	public	housing	solutions,	the	migrants	constructed	their	own	homes	on	unused	private	and	public	lands.	 Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 government	response	 to	 the	 multiplying	 favelas	 varied	 greatly,	 from	 apathetic	inaction	 to	 violent	 slum	 clearance.	 Between	 the	 two	 extremes	emerged	various	schemes	 to	upgrade	 the	 favelas,	 re-house	residents	in	large-scale	developments	on	the	outskirts	of	the	city,	or	“urbanise”	the	areas,	a	term	used	to	signify	the	paving	of	roads	and	provision	of	basic	 city	 services	 (Burgos	 1998;	 Fischer	 2008;	 Freire	 and	 Oliveira	2008;	 Gonçalves	 2013;	 B.	 McCann	 2014).	 The	 programmes	 were	underfunded	 given	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 housing	 crisis,	 and	 while	 a	programme	of	“upgrading”	the	favelas	in	the	1990s	known	as	Favela-Bairro	showed	promise	and	received	international	praise	at	 the	turn	of	 the	 millennium;	 it	 was	 only	 in	 the	 past	 ten	 years	 that	 the	 state	consolidated	 decades	 of	 accrued	 experience	 and	 expertise	 and	enacted	 multiple	 policies	 and	 programmes	 recognising	 the	 favelas’	permanence	and	sought	to	definitively	“integrate”	them	into	the	city.	This	 research	 took	 place	 during	 an	 exceptional	 as	 well	 as	definitive	moment	in	Brazilian	history.	Rio	de	Janeiro	was	in	the	midst	of	 rapid	 and	 dramatic	 change.	 Brazil	 was	 coming	 to	 the	 end	 of	 a	decade-long	economic	boom,	and	Rio	was	centre-stage	with	a	global	spotlight.	 In	 less	 than	 ten	 years	 the	 city	 played	 host	 to	 an	 array	 of	mega	events	including	the	2007	Pan	American	Games,	the	2011	World																																																									(public	housing	complexes)	together	with	favelas.	This	conflation	of	categories	adds	up	to	nearly	40%	of	Rio’s	population.		
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Military	 Games,	 the	 2012	 United	 Nations	 Rio+20	 sustainability	conference,	the	2013	Catholic	World	Youth	Conference,	the	2014	FIFA	Men’s	World	Cup	and	the	2016	Summer	Olympic	Games.	The	political	party	 that	controlled	the	state	and	municipal	executive	governments	had	 formed	 an	 alliance	 with	 the	 ruling	Workers	 Party	 (PT),	 and	 to	Rio’s	 benefit,	 billions	 of	 dollars	 had	 been	 invested	 in	 infrastructure,	education,	 and	 health.	 Some	 of	 the	 most	 profound	 changes	 were	taking	 place	 in	 the	 city’s	 more	 than	 1000	 favelas.	 Rather	 than	pursuing	 strategies	 that	 would	 eradicate	 or	 drastically	 reduce	 the	presence	 of	 favelas	 in	 the	 city,	 the	 municipal,	 state	 and	 federal	governments	 rolled	out	 coordinated	urban	planning	and	governance	programmes,	policies,	 and	projects	with	 the	aim	of	 comprehensively	“integrating”	the	favelas	into	the	“formal”	city.			
	
Figure	1.1	–	Favelas	throughout	Rio	de	Janeiro	(2013)	
Using	municipal	data,	the	above	map	shows	how	the	favelas	(marked	red)	are	
spread	throughout	the	city.		 My	 interest	 in	 “favela	 integration”	began	while	 studying	 for	 a	Masters	degree	in	Public	Health	at	the	University	of	Buenos	Aires.	As	a	HIV/AIDS	and	health	activist	 I	 considered	how	health	systems	could	better	 reach	 so-called	 “vulnerable	 populations”	 that	 face	 barriers	accessing	 healthcare.	 “Slums”,	 especially	 when	 viewed	 through	 the	
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lens	 of	 informality	 (Roy	 and	 AlSayyad	 2004),	 seem	 to	 operate	antithetically	 to	 how	 public	 health	 systems—rigid,	 hierarchical,	 and	slow	 to	 change—organise	and	serve	populations.	This	prompted	 the	question,	 how	 might	 the	 state	 adapt	 to	 the	 realities	 of	 the	 favela?	Geography	 seemed	 a	 logical	 “home”	 for	 addressing	 this	 question	because	of	the	strength	of	critical	urban	geography	literature	as	well	as	 its	 interdisciplinary	 approach.	 As	 I	 made	 the	 conversion	 to	geographic	 thought,	 my	 original	 interests,	 rooted	 in	 programmatic	public	 health	 pragmatism,	 led	 to	 broader	 questions	 related	 to	 the	production	 of	 urban	 space	 and	 the	 workings	 of	 state	 spatiality	 in	relation	to	the	favelas.		During	 preliminary	 research	 into	 government	 programmes	and	 policy,	 programme	 analysis,	 and	 development	 specialists’	opinions,	 I	 noticed	 a	 repetition	 of	 words	 and	 ideas	 related	 to	connecting	 “the	 favela”	 with	 “the	 city.”	 Universities	 and	 think	 tanks	held	public	debates	and	seminars	about	“integration”	and	the	right	to	
the	 city.	 Government	 institutions	were	 publishing	 reports	 about	 the	importance	of	successfully	“integrating”	favela	communities	that	have	been	 socially	 excluded.	Mayor	Eduardo	Paes	 championed	 the	 slogan	“we	 are	 one	 Rio”	 (Somos	 um	 Rio),	 employing	 an	 ideology	 of	unification.		It	 was	 clear	 that	 “integration”	 was	 a	 loaded	 term,	 but	 what	remained	unclear	was	what	and	who	defines	“favela	integration.”	Is	it	simply	a	buzzword	or	does	it	qualify	as	something	new?	What	would	an	integrated	Rio	de	Janeiro	look	and	feel	like?	What	precisely	is	there	to	 integrate?	 The	 favelas	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 exist	 both	 as	 real	neighbourhoods,	 homes	 to	 millions	 of	 people,	 and	 as	 an	 abstract	spatial	 category,	 subject	 to	 cultural	 stereotypes,	 state	 violence	 and	social	stigma.	What	is	the	capacity	of	the	state	to	break	down	the	very	socio-spatial	 divisions	 that	 government	 policy	 and	 actions	 were	complicit	in	producing	for	over	half	a	century?	
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Thus	 the	 research	 problem	 pertains	 to	 how	 the	 city	 is	conveyed,	 particularly	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 socially	 constructed	 spatial	binary	 favela/cidade	 (slum/city)	 and	 how	 “favela	 integration”	 as	 an	urban	 ideal,	 championed	 and	 imposed	 by	 the	 state,	 transforms	 the	production,	 experience,	 and	 governance	 of	 urban	 space	 in	 Rio	 de	Janeiro.		
1.2	Research	questions	and	summary	of	claims		 The	specific	questions	that	guided	fieldwork	and	analysis	are:	
• How	 is	 “favela	 integration”	 discursively	 produced	 and	defined	 by	 the	 state	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 as	 part	 of	 a	 larger	narrative	of	urban	reform	and	renewal?		
• How	 is	 the	 meaning	 of	 “integration”	 interpreted,	represented,	challenged,	or	appropriated	by	popular	media,	special	interest	groups	and	citizens?	
• In	what	ways	do	state	interventions	designed	to	“integrate”	the	favelas	transform	urban	space?		
• How	 do	 techniques	 of	 urban	 planning	 and	 governance	establish	 favelas	 as	 legitimate	 urban	 space	 subject	 to	 and	benefiting	from	state	rule?			 	To	 pursue	 answers,	 I	 conducted	 mixed-method	 ethnographic	fieldwork	from	May	2013	until	October	2014	and	gathered	data	on	a	number	 of	 municipal,	 state-province	 and	 federal	 programmes	 that	characterised	 the	paradigm	of	 “integration.”	The	 federal	government	had	 allocated	 billions	 of	 reals	 to	 infrastructure	 and	 housing	 in	 Rio’s	favelas	 through	 the	 national	 stimulus	 package	 PAC	 (Programa	 de	Aceleração	do	Crescimento).	Rio’s	state	government	added	additional	money	 to	 PAC	 and	was	 spending	 hundreds	 of	millions	 of	 reals	 on	 a	new	 Pacifying	 Police	 Force	 to	 practice	 a	 supposed	 version	 of	
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community	 policing	 in	 the	 favelas.	 The	 municipal	 government	 was	ramping	 up	 the	 new	 Morar	 Carioca	 “integration	 of	 precarious	 and	informal	 settlements	programme”	by	matching	 loans	 from	the	 Inter-American	Development	Bank	with	public	funds	after	Mayor	Paes	had	set	 the	ambitious	goal	of	“urbanising”	all	of	 the	 favelas	by	2020.	The	municipal	 government	 also	 championed	 UPP	 Social,	 an	 initiative	developed	 by	 critical	 thinking	 scholars,	 technocrats	 and	 UN	 Habitat	experts	 to	 engage	 favela	 residents	 in	 generating	 local	 demands	 and	public	 policy	 solutions	 that	 reduced	 socio-spatial	 and	 economic	inequalities.	This	 research	 draws	 on	 and	 engages	 with	 geographical,	anthropological,	 and	 sociological	 research	 on	 favelas	 as	 a	 particular	form	 of	 urban	 inequality	 as	 well	 as	 with	 policy	 and	 programme	analyses	of	state	interventions	alleging	to	“integrate”	the	city	without	fully	belonging	to	either	camp	of	literature.	When	asked	in	the	field,	I	often	 explained	 that	 I	 was	 researching	 the	 state	 through	 its	interventions	 into	 the	 favelas.	 Thus	 my	 aim	 is	 not	 to	 present	 new	knowledge	 about	 the	 self-built	 neighbourhoods,	 nor	 theorise	informality	 or	 analyse	 the	 programmes	 and	 policies	 I	 followed	 into	the	field.	Rather	my	objectives	are	twofold.		First,	 empirically,	 I	wish	 to	 “interrogate	 favela”	 integration	as	a	paradigm	of	urban	development,	because	 I	believe	 its	principles	will	continue	to	define	urban	policy	towards	informal	housing	settlements	in	Rio	de	Janeiro,	Brazil	and	abroad.	Indeed	favela	integration	may	be	read	 alongside	 the	 celebrated	model	 of	 “social	 urbanism”	 applied	 to	great	fanfare	in	Medellín,	Colombia	(Samper	Escobar	2010;	Brand	and	Dávila	 2011;	 Oviedo	 Hernandez	 and	 Dávila	 2016;	 Maclean	 2015;	Sotomayor	2015).	A	number	of	factors	have	pushed	state	actors	(e.g.	policy	makers,	urban	planners)	 to	recognize	 favelas	(conceptually	as	well	 as	materially)	 as	 constitutive	 of	 urban	 space.	 These	 factors	 are	many	 and	 include,	 but	 are	 not	 limited	 to,	 the	 contemporary	 liberal	
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construction	 of	 citizenship	 that	 evolved	 post	 military	 dictatorship,	federal	 institutionalisation	 of	 certain	 housing	 rights	 influenced	 by	“right	 to	 the	 city”	 ideology,	 local	 historical	 development	 of	 electoral	politics	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 limitation	 of	 public	 funds	 and/or	 lack	 of	political	will	 to	pursue	systematic	re-housing	of	 favela-residents	 in	a	universal	social	housing	scheme,	lessons	learned	from	past	modernist	urban	 planning	 failures	 and	 slum-upgrading	 successes,	 and	 expert	knowledge	 and	 analysis	 produced	 by	 academics	 and	 urban	development	specialists.		No	longer	pursing	large-scale	demolition	of	favelas	as	pockets	of	illegitimate	non-city	spaces,	the	state	constructs	the	moral	imperative	and	legal	authority	to	intervene	using	new	strategies	and	policies	that	re-conceptualise	 the	 favelas.	 Once	 seen	 as	 antithetical	 to	contemporary	 urban	 life	 or	 threatening	 to	 urban	 development	 (as	“marginal	 territories”	 are	 traditionally	 represented),	 the	 favelas	 are	now	productively	participating	 in	 and	benefitting	 from	development	and	 even	 representative	 of	 Brazil’s	 social	 democratic	 advancement.	But	 “favela-integration”	 does	 not	 take	 place	 in	 a	 vacuum;	 and	 it	 is	subject	to	a	diverse	array	of	processes	and	interests,	including	but	not	limited	 to	 real	 estate	 markets	 and	 private	 developers,	 electoral	politics,	social	movements	and	politics	of	resistance,	middle	class	and	bourgeois	stereotypes	and	 fears	concerning	poverty	and	race,	mega-event	 planning,	 and	 macro-economic	 trends	 and	 policies.	 As	 such	“favela-integration”	 is	 contested	 and	 socio-political	 and	 economic	power	dynamics	are	simultaneously	challenged	and	reinforced.	In	the	ideological	struggle	to	envision	a	better	Rio	de	Janeiro,	the	recognition	of	 favelas	 as	 constitutive	 of	 legitimate	 urban	 space	 engenders	 new	opportunities	 for	 social	 change,	 but	 it	 also	 risks	 co-opting	 radical	visions	 of	 the	 “right	 to	 the	 city”	 (Lefebvre	 1996;	D.	Harvey	 2008;	 E.	Fernandes	2007).	Second,	 and	 theoretically,	 I	 aim	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	
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understanding	 of	 urban	 state	 spatiality	 and	 the	 production	 of	territory.	Because	the	favelas	have	been	historically	produced	as	non-city	spaces	“abandoned”	by	the	state	or	controlled	by	organised	crime,	“favela	 integration”	 necessitates	 the	 territorialisation	 of	 urban	enclaves	 spread	 throughout	 the	 city.	A	 renewed	 interest	 in	 the	 state	(Jessop	 2001;	 T.	Mitchell	 1991)	 generated	 a	 debate	 considering	 the	spatial	 production	 of	 the	 state	 under	 neoliberal	 capitalism	 (Brenner	2004;	 Brenner	 et	 al.	 2003;	 D.	 Harvey	 2012).	 A	 similar	 rethinking	 of	territory	by	Agnew	(1994)	has	resulted	 in	a	rich	 literature	exploring	the	many	ways	territory	is	produced	at	various	scales	(Painter	2010;	Haesbaert	 2004;	 Brenner	 and	 Elden	 2009).	 This	 research	 project	contributes	to	the	budding	 literature	considering	state	spatiality	and	territory	outside	the	Global	North	(Nuijten,	Koster,	and	de	Vries	2012;	Klink	 2013;	 P.	 Harvey	 2005;	 Freeman	 2012;	 Garmany	 2014;	 M.	Richmond	2015).	I	argue	that	“favela-integration”	constitutes	a	spatial	strategy	 of	 territory.	 The	 interventions	 analysed	 throughout	 this	thesis	first	make	favelas	legible	to	state	technocracy	(Scott	1998)	and	construct	the	defined	areas	as	requiring	development	and	governance	(Ferguson	 1990),	 and	 then	 roll	 out	 various	 technologies	 of	governance	(Painter	2010)	and	spectacular	infrastructure	in	order	to	envelope	the	favelas	into	urban	state	territory.			
1.3	Thesis	structure		The	thesis	is	structured	as	follows.	In	Chapter	2	I	introduce	the	city	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	within	the	context	of	the	research	problem	and	questions.	I	review	relevant	literature	that	explains	the	socio-political	and	 economic	 development	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 that	 produced	 the	dramatic	division	between	the	1000-plus	favelas	and	the	“formal”	city.	I	 review	 how	 theories	 of	 urban	marginality	 exacerbated	 the	 “favela	problem”	(Perlman	1976;	Perlman	2010;	Valladares	2005)	and	argue	
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that	 its	 resurgence,	 “advanced	 urban	marginality”	 (Wacquant	 1999;	Wacquant	2008a;	Wacquant	2009b)	ignores	past	shortcomings.	I	then	set	the	scene	of	this	research	project—contemporary	Rio	de	Janeiro—and	 review	 recent	 research	 discussing	 the	 unprecedented	investments	 in	 urban	 redevelopment	 and	 the	 favelas	 as	 the	 city	 is	actively	marketed	as	Brazil’s	global	city	in	an	era	of	mega-events,	real	estate	speculation,	and	spectacle.		I	 construct	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 for	 the	 research	 in	Chapter	3.	Building	on	 the	concept	of	 landscape	 as	a	 “way	of	seeing”	(Cosgrove	 1985),	 I	 draw	 from	 Lefebvre’s	 theory	 of	 abstract	 space	(1991)	 to	 understand	 how	 landscape	 creates	 a	 totalising	 vision	 of	 a	spatial	 category	 (for	 example	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 “the	 marvellous	 city”)	through	various	modes	of	 abstraction	 that	obscure	politics,	 struggle,	and	 hegemonic	 power.	 I	 then	 pair	 this	 analytical	 framework	 of	landscape	 with	 the	 growing	 field	 of	 critical	 mobilities,	 principally	Cresswell’s	 (2010)	“politics	of	mobility”	 in	response	to	Maddrell	and	Qvistrom’s	 call	 (2016)	 to	 consider	 how	 landscapes	 are	 composed	 of	various	forms	of	mobility	and	how	mobility	is	shaped	by	landscape.	I	subsequently	 review	 contemporary	 theorisations	 of	 state	 spatiality	and	the	production	of	(state)	space	on	the	one	hand	and	the	renewed	debate	on	territory	on	the	other.	I	draw	from	overlapping	literature	of	Lefebvre	and	his	contemporaries	(Elden	2001;	Brenner	and	Theodore	2002;	 Jessop,	 Brenner,	 and	 Jones	 2008)	 as	 well	 as	 post-structural	geographers	 and	 spatial-thinking	 social	 scientists	 (Painter	 2006;	Elden	 2007;	 T.	 Mitchell	 1999;	 Ferguson	 and	 Gupta	 2002).	 Finally,	 I	follow	 some	 of	 these	 scholars	 to	 a	 renewed	 debate	 on	 territory,	 its	production	 and	 relation	 to	 state	 space	 (Painter	 2010;	 Brenner	 and	Elden	2009;	Haesbaert	2004).	These	literatures	facilitate	the	analysis	of	how	the	state	transforms	a	city	through	a	spatial	strategy,	such	as	“favela	 integration”,	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	 effects	 of	 territory—the	illusion	of	even	sovereignty	and	governance	across	bounded	space.		
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Chapter	 4	 summarises	 my	 thinking,	 reading,	 debating,	 and	writing	about	methodological	 challenges.	After	defining	 the	 research	problem	and	questions,	the	two	most	significant	decisions	that	shaped	this	research	concerned	(i)	whether	 to	 include	 the	urban	protests	of	2013	into	the	project’s	focus	and	similarly	how	to	approach	counter-hegemonic	 organised	 resistance	 within	 the	 favelas;	 and	 (ii)	 how	 to	conduct	ethnography	of	“favela	integration”	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	without	a	defined,	and	defining,	field-site.	I	outline	my	approach	to	intertextual	discourse	analysis	across	genres	of	policy,	political,	expert,	news,	and	citizen-produced	 texts	 (G.	 Rose	 2007;	 Waitt	 2010).	 Engaging	 with	contemporary	 debates	 on	 ethnography	 and	 constructing	 the	 field,	 I	employ	Lefebvre’s	spatial	triad	to	supplant	the	site	with	a	constructed	field	 of	 spatial	 process:	 “favela	 integration.”	 Ultimately,	 I	 recognise	that	 this	 project	 does	 not	 qualify	 as	 traditional	 ethnography	 largely	due	to	decisions	made	while	in	the	field,	but	I	detail	how	the	research	nonetheless	adheres	 to	 reflexive	ethnographic	principles	 in	 research	design	and	analysis.		The	 first	 of	 three	 empirical	 chapters,	 Chapter	 5	 seeks	 to	interrogate	 the	 paradigm	 of	 “favela	 integration”	 through	 the	theoretical	 model	 of	 landscape-mobilities	 constructed	 in	 Chapter	 3.	Building	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 favelas	 represented	 a	 “crisis	 of	landscape”	(Barbosa	2012),	I	argue	that	the	dichotomous	production	of	 the	 “divided	 city”	 operated	 as	 a	 coping	 mechanism	 meant	 to	maintain	Rio	de	 Janeiro	as	 “marvellous”	despite	stark	 inequality	and	segregation.	 Nonetheless	 the	 duality	 separating	 the	 favela	 from	 the	marvellous	eventually	constituted	a	socio-political	crisis	of	landscape	itself.	 “Favela	 integration”	 as	 a	 paradigm	 of	 urban	 governance	 and	planning	 has	 been	 presented	 as	 the	 solution.	 I	 argue	 that	 “favela	integration”	 is	 hegemonically	 defined	 through	 state	 facilitation	 and	regulation	 of	 flows	 of	 people,	 goods,	 and	 services	 in	 and	 out	 of	 the	favelas.	Discursively	produced	based	on	liberal	notions	of	citizenship	
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and	 favela	 residents’	 right	 to	 the	 city,	 I	 argue	 that	 analysing	 the	
politics	 of	mobility	 (Cresswell	 2010)	 reveals	 that	 “favela	 integration”	reproduces	spatial	inequalities.		Chapter	 6	 tells	 the	 tumultuous	 story	 of	 the	 programme	formerly	 known	 as	 UPP	 Social.	 Based	 on	 the	 consensus	 that	 police	“pacification”	 of	 the	 favelas	 establishes	 the	 necessary	 conditions	 for	better	 governance	 and	 quality	 services,	 the	 progressive	 programme	UPP	Social	rolled	out	in	“pacified”	favelas	in	order	to	engage	residents	and	 create	 favela-specific	 policies	 to	 address	 local	 demands.	 Shortly	after	 its	 creation	 in	 the	 State	 government	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 the	programme	 was	 shifted	 to	 the	 municipal	 government’s	 planning	institute	where	 it	morphed	 into	 a	 technocratic	 supposedly	 apolitical	intra-government	 favela	 consulting	 service.	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 favela-specific	 knowledge,	 produced	 through	 descriptive	 and	 inferential	quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 data,	 serves	 “favela	 integration”	 in	 two	connected	 functions:	 first	 as	 a	 technocratic	 lens	 through	 which	 the	state	sees	the	favelas	as	objects	needing	intervention	(Ferguson	1990)	and	second	as	the	effectuation	of	territory	(Painter	2010).		The	central	concern	of	Chapter	7	is	similar	to	that	of	Chapter	6:	the	 techniques	 and	 processes	 of	 state	 territorialisation	 of	 defined	pockets	of	space	considered	‘outside’	of	state	control	and	thus	lacking	the	 benefits	 of	 governance.	 However,	 whereas	 the	 previous	 chapter	focused	 on	 a	 technocratic	 programme	 largely	 preoccupied	 with	abstract	 space	 (in	 the	 forms	 of	 maps,	 GIS,	 descriptive	 documents,	coordinated	plans	etc…),	Chapter	7	takes	the	large-scale	interventions	of	 PAC-favelas	 as	 the	 central	 object	 of	 analysis.	 Describing	 the	structure	and	planning	processes	of	PAC-favelas	and	the	interventions	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	as	state	spaces	of	territory,	I	argue	that	in	contrast	to	neoliberal	 Europe,	 Brazil	 has	 not	 seen	 the	 same	 downshift	 in	statehood	 towards	 neo-localism	 (Brenner	 2004)	 but	 that	 scale	continues	 to	 be	 politically	 contested	 under	 late	 capitalism	 (Klink	
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2013).	 This	 chapter	 spends	 considerable	 time	 analysing	 a	 cable-car	system	known	as	the	Teleférico	do	Alemão	that	is	seen	as	the	flagship	of	 PAC	 and	 a	 symbol	 of	 the	 state’s	 presence	 in	 the	 favelas	 and	 the	favelas	 integration	 into	 the	 city.	 Chapter	 7	 further	 contains	 an	exploratory	 analysis	 of	 “favela	 integration”	 and	 territory	 through	 an	explicit	 feminist	 lens	 in	 which	 I	 observe	 that	 defining	 aspects	 and	types	of	labour	of	“favela	integration”	are	gendered;	and	I	argue	for	a	feminist	approach	to	the	resurgent	theorisations	of	territory.		I	present	my	conclusions	 in	Chapter	8.	 I	 review	 the	empirical	analysis	in	the	previous	three	chapters	in	dialogue	with	contemporary	literature	 about	 Rio’s	 transformations.	 I	 attempt	 to	 synthesise	 my	claims	about	“favela	integration”	as	a	state	spatial	strategy	that	seeks	to	transform	Rio’s	cityscape	from	the	divided	city	to	a	unified	city	by	making	the	favelas	marvellous	and	producing	the	favelas	as	territory.	I	 then	consider	my	claims	beyond	the	 immediacy	of	Rio.	Despite	Rio	de	Janeiro’s	exceptionality,	it	serves	as	a	reference	for	other	Brazilian	and	 Latin	 American	 urban	 policy	 makers	 and	 international	organisations	 adopting	 more	 inclusive	 and	 rights-based	 strategies	towards	 informal	housing	settlements.	Reviewing	the	challenges	and	limitations	of	the	research	design,	I	consider	the	lessons	of	this	project	for	contemporary	urban	and	un-sited	ethnography.	Finally,	reviewing	this	 project’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 theorisation	 of	 territory	 and	 state	spatiality,	I	consider	implications	for	future	research.		
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Chapter	2	–	Historical	and	Contemporary	
Understandings	of	Urban	Segregation,	
Inequality,	and	“Marginality”	in	Rio	de	Janeiro			 Rio	de	Janeiro	is	far	from	the	only	city	described	as	“divided,”	“fragmented,”	or	“partitioned.”	The	theorisation	of	cities	whose	 form	is	 marked	 by	 conflict—war,	 religion,	 race,	 national	 identity,	 or	economic	polarisation—has	been	examined	as	a	growing	global	trend	in	 recent	 decades	 (Allegra,	 Casaglia,	 and	 Rokem	 2012).	 Some	 argue	that	 this	 literature	 has	 led	 to	 a	 “false	 gospel”	 that	 cities	 are	 newly	divided	 as	 a	 result	 of	 neoliberal	 market	 dominance	 and	 state	ineffectuality	(Marcuse	and	Kempen	2002).	Rio	is	an	example	of	a	city	whose	socio-spatial	division	and	its	study	predate	such	literature	and	assumptions	built	into	critiques	of	neoliberalism.	As	the	authors	cited	above	note,	 it	 is	near	impossible	to	theorise	polarised	and	polarizing	spatial	differences	on	a	global	scale	or	even	by	 ideal-type	categories.	This	is	not	to	discourage	comparative	research	but	rather	dissuade	an	observer	 to	 conclude,	 based	 on	 a	 cursory	 examination,	 that	similarities	 of	 urban	 form	 necessarily	 result	 from	 common	 causes.	Each	 city	 must	 be	 understood	 by	 its	 unique	 geography	 and	 history	prior	 to	 comparison	 and/or	 theoretical	 generalisation.	 This	 chapter	has	 the	 objective	 of	 reviewing	 the	 historical	 production	 of	 Rio	 de	Janeiro	 as	 defined	 by	 the	 dichotomous	 divide	 favela/cidade	[favela/city].	 Despite	 evidence	 to	 the	 contrary,	 for	more	 than	 half	 a	century	 the	 favelas	 were	 considered	 economic	 and	 culturally	“marginal”	to	the	metropolitan	city,	a	drain	on	public	resources	and	an	impediment	 to	modernity.	 Detailing	 the	 construction	 of	 segregation	
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and	 inequality	 as	 a	 problem	 is	 fundamental	 to	 understanding	 the	current	proposed	solution,	a	strategy	of	favela	integration.3	The	 chapter	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 In	 Section	 2.1	 I	 offer	 a	brief	 summary	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro’s	 450-year	 historical	 development,	ending	 with	 the	 founding	 myth	 of	 the	 favelas.	 I	 review	 the	proliferation	of	the	favelas	as	an	urban	“social	ill”	during	the	twentieth	century.	As	neighbourhoods	constructed	on	unused	land	by	poor	rural	migrants	and	Afro-Brazilians,	favelas	were	the	only	housing	option	for	many	among	the	poor	labouring	classes.	Section	2.2	offers	a	nuanced	reading	of	how	the	favelas	and	their	residents	(sometimes	referred	to	as	 favelados)4	were	understood	as	a	social	problem	through	the	 lens	of	 social	 marginality,	 the	 product	 of	 crossed	 theories	 from	 political	economy	on	 the	one	hand	and	urban	anthropology	and	sociology	on	the	 other.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 perversion	 of	 scholarship	 on	 social	marginality	 and	 the	 culture	 of	 poverty	 persisted	 in	 vernacular	 and	political	thinking	towards	the	favelas.	Building	on	those	scholars	who	have	 critiqued	 advanced	marginality	 empirically	 and	 theoretically,	 I	add	 an	 ethical	 critique	 drawing	 on	 feminist	 literature	 as	 well	 as	Wacquant’s	own	criticism	(writing	with	Pierre	Bourdieu)	of	academic	“imperialism”.	Section	2.3	outlines	academic	debates	among	urbanists																																																									3	 In	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 each	 mention	 of	 “favela	 integration”	 was	 placed	 in	quotation	 marks	 to	 underscore	 my	 treatment	 of	 it	 as	 a	 hegemonic	 paradigm	produced	 through	 “specialist,”	 technocratic,	 and	 political	 discourse	 (explored	 in	depth	throughout	empirical	analysis,	but	especially	Chapter	5).	From	this	point	on,	I	cease	 to	 mark	 the	 term	 with	 quotation	 marks	 except	 its	 first	 mention	 in	 every	chapter	or	when	I	wish	to	call	particular	attention	to	its	construction	and	imposition	as	a	dominant	idea.	4	Favelado	is	a	culturally	loaded	word	that	I	use	sparingly	and	self-consciously.	It	is	difficult	to	use	the	term	matter-of-factly	due	to	the	framing	of	favelas	and	favelados	as	social	problems	throughout	Brazilian	history.	The	term	favelado	 is	 increasingly,	but	not	universally,	 claimed	by	 residents	as	a	 socio-spatial	 identity	of	which	 to	be	proud.	While	many	researchers	who	conduct	ethnography	of	favelas	use	the	term	in	a	 similar	 context	 or	 simply	 to	 denote	 those	 living	 in	 favelas,	 I	 do	 so	 cautiously,	recognising	that	even	today	when	the	term	is	spoken	by	those	with	social	privilege	it	is	most	often	deployed	pejoratively.	It	may	be	helpful	to	note	that	there	is	no	similar	term	 in	 contraposition	 to	 the	 favelado.	 Those	 residents	 living	 in	 apartments	 and	homes	on	the	planned	streets	of	the	city	are	linguistically	unmarked,	as	is	often	the	case	with	privileged	social	groups.	
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seeking	 to	 explain	 the	 recent	 and	 undergoing	 transformative	 state	interventions	 in	 the	 favelas	 in	 an	 era	 of	 economic	 boom	 and	mega-events	during	the	longest	period	of	democratic	governance	in	Brazil’s	history.	I	review	the	chapter	in	Section	2.4	and	preview	the	next.		
2.1	The	founding	of	Rio	and	the	foundations	of	the	favelas		
Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 (city):	 A	 beautiful	 and	 grand	 city,	 the	 mercantile	
premier	of	meridian	America,	capital	of	the	empire	of	Brazil.	It	sits	on	
the	shores	of	one	of	 the	most	beautiful	bays	 in	the	world	at	 twenty-
two	 degrees	 and	 fifty-four	 minutes	 latitude,	 and	 forty-five	 degrees	
and	thirty-six	minutes	longitude.	[…]	
The	 [Guanabara]	 Bay	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 is	 the	 most	 beautiful	
ornament	 for	 Brazil’s	 capital.	 It	 would	 be	more	 beautiful	 still	 if	 its	
margins	and	wharf	were	not	rife	with	buildings	of	recent	date	so	that	
the	only	place	where	one	may	disembark	in	comfort	is	the	handsome	
new	 pier	 with	 stairs	 on	 its	 three	 sides	 constructed	 near	 the	 navy	
arsenal.	 One	 finds	 all	 other	 places	 to	 disembark	 full	 of	 blacks	
dumping	filth	at	all	hours	of	day	and	night.			The	above	text,	written	by	former	French	military	officer	J.C.R.	Milliet	de	Saínt-Adolphe,	 is	excerpted	 from	 the	description	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	 in	 the	Descriptive	Geographic	and	Historical	Dictionary	of	 the	
Empire	 of	 Brazil	 (Saínt-Adolphe	2014,	 743–44).	Originally	 published	in	1845,	Saínt-Adolphe,	who	historians	suppose	arrived	in	Brazil	as	a	refugee	 after	 Napoleon’s	 fall,	 spent	 a	 decade	 researching	 and	travelling	the	country	as	a	topographer	before	publishing	the	massive	dictionary	 (republished	one	and	a	half	 centuries	 later).	The	city	 that	Saínt-Milliet	described	was	founded	in	1565	and	considered	the	jewel	of	 the	Portuguese	Empire.5	 The	wealth	 that	 flowed	 from	 the	port	 of																																																									5	 The	 city	 of	 Salvador	 predates	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 founded	 in	 1549	 as	 the	 colonial	capital	 of	 Brazil,	 but	 by	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 economic	 and	political	power	had	consolidated	and	shifted	from	the	North-East	to	the	South-East	
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Guanabara	Bay	 to	Europe	was	so	great	 that	when	Napoleon	 invaded	Portugal,	 the	entire	Portuguese	 royal	 court	 led	by	King	Dom	 João	VI	fled	 to	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 and	 declared	 the	 city	 the	 capital	 of	 the	Portuguese	 Empire	 in	 1808.	 Even	 after	 the	 threat	 of	 the	 French	subsided,	 the	 King	 remained.	 Saínt-Adolphe	 wrote	 of	 the	 envy	 and	indignation	of	 the	Portuguese	 ruling	 class	 in	Lisbon	as	 they	 saw	 the	royal	family	constructing	a	modern	capital—a	state	of	the	art	hospital,	military	 academy,	 and	 botanical	 gardens—in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	relegating	Portugal	to	the	status	of	a	colony.	The	threat	of	revolution	in	 Lisbon	 forced	 the	 King’s	 return	 and	 the	 transfer	 of	 the	 imperial	capital	back	to	Portugal;	but	he	left	his	son,	Dom	Pedro	I,	as	his	regent,	who	swiftly	became	Emperor	when	Brazil	declared	 independence	 in	1822.	Rio	de	Janeiro	remained	the	capital	of	the	Empire	and	then	the	Republic	 of	 Brazil	 (declared	 in	 1889)	 until	 the	 federal	 government	was	transferred	to	Brasilia	in	1960.	The	 “blacks”	 Saínt-Adolphe	 complained	 about	 sullying	 the	“most	 beautiful”	Guanabara	Bay	were	 likely	 slaves	 arriving	 to	dump	domestic	waste	or	 to	bathe	 in	 the	seawater.	Brazil	was	 founded	and	developed	 on	 the	 backs	 of	 enslaved	Africans	 and	 their	 descendants.	From	 1501	 until	 1866,	 an	 estimated	 five	 million	 Africans	 were	brought	to	Brazil	by	Portuguese	slave	traders	(Eltis	2015).	Brazil	did	not	ban	 the	 transatlantic	 slave	 trade	until	1850	(a	previous	 law	was	enacted	 in	1831	 to	appease	 the	British,	however	 it	went	unenforced	and	became	referred	to	as	“para	inglés	ver,”	or	for	the	English	to	see).	A	 law	 from	 1871	 declared	 all	 children	 born	 to	 slaves	 free,	 but	 the	practice	 itself	 was	 not	 fully	 abolished	 until	 1888.	 According	 to	 a	census	cited	by	Saínt-Adolphe,	 the	85,000	slaves	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro	 in	1844	represented	half	of	the	total	population.		By	 1891	 the	 general	 population	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 had	 more																																																									due	 to	 mining	 in	 Minas	 Gerais	 and	 large	 scale	 agriculture,	 especially	 sugar	 and	coffee,	in	São	Paulo	and	Rio	de	Janeiro	(Prado	1971,	86–89).	
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than	 doubled	 to	 522	 thousand	 (J.	 M.	 de	 Carvalho	 1987,	 16).	 The	abolition	 of	 slavery	 corresponded	 to	 a	 large	 influx	 of	 European	immigrants	as	well	as	the	arrival	of	newly	freed	slaves.	The	ballooning	population	 drove	 down	 wages,	 and	 a	 significant	 portion	 of	 the	 city	found	itself	unemployed	and	destitute.	Rio	de	Janeiro,	now	the	federal	capital,	had	lost	its	imperial	grandeur	and	the	elite	began	to	consider	it	 dangerous,	 full	 of	 criminals	 and	 radicals.	 Overcrowding	 in	 the	tenements	 resulted	 in	 a	 yellow	 fever	 outbreak,	 and	 the	 unsanitary	conditions	were	deemed	a	public	health	crisis	justifying	evictions	and	demolitions	(J.	M.	de	Carvalho	1987;	Chalhoub	1993;	Chalhoub	1996).		During	 the	 last	 decade	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 a	 group	 of	soldiers	 returning	 from	 quelling	 a	 rebellion	 in	 the	 North	 East	 (the	Canudos	War)	squatted	on	a	hill	facing	the	Ministry	of	War.	They	were	owed	wages	and	promised	land	(M.	Abreu	1987;	Valladares	2005).	At	first	 they	 occupied	 a	 small	 existing	 covenant	 but	 erected	 makeshift	shelters	as	 their	numbers	grew.	The	hill	upon	which	 they	built	 their	shacks	 became	 referred	 to	 as	Morro	 do	 Canudos	 and	 then	Morro	 da	
Favella	after	a	plant	covering	the	hill	the	soldiers	recognised	from	the	North	East.	Valladares	(2005,	28–30)	refers	to	this	story	as	the	“origin	myth”	 of	 the	 favelas.	 The	 soldiers’	 encampment	 of	 shacks	 spilling	down	the	hill	was	not	 the	 first	 informal	housing	structures	occupied	by	 the	 poor	 in	 the	 city.	 In	 fact	 at	 the	 base	 of	 the	 hill	 had	 stood	 the	largest	 and	 most	 infamous	 cortiços	 (tenement	 slums,	 lit.	 beehive),	known	as	Cabeça	do	Porco.6	Considered	an	embarrassment	to	the	city,	an	aesthetic	eyesore	to	citizens	of	good	taste	and	breeding,	a	hotbed	of	immorality	 and	 criminality,	 and	 a	 threat	 to	 public	 health;	 the	 city	issued	 a	 decree	 prohibiting	 cortiços	 in	 1893.	 Cabeça	 do	 Porco	 was																																																									6	The	cortiços	were	famously	depicted	at	 the	time	by	the	novelist	Aluísio	Azevedo.	His	 book	 O	 Cortiço,	 published	 in	 1890	 told	 the	 story	 of	 a	 hotel-residency	transformed	to	a	sprawling	tenement	slum.	In	line	with	bourgeois	fears	at	the	time,	the	book	depicts	cortiços	as	determining	factors	of	 immorality	and	sordid	sociality	(See	Sà	2010).	
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demolished	the	same	year	and	just	a	few	years	before	the	founding	of	
Morro	da	Favella	(eventually	named	Morro	da	Providência)	(M.	Abreu	1987;	 Valladares	 2005;	 Fischer	 2008;	 Gonçalves	 2013).7	 Valladares	suggests	that	the	quality	of	the	favella	plant,	a	hardy	shrub	that	grows	even	 on	 steep	 and	 rocky	 hillsides,	 was	 symbolic	 of	 the	 hillside	settlements	as	their	residents	struggled	against	a	powerful	oppressor	(2005,	29).	With	the	prohibition	of	cortiços	but	lack	of	state	solution	to	the	housing	 crisis,	 self-constructed	 shacks	 on	 unused	 land	 became	 the	only	 option	 for	 Rio’s	 arriving	 or	 dispossessed	 poor.	 This	 incipient	spatial	divide	between	the	rich	and	the	poor	grew	more	pronounced	in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century	 by	 an	 aggressive	 campaign	 to	modernise	 the	 city	 through	 public	 planning.	 In	 the	 new	 republic,	politics	 were	 tumultuous;	 but	 because	 voting	 rights	 were	 severely	limited	 by	 gender	 and	 literacy	 requirements,	 the	 state	 remained	firmly	in	the	control	of	the	country’s	elite	(J.	M.	de	Carvalho	1987).		Modern	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 is	 often	 traced	 back	 to	Mayor	 Pereira	Passos,	who,	supported	by	the	learned	and	landed	classes,	envisioned	Rio	de	Janeiro	as	a	modern	metropolis.	Passos	admired	Haussmann’s	Paris	and	embarked	on	a	campaign	to	oversee	its	tropical	replication	(Benchimol	1992;	Hahner	1986;	L.	L.	Oliveira	2002;	Fischer	2008).	In	addition	 to	 demolishing	 remaining	 cortiços,	 widening	 streets,	 and	constructing	open	squares,	Passos	enacted	a	number	of	planning	and	public	 health	 regulations.	 He	 issued	 decrees	 regulating	 how	 people	used	 urban	 infrastructure	 and	 behaved.	 He	 instructed	 police	 to	enforce	 bans	 on	 pushcarts,	 street-hawking	 of	 lottery	 tickets,	 and	public	 begging;	 prohibited	 the	 raising	 of	 pigs	 and	 the	 circulation	 of	dairy	cows	 in	 the	streets;	and	demanded	that	residents	stop	spitting																																																									7	 Fischer	 (2008),	 while	 not	 the	 first	 to	 tell	 this	 story,	 offers	 the	 most	 thorough	English	summary	of	the	literature	and	original	archival	work.	See	especially	chapter	7.	
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on	 the	 walkways	 and	 in	 trolleys,	 urinating	 in	 public,	 and	 even	emptying	tobacco	pipes	on	the	streets	(Benchimol	1992).	The	reforms	corresponded	 to	 a	 strict	 set	 of	 modernist	 and	 racist	 bourgeois	aesthetics	 that	 exalted	 a	 specific	 urban	 form	 and	 social	 order	 and	found	concentrated	forms	of	poverty	and	growing	population	of	black	and	 mixed-raced	 Brazilians	 particularly	 distasteful	 and	 fearful	(Batista	2003).		Such	 groupings	 of	 households	 on	 the	 hills	 and	 thin	 tracks	 of	unused	 land	 in	 the	 expanding	 city	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 continued	 to	proliferate	 during	 the	 mid-twentieth	 century	 as	 more	 migrants	arrived	 but	 there	 was	 no	 legal	 private	 or	 public	 housing	market	 to	accommodate	 them	 (Perlman	 1976;	 A.	 Leeds	 and	 Leeds	 1978;	Valladares	2005).	The	push	for	modernisation	corresponded	to	global	capitalist	urban	industrialisation.	According	to	historian	Caio	Prado	Jr.	(1971,	281-287),	Rio	de	Janeiro	became	a	major	industrial	centre	for	a	confluence	 of	 structural	 reasons.	 Its	 history	 as	 an	 imperial	 city	 and	site	of	political	power	meant	that	it	was	already	the	centre	of	national	and	 international	 private	 capital	 and	 large	 banks.	 Rio	 was	 also	 a	principal	arrival	point	for	European	migrants,	including	many	artisans	who	 sustained	 the	 city’s	 cosmopolitan	 flair.	 Finally	 imported	 energy	(coal)	 and	 industrial	 machinery	 arrived	 at	 the	 port	 of	 Guanabara,	meaning	ground	transportation	was	minimised	if	factories	were	built	near	 by.	 By	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	began	to	take	shape	into	its	current	form:	industrial	to	the	north	of	the	city	 centre	 wrapping	 around	 the	 large	 bay	 with	 new	 factories	 and	working	 class	neighbourhoods,	 and	 residential	 and	privileged	 to	 the	south	 along	 the	 Atlantic	 coast.	 These	 neighbourhoods—Flamengo,	Copacabana,	 Ipanema,	 Lagoa,	 and	 Leblon—became	 known	 as	 the	“noble	neighbourhoods”	of	the	South	Zone.	The	favelas	expanded	with	the	 city	 in	 all	 directions,	 to	 the	 industrial	 North	 and	 the	 domestic	service	economy	in	the	South.		
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Valladares	 (2005)	 notes	 that	 at	 this	 time	 of	 industrialisation	and	 modernist	 influence,	 the	 favelas	 were	 constructed	 as	 a	 social	problem	 for	 the	 city.	 The	 intellectuals,	 doctors,	 and	 engineers	empowered	by	Passos	continued	to	wield	substantial	influence	during	the	 1930s	 and	 ’40s	 through	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 Rotary	 Club	(Valladares	2005;	Fischer	2008).	These	Cariocas	(Rio	natives)	saw	the	favelas,	 especially	 those	adjacent	 to	wealthy	mansions	and	buildings	in	the	noble	neighbourhoods,	as	urban	blight,	a	sickness	afflicting	the	city.	The	geographer	Andrelino	Campos	(2005)	argues	 that	 the	early	spatial	 production	 of	 favelas	 could	 be	 compared	 with	 that	 of	 the	
quilombos	 settled	 by	 runaway	 or	 freed	 slaves.	 Their	 poverty	 and	seemingly	 chaotic	 organisation	 was	 the	 opposite	 of	 the	 old	 slave	quarters	 known	 as	 valongos,	 rudimentary	 structures	 resembling	barracks	 and	 easy	 to	 police.	He	 suggests	 this	 tension	 contributed	 to	the	 construction	 of	 favelas	 as	 the	 antithesis	 to	 the	 desired	 city	 and	eventually	 their	 criminalisation.	 Barbosa	 (2012)	 refers	 to	 the	widening	 divide	 between	 the	 illegal	 and	 impoverished	 favelas	 as	 a	“crisis	of	landscape”	that	threatened	the	collective	cultural	identity	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	(explored	in	depth	in	Chapter	5).	Despite	the	fact	that	a	significant	portion	of	favela	residents	worked	in	the	expanding	urban	economy,	 often	 informally	 and	 for	 low	 wages,	 the	 city’s	 elite	constructed	the	favelas	as	parasitic	(Perlman	1976;	Valladares	1978;	Piccolo	2006).	The	aesthetics	of	the	favelas—both	in	urban	form	(no	roads,	 precariously	 built	 shacks	 in	 no	 apparent	 order,	 lack	 of	water	and	 electricity)	 and	 demographic	 makeup	 (black	 and	 mixed	 race	former	slaves	and	economic	migrants	from	the	rural	interior)—were	understood	 as	 proof	 that	 the	 city	 could	 not	 absorb	 the	 growing	population,	 that	 those	 living	 in	 the	 favelas	were	not	needed	and	did	not	belong	in	Rio	de	Janeiro.	The	favelas	became	considered	marginal	to	the	city	and	the	favelados	marginal	to	urban	society.		
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2.2	Urban	social	marginality	–	the	theory	that	just	won’t	
quit8	 The	conceptual	roots	of	social	marginality	lie	in	the	confluence	of	a	particular	Marxist	 critique	of	 capitalist	 industrialisation	 in	Latin	America	with	 the	 theorisation	of	 cultural	 reproduction	of	poverty	 in	industrialising	 cities.	 As	 a	 precursor,	 Robert	 Park	 of	 the	 “Chicago	School”	of	sociology	and	anthropology	(Apter	et	al.	2009;	G.	A.	 Jones	and	 Rodgers	 2016)	 wrote	 of	 the	 “marginal	 man”	 in	 reference	 to	migrants	as	divided	between	two	worlds	and	thus	truly	belonging	to	none	 (Park	 1928).	 His	 research	 focused	 on	 race	 relations	 and	migration	 in	 the	 Untied	 States,	 but	 he	 became	 influential	 among	Brazilian	scholars	by	the	1930s	that	believed	his	analysis	applicable	to	rural-to-urban	migrants	in	Brazil	(Valladares	2010).	Throughout	early	industrialisation	and	 its	associated	urbanisation,	 scholars	and	public	intellectuals	 considered	 the	 favelas	 slivers	 of	 rural	 provincialism	within	 the	 city	 (Bonilla	 1961;	 Perlman	 1976;	 M.	 C.	 Abreu	 1999;	Valladares	2005).	During	 the	 mid-twentieth	 century,	 Latin	 American	 world	
system	 theorists	 were	 concerned	 about	 the	 unequal	 distribution	 of	benefits	 in	 capitalism.	 The	 political	 economists	 constructed	
dependency	 theory	 to	 explain	 how	 wealth	 flowed	 from	 poor	 to	 rich	countries	 (from	the	 “periphery”	 to	 the	 “core”)	 in	 the	 form	of	natural	resources	and	unrefined	commodities.	This	created	a	system	of	poor	countries’	 dependence	 on	 rich	 countries,	 since	 free	 trade	 ideology	meant	 that	 lesser-industrialised	 countries	 struggled	 to	 develop	competitive	 internal	 markets	 or	 economic	 autonomy	 (Nun	 1969;	Quijano	1971;	Kowarick	1975).	The	constrained	development	meant	industry	 could	 not	 absorb	 the	 available	 labour	 force,	 and	 a	 certain	portion	of	the	population	would	be	made	structurally	redundant,	the																																																									8	 This	 section	 draws	 heavily	 on	 a	 longer	 essay	 I	 wrote	 titled	 “The	 historical	 and	contemporary	pitfalls	of	marginality”	(Landesman	Forthcoming).	
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marginal	 masses	 (Zuazúa	 2005;	 Montoya	 2006;	 Filho	 and	 Oliveira	2012).9	 Most	 dependency	 theorists	 did	 not	 elaborate	 claims	 about	slums	or	the	particularities	of	urban	poverty,	but	it	was	a	short	leap	to	associate	 the	 población	 marginal	 with	 “precarious”	 settlements	 that	were	multiplying	around	urban	peripheries	(Montoya	2006).	A	 consolidated	 theory	 on	 urban	 social	 marginality	incorporated	 Oscar	 Lewis’	 culture	 of	 poverty	 (Lewis	 1959;	 1961;	1966b;	 1966a).	 Studying	poor	 families	 in	 a	 tenement	 of	Mexico	City	(and	later	impoverished	Puerto	Rican	immigrants	living	in	New	York	City),	 Lewis	 argued	 that	 remarkably	 similar	 behaviour	 patterns,	family	structures	and	psychological	beliefs	were	present	in	poor	slum	neighbourhoods	across	the	Western	world,	and	interrupting	the	cycle	necessitated	a	focus	on	this	“culture	of	poverty”	(1966a).	Scholars	and	intellectuals	 began	 associating	urban	 shantytowns	with	 the	material	manifestation	 of	 a	 redundant	 economic	 class	 as	 well	 as	 sites	 of	hopeless	 poverty.	 The	 so-called	 “marginal	 neighbourhoods”	 were	thought	to	increase	or	solidify	urban	poverty.		Poverty	in	the	Brazilian	metropolis	was	historically	associated	with	 social	 representations	 of	 the	 vadio	 (the	 vagrant	 or	 bum),	 of	 a	weak	moral	 character,	 and	 a	 result	 of	 the	 choices	 and	 actions	 of	 an	individual	 (Valladares	 2005).	 During	 the	 1930s	 and	 40s,	 populist	President	Getúlio	Vargas	engendered	a	new	narrative	of	poverty:	near	insurmountable	 obstacles	 that	 faced	 poor	 Brazilians	 and	 a	 lack	 of	choices	 to	 pursue	 a	 life	 of	 dignity	 through	 work.	 This	 narrative	allowed	for	the	construction	of	poverty	as	a	social	problem	in	which	the	State	had	the	moral	imperative	to	intervene	(Fischer	2008).	Brazil																																																									9	 According	 to	 the	 Argentine	 scholar	 Nun	 (1969	 cited	 in	 Valladares	 2005),	 the	“superpopulação	relativa”	(relative	surplus	population)	referred	to	the	unemployed	or	 underemployed,	 the	 “exército	 industrial	 de	 reserva”	 (industrial	 reserve	 army)	corresponded	 to	 labour	 that	 private	 capital	 could	 eventually	 incorporate	 into	production,	 and	 the	 “masa	 marginal”	 (the	 marginal	 masses)	 constituted	 the	multitudes	 that	 would	 never	 find	 employment	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Third	 World	dependency.	
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experienced	rapid	rural-to-urban	migration	between	1959	and	1980,	and	most	 new	migrants	 settled	 in	 favelas.	 The	 relocation	 of	 poverty	from	rural	to	urban	Brazil	gave	the	impression	that	poverty	itself	had	increased	 as	 a	 result	 of	 urbanisation.	 Structuralist	 frameworks	 of	economic	 modernisation	 became	 dominant	 in	 the	 region	 (Maiolino	and	Mancebo	2005)	and	were	invoked	more	frequently	in	reference	to	favelas	and	shantytowns	in	Latin	America	than	in	Asia	or	Africa	(Lloyd	1979).	 Brazilian	 geographers	 raised	 concerns	 about	 “over-urbanisation”	 or	 “hyper-urbanisation”	 and	 unemployment	 figures	suggested	 that	 the	 growing	 economy	 could	 not	 accommodate	 the	rising	demand	for	jobs	in	the	urban	industrial	sectors	(Perlman	1967,	5-7;	 Valladares	 2005,	 128-128),	 seeming	 to	 confirm	 hypotheses	 of	unemployable	marginal	masses.		Janice	Perlman	took	aim	at	the	culture	of	poverty	and	sought	to	debunk	 social	 marginality	 in	 her	 modern	 classic,	 The	 Myth	 of	
Marginality:	Urban	Poverty	 and	Politics	 in	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 (1976).	 She	claimed	 that	 the	 favelas	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 offered	 a	 solution	 to	 a	housing	crisis,	as	the	occupation	of	unused	land	and	auto-construction	of	 homes	was	 the	 only	 option	 for	 the	migrating	 poor.	Her	 empirical	data	 suggested	 that	 the	 city	 relied	 on	 the	 cheap,	 mostly	 informal	labour	 of	 favela	 residents.	 She	 presented	 the	 favelas	 as	 socially	organised	 and	 politically	 engaged	 and	 showed	 how	 residents	prioritised	 family	 and	 community	 and	 created	 rich	 culture.10	 The	favela	 population	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 was	 not	 marginal	 to	 the	socioeconomic	 relations	 of	 the	 city,	 but	 their	 participation	 in	 the	wider	 society	was	 “asymmetrical.”	 They	 suffered	 discrimination	 and	disdain	of	the	middle	and	upper	classes,	but	they	were	neither	socially	
																																																								10	Perlman	primarily	focused	on	samba	music,	which	originated	in	the	favelas	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	and	which	President	Vargas	promoted	as	national	Brazilian	culture.	
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inconsequential	nor	economically	redundant.11	A	lasting	consequence	of	 Perlman’s	 work	 is	 a	 slow	 paradigm-shift	 away	 from	 viewing	 the	favela	 as	 a	 problem-source.	 Perlman	 effectively	 showed	 that	 the	“favela	 problem”	 was	 socially	 constructed	 to	 reflect	 current	stereotypical	views	about	poor	people,	rural	peasants,	and	Brazilians	of	mixed	race.		Despite	some	attempts	to	vindicate	Lewis	and	rehabilitate	his	theories,12	both	the	culture	of	poverty	and	social	marginality	(the	two	are	 intertwined	 by	 Perlman	 in	 her	 critiques)	 remained	 largely	shunned	until	the	end	of	the	twentieth	century.	Urban	sociologist	Loïc	Wacquant	 reinvigorated	 the	 debate	 about	 social	 marginality	 under	neoliberalism,	 arguing	 that	 the	 reordering	 of	 economic	 relations,	particularly	of	labour	and	government,	has	produced	a	novel	form	of	
advanced	urban	marginality	(Wacquant	1999).	Wacquant	 theorises	 contemporary	 social	 inequality	 as	 a	product	 of	 transformed	urban	economic	 relations	 aggravated	by	 the	neoliberalisation	 of	 the	 State.	 Based	 on	 his	 comparative	 sociological	interventions	into	the	US	ghetto	and	the	French	banlieues,	Wacquant	developed	 a	 Weberian	 model	 (a	 socio-historical	 abstraction	 of	 real	phenomenon)	 to	 explain	 the	 “resurgence	 of	 extreme	 poverty	 and	destitution,	 ethno-racial	 divisions	 (linked	 to	 the	 colonial	 past)	 and	public	 violence”	 in	 concentrated	 urban	 territories	 in	 “advanced	societies”	 (1996,	 121).	 Advanced	 marginality	 consists	 of	 six	properties:																																																									11	Perlman	was	not	alone	in	thinking	that	marginality	was	not	an	applicable	theory	to	explain	the	favelas	of	Rio	de	Janeiro.	According	to	Valladares,	who	was	a	colleague	of	 Perlman’s	 also	 researching	 the	 favelas	 during	 the	 late	 1960s-early	 1970s,	 the	small	number	of	researchers	engaged	with	the	city’s	favelas	all	knew	each	other	and	more	 or	 less	 agreed	 that	 marginality	 as	 a	 theory	 did	 not	 make	 sense	 (Vallardes	2005,	 17).	 Apart	 from	Valladares	 and	 Perlman	 that	 included	 Lucien	 Parisse,	 Jean-Pierre	 Bombart,	 Anthony	 and	 Elizabeth	 Leeds,	 Paul	 Silverstein,	 Lawrence	 Salmen,	Diana	Brown,	Luiz	Antonio	Machado	da	Silva,	Carlos	Nelson	Ferreira	dos	Santos,	and	Rogério	Aroeira	Neves.	12	See	Hannerz	1969,	Harvey	and	Reed	1996,	Bourgois	2001.	
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(i) Growing	 internal	 heterogeneity	 and	 desocialisation	 of	labour:	 undermining	 of	 the	 Keynesian	 wage	 labour	contract	 through	 flexibilisation	 and	 reduction	 of	benefits.	(ii) Functional	disconnection	from	macro-economic	trends:	unemployment	 and	 poverty	 in	 these	 areas	 are	permanent,	regardless	of	economic	growth.	(iii) Territorial	 fixation	 and	 stigmatisation:	 residents	 and	outsiders	 directly	 associate	 marginalised	 urban	enclaves	with	poverty,	crime,	and	anti-social	behaviour.	Residents	 experience	 discrimination	 outside	 of	 their	neighbourhood	 based	 on	 the	 stigma	 attached	 to	 living	there.	(iv) Territorial	 alienation,	 or	 the	 dissolution	 of	 ‘place’:	 a	result	 of	 the	 latter,	 the	marginalised	 territory	 looses	 a	sense	 of	 wholeness,	 of	 internal	 safety,	 and	 identity.	 A	politics	 of	 space	 supplants	 that	 of	place	 (following	 J.	 Z.	Smith	1987).	(v) Loss	 of	 hinterland:	 the	 dissolution	 of	 place	 precludes	community-supplied	 relief	 for	 the	 structurally	unemployed.	 As	 a	 result,	 individuals	 often	 turn	 to	 the	informal	 and	 illicit	 economy,	 hustling	 to	 get	 by,	which	adds	to	territorial	stigma.	(vi) Symbolic	 and	 social	 fragmentation:	 marginalised	subjects	 are	 treated	 as	 “human	 rejects,”	 considered	“hopeless,”	 contributing	 to	 class	 decomposition	 and	precluding	class-based	political	mobilisation.	In	 a	 later	 paper,	 Wacquant	 (1999)	 outlined	 four	 “structural	logics”	 that	 produce	 urban	 marginality.	 First	 is	 growing	 social	inequality.	Second	 is	 the	weakening	of	wage	 labour	as	a	stance	 from	which	 to	organise	politically	by	 the	elimination	of	 low-skill	 jobs	as	a	
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result	of	 technological	 innovation	and	 foreign	outsourcing	as	well	as	the	withering	of	benefits	associated	with	fulltime	employment.	Third	is	what	Wacquant	refers	 to	as	 the	“reconstruction	of	welfare	states,”	which	 entrenches	 socio-economic	 differentiation	 through	 policies	responding	 to	 or	 regulating	 poverty,	 unemployment,	 education,	 and	social	welfare.	Fourth	is	the	spatial	concentration	of	marginality	that	produces	 “no-go	areas”	 that	are	 clearly	 identified—by	 “outsiders”	as	well	 as	 residents—as	 urban	 “hellholes	 rife	 with	 deprivation,	immortality	 and	 violence	 where	 only	 the	 outcasts	 of	 society	 would	consider	living”	(Wacquant	1999,	1644).	In	 the	 early	 twenty-first	 century,	 Wacquant	 (2003)	 took	interest	 in	 Brazil.	 Relying	 heavily	 on	 the	 research	 of	 other	 social	scientists,	Wacquant	considers	Brazil	a	laboratory	for	the	containment	and	punishment	of	the	poor	in	class-polarised	cities,	 in	part	due	to	a	number	 of	 structural	 similarities	 with	 advanced	 marginality	 and	punitive	 incarceration	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 He	 states	 that	 a	 “fateful	triangle	 formed	by	economic	deregulation,	entho-racial	division,	and	state	 restructuring	 in	 the	 age	 of	 triumphant	 neoliberalism”	 has	produced	 a	 “dictatorship	 over	 the	 poor”	 (2008a,	 58).	 His	 new	 focus	was	on	the	penal	state	(Wacquant	2009a;	2009b)	and	took	his	theory	of	 marginality	 for	 granted,	 often	 referencing	 his	 past	 publications	without	 dedicating	 adequate	 time	 to	 examining	 whether	 or	 not	 the	neoliberal	 reordering	 of	 the	 state	 and	 socioeconomic	 relations	 in	Brazil	 produced	 the	 same	 “marginality”	 as	 witnessed	 in	 the	 United	State	or	France.		Wacquant’s	 theories	 of	 marginality	 and	 the	 penal	 state	 have	been	widely	read	in	Brazil.	His	books	are	translated	into	Portuguese,	he	 is	 widely	 cited	 by	 postgraduate	 students	 and	 university	researchers	 alike,	 and	 he	 has	 given	well-attended	 public	 lectures	 at	Brazilian	 universities.	 Nonetheless,	 Brazilianists	 focussed	 on	 urban	socio-spatial	inequality	have	critiqued	and	criticised	his	application	of	
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advanced	marginality	in	“the	Brazilian	metropolis.”	Existing	critiques	focus	 on	 discrepancies	 between	 Wacquant’s	 structural	 logics	 and	observable	empirical	data	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro	and	São	Paulo	as	well	as	the	 strict	 structuralist	 vision	 of	 social	 relations	 that	 discount	 the	agency	of	individuals	and	community	groups	alike.		In	a	review	essay	titled	“Marginality,	Again?!”	Teresa	Caldeira	(2009)	accuses	Wacquant	of	recycling	the	arguments	put	forward	by	the	 dependency	 theorists	 reviewed	 above:	 that	 one	 can	 point	 to	 a	population-group	and	deem	it	wholly	redundant	and	inconsequential	to	 the	 reproduction	 of	 socio-economic	 relations.	 Drawing	 from	 her	research	 in	 São	 Paulo	 (Caldeira	 2001;	 Caldeira	 2006;	 Holston	 and	Caldeira	 2008),	 she	 notes	 that	 in	 the	 poor	 peripheries	 home	ownership	is	high	and	violence	is	decreasing.	She	highlights	successful	grassroots	 community	 building	 initiatives	 and	 points	 out	 that	many	residents	 of	 the	 supposedly	 absolute	 redundant	 population	 have	become	 social	 organisers,	 NGO	 employees,	 artists	 and	 musicians.	Caldeira	says	that	Wacquant’s	theory	is	incapable	of	recognizing	these	collective	expressions	of	identity,	 language,	and	resistance	because	it	does	 not	 follow	 a	 “Fordist	 script”	 determined	 by	 “trade	 unions,	political	 parties	 or	 intellectuals	 who	 might	 be	 able	 to	 judge	 their	proximity	 or	 distance	 from	 the	 ‘right’	 parameter	 of	 class	consciousness”	(2009,	852).	Janice	Perlman	returned	to	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	2001	to	conduct	a	follow-up	study	to	her	1968-69	ethnography	that	debunked	the	“myth	of	marginality”.	Although	she	rebuts	Wacquant’s	model,	she	makes	a	surprising	 and	 puzzling,	 about-face	 and	 claims	 that	 the	 myth	 has	become	 a	 reality	 (Perlman	 2006;	 2010,	 see	 Chapter	 6).	 (I	 offer	 an	interpretation	of	this	curious	conclusion	later	in	this	section.)	Perlman	tests	the	four	“structural	logics”	of	advanced	marginality	against	data	in	Rio	de	 Janeiro	and	Brazil	and	concludes	 that	 it	 fails	 to	adequately	explain	 inequality	 experienced	 by	 favela	 residents.	While	 neoliberal	
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reforms	 did	 structurally	 reinforce	 urban	 poverty,	 the	 welfare	 state	expanded	 and	 the	 percentage	 of	 residents	 working	 in	 the	 formal	sector	 increased,	 as	 did	 general	 education	 levels.	 I	 continued	Perlman’s	exercise	and	additionally	held	data	 from	Rio	de	 Janeiro	 to	the	 six	 properties	 with	 updated	 published	 research,	 data	 and	observations	 (Landesman	 Forthcoming),	 and	 concluded	 that	 the	favelas	are	not	“declining”	and	indeed	the	heterogeneity	of	the	favelas	precludes	the	type	of	generalisations	that	Wacquant’s	model	requires.	Furthermore,	 levels	 of	 poverty	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro’s	 poor	neighbourhoods	 are	 not	 divorced	 from	macro	 economic	 trends,	 nor	do	 residents	 of	 favelas	 psychologically	 divorce	 their	 personal	identities	 from	their	neighbourhoods	as	a	mechanism	to	emotionally	cope	with	territorial	stigma.	This	 last	 point	 related	 to	 territorial	 stigma,	 alienation,	 and	identity	 is	 further	 substantiated	 by	 two	 recent	 research	 projects	 on	the	favelas	from	Rio	de	Janeiro.	Both	Cavalcanti	(2007)	and	Richmond	(2015)	 critique	 advanced	 marginality	 as	 limited	 by	 its	 structuralist	attempt	to	explain	the	everyday	realities	and	life	trajectories	of	favela	residents.	 Neither	 of	 the	 two	 discounts	 Wacquant’s	 theoretical	usefulness	 to	 critique	 neoliberal	 inequality	 at	 a	 macro	 level,	 but	Cavalcanti	 “counters	 […]	 analyses	 that	 hinge	 on	 the	 increasing	dualisation	of	the	social	structure”	as	unable	to	explain	the	“concrete	social	and	spatial	dynamics”	that	have	produced	the	transformation	of	favelas	from	shantytowns	to	“consolidated	favela”	neighbourhoods	in	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 (2007,	 26).	 For	 his	 part,	 Richmond	 suggests	 that	Wacquant’s	 theory	 of	 identity	 formation	 of	 residents	 subjected	 to	marginality	only	scratches	the	surface	of	a	complex	process	involving	structural	 stereotyping	 and	 perceived	 social,	 cultural,	 and	 moral	“ordering”	 that	 result	 from	 hegemonic	 as	 well	 as	 local	 historical	framing	(2015,	295–97).		
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Given	 all	 the	 evidence	 to	 the	 contrary,	 why	 does	 Perlman	conclude	 that,	 “taken	 together,	 the	negative	 stereotypes	 about	 those	living	 in	 favelas	 have	 formed	 an	 ideology	 of	 marginality	 powerful	enough	to	blot	out	all	evidence	to	the	contrary”	(2010,	148,	emphasis	added)?	 I	 argue	 that	 those	 who	 interpret	 Perlman’s	 latest	 work	 as	conceding	Wacquant’s	theory	are	misreading	what	type	of	marginality	Perlman	believes	to	have	become	“real.”	 In	Brazilian	Portuguese,	 the	pejorative	use	of	the	word	marginal	to	refer	to	a	person	of	irreparable	morality	 dates	 back	more	 than	 half	 a	 century.	 By	 the	 time	 Perlman	conducted	 her	 original	 fieldwork,	 she	 noted	 that	 the	 term	 “has	exceedingly	 derogatory	 connotations”	 (1967,	 91).	 She	 identified	 five	vernacular	 categories	 of	 marginal	 persons:	 inhabitants	 of	 squatter	settlements	 (favelados),	 the	 urban	 underclass	 employed	 in	 the	precarious	 informal	 market;	 migrants	 and	 members	 of	 subcultures,	racial	 or	 ethnic	 minorities;	 and	 social	 deviants.	 The	 racialised	 term	continues	to	be	used	widely	to	disparage	gang	members,	drug	dealers,	street	 sleepers,	 and	 petty	 thieves.	 Perlman	 presents	 evidence	 of	residents	resisting	the	social	label	of	“marginal”	because	it	strips	them	of	 claims	 to	 morality	 and	 citizenship.	 Perlman	 rightly	 engaged	
marginality	both	as	an	academic	theory	and	a	vernacular	category	of	social	standing.	While	she	did	not	always	distinguish	between	the	two,	she	 originally	 sought	 to	 deconstruct	 the	 cultural	 and	 debunk	 the	academic.	The	“ideology	of	marginality,”	for	Perlman,	is	the	conflation	of	elitist	class	morality	with	academic	theory.	When	she	laments	that	marginality	has	gone	from	“myth	to	reality,”	she	refers	to	the	material	effects	 of	 the	 anti-favela,	 dehumanising	 ideology	 that	 perverted	academic	theory	to	justify	revanchism.	Wacquant	 is	 not	 totally	 ignorant	 of	 the	 vernacular	 use	 of	“marginal”	 in	Brazilian	Portuguese.	He	references	 the	 term	 in	one	of	his	 articles,	 although	 he	 oversimplifies	 its	 social	 meaning	 when	 he	translates	marginais	as	 “low-lives”	(2008,	61).	Therefore	he	 is	either	
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unaware	of	or	unconcerned	by	the	historical	 impact	that	marginality	thinking	 has	 had	 on	 the	 social	 representations	 of	 poverty	 in	 the	favelas	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 and	 Brazil	 as	 a	 whole.	 In	 an	 essay	 about	urban	ethnography	and	social	theory,	Wacquant	berates	authors	who	uncritically	adopt	 “folk	 concepts”	 as	analytical	 categories	 (Wacquant	2002).	 In	 Brazil	 there	 is	 a	 dynamic	 process	 of	 constructing	marginality:	 the	 historical,	 the	 vernacular,	 the	 external,	 the	internalised,	 and	 the	 foreign.	 A	 critical	 and	 reflexive	 theorisation	 of	class	and	place-based	oppression	must	take	into	account	this	perverse	relationship	between	marginality	as	a	theory	and	as	a	“folk	concept.”	The	 reviewed	critiques	of	Wacquant’s	 “advanced	marginality”	address	the	limitation	of	a	structuralist	approach—the	stripping	away	of	agency—and	the	failure	of	Wacquant’s	Weberian	model	to	hold	up	to	empirical	scrutiny	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	and	São	Paulo.	I	would	like	to	offer	a	third	line	of	critique	based	on	ethical	considerations.13	To	do	so	I	read	Wacquant	(writing	with	Bourdieu)	against	Wacquant	and	draw	on	 radical	 intersectional	 feminist	 theory.	 In	 an	 essay	 titled	 “The	cunning	 of	 imperialist	 reason,”	 Bourdieu	 and	 Wacquant	 rebuke	 US	academia	as	 imperialist:	 “The	neutralisation	of	 the	historical	 context	resulting	 from	 the	 international	 circulation	 of	 texts	 and	 from	 the	correlative	 forgetting	 of	 their	 originating	 historical	 conditions	produces	an	apparent	universalisation	further	abetted	by	the	work	of	‘theorisation’”	(Bourdieu	and	Wacquant	1999,	41).	They	warn	against	subjective	 interpretations	 of	 categories	 (such	 as	 the	 “underclass”);																																																									13	 It	 is	 important	 to	 state	 that	 my	 critique	 of	 Wacquant	 does	 not	 question	 or	discount	 his	 politics.	 Unlike	 Perlman,	 I	 do	 not	 associate	 Wacquant’s	 theory	 of	advance	 marginality	 with	 a	 moralist	 discourse	 that	 blames	 the	 victims	 for	 their	impoverished	existence.	I	also	acknowledge	that	some	of	Wacquant’s	arguments	are	persuasive,	and	that	his	claims	about	the	abuse	suffered	by	the	urban	poor	are	valid	and	substantiated	by	a	plethora	of	data.	Furthermore	he	presents	his	theory	with	a	cohesive	 logic	 that	 is	 relatively	 easy	 to	 follow	 and	 understand;	 and	 he	 gives	 his	readers	a	 toolbox	of	 terminology	 that	 facilitates	an	academic	discussion	about	 the	phenomena	that	they	are	witnessing.	These	are	some	of	the	reasons	why	I	believe	he	is	well	respected	and	cited	in	academic	circles,	including	in	Brazil.	
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and	 they	 attack	 a	 US	 Black	 scholar	 for	 what	 they	 claim	 was	 an	uncritical	 and	 ideological	 attempt	 to	 force	 Brazilians	 into	 thinking	about	 race	 through	 a	 US	 cultural	 lens.14	 They	 argue	 that	 even	 non-native	US	 scholars	who	 study	 or	 base	 themselves	 in	 the	US	 become	unknowing	agents	of	imperialist	thought	when	they	write	about	their	home	 countries	 uncritically	 applying	 theory	 developed	 to	 explain	cultural	phenomena	in	the	United	States.		I	argue	that	application	of	Wacquant’s	model	of	marginality	is	an	 ironic	 case	of	Euro-American	 theoretical	 imperialism.	Marginality	(one	presumes	the	‘old	marginality’)	is	invoked	to	explain	in	a	general	manner	 or	 reference	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 favelas	 without	 historical	contextualisation,	 and	 while	 he	 lists	 Perlman’s	 famous	 book	debunking	 marginality	 in	 his	 bibliography,	 he	 neither	 engages	 with	her	 arguments	 nor	 attempts	 to	 reconcile	 the	 “new”	 with	 the	 “old”	marginalities.	 The	 favelas	 are	 repeatedly	 referred	 to	 as	 subject	 to	advanced	 marginality,	 but	 he	 reports	 little-to-no	 fieldwork	 in	 any	favelas	 or	 Brazilian	 urban	 spaces.	 He	 mostly	 relies	 on	 published	literature	 concerning	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 with	 some	 references	 to	 São	Paulo	 and	 Curitiba,	 and	 then	 conflates	 all	 of	 the	 informal	 housing	settlements	in	the	country	as	the	“favelas	of	the	Brazilian	metropolis.”	His	 failure	 to	 engage	 with	marginal	 as	 a	 pejorative	 racialised	 slur	lodged	against	favela	residents	and	the	history	of	what	Perlman	calls	the	“ideology	of	marginality”	reinforces	his	US-centric	positionality.	I	interpret	Wacquant’s	new	marginality	as	a	theory	of	dystopia,	despite	 his	 claims	 to	 an	 empirically	 grounded	 Weberian	 model.15																																																									14	While	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 paper	 were	 well	 received,	Wacquant	 and	 Bourdieu	came	under	heavy	 fire	 for	 their	mischaracterisation	of	Brazilianist	 literature.	They	were	 accused	 of	 being	 irresponsibly	 ignorant	 of	 Brazilian	 culture	 and	 of	 its	many	examples	 of	 critical	 national	 literature	 in	 which	 Brazilian	 scholars	 successfully	theorised	race	in	Brazil	without	succumbing	to	US	intellectual	imperialism	(French	2000;	Healey	2003).	15	 Following	 Crook’s	 (2000)	 distinction	 between	 utopian,	 dystopian,	 and	 anti-utopian	 social	 theory.	 While	 the	 lines	 separating	 the	 categories	 can	 be	 blurred,	utopian	 theory	 is	 understood	 as	 optimistic	 and	 working	 towards	 a	 more	 perfect	
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Wacquant	 leaves	 his	 subjects,	 the	 victims	 of	 marginality,	 virtually	powerless	 to	alter	 their	 life	circumstances.	He	offers	 three	visions	of	how	marginality	 under	 neoliberalism	 can	 be	 confronted	 (Wacquant	2008b,	 276–79).	 The	 first	 is	 the	 spectacular	 expansion	 of	 the	 penal	system	 that	 criminalises	 poverty	 and	 incarcerates	 the	 marginalised	(the	 internationalising	 US-model).	 The	 second	 is	 to	 revitalise	 the	European	 social	 democratic	 welfare	 state	 (one	 could	 argue	 this	 has	been	the	approach	of	Presidents	Lula	and	Dilma).	The	third	option	is	the	 radically	 decoupling	 of	 subsistence	 from	 work	 by	 instituting	 a	“citizen	 wage”	 and	 free	 education/job	 training	 for	 life.	 Wacquant	argues	that	this	radical	option	is	the	only	way	to	adequately	dismantle	advanced	marginality,	but	only	mentions	it	in	the	last	paragraph	of	the	postscript	 to	 his	 2008	monograph.	 How	 such	 a	 policy	 is	 achievable	when	the	new	marginality	supposedly	rules	out	class	or	place-identity	political	mobilisation	is	left	unexplored.16	Intersectional	feminist	thought	may	explain	why	some	scholars	(myself	 included)	 are	 so	 forceful	 in	 our	 critique	 of	 advanced	 urban	marginality.	Wacquant’s	theorisation	reaffirms	spatial	and	conceptual	dualities	where	 the	only	 type	of	power	 is	 that	which	 is	 found	 in	 the	centre.	 This	 is	 incongruent	 with	 feminist	 theory	 that	 seeks	 to	destabilise	 imperialist	 “white-supremacist	 capitalist	 hetero-patriarchy”	and	disavow	the	relationships	of	power	upon	which	such	systems	 of	 domination	 are	 built	 (hooks	 1984;	 hooks	 2012).	 Rather																																																									society.	 Anti-utopian	 theory	 (most	 contemporary	 critical	 thought)	 refuses	 idealist	and	 pessimist	 theorizing	 of	 imagined	 societies,	 and	 is	 concerned	 with	 a	 critical	evaluation	 of	 the	 present	 and/or	 pragmatic	 change.	 Dystopian	 theories	 are	 often	wholly	 negative	 evaluations	 of	 society	 and/or	 pessimist	 depictions	 of	 the	 future	based	on	presumed	trajectories.	Because	Wacquant’s	models	follow	Weber,	fiercely	anti-utopian	 according	 to	 Cook,	 advanced	 marginality	 should	 follow	 suit	 in	theorizing	the	“actually	existing”	social	conditions.	However,	I	consider	it	dystopian	because	it	constructs	hopeless	subjects-as-victims	and	indicates	a	bleak	future,	and	because	his	model	fails	empirical	testing	in	Rio.	16	The	fact	that	Wacquant	spends	so	little	time	thinking	about	how	people	may	resist	or	undermine	marginality	distinguishes	him	from	other	critical	thinkers,	especially	the	 radical	 European	 scholars	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 upon	 whose	 shoulders	Wacquant	now	stands	(see	Keucheyan	2013,	especially	chapters	2-3).	
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than	seizing	power,	hooks	insists	that	we	construct	theoretical	models	that	 conceive	 radical	 change	 as	 possible	 at	 the	 margins.17	 The	 new	marginality,	 just	 like	 the	 old,	 places	 a	 structural	 analysis	 of	 class	domination	 above	 all	 other	 forms	 of	 oppression;	 and	 only	 engages	with	 race	 when	 “ethno-racism”	 neatly	 coincides	 with	 class	domination.	 Robust	 intersectional	 analysis	 of	 race,	 gender,	 and	sexuality	 necessarily	 destabilise	 the	 reductively	 clear	 delineation	between	 those	 supposedly	marginal	 subjects	and	 the	 rest.	That	 is	 to	say,	for	all	of	its	usefulness	as	a	spatial	metaphor	when	discussing	the	placement	 of	 poverty	 and	 the	 working	 of	 territorial	 stigma,	 urban	marginality	 as	 an	 explanatory	 theory	 offers	 at	 best	 an	 incomplete	account	 of	 urban	 inequality	 and	 segregation	 while	 unjustifiably	dismissing	 organised	 resistance	 in	 the	 neoliberal	 city.	 Judith	 Butler	makes	 a	 similar	point	 in	her	 critique	of	Agamben’s	 concept	 of	 “bare	life”	(explored	in	relation	to	favela	residents	in	Section	2.3):		
Those	 who	 find	 themselves	 in	 positions	 of	 radical	
exposure	 to	 violence,	 without	 basic	 political	 protections	
by	 forms	 of	 law,	 are	 not	 for	 that	 reason	 outside	 of	 the	
political	or	deprived	of	all	forms	of	agency.	Of	course,	we	
need	a	 language	 to	describe	 that	 status	of	unacceptable	
exposure,	but	we	have	to	be	careful	that	the	language	we	
use	does	not	further	deprive	such	populations	of	all	forms	
of	 agency	 and	 resistance,	 all	 ways	 of	 caring	 for	 one	
																																																								17	 Also	 see	 Soja	 (1996)	 and	Holloway	 (2002).	On	 the	 surface	 this	 breaks	with	 the	classic	Gramscian-Marxist	model	of	occupying	centres	of	power.	However	hooks	and	others	 do	 not	 invalidate	 traditional	 class	 struggle,	 but	 rather	 insist	 on	 the	 radical	potential	 of	 building	 alternative	 social	 relations	 that	 subvert	 hegemonic	 power	rather	 than	 seeking	 to	 seize	 it.	 In	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 the	 radical	 visionaries	 behind	Observatório	 de	 Favelas	 are	 an	 inspiring	 example	 of	 building	 on	 a	 Gramcian	foundation	of	occupying	spaces	of	power	by	relocating	them	from	the	centre	to	the	margins.	 For	 example,	 their	 quest	 to	 open	 a	 public	 university	 in	 the	 favelas	Complexo	da	Maré.	
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another	 or	 establishing	 networks	 of	 support.	 (Butler	2015,	79–80)	
	As	 scholars	 and	 researchers,	we	may	 be	 in	 the	 unhappy	 position	 to	conclude	that	sometimes	resistance	of	the	poor	and	dispossessed	has	little-to-no-effect	on	neoliberal	economic	 structures.	But	we	have	no	moral	authority	to	declare	that	resistance	is	futile,	that	their	collective	action	is	incapable	of	creating	change,	that	it	means	nothing.		
2.3	From	marginality	to	mega-events	and	“bare	life”	–	
contemporary	debates	Valladares	 (2005)	 notes	 that	 marginality,	 along	 with	 the	culture	of	poverty,	fell	out	of	fashion	among	academics	by	the	1980s;	and	Misse	(1999)	studying	the	social	representations	of	poverty	and	crime,	similarly	notes	that	stereotypical	fictional	characters	explained	by	marginality	largely	disappeared	in	popular	media	around	the	same	time.	 My	 own	 archival	 research	 of	 the	 largest	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	newspaper,	O	Globo,	 shows	 no	 such	 decrease	 in	 use	 in	 news	media.	The	term	“marginal”	was	routinely	used	in	reference	to	violent	crime	occurring	 in	 the	 favelas	 or	 criminals	 “from”	 the	 favelas	 through	 the	end	of	the	century.	What	is	noted	is	a	near	disappearance	of	the	term	“social	 marginality”	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 a	 social	 phenomenon	 or	academic	 theory.	 In	 the	 final	 decades	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	economic	 inequality	 and	 segregation	 in	urban	Brazil	became	 further	entrenched	by	economic	 liberalisation,	particularly	during	the	1990s	when	President	Cardoso	followed	the	neoliberal	economic	principles	of	the	“Washington	Consensus”	and	prioritised	low	inflation	rates	and	steady	GDP	growth	rates	through	open	markets	and	marked	decrease	of	public	expenditures.	Critics	then	claimed	Cardoso,	who	at	one	time	was	 a	 dependency	 theorist	 scholar	 (Cardoso	 and	 Faletto	 1979),	 had	
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led	Brazil	towards	“neo-dependency"	(Rocha	2002).		The	 effects	 on	 Brazil’s	 urban	 centres	 were	 severe	 (A.	 C.	Fernandes	and	Negreiros	2001).	Already	having	lost	economic	activity	tied	 to	 the	 status	 as	 the	 federal	 capital,	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 experienced	factory	 closures	 and	 large-scale	 privatisation	 of	 public	 companies	with	 accompanying	 lay-offs.	 To	 this	 day,	 abandoned	 factories	 and	warehouses	are	scattered	throughout	the	North	Zone.	Concomitantly	the	international	cocaine	trade	developed	shipping	routes	through	Rio	de	Janeiro	to	Europe	and	the	US,	and	gangs	began	to	consolidate	the	local	market	 operating	 out	 of	 favelas	 throughout	 the	 city,	 recruiting	youth	as	packagers,	 look-outs,	dealers,	and	 ‘soldiers’	 (E.	Leeds	1996;	Arias	2006;	Perlman	2010;	M.	H.	M.	Alves	and	Evanson	2012).	As	turf	wars	between	rival	gangs	intensified	and	the	state	adopted	aggressive	criminal	justice	policies	and	policing	strategies	in	line	with	the	US-led	“war	 on	 drugs,”	 an	 arms	 race	 ensued	 and	 Rio’s	 homicide	 rate	skyrocketed.	Social	scientists	began	discussing	the	“territorialisation”	of	the	favelas	by	the	drug	gangs—referred	to	as	o	tráfico	(the	traffic)	or	traficantes	(traffickers)	in	the	news	media	and	popular	discourse—as	 they	 increasingly	 controlled	 the	 behaviour	 of	 residents	 and	 local	economies	 and	 politics	 (Cavalcanti	 2007;	 Penglase	 2014).	 The	authority	 wielded	 by	 the	 gangs	 in	 the	 favelas	 was	 considered	 so	absolute	that	some	described	them	as	a	“parallel	power”	to	the	state	(E.	 Leeds	 1996;	 Heritage	 2005).	 This	 too	 trickled	 from	 academia	 to	news	 and	 popular	 discourse.18	 Beyond	 the	 borders	 of	 the	 favelas,	organised	 crime	 affected	 the	 real-estate	 prices	 of	 homes	 in	 the	immediate	 surroundings	 (Cavalcanti	2007)	 as	well	 as	municipal	 and	state-province	electoral	politics	(Arias	2006).	Equally	violent	were	the																																																									18	 For	 example	 a	 2002	 news	 articles	 in	 Folha	 de	 São	 Paulo	 titled,	 “Traficantes	institute	 parallel	 power	 in	 the	 favelas,”	 describes	 the	 situation	 as	 such:	 “The	
traficantes	control	access	to	the	favelas	and	have	the	power	to	expel	people	from	the	area.	They	charge	a	tax	on	businesses,	cancel	community	projects,	close	schools	and	have	power	of	life	and	death	over	the	population.	They	even	have	a	parallel	justice	system	to	punish	enemies.”		
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police,	 an	 institution	 still	 ran	 by	 the	 military	 hierarchy	 under	 the	control	of	 the	state-province	government,	who	killed	suspected	gang	members	 or	 petty	 criminals	with	 impunity.	 The	 police	 also	 profited	from	the	drug	trade,	by	demanding	payoffs	from	gang	leaders	as	well	as	selling	guns	and	ammunition	(Alba	Zaluar	1995;	L.	E.	Soares	1996;	Larkins	 2015).	 Eventually,	 corrupt	 police	 formed	 their	 own	 mafias,	the	 so-called	 milicias,	 that	 took	 advantage	 of	 the	 sate	 security	apparatus	 to	 expel	 gangs	 and	 assume	 control	 of	 the	 area.	 Publicly	depicted	as	private	citizen-led	 initiatives	with	support	of	 local	police	and	 politicians,	 the	milicias	 prohibited	 the	 drug	 trade	 and	 extracted	mafia-like	 sales	 taxes	on	 local	 staples	 like	propane	gas,	 internet	 and	cable	 connections,	 and	 provision	 of	 public	 safety	 (A.	 Zaluar	 and	Conceiçao	2007;	Cano	2013).		The	confluence	of	neoliberal	structural	reforms	and	its	effects	on	 the	 labour	 market	 and	 conditions	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 and	 favela	territorialisation	by	drug-trafficking	gangs	led	to	what	the	geographer	Marcelo	Lopes	de	Souza	calls	the	“fragmentation	of	the	socio-political	spatial	 fabric”	 of	 the	 city	 (Souza	 1999;	 for	 a	 condenced	 version	 of	argument	 in	 English	 see	 2001a).	 This	 refers	 to	 the	 production	 of	differentiated	urban	spaces	in	exclusionary	opposition	to	one	another.	The	 “legal”	 city,	 the	asfalto,	 began	 to	produce	 increasingly	 closed	off	private	 spaces	 of	 consumption	 and	 leisure	 through	 gated	condominiums,	shopping	malls,	and	the	expansion	of	wealthy	suburbs	(also	 see	 Guimarães	 2015),	 whereas	 the	 favela,	 even	 those	 once	‘porous’	 favelas	 in	 the	 city’s	 South	 Zone	 and	 centre,	 ‘closed	 off’	 and	became	marked	by	fear	and	stigma	of	gang	control.	This	corresponded	to	 a	 broader	 pattern	 in	 urban	 Brazil.	 In	 São	 Paulo,	 Caldeira	 (2001)	described	 a	 “city	 of	 walls”	 built	 to	 protect	 the	 middle	 class	 and	wealthy	 from	violent	 crime	and	 increasing	hysteria	 related	 to	urban	insecurity;	 and	 Silva	 (2004)	 argued	 that	 urban	 life	was	 increasingly	characterised	 by	 a	 “sociability	 of	 violence”	 that	 encouraged	 fear,	
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entrenched	 segregation,	 and	 justified	 violent	 repression	 of	 the	 poor	and	 those	 deemed	 “marginal.”	 For	 Souza	 (1999;	 2007),	 reworking	some	of	 the	population-labour	categories	of	 the	Marxist	dependency	theorists,	 the	 favela	 residents	 morphed	 into	 a	 “hyperprecariat”	class—politically	 disenfranchised	 and	 caught	 between	 a	 negligent	state	and	repressive	police	on	the	one	hand	and	the	violent	control	of	the	gangs	on	 the	other.	 In	his	vision	of	urban	social	 transformations	after	 Brazil’s	 return	 to	 democratic	 rule	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 neoliberal	reforms	of	 the	1990s,	 the	socio-spatial	 fragmentation	of	urban	space	resulted	 in	 the	 “erosion	 of	 citizenship”	 as	 self-segregation	 of	 the	wealthier	 classes	 eroded	public	 space,	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 the	
polis	and	practice	of	democratic	politics.	If	rights	and	citizenship	became	a	centre	of	debate	after	the	fall	of	the	military	dictatorship	in	1985,	there	are	significant	contributions	to	 the	 literature	 that	deny	 the	 idea	 that	 the	poor	and	 favelados	ever	achieved	 citizenship	 to	 begin	 with.	 Fischer	 (2008)	 argues	 that	 the	poor	 suffer	 from	 a	 “poverty	 of	 rights.”	 She	writes	 “Rio’s	 urban	 poor	never	have	achieved	full	rights,	and	their	weak	citizenship	has	become	a	 deeply	 entrenched	 component	 of	 Brazil’s	 economy	 and	 politics,	where	 both	 wealth	 and	 power	 are	 frequently	 built	 on	 the	 legal	vulnerabilities	 of	 those	 with	 few	 resources”	 (2013,	 7).	 Fischer’s	argument	echoes	that	of	Milton	Santos	when	he	said	rather	boldly	in	a	documentary	of	which	he	was	the	subject,	“Brazil	never	had	citizens;	and	we	the	middle	class	do	not	want	rights.	We	want	privileges.	And	the	poor	don’t	have	rights.	There	 is	not,	 therefore,	citizenship	 in	this	country.	There	never	has	been”	(Tendler	2006).	The	geographer	and	activist	 scholar	 Jailson	 de	 Souza	 e	 Silva	 (2011)	 has	 argued	 that	 in	neoliberal	 Brazil,	 citizenship	 is	 not	 constructed	 via	 participation	 in	democratic	elections,	 local	campaigns,	or	claims	 to	rights;	but	rather	via	 consumption.	 Those	 that	 are	 able	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 frenzy	 of	consumerism	feel,	and	are	considered	superior	to	those	who	consume	
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less	 and	of	 poorer	 quality.	Nevertheless	 Silva	 and	 colleagues	 (2015)	advocate	for	the	reconceptualisation	of	highly	fragmented	cities	with	differentiated	 urban	 peripheries	 (including	 favelas	 that	 may	 not	 be	located	 on	 the	 physical	 peripheries	 of	 the	 city)	 as	 operating	 with	multiple	cultural	and	political	centres	where	 identity	and	citizenship	are	 constructed.	 This	 line	 of	 thought	 corresponds	 with	 Holston’s	(2008)	 optimistic	 “insurgent	 citizenship:”	 the	 idea	 that	 when	 the	labouring	class	self-constructs	their	own	homes	and	neighbourhoods	on	 the	urban	peripheries,	 they	 simultaneously	 construct	 the	 city	 (as	opposed	to	constructing	illegal,	non-city	settlements)	which	in	and	of	itself	constitutes	a	polis.	These	new	spaces	of	politics	and	participation	produce	 a	 “different	 order”	 of	 citizenship	 that	 does	 not	 conform	 to	that	 enshrined	 in	 constitutional	 law	 but	 is	 no	 less	 valid	 from	 the	viewpoint	of	democracy	as	an	incomplete	and	contradictory	process,	a	utopian	project	always	needing	completion.	The	 academic	 debates	 summarised	 above	 also	 occurred	 in	political,	 news,	 and	 popular	 discourse	 at	 varying	 degrees	 of	sophistication,	 as	 will	 be	 evident	 throughout	 empirical	 analysis.	 Of	particular	 concern	 to	 the	 paradigm	 of	 favela	 integration	 is	 the	“fragmentation”	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro,	 in	which	 the	 favelas	are	produced	as	 “territories”	 unto	 themselves,	 abandoned	 by	 the	 state	 and	subjected	 instead	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 drug	 gangs.	 This	 has	 evolved	 as	 the	new	 “favela	 problem”	 which	 the	 state	 attempts	 to	 solve	 through	planning	and	governance	interventions	involving	civil	society	and	the	private	sector.	These	solutions	have	been	conceived	and	implemented	during	an	exceptional	moment	 in	history	during	which	Brazil	sought	to	 rise	 as	 a	 global	 economic	 and	 political	 power.	 Part	 of	 Brazil’s	ascension	was	Rio	de	 Janeiro	playing	host	 to	a	 series	of	 increasingly	high-profile	sporting,	political	and	religious	mega-events.	Within	this	context,	 the	 “solution”	 of	 favela	 integration	 has	 been	 constructed	 in	the	 international	spotlight	as	 indicative	of	 the	city’s	prominence	and	
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the	nation’s	progress.	As	such,	this	project	seeks	to	understand	favela	integration	 as	 a	 response	 to	 a	 century-old	 debate	 concerning	“marginal”	 spaces	of	poverty	and	 criminality	within	a	metropolis,	 as	well	 as	 within	 the	 context	 of	 contemporary	 socio-political	 and	economic	transformation.	This	 approach	 will	 at	 times	 parallel	 but	 ultimately	 differ	significantly	 from	 those	 explaining	 the	 contemporary	 production	 of	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 and	 state-favela	 relations	 through	 mega-event	exceptionalism.	Ever	since	Rio	de	Janeiro	was	awarded	the	2014	FIFA	Men’s	World	Cup	and	the	2016	Summer	Olympic	Games,	the	issue	of	mega-event	planning	and	urbanism	became	a	major	focus	of	academic	research.	Since	the	1990s	Rio	de	Janeiro	planners	and	policy	makers	had	 cited	 the	 “Barcelona	model”	 and	 positioned	 the	 city	 as	 a	 prime	location	 to	 play	 host	 to	 major	 international	 gatherings	 (Compans	2004;	N.	G.	de	Oliveira	and	Gaffney	2014).	But	the	scale	of	investment	and	magnitude	of	transformation	that	Mayor	Eduardo	Paes,	backed	by	Governor	Cabral	 and	President	 Lula,	 promised	 in	 anticipation	of	 the	two	 largest	 global	 sporting	 events	 landed	 credence	 to	 the	 argument	that	Rio	de	Janeiro	was	becoming	a	city	made	for	and	by	mega-events	(Gaffney	 2010;	 2015).	 Richmond	 and	 Garmany	 (2016)	 delineate	between	what	 they	argue	are	 two	competing	narratives	 that	 explain	Rio	 de	 Janeiro’s	 broad	 transformation	 during	 mega-event	 planning:	that	 of	 the	 “post-third-world	 city”	 or	 as	 a	 neoliberal	 city	 of	 [mega-event]	 exceptionalism.	 The	 former	 is	 produced	 through	 officialist	discourse—political	rhetoric,	Rio’s	Olympic	bid	proposal	and	planning	documents,	 and	 promotional	 materials	 the	 many	 initiates	 to	redevelop	the	depressed	old	port	area	and	integrate	the	favelas—and	tells	 the	 story	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 (and	 broadly	 Brazil)	 emerging	 as	 a	world	 city	 and	 global	 power.	 As	 I	 will	 discuss	 at	 length	 in	 later	chapters,	 this	 discourse	 does	 not	 shy	 from	 issues	 of	 inequality,	violence,	 or	 socio-spatial	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 city;	 but	 it	 presents	
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those	 problems	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 a	 pluralistic,	 participatory	democracy	 and	 purports	 to	 already	 be	 implementing	 solutions	through	planning,	governance,	and	development	initiatives.	The	latter,	mega-event	 exceptionalism,	 is	 an	 academic	 critique	 of	 the	 officialist	narrative.	 Based	 off	 Agamben’s	 (2005)	 theory	 of	 the	 “state	 of	exception,”	 some	 critical	 geographers	 and	 urbanists	 argue	 that	 the	state	 uses	 the	 pressing	 importance	 of	 mega-events	 to	 justify	suspending	 normal	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 clandestinely	 subverting	democratic	processes	 in	order	 to	serve	capital	accumulation	and	 the	political	 interests	of	 the	elites	 (Freeman	2012;	Rekow	2016;	Gaffney	2012;	 Saborio	 2013;	 Sánchez	 and	 Broudehoux	 2013;	 Vargas	 2013).	Researchers	 employing	 the	 state	 of	 exception	often	do	 so	 to	 explain	how	the	state	justifies	favela	removals	near	mega-event	venues	(seen	as	a	form	of	social	cleansing),	the	police	militarisation	of	favela	space	through	 the	 Pacifying	 Police	 Force,	 and	 the	 disregard	 of	environmental	 degradation	 among	 other	 abnormal	 planning	 and	approval	 processes	 (Brum	 2013;	 Gaffney	 2010;	 Gaffney	 et	 al.	Forthcoming;	 Freeman	 and	 Burgos	 2016;	 Faulhaber	 and	 Azevedo	2015).	A	related	argument	as	categorised	by	Richmond	and	Garmany	is	 that	 the	 result	 of	 state	 urban	 interventions,	 including	 strategies	purporting	to	 integrate	the	favelas,	 is	by	design	capital	accumulation	through	dispossession	or	creative	destruction.		Although	 these	 narratives	 are	 depicted	 as	 in	 competition,	because	 one	 is	 grounded	 in	 social	 theory	 and	 the	 other	 is	 political	discourse,	 they	may	not	always	do	so	 in	 the	same	arenas.	Richmond	and	Garmany	offer	a	critique	of	the	neoliberal	city	of	exception	thesis.	They	 find	 three	 points	 of	 weakness.	 First,	 they	 find	 the	 uncritical	blame-it-all-on-neoliberalism	 position	 a	 reductive	 depiction	 of	 the	Brazilian	 state,	 citing	 research	 that	 challenges	 the	 equal	understanding	 of	 neoliberalism	 as	 theorised	 in	 Europe	 and	 the	 USA	with	neoliberalism	as	 it	 “actually	exists”	 in	 the	Global	South	broadly	
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and	Brazil	specifically.	Similar	to	Souza,	they	do	not	deny	processes	of	neoliberalisation	in	Brazil	or	their	negative	effects	on	socio-economic	inequality,	but	they	argue	that	it	must	be	understood	from	a	nuanced	discussion	of	the	time	and	space	of	Rio	de	Janeiro,	Brazil.	Second,	the	authors	 recognise	 that	 many	 urban	 planning	 and	 governance	programmes	 were	 attached	 to	 the	 spectacle	 of	 the	 Olympics	 and	World	Cup	as	part	of	 the	“post-third-world	city”	narrative,	but	argue	that	 such	 an	 association	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 those	interventions	 are	 wholly	 attributable	 to	 the	 mega-events.	 The	integrating	 planning	 intervention	 Morar	 Carioca,	 the	 evolution	 of	Favela-Bairro	 (both	 of	which	 I	 explore	 in	 Chapter	 5),	 as	well	 as	 the	UPP	 were	 rolled	 out	 in	 many	 favelas	 that	 are	 not	 near	 sporting	 or	tourist	venues	and	lie	outside	of	the	so-called	“ring	of	security”.	They	suggest	 that	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 local	 contexts	within	 the	 city,	 a	nuanced	empirical	approach	is	necessary	and	caution	against	applying	the	“state	of	exception”	carte	blanche	across	city	space	since	policies	are	 rolled	 out	 unevenly	 and	 contradictorily.	 Third,	 they	 argue	 that	social	 processes	 related	 to	 gentrification,	 suburbanisation,	 and	diversification	 at	 the	 urban	 peripheries	may	 have	 been	 exacerbated	by	 mega-event	 planning	 and	 infrastructure	 but	 they	 are	 processes	that	occurred	 independent	of	 the	mega-events	due	 to	Brazil’s	 strong	economic	 growth	 for	 over	 a	 decade	 due	 to	 the	 commodities	 boom,	expanding	 significance	 of	 the	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 off-shore	 oil	 economy,	and	global	capital	investment	associated	with	the	BRIC	phenomenon.	Moreover	 they	 are	 all	 processes	 also	 found	 in	 other	 large	 Brazilian	cities.	 Of	 course,	 much	 of	 the	 research	 following	 the	 narrative	critiqued	 above	 present	 well	 reasoned	 arguments	 and	 strong	 data.	Some	 indeed	 offer	 a	 nuanced	 discussion	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	development	 and	 history	 of	 state-favela	 relations	 (Brum	 2013;	Freeman	2014),	although	I	would	suggest	that	they	sometimes	come	
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close	to	privileging	elitist	political	 interests	as	the	only	 interests	that	matter.	 There	 are	 scholars	 who	 have	 already	 offered	 a	 complex	theorisation	of	the	state	of	exception	independent	of	the	mega-events.	For	example,	Larkins	(2015)	argued	that	the	favelas	existed	in	a	state	of	exception	long	before	the	Olympics	were	awarded	to	Rio	de	Janeiro	or	 the	UPP	pacification	strategy	was	announced.	She	argues	 that	 the	state	of	exception	in	Brazil	dates	back	to	the	military	dictatorship	and	the	 political	 repression,	 torture	 and	 murder	 of	 “subversives.”	However	 even	 after	 the	 return	 to	 democracy	 the	 favelas	 remained	subject	 to	 the	 state	 of	 exception,	 largely	 corresponding	 to	 urban	violence	 and	 gang	 control.	 The	 position	 of	 the	 favelas	 within	 the	fragmented	 city,	 their	 illegal	 formation,	 informal	 organisation,	 and	criminal	 territorialisation	are	 invoked	to	 justify	why	favela	residents	are	 denied	 so	 many	 of	 their	 basic	 rights	 as	 citizens	 and	 subject	 to	extreme	levels	of	police	violence.		Larkins	applies	another	concept	from	Agamben	(1998),	that	of	
bare	life	as	a	dehumanising	condition	forced	on	favela	residents	living	in	 “enemy	 territory”	 and	 guilty	 by	 association.	 These	 subjects	 are	stripped	of	citizenship,	humanity,	and	dignity	in	the	eyes	of	the	state,	the	justice	system,	and	society	made	of	citizens	(non-favela	residents).	Larkin’s	 use	 of	 “bare	 life”	 to	 describe	 the	 normalisation	 of	 violence	against	favela	residents	is	persuasive,	although	in	curious	contrast	to	Holston	(2008,	311)	who	argues	that	the	poor	are	maintained	at	bare	life	 in	 rural	 settings	 but	 are	 better	 equipped	 to	 make	 political	demands	 by	 constructing	 the	 city	 at	 the	 peripheries.	 This	 difference	may	 be	 explained	 by	 which	 moment	 of	 Agamben’s	 concept	 the	authors	engage.	The	result	of	bare	life	is	the	reduction	of	a	being,	or	a	category	 of	 subjects,	 to	 the	 bare	 minimum	 of	 substance,	 such	 that	their	 lives	 can	 be	 taken	without	 constituting	 a	 loss.	 The	 conceptual	construction	builds	on	political	philosophy	that	theorises	how	citizen-subjects	 are	 produced	 through	 participation	 in	 the	 polis,	 political	
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space.	 Holston	 and	 others	 (J.	 de	 S.	 e	 Silva	 et	 al.	 2015;	 and	 more	cautiously	Cavalcanti	2007)	engage	with	the	theory	at	 this	point	and	argue	that	favela	residents	can	succeed	in	engendering	the	polis	at	the	periphery.	 They	 thus	 preclude	 wholesale	 application	 of	 bare	 life	 to	favela	 residents.	 While	 Butler’s	 critique	 of	 the	 concept,	 referenced	above	 in	 relation	 to	 advanced	 marginality,	 causes	 me	 hesitation	 to	theorise	favela	residents	as	reduced	to	bare	life—especially	given	the	rich	 history	 of	 favela	 activism	 and	 the	 resurgence	 of	 contemporary	youth	activism	I	saw	during	my	fieldwork—Larkins	and	others	(Biehl	2004;	 Roy	 2005;	 Garmany	 2009;	 Appadurai	 2013;	 J.	 A.	 Alves	 2014;	Poets	 2015)	make	 persuasive	 empirical	 arguments.	While	 some	 are	rash	in	offering	sensationalist	depiction	of	favelas	as	a	lawless	zone	of	anything-goes	 violent	 exceptionalism,	most	 are	 cautious	 to	 not	 strip	their	subjects	of	agency.			
2.4	Conclusions	This	 chapter	 reviewed	 a	 series	 of	 academic	 and	 political	debates	 that	 have	 shaped	 the	 understanding	 of	 urban	 poverty	 and	segregation	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	with	 the	 objective	 to	 understand	 how	the	 “favela	 problem”	 is	 currently	 understood	 within	 the	 broader	context	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	and	urban	development.	I	traced	the	history	of	 the	 formation	of	urban	poverty,	 from	slum	tenements	to	 the	“first	favela”	 on	 the	 hill	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 The	 favelas	proliferated	 throughout	 the	 next	 100	 years,	 scorned	 by	 elite	 society	and	targeted	for	removals	and	violent	repression.	Based	on	a	review	of	 literature	 and	 drawing	 on	 my	 own	 analysis,	 I	 argued	 that	 social	marginality	was	one	of	the	most	significant	social	theories	that	shaped	modern	representation	of	 the	favelas.	 I	reviewed	how	the	theory	fell	out	 of	 fashion	 and	 its	 resurgence	 as	 advanced	 urban	 marginality.	Building	 on	 existing	 critiques,	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 theory	 does	 not	
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adequately	 explain	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 empirically,	 that	 it	 theoretically	precludes	 favela	 residents’	 agency	 historically	 proven	 to	 affect	 their	own	 lives	 in	 the	 city,	 and	 is	 ethically	 dangerous.	 There	 are	 three	reasons	why	I	have	discussed	and	critiqued	marginality	theory	to	this	length.	 One,	 the	 historical	 debate	 on	 marginality	 had	 deep	 and	detrimental	influence	over	how	the	favelas	were	socially	constructed	and	 understood	 in	 both	 intellectual	 and	 popular	 debates.	 Two,	marginality	 as	 an	 idea	 shaped	 public	 policy	 serving	 revanchist	ideology	to	blot	out	the	favelas	from	the	landscape;	and	I	will	argue	it	continues	to	shape	the	liberal	attempt	to	incorporate	that	which	was	“informal”	 into	 the	 “formal”	 (see	 Chapter	 5).	 Three,	 advanced	marginality	 theorises	 the	 state	 as	 a	 neoliberal	monolith.	Without	 an	explicit	understanding	of	scale,	and	without	acknowledging	the	state	as	 a	 space	 of	 contestation,	 it	 cannot	 explain	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	“consolidated	 favela”	 as	 explored	 by	 Cavalcanti,	 nor	 the	 ideal	 of	“favela	integration”	explored	in	this	project.	I	 then	 turned	 my	 attention	 to	 contemporary	 debates	concerning	socio-spatial	segregation	and	inequality	in	relation	to	Rio	de	Janeiro,	the	favelas	and	the	state	since	Brazil’s	return	to	democracy	and	 economic	 liberalisation	 during	 the	 1990s.	 The	 entrenchment	 of	economic	 inequality,	 increased	 fear	 of	 violence,	 and	 the	territorialisation	 of	 the	 favelas	 by	 organised	 criminal	 groups	contributed	to	cementing	the	socio-spatial	divide	between	that	which	was	 formal	 and	 informal,	 legal	 and	 illegal.	 Even	 though	marginality	had	been	unmasked	as	myth,	the	“ideology	of	marginality”	continued	to	serve	as	an	excuse	to	stigmatise	the	favelas	and	their	residents.	In	Chapter	 5,	 I	 will	 return	 to	 this	 moment	 in	 history	 and	 further	elaborate	 how	 the	 increasing	 otherness	 of	 the	 favelas	 created	 the	notion	of	a	city	divided	in	two,	desperately	needing	unification.	This	is	the	origin	of	“favela	integration”	as	a	hegemonic	ideal.	To	 contextualise	 favela	 integration	 within	 the	 contemporary	
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debate	 as	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 as	 a	 global	 city,	 I	 relied	 on	 the	 recently	published	 review	 by	 Richmond	 and	 Garmany	 concerning	 urban	transformations	 during	 an	 era	 of	 mega-events	 and	 sustained	economic	boom.	 I	 concur	with	 the	 three-pronged	critique	offered	by	the	authors,	and	this	thesis	responds	to	and	builds	on	their	call	 for	a	more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 state	 interventions	 into	 the	 city’s	favelas	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 urban	 transformation.	 I	 analyse	 favela	integration	discursively	and	across	different	genres	of	text	accounting	for	 hegemony	 and	 contestation	 (further	 detailed	 in	 Chapter	 4).	 I	consider	 the	 urban	 planning	 interventions,	 Morar	 Carioca	 and	 PAC-favelas	 within	 the	 historical	 context	 of	 “slum	 upgrading”	 and	 favela	“urbanisation”	 dating	 back	 to	 the	 1980s	 in	 Chapter	 5.	 I	 pay	 close	attention	to	inter-scalar	and	electoral	politics	in	the	rolling	out	of	the	state	 and	 rolling	 back	 of	 programmes	 and	 engage	 in	 the	 debate	 of	“actually	 existing	 neoliberalism”	 through	 favela	 integration	 in	Chapters	6	and	7.		The	 next	 chapter	 reviews	 theoretical	 concepts	 and	 debates	necessary	 to	 respond	 to	 my	 research	 questions	 related	 to	 state	spatiality	 and	 the	 production	 of	 favelas	 territory.	 Additionally	 I	elaborate	 a	 conceptual	 model	 based	 on	 landscape	 and	 critical	
mobilities	 in	 order	 to	 analyse	 the	 discursive	 production	 of	 favela	integration.	
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Chapter	3	–	Concepts	and	Theory		This	 chapter	 outlines	 the	 concepts	 and	 theory	 necessary	 to	analyse	 the	 paradigm	 of	 “favela	 integration”	 and	 substantiate	 the	arguments	previewed	in	Chapter	1.	In	order	to	discuss	“the	favela”	as	a	 socio-spatial	 category	 within	 the	 city	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 as	 a	generalizable	and	specific	place,	I	use	the	concept	of	landscape.	I	draw	from	Cosgrove	(1984;	1985)	as	well	as	Lefebvre	(1991)	to	understand	landscape	 as	 an	 ideological	 way	 of	 seeing	 that	 totalises	 space	 and	obscures	 social	 relations	 of	 domination.	 I	 pair	 the	 concept	 of	landscape	with	critical	mobilities,	in	particular	drawing	on	Cresswell’s	(2010)	politics	of	mobility,	an	analytical	model	that	interrogates	social	relations	of	power	reproduced	through	movements	and	flows.	While	I	began	my	 research	 influenced	by	Cosgrove’s	 theories	 in	 considering	the	 visual	 effects	 of	 favela	 integration,	 my	 interest	 in	 mobilities	emerged	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 fieldwork	 as	 I	 reviewed	 the	 data	 in	search	of	the	meaning	behind	integration.	State	and	space	are	 central	 themes	of	 this	project,	which	was	conceived	from	very	broad	questions	related	to	how	the	state—itself	a	concept	 requiring	 problematisation—transforms	 urban	 space	 by	targeting	pockets	of	 space	historically	produced	 in	 large	part	by	 the	conceived	 absence	 of	 the	 state.	 As	 the	 project	 developed,	 interests	narrowed,	 and	 I	 attempted	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 data	 fieldwork,	 I	returned	 to	 discussions	 concerning	 the	 state	 as	 effect	 (T.	 Mitchell	1999)	 and	 state	 spatial	 strategies	 that	 reorder	 socioeconomic	relations	 (Brenner	 2004).	 In	 seeking	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 that	could	explain	how	non-city	space	can	be	reproduced	as	constitutive	of	the	city,	I	 found	debates	on	territory	(Painter	2010;	Haesbaert	2004;	Brenner	and	Elden	2009)	to	be	most	useful.		
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This	 chapter	 is	 structured	 into	 five	 sections.	 Section	 3.1	reviews	the	concept	of	landscape	within	the	field	of	human	geography	drawing	 from	 Cosgrove	 and	 proposing	 that	 Lefebvre’s	 concept	 of	
abstract	 space	 further	explicates	 the	effects	of	 landscape.	Section	3.2	surveys	 the	emerging	 field	of	critical	mobilities	 in	urban	studies	and	suggests	 its	 application	 to	 research	 regarding	 development	interventions	 into	 self-built	 neighbourhoods	 or	 research	problematising	the	so-called	“divided	cities.”	The	section	ends	with	an	original	pairing	of	 landscape	and	mobilities	(in	response	to	Maddrell	and	Qvistrom	2016)	in	order	to	analyse	the	planning	and	governance	paradigm	 of	 favela	 integration.	 Sections	 3.3	 –	 3.5	 are	 separated	 for	conceptual	 clarity	 but	 should	 be	 read	 together	 as	 building	 a	theoretical	 framework	 to	 understand	 favela	 integration	 as	 a	 state	spatial	strategy	of	territory.	I	review	recent	literature	that	effectively	redefined	the	state	as	a	concept	and	object	of	analysis	in	Section	3.3,	eventually	 committing	 to	 Timothy	 Mitchell’s	 call	 to	 understand	 the	state	 through	 the	many	 processes	 that	 give	 it	 the	 appearance	 of	 an	autonomous	structure.	Section	3.4	reviews	state	spatiality:	how	states	are	 spatially	 produced,	 and	 how	 states	 produce	 space	 according	 to	neoliberal	 ideology.	 I	 follow	Neil	 Brenner’s	 framework	developed	 in	
New	State	Spaces,	with	 some	 important	distinctions.	 In	 Section	3.5	 I	review	how	 the	 re-thinking	of	 state	 and	 space	 leads	 to	 a	productive	re-conceptualisation	 of	 territory	 as	 the	 appearance	 of	 state	sovereignty	 spread	 evenly	 throughout	 bounded	 space	 produced	continuously	 through	 various	 technologies	 and	 practices	 (Painter	2010;	Haesbaert	2004).	I	close	with	a	review	of	the	chapter.	
3.1	Constructing	“landscape”		
The	Dictionary	of	Human	Geography	calls	landscape	a	“cardinal	term”	 of	 the	 discipline,	 serving	 as	 “central	 object	 of	 investigation,	organizing	 principle	 and	 interpretive	 lens	 for	 several	 different	
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generations	of	researchers”	(Gregory	et	al.	2009,	409).	Within	human	geography,	one	may	compare	its	expansiveness	with	that	of	spatiality	itself.	The	lack	of	conceptual	consensus	within	the	discipline	may	have	encouraged	its	overuse	as	a	general	backdrop,	a	reference	to	vaguely	defined	 regions	 or	 places,	 or	 to	 reference	 differentiated	 spatial	experiences	 of	 social	 groups.	 Many	 scholars,	 perhaps	 especially	outside	of	human	geography,	 invoke	the	word	 landscape	as	a	spatial	metaphor	 referring	broadly	 to	visual	 aesthetics	without	defining	 the	term,	 referencing	 an	 extensive	 literature,	 or	 specify	 whether	 they	intend	 to	 analyse	 landscape	 (as	 relations	 between	 humans	 and	“nature”),	apply	landscape	as	a	tool	of	analysis	(as	a	way	of	seeing),	or	simply	 use	 as	 defined	 by	 vernacular	 dictionaries.19	 This	 last	 option	places	the	burden	on	the	reader	to	understand	the	author’s	intention	via	 context	 and	 may	 lead	 to	 conceptual	 confusion	 if	 “landscape”	 is	featured	 prominently	 (for	 example	 in	 the	 title)	 or	 repeated	throughout	 the	 text.	 In	 a	 pointed	 essay,	 Cresswell	 expresses	 his	weariness	 of	 the	 term	 altogether,	 suggesting	 that	 landscape	 is	“burdened	 by	 its	 own	 history,”	 and	 “too	 stuck	 in	 the	 humanities	 to	make	it	amenable	to	[…]	critical	theory”	(2003,	269).	A	big	part	of	the	problem,	 Cresswell	 notes,	 is	 that	 the	 term	 is	 routinely	 used	 within	
																																																								19	 In	 limiting	my	 review	 to	 scholarship	 on	 urbanism	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 or	 authors	cited	 elsewhere	 in	 this	 text,	 a	 number	 of	 writers	 make	 regular	 use	 of	 “urban	landscape”	to	refer	to	general	qualities	about	the	city	or	the	visual	urban	form	(e.g.	Roy	 2005;	 Brum	 2013;	 Chalhoub	 1993);	 and	 varying	 use	 of	 “political	 landscape,”	and	 “cultural	 landscape”	 (Arias	 2006;	 Vargas	 2006;	 Amar	 2013)	 in	 open-ended	references	 to	 broad	 social	 processes	 or	 conditions.	 Authors	 may	 cause	 readers	confusion	 if	 they	 mix	 landscape	 metaphors	 with	 references	 to	 landscape	 as	 a	theoretical	 concept,	 a	 material	 process,	 or	 a	 specific	 place	 (e.g.	 Goldstein	 2003;	Freeman	 2014;	McGuirk	 2014).	 Both	 Perlman	 (2010)	 and	 Larkins	 (2015)	 use	 the	term	 sometimes	 in	 reference	 to	 cultural	 urban	 processes	 and	 other	 times	 in	reference	 to	 the	 physicality	 of	 favelas.	 Larkins	 subtitles	 a	 section	 “Aesthetics	 and	discourses	of	favela	as	landscape”	(88),	which	leads	the	reader	to	expect	a	‘reading’	of	landscape	as	discourse,	but	what	follows	is	limited	to	a	discourse	analysis	of	how	favelas	 are	 visually	 represented	 in	 Brazilian	 film	 and	 the	 discussion	 makes	 no	reference	 of	 established	 literature.	 Perlman	 titles	 cartographic	maps	 showing	 the	location	of	 favelas	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro	 as	 “landscape	of	 poverty	 and	 inequality”	 (57)	but	also	refers	generally	to	“landscapes	of	political	participation”	(213).		
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academia	 as	 well	 as	 popular	 media	 to	 mean	 “just	 about	 anything”	(Ibid.,	269).	While	I	share	his	frustration,	I	do	not	see	this	as	a	reason	to	avoid	the	concept	but	rather	as	a	call	to	be	explicit	in	one’s	intent.		I	 employ	 the	 concept	 of	 landscape	 based	 on	 the	 conceptual	framework	 developed	 by	 Denis	 Cosgrove	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 material	object	 of	 analysis	 (D.	 Mitchell	 2002;	 2003),	 a	 particular	 form	 of	discourse	 to	 be	 ‘read’	 through	 structural	 semiotics	 (Duncan	 and	Duncan	 2003),	 or	 most	 generally	 referring	 to	 people’s	 relations	 to	“nature”	or	modifications	of	the	topography	(Lowenthal	2007).		Cosgrove	 famously	 reviewed	 landscape’s	 historical	 evolution	and	 critiqued	 its	 ill-defined,	 apolitical	 use	 during	 the	 20th	 century.	Tying	 landscape	 to	 ideological	 “ways	 of	 seeing”	 and	 operating	[bourgeois]	power	over	space,	Cosgrove	argued	against	what	he	saw	as	 an	 antiscientific,	 humanist	 geographical	 application	 of	 the	 term	(1984).	His	monograph	insisted	on	a	materialist	reading	of	landscape,	and	 his	 analysis	 focused	 primarily	 on	 cultural	 artefacts	 such	 as	painting	 and	 architecture	 in	 order	 to	 expose	 class	 hegemony	 in	 the	visual	 production	 of	 land	 and	 nature	 (Cosgrove	 1985).	 Highly	influential,	the	book	has	been	credited	with	shaping	the	sub-discipline	of	 cultural	 geography	 (Berg,	 Duncan,	 and	 Cosgrove	 2005).	 The	theorisation	of	 landscape	as	a	“way	of	seeing”	continues	to	 influence	contemporary	scholars,	such	that	within	human	geography	landscape	is	conceptually	inseparable	from	discussions	of	power	or	hegemony.		Landscape	 has	 been	 particularly	 useful	 to	 analyse	 how	 social	groups	 understand	 or	 represent	 their	 relationship	 to	 “nature”	 and	how	 cultural	 and	 economic	 ideology	moulds	behaviour	 to	 shape	 the	“natural”	environment.	However	an	analysis	of	the	visual	imagination	and	placement	of	urban	poverty	and	segregation	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	(or	any	city	for	that	matter)	needs	further	elaboration.	If	we	understand	landscape	 as	 a	 totalizing	 visual	 ideological	 ordering	 of	 space,	 how	then	does	landscape	operate?	And	what	are	its	effects?	Such	questions	
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are	asked	by	Mitch	Rose	(2002)	who	wants	to	know	how	landscapes	are	actively	“called	forth”	and	what	work	do	they	do?	He	critiques	the	classic	cultural	Marxist	construction	of	 landscape	as	both	hegemonic	ideological	 structures	 and	 realms	 that	 permit	 subjective	 agency.	Despite	cultural	geographers’	best	intentions	to	recognise	agency,	it	is	necessarily	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 class	 struggle	 and	 hegemony	 and	therefore	 limited	 by	 inherent	 structuralism.	 In	 such	 theorisation,	landscape	 requires	 consistent	 interpretation	 so	 that	 subjects	 may	indeed	 struggle	 against	 hegemonic	 production	 of	 landscape	 but	 are	never	 able	 to	 produce	 landscape	 themselves.	Rose	 suggests	 ditching	the	 structuralist	 tradition	 and	 offers	 actor	 network	 theory	 as	 an	alternative.	 Cosgrove	 explains	 that	 trying	 to	 resolve	 the	 structure-agency	dilemma	was	a	principal	concern	of	his	at	the	time	(see	Berg,	Duncan,	and	Cosgrove	2005),	and	I	am	hesitant	to	disregard	Cosgrove	in	 favour	 of	 a	 post-structuralist	 approach	 simply	 because	 some	tension	 still	 remains.	 I	 do,	 however,	 find	Rose’s	 provocations	useful,	and	 in	 Chapter	 5	 I	 discuss	 how	 the	 “marvellous	 city,”	 the	 “divided	city,”	and	the	“integrated	city”	are	all	landscapes	that	are	called	forth	to	do	political	work.		In	 so	 doing,	 my	 approach	 is	 informed	 by	 Lefebvre’s	theorisation	 of	 abstract	 space.	 In	 The	 Production	 of	 Space,	 Lefebvre	does	not	develop	a	robust	accounting	of	landscape.	The	word	is	most	commonly	 grouped	 together	 with	 ‘monuments,’	 ‘buildings,’	 and	‘pictures’	or	as	a	general	term	referring	to	geographical	areas,	such	as	‘rural	landscapes’	and	‘industrial	landscapes.’	In	the	first,	landscape	is	understood	as	a	visual	representation	of	space,	such	as	a	painting,	full	of	signs	for	the	subject	to	decipher.	In	the	second,	landscape	is	offered	as	something	of	an	intellectual	spectrum	of	consciousness	toward,	but	not	 quite	 reaching,	 spatiality.	 In	 a	 short	 passage	 on	 “spatial	architectonics”	Lefebvre	elaborates:			
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The	power	of	a	landscape	does	not	derive	from	the	fact	that	it	offers	
itself	 as	 a	 spectacle,	 but	 rather	 from	 the	 fact	 that,	 as	 a	mirror	 and	
mirage,	it	presents	any	susceptible	viewer	with	an	image	at	once	true	
and	 false	 of	 a	 creative	 capacity	 which	 the	 subject	 (or	 Ego)	 is	 able,	
during	a	moment	of	marvellous	self-deception,	to	claim	as	his	own.	A	
landscape	 also	 has	 the	 seductive	 power	 of	 all	 pictures,	 and	 this	 is	especially	true	of	an	urban	landscape–Venice,	for	example–that	can	
impose	 itself	 immediately	as	a	work.	Whence	 the	archetypal	 tourist	
delusion	of	being	a	participant	in	such	a	work,	and	of	understanding	
it	 completely,	 even	 though	 the	 tourist	 merely	 passes	 through	 a	
country	or	countryside	and	absorbs	its	image	in	a	quite	passive	way.	
The	 work	 in	 its	 concrete	 reality,	 its	 products,	 and	 the	 productive	
activity	 involved	 are	 all	 thus	 obscured	 and	 indeed	 consigned	 to	
oblivion.	(1991,	189	emphasis	original)		Expressly,	a	landscape	allows	the	tourist,	the	generic	observer	of	 a	 place	 they	 do	 not	 inhabit,	 to	 self-deceivingly	 comprehend	 a	complex	 socio-spatial	 reality	 from	 a	 single,	 privileged	 vantage	 point	and	 frame	 of	 reference	 without	 truly	 knowing—that	 is	 to	 say	
inhabiting	and	producing—the	space	 that	 the	abstraction	represents.	Lefebvre’s	 description	 calls	 to	mind	 the	pedantic	 traveller	who	 goes	on	 holiday	 and	 returns	 making	 explanatory	 proclamations	 about	 a	place	and	culture	they	briefly	toured.	But	the	same	is	often	true	for	the	native.	 For	 example	 the	 middle	 class	 Brazilian	 who	 professes	authoritative	 knowledge	 about	 the	 culture	 of	 the	 favelas	 and	 the	nature	of	their	“problems”	without	spending	any	significant	amount	of	time	 in	 any	 favela(s).	 What	 is	 the	 origin	 of	 this	 innate	 and	unquestioned	comprehension?	While	 the	 explicit	 development	 of	 the	 landscape	 idea	 in	 The	
Production	of	Space	is	scant,	we	can	call	on	Lefebvre’s	theorisation	of	
abstract	 space.	 In	 contrast	 to	 social	 space	 (consisting	 of	 the	 triad	spatial	practice,	representation	of	space	and	representational	spaces,	revisited	in	Chapter	4),	abstract	space	operates	as	falsely	objective,	a	
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“set	 of	 things/signs	 and	 their	 formal	 relationships	 […]”	 (1991,	 49).	Abstract	 space	 can	 erase	 differences,	 forcing	 them	 into	 “symbolic	forms	of	an	art	that	is	itself	abstract”	(Ibid.,	49).	For	Lefebvre,	abstract	space	 is	 closely	 tied	 to	 positivist	 social	 science	 and	 state	 power.	 In	opposition	 to	 social	 space,	 the	 abstract	 poses	 as	 a	 pseudo	 subject,	manipulating	 reality,	 hiding	 hegemonic	 agency,	 and	 obscuring	 the	“real	‘subject’,	namely	state	(political)	power”	(Ibid.,	51).	As	articulated	by	Lefebvre,	at	times	vaguely,	abstract	space	has	some	 clear	 differences	 with	 the	 use	 of	 landscape	 described	 by	Cosgrove.	Landscape	is	not	purely	political,	institutional,	or	a	product	of	 state	 power.	 Neither	 is	 it	 dependent	 on	 supposedly	 objective	scientific	data.	Lefebvre	is	principally	concerned	with	how	numerical	data	 and	 architectural	 plans	 create	 a	 false	 reality,	 ignore	 the	complexity	of	 lived	 space,	and	obscure	politics.	Here	we	may	draw	a	parallel	 to	 James	 Scott’s	 (1998)	 theorisation	 on	 how	 states	 use	statistics,	 maps,	 and	 visual	 data	 to	 abstract	 from	 detail	 and	 make	populations	and	space	legible	and	thus	manageable;	but	at	first	glance	abstract	 space	 seems	 to	 be	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 cultural	 approach	 of	landscape.	 We	 should	 understand	 landscape	 as	 synonymous	 to	abstract	 space	 as	 theorised	 by	 Lefebvre,	 however	 the	 effects	 of	abstract	 space	 parallel	 those	 of	 landscape.	 Lefebvre	 proposes	 that	abstract	 space	 has	 three	 elements	 (which	 he	 calls	 “formants”):	 the	geometric	(Euclidean	space),	the	visual/optical,	and	the	phallic	(which	is	 best	 understood	 as	masculinist	 symbols	 of	 violence).	 For	 present	purposes,	I	want	to	underscore	the	second	element,	that	of	the	optical,	which	 operates	 as	 a	 “logic	 of	 visualisation”	 such	 that	 metaphorical	writing	 and	 “spectacularisation”	 (following	 Guy	 Debord)	 dominate	over	other	sensorial	perceptions	of	space.	The	gaze	transforms	details	and	difference	 into	a	 totality,	Lefebvre	argues,	noting	 that	 the	visual	“tends	 to	 relegate	objects	 into	 the	distance,	 to	 render	 them	passive”	(1991,	286).	
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How	 can	 Lefebvre’s	 abstract	 space,	 read	 alongside	 Cosgrove,	inform	 our	 understanding	 of	 landscape?	 Offering	 a	 visual	understanding	of	a	 social	process	 (social	 reproduction,	urbanisation,	land	 regulation)	 bounded	 by	 a	 spatial	 category	 (the	 city,	 the	 beach,	nature	 reserves	 etc…),	 landscape	 creates	 a	 totalizing	 vision	 of	harmonious	 relationships	 between	 signifying	 objects/subjects	through	various	modes	of	abstraction.	Obscuring	social	processes	and	power,	 this	 visual	 representation	 deletes	 difference	 in	 service	 to	hegemony	and	presents	a	false	totality	as	the	natural	order	of	things,	passive	 and	 readable,	 reassuring	 to	 the	 “native”	 and	 easily	comprehensible	to	the	“tourist”.		
3.2	Pairing	a	“politics	of	mobility”	with	landscape	analysis	My	 pairing	 of	 landscape	 with	 critical	 mobilities	 responds	 to	Maddrell	 and	 Qviström	 (2016),	 who	 are	 interested	 in	 the	 two	concepts	as	dynamic	and	interrelated:	how	landscapes	are	composed	of	and	produce	movement	defined	in	the	broadest	sense.	Since	Sheller	and	 Urry	 (2006)	 proclaimed	 a	 “mobilities	 turn”	 in	 social	 science,	 a	growing	 number	 of	 critical	 scholars	 have	 explored	 the	 possibilities	mobilities	 offers	 to	 urban	 studies	 (Graham	 2001;	 Söderström	 et	 al.	2013;	 Kwan	 2013;	 Maksim	 and	 Bergman	 2016).20	 These	 advocates	argue	for	a	perspective	that	incorporates	inhabiting	cities	on	the	move	as	 opposed	 to	 what	 they	 see	 as	 analyses	 of	 static	 freeze-framed	moments	 of	 urban	 processes.	 Reaching	 for	 an	 understanding	 of	urbanity	 beyond	 understanding	 the	 city	 as	 a	 composition	 of	 urban	enclaves,	 Jensen	 (2009)	 argues	 that	 mobilities	 changes	 our	understanding	 of	 place:	 that	 the	 geographical	 concept	 must	 be																																																									20	Cresswell	wrote	a	series	of	 three	essays	reviewing	the	expansive	and	expanding	streams	 of	mobilities	 research	 (2011;	 2012)	 as	well	 as	 a	 research	 agenda	 (2014),	however	he	cautioned	against	seeing	the	field	as	completely	new,	noting	that	many	of	 the	 arguments	 pre-exist	 the	 so-called	 mobilities	 turn	 in	 fields	 such	 as	transportation	and	migration	studies.	
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understood	 relationally	 by	 flows;	 and	 that	 understanding	 of	 places	and	 the	broader	city	 is	developed	 through	 the	experience	of	moving	through	urban	space.		Mobilities	 literature	 emerged,	 and	 continues	 to	 grow,	examining	 differentiated	 movement	 within	 the	 context	 of	 gender,	race,	 age,	 and	 broadly	 social	 exclusion.21	 Scholars	 argue	 that	“attention	 to	 the	 mobilities	 of	 the	 urban	 poor—their	 physical	movements	as	well	as	 the	associated	representation	and	practices—will	enable	a	better	understanding	of	mobilisation	towards	collective	claim	making	as	well	as	individual	attempts	to	achieve	social	mobility”	(Jaffe,	Klaufus,	and	Colombijn	2012,	644).	Few	scholars	have	used	the	literature	 to	 examine	 self-built	 housing	 settlements,	 although	 some	have	 written	 on	 tourist	 mobilities	 in	 connection	 with	 slum	 tourism	and	service-work	 in	Mexico,	 Jamaica	and	India	(Dürr	and	Jaffe	2012;	Dürr	 2012;	 Diekmann	 and	 Hannam	 2012)	 as	 well	 as	 “symbolic	mobility”	 of	 aesthetics	 and	 architectural	 design	 in	 Ecuador	 (Klaufus	2012).	 I	propose	 that	mobilities	 is	a	valuable	 framework	 to	examine	planning	 and	 governance	 programmes	 targeting	 slums	 as	 well	 as	broader	 cultural	 and	 spatial	 phenomena	 such	 as	 tourism,	gentrification	and	 (state)	violence	within	 such	neighbourhoods.	This	thesis	serves	as	one	example	of	such	application,	following	Cresswell’s	work	on	the	“politics	of	mobilities.”	Cresswell	 states	 that	 “mobility	 exists	 in	 the	 same	 relation	 to	movement	 as	 place	 does	 to	 location”	 (2010,	 18).	 That	 is,	 mobility																																																									21	 An	 important	 stream	 of	 mobilities	 literature	 concerns	 “policy	 mobilities,”	 how	innovative	ideas	transformed	into	policy	‘travel’	from	one	place/context	to	another	(Ong	 2007;	 E.	 McCann	 2011;	 Robinson	 2015;	 Baker	 and	 Temenos	 2015;	 Prince	2016).	 I	 do	 not	 directly	 engage	 with	 this	 literature	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 maintaining	 a	manageably	 narrowed	 focus,	 however	 there	 are	 possibilities	 of	 discussing	 “favela	integration”	and	policy	mobility	in	regards	to	the	UN	Habitat’s	“safer	cities”	network	and	educational	exchange	 trips	 that	Rio’s	policy	makers	and	programmers	 took	 to	Medellín.	 These	 opportunities	will	 be	 evident	 to	 interested	 readers	 in	 Chapters	 6	and	7,	although	I	do	not	return	to	the	subject	of	policy	mobilities	until	Chapter	8	in	discussing	implications	for	future	research.	
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imbues	 movement	 with	 social	 meaning.	 Cresswell’s	 theoretical	formulation	 of	 how	 to	 conceptualise	 the	 politics	 of	 mobility	 builds	directly	 on	 Lefebvre’s	 spatial	 triad.	 His	 triad	 of	 physical	 movement,	
representations	 of	 movement	 and	 embodied	 experience	 mirrors	Lefebvre’s	triad	of	spatial	practice,	representations	of	space,	and	lived	space.	 In	 the	 same	way	 that	 social	 space	 is	a	 composite,	 all	 forms	of	mobility—walking,	 flying,	 travelling,	 transportation	 of	 goods	 or	services,	 for	 example—exist	 in	 the	 nexus	 of	 the	 physical	 practice	 of	movement,	the	representation	of	that	movement	(which	we	may	also	call	discourses	on	movement),	and	the	experience	and	social	meaning	engendered	by	movement.	Only	by	taking	these	together	do	we	arrive	at	an	analysis	of	mobility.		Cresswell’s	approach	 is	especially	useful	 to	understand	 favela	integration	beyond	its	discursive	imagining	of	a	united	Rio	de	Janeiro.	As	 I	 argue	 in	 Chapter	 5	 and	 continue	 to	 demonstrate	 throughout	empirical	analysis,	state	interventions	often	have	the	explicit	objective	to	 encourage	 and/or	 regulate	 how	 people	 and	 things	move	 through	the	city	and	in	and	out	of	the	favelas.	I	highlight	many	examples	that	substantiate	 the	claim	that	mobility	 is	political	 in	 the	sense	 that	 it	 is	subject	 to	 power.	 A	 politics	 of	 mobility	 takes	 into	 account	 how	movements	 are	 both	 productive	 of	 social	 power	 distribution	 and	produced	 by	 those	 very	 dynamics.	 Cresswell	 argues	 that	 a	 nuanced	understanding	of	mobility	can	 inform	theorisation	of	social	 relations	according	to	economic	class,	race,	gender	or	other	identity	categories.	In	Chapter	7,	I	discuss	how	different	bodies	moving	or	hanging	about	in	 favela	 space	 are	 targeted	 for	 scrutiny,	 and	 argue	 that	 this	heightened	friction	(see	below)	works	against	the	progressive	notion	of	integration	by	reifying	racialised,	place-based	stigma.	Cresswell	 identifies	 six	 thematic	 aspects	 of	 mobility	 through	which	one	can	analyse	 the	politics	of	mobility:	 (i)	motivation	behind	exerted	force,	(ii)	velocity	of	movement	(which	is	often	hierarchical),	
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(iii)	 rhythm,	 following	 Lefebvre’s	 rythymalaysis	 looking	 closely	 at	repetition	 and	 pace	 broadly	 defined	 (e.g.	 the	 gait	 of	 a	 young	 male	walking,	 swag,	 or	 the	 beat	 of	 Afro-Brazilian	 music);	 (iv)	 route,	drawing	 on	 Deleuze	 and	 Gutarri’s	 “smooth	 space”,	 or	 the	 quest	 to	produce	ordered	and	predictable	movement;	(v)	experience	according	to	bodily	senses	and	emotive	response,	and	finally	(vi)	friction,	or	how	and	 when	 does	 movement	 stop?	 As	 I	 detail	 in	 later	 chapters,	 the	policies	 and	 programmes	 currently	 targeting	 the	 favelas	 aim,	explicitly	 or	not,	 to	modify	 and	 regulate	 the	movement	 and	 flows	of	people,	 goods,	 services,	 and	 even	 ideals	 (such	 as	 citizenship	 and	specific	 rights)	 that	 flow	 in	 and	 out	 of	 the	 favelas.	 The	 analytical	model	 offered	 by	 Cresswell	 is	 useful	 to	 interrogate	 what	 types	 of	mobility	 are	 encouraged	 to	 achieve	 integration	 and	 what	 types	 are	prohibited,	marked	as	dangerous,	or	targeted	for	regulation.	Pairing	 landscape	 with	 critical	 mobilities	 is	 a	 valuable	analytical	framework	because	the	integration	paradigm	is	an	attempt	to	 modify	 the	 exiting	 visual	 spatial	 ordering	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro.	 As	Soares	(2013)	argues,	the	landscape	of	Rio	de	Janeiro—in	the	sense	of	landscape	as	 a	 type	of	 city	 identity—has	become	an	object	of	public	policy;	and	one	of	the	principal	focuses	of	landscape-altering	policy	is	modifying	how	the	 favelas	are	understood	 in	relation	to	 the	broader	city.	Thus	 landscape	allows	an	empirical	evaluation	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro	as	 a	 whole;	 and	 mobilities	 provides	 the	 analytical	 means	 to	understand	how	landscape	is	“called	forth”	beyond	discourse.	The	two	concepts	together	answer	how	favela	integration	fits	into	pre-existing	and	 historic	 hegemony	 that	 for	 decades	 delegitimized	 favela	neighbourhoods	 as	 malevolent	 urban	 blight	 as	 well	 as	 exposing	residual	revanchist	politics	embedded	in	state	interventions.			
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3.3	Redefining	the	state	Building	a	theory	of	the	state	 is	difficult	work	in	part	because	defining	 what	 “the	 state”	 is,	 where	 it	 begins	 and	 ends,	 and	 how	 it	operates	has	proved	near	impossible.	As	Timothy	Mitchell	writes,	any	“scholarly	 analysis	 of	 the	 state	 is	 liable	 to	 reproduce	 in	 its	 own	analytical	 tindiness	 [an]	 imaginary	 coherence	 and	misrepresent	 the	incoherence	 of	 state	 practice”	 (1999,	 76).	 Both	Mitchell	 (1991)	 and	Jessop	(2001)	review	the	various	theoretical	attempts	to	describe	and	analyse	 the	 state	 post	 World	 War	 II.	 Mid-century	 social	 scientists	largely	 abandoned	 the	 state	 of	 as	 object	 of	 analysis	 and	 instead	favoured	 a	 political	 systems	 approach	 that	 avoided	 state	 singularity	and	attempted	to	understand	the	more	complex	connections	between	institutions,	parties,	and	political	actors	in	an	era	where	comparative	governance	 studies	 corresponded	 to	 United	 States	 and	 Western	Europe’s	 international	 objectives	 during	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 Cold	War	(T.	Mitchell	1991).	The	political	systems	theory	did	not	however	solve	 the	problem	of	defining	 the	boundaries	and	 limits	of	 the	state,	and	by	the	late	1960s	and	1970s	scholars	were	calling	for	a	“return	to	the	state”	(Nettl	1968;	Poulantzas	1978;	Krasner	1978).	Jessop	points	out	 this	 shift	 corresponded	 to	 the	 Latin	 American	 dependency	theorists	 concerns	 regarding	 the	 role	of	 the	 state	 in	 facilitating	poor	countries’	 subjugation	 to	 wealthy	 countries	 in	 a	 world	 system	 of	extractivist	 capitalism	 and	 alternatively	 how	 the	 state	 could	 be	harnessed	to	prioritise	national	development	and	internal	markets.	Political	 scientists	 and	 sociologists	 who	 revived	 the	 state	constructed	what	was	critiqued	as	a	“statist”	approach	that	fetishises	the	state	as	“an	autonomous	entity	whose	actions	are	not	reducible	to	or	 determined	 by	 forces	 in	 society”	 (T.	 Mitchell	 1991,	 82).	 Jessop	(2001,	 153)	 refers	 to	 Marxist	 political	 economists	 of	 the	 time	 as	following	 a	 “state-centred”	 approach	 that	 largely	 ignored	 Antonio	
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Gramsci	 (1971)	 and	Nicolas	Poulantzas’	 (1978)	 efforts	 to	pay	 closer	attention	 to	 state	 power	 as	 relational	 and	 understand	 how	 its	influence	 spread	 beyond	 its	 institutional	 boundaries.	 Nonetheless	Jessop	 argues	 that	 state-cantered	 Marxists	 did	 well	 to	 note	 that	political	 forces	 engender	 the	 state	with	 a	 specific	 form	and	 function	that	 allow	 it	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 to	 pursue	 political,	economic	and	social	objectives	 independent	 from	civil	 society	or	 the	economy.		After	 tracing	 the	 modern	 historical	 development	 of	 how	various	 fields	 of	 scholarship	 have	 engaged	 with	 the	 sate,	 from	Marxists,	 to	 Foucauldians,	 feminists,	 and	 neo-statists,	 Jessop	summarises	that:			
the	sate	 is	seen	as	an	emergent,	partial,	and	unstable	system	that	 is	
interdependent	with	other	systems	in	a	complex	social	order.	This	has	
vastly	 expanded	 the	 realm	 of	 contingency	 in	 the	 state	 and	 its	
operations	 and	 this	 implies	 the	 need	 for	more	 concrete,	 historically	
specific,	 institutionally	 sensitive,	 and	 action-oriented	 research”	
(Jessop	2001,	166).22		
	This	 thesis	 is	 informed	 by	 and	 indebted	 to	 Jessop’s	 substantial	contributions	 to	 theorising	 the	 state	 and	 state	 power	 as	 objects	 of	analysis.	He	influenced	and	collaborated	with	spatial	thinking	political	theorists	 and	 geographers	 to	 develop	 a	 nuanced	discussion	 on	 state	scale	and	state	space,	which	I	return	to	in	the	next	section.	Ultimately,	however,	I	do	not	abide	by	his	theoretical	approach	here.	Even	though	Jessop	 accounts	 for	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 past	 statist/state-centred	approaches	 by	 understanding	 power	 as	 relational	 and	 by																																																									22	 Jessop	 later	 develops	 an	 impressive	 and	 comprehensive	model	 to	 research	 the	state	 called	 the	 “strategic-relational	 approach,”	 (SRA)	 to	 which	 he	 has	 updated	throughout	 the	 years	 to	 incorporate	 concepts	 and	 ideas	 from	 various	 fields	including	feminist	theory,	Foucault’s	notion	of	bio-power,	and	actor-network	theory	(Jessop	2008;	also	see	 Jessop,	Brenner,	and	Jones	2008).	 I	do	not	apply	the	SRA	in	this	thesis	but	some	scholars	working	in	Brazil	have	(Ioris	2011;	Leubolt	2013).		
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incorporating	 bits	 of	 feminist	 and	 post-structuralist	 critiques;	 his	objective	 seems	 to	 be	 to	 finally	 arrive	 at	 that	 “totalising	 science”	(Mitchell	1991)	of	a	state,	as	if	one	can	finally	comprehensively	study	and	understand	The	State	 if	the	model	is	complex	enough.23	This	is	a	task	 that	 I	 do	 not	 think	 possible.	 While	 he	 has	 said	 that	 a	 main	objective	of	his	approach	is	to	find	a	Marxist	way	out	of	the	structure–agency	 debate,	 he	 still	 understands	 “the	 state”	 as	 conceptually	separate	 from	 “society”	 and	 “the	 economy.”	 These	 divisions	 allow	critiques	of	neoliberalism	to	continue	to	see	the	state	acting	singularly	with	 explicit	 intentions	 to	 facilitate	 the	 interests	 of	 a	 bourgeois	capitalist	class.	This	is	a	common	position	implied	by	the	literature	on	Rio	de	Janeiro	as	a	“city	of	exception”	as	noted	in	the	previous	chapter.	Mitchell	offers	an	alternative	approach	that	“acknowledges	the	power	of	 the	political	arrangements	 that	we	call	 the	state	and	at	 the	same	time	account	for	their	elusiveness”	(19991,	94),	that	is	the	state	as	a	structural	effect.	His	theory	builds	on	Foucault’s	reading	of	power	and	notions	of	discipline	and	government.	To	approach	the	state,	one	must	abandon	the	idea	of	a	sovereign	as	the	host,	centre,	and	wielder	of	 power,	 a	 power	 that	 is	 transformed	 into	 governing	decisions	 and	policies	 through	 a	 vast,	 strict	 hierarchy	 of	 systems	 and	 institutions.	Rather,	the	‘state	effect’	perspective	shifts	to	a	concern	with	discipline,	the	 various	 forms	 of	 local,	 internal,	 and	 productive	 powers	 that	 are	increasingly	 organised	 and	 regulated	 into	 schools,	 armies,	 health	systems,	 and	 bureaucracies.	 This	 is	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 the	governmentalisation	 of	 the	 state	 or	 statisation	 (see	 Ferguson	 1990;	Painter	2006).	Mitchell	sets	out	to	do	what	Foucault	did	not,	that	is	to	explain	how	“disciplinary	powers	are	somehow	consolidated	into	the	territorially	 based,	 institutionally	 structured	 order	 of	 the	 modern																																																									23	 The	 strategic-relational	 approach	 became	 increasingly	 complex	 as	 Jessop	incorporated	 ideas	 from	 critical	 realism,	 systems	 theory,	 regulation	 theory,	 actor-network	 theory,	 and	 Foucauldian	 theories	 on	 power	 (Jessop	 2008;	 also	 see	interview	with	Jessop	on	the	SRA	by	Ji	and	Kytir	2014).		
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state”	 (1999,	178).	The	appearance	 of	 structure	 is	 fundamental;	 that	is,	the	state	is	engendered	as	a	structural	entity	separate	from	society	on	the	one	hand	and	economy	on	the	other.	I	cite	him	at	length:		
The	 precise	 specification	 of	 space	 and	 function	 that	 characterise	
modern	 institutions,	 the	 coordination	 of	 these	 functions	 into	
hierarchical	 arrangements,	 the	 organisation	 of	 supervision	 and	
surveillance,	 the	marking	 out	 of	 time	 into	 schedules	 and	 programs,	
all	contribute	to	constructing	a	world	that	appears	to	consist	not	of	a	
complex	 of	 social	 practice	 but	 of	 a	 binary	 order:	 on	 the	 one	 hand	
individuals	and	their	activities,	on	the	other	an	inert	“structure”	that	
somehow	stands	apart	from	individuals,	precedes	them,	and	contains	
and	 gives	 a	 framework	 to	 their	 lives.	 Indeed	 the	 very	 notion	 of	 an	
institution,	 as	 an	 abstract	 framework	 separate	 from	 the	 particular	
practices	it	enframes,	can	be	seen	as	the	product	of	these	techniques.	
Such	 techniques	 have	 given	 rise	 to	 the	 peculiar,	 apparently	 binary	
world	we	 inhabit,	where	 reality	 seems	 to	 take	 the	 two-dimensional	
form	 of	 individual	 versus	 apparatus,	 practice	 versus	 institution,	
social	life	and	its	structure–or	society	versus	state	(1991,	94).	
		
We	must	analyse	the	state	as	such,	a	structural	effect.	That	is	to	say	
we	should	examine	it	not	as	an	actual	structure,	but	as	the	powerful,	
apparently	 metaphysical	 effect	 of	 practices	 that	 make	 such	
structures	appear	to	exist.	(1999,	180).		Mitchell	 calls	 for	 interrogations	 of	 the	 state	 to	 further	 explicate	 the	forces	that	give	rise	to	structural	effects.	As	an	example	he	mentions	how	 legal	processes	are	organised	 into	a	 framework,	 the	 law,	 that	 is	imagined	as	controlling	social	behaviour	 from	 ‘above,’	and	operating	independent	of	the	persons	living	‘under	it.’	The	expression	nobody	is	
above	the	law	reinforces	this	hierarchical	and	spatial	division	between	individuals	living	in	society	and	the	mechanisms	of	discipline	that	give	structure	to	the	state.	Applying	this	approach	to	the	research	problem	presented	 in	 Chapter	 1	 could	 consider	 how	 urban	 planning	
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regulations	 and	 strategic	 policies	 seem	 to	 organise	 urban	 space	 and	shape	behaviour.	But	the	favelas	very	explicitly	and	very	visibly	do	not	conform	to	planning	codes	or	logic;	and	thus	their	very	form	does	not	produce	the	same	state	effect	as	the	asfalto,	but	appears	to	challenge	it.	This	thesis	explores	how	favela-specific	plans	and	policies	address	the	 failure	 of	 favelas	 to	 structure	 the	 state.	 The	 full	 significance	 of	Mitchell’s	state	effect	will	be	realised	 in	discussing	 the	production	of	territory,	 also	 as	 an	 effect,	 as	 fundamental	 to	 the	 duality	 of	state/society.			
3.4	State	+	space	(under	neoliberalism)	In	understanding	“favela	integration”	as	a	state	spatial	strategy	and	 government	 programmes	 such	 as	 PAC,	Morar	 Carioca,	 and	 UPP	Social	as	state	spatial	projects,	I	am	borrowing	conceptual	vocabulary	from	Neil	Brenner	(2004).	However,	my	following	of	Mitchell	and	the	state	 effect	 precludes	 a	 strict	 application	 of	 Brenner’s	 approach	 to	state	space.	Below	I	summarise	his	major	claims,	and	then	clarify	how	I	 modify	 his	 conceptual	 terminology	 and	 specify	 to	 what	 degree	 I	engage	directly	with	his	theories.		Brenner	 argues	 that	 accompanying	 the	 rise	 of	 contemporary	neoliberal	 capitalism	 there	 has	 been	 a	 radical	 rescaling	 of	“statehood”.24	 He	 classifies	 the	 era	 preceding	 the	 1970s	 as	 “spatial	Keynesianism”,	 that	 is	 the	 centralised	 national	 government	 of	 the	nation-state	pursued	spatial	policies	 that	sought	 to	distribute	capital	and	development	throughout	its	territory.	This	changed	beginning	in	the	 1970s	 with	 decentralisation	 of	 state	 regulatory	 authority,	 the	
																																																								24	Brenner	favours	the	term	“statehood”	over	simply	“the	state”	because,	as	he	says,	“it	does	not	ontologically	prejudge	the	configuration	of	state	scalar	organisation,	the	level	of	state	centralisation,	or	the	degree	of	institutional	isomorphism	among	state	agencies”	(Brenner	2004,	4).	The	term	refers	broadly	to	social	relations	embedded	in	state	institutions.	
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adoption	 of	 neoliberal	 discourses	 about	 market	 competitiveness	 in	relation	to	subnational	geographies,	and	the	subsequent	reordering	of	political	economic	policy	so	that	cities	and	urban	regions	compete	for	resources	 and	 capitalist	 investment.	 This	 rescaling	 of	 statehood	engenders	 and	 necessitates	 “new	 state	 spaces”	 from	 which	 state	power	facilitates	economic	policy.	Following	 Lefebvre’s	 (1991)	 seminal	 work	 The	 Production	 of	
Space,	 Brenner	 recognizes	 space	 as	 ‘co-constitutive’	 of	 time	 and	historicity	 and	 asserts	 that	 space	 is	 best	 understood	 within	 a	dialectical	 space-as-process	 framework	 (Brenner	 2004,	 32).	 He	establishes	 the	 inherent	 spatiality	 of	 the	 state	 by	 Lefebvre’s	 claims	that	the	origin	of	the	state	lies	in	spaces	of	accumulation	and	that	the	principle	 of	 sovereignty	 attempts	 to	 encapsulate	 all	 spatialised	political	 and	economic	processes	by	directing	violence	against	 space	(Lefebvre	1991,	279-80).	Lefebvre	states	that	the	ultimate	goal	of	the	state	 is	 “unification”,	 that	 is	 the	 production	 of	 space	 in	 which	 a	homogeneous	society	 is	perfected.	To	Lefebvre,	space	 is	what	makes	the	 state	 concrete.	 Without	 a	 spatial	 framework,	 and	 without	 the	conceptualisation	 of	 space	 as	 a	 contested	 social	 process,	 the	 state	remains	 abstract.	 To	 ignore	 the	 production	 of	 state	 space	 results	 in	what	Brenner	critiques	as	state-centrism,	defined	as	perspectives	that	view	 space	 as	 static,	 social	 processes	 as	 contained	 by	 territorial	boundaries	 and	 the	 nation-state	 as	 pre-existing	 condition	 of	 politics	(Brenner	2004,	38,	43).		Brenner	 defines	 state	 space	 as	 dialectical:	 state	 space	 in	 the	“narrow”	 and	 “integral”	 senses.	 State	 space	 in	 the	 narrow	 sense	 is	territory-specific,	 and	 refers	 to	 distinctive	 physical	 organisational	forms	of	the	state	and	its	juridico-political	and	regulatory	institutions.	The	territorial	characteristic	of	nation-states	with	heavily	militarised	external	borders	and	differentiated	partitioned	subnational	territories	corresponds	 to	 state	 space	 in	 the	 narrow	 sense	 and	 results	 in	 the	
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common	form	of	all	states	in	the	inter-state	system	of	modern	history	(Taylor	 2003).	 State	 space	 in	 the	 integral	 sense	 refers	 to	 how	 state	institutions	 and	 their	 policies	 shape	 socioeconomic	 relations	 within	specific	geographies.	In	this	broader	conceptualisation	of	state	space,	spatial	policies	target	social	processes	and	economic	relationships	 in	place-specific	 areas	of	defined	 territories.	 It	 also	 includes	 the	 spatial	effects	 of	 seemingly	 aspatial	 policies	 (such	 as	 fiscal	 policy).	 Taken	together,	the	narrow	and	the	integral	dimensions	of	the	state	“interact	reciprocally	 to	 produce	 historically	 specific	 formations	 of	 state	spatiality”	(Brenner	2004,	79).	For	Brenner,	therefore,	the	production	of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 exercise	 of	 state	 power	 are	 defined	 by	 this	continuous	dialectical	process.25		Specifically,	 Brenner	 outlines	 two	 processes	 that	 spatially	reproduce	 the	 state,	 and	 that	 I	 find	 useful	 in	 analyzing	 favela	integration:	 state	 spatial	 projects	 and	 state	 spatial	 strategies.	 State	spatial	 projects	 refer	 to	 administrative,	 bureaucratic	 and	 regulatory	activities	 that	 simultaneously	 coordinate	 and	 differentiate	 state	institutions	 at	 various	 locations	 and	 at	 all	 scales	 (national,	subnational,	regional,	provincial,	metropolitan	and	local).	Because	the	projects	 operate	 with	 clear	 institutional	 objectives	 to	 regulate	intrastate	workings	 as	well	 as	 to	 structure	 particular	 economic	 and	other	activities,	 state	spatial	projects	are	associated	with	state	space	in	 the	 narrow	 sense.	 State	 spatial	 strategies	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 are	concerned	 less	 with	 institutional	 relations	 and	 more	 with																																																									25	 Brenner	 et	 al.	 2003	 also	 names	 “representational	 state	 space”	 as	 a	 third	dimension,	 This	 includes	 place-	 and	 scale-	 specific	 state	 spatial	 strategies,	power/knowledge	relations	in	the	context	of	territory,	and	the	everyday	contested	subjectivities	 of	 state	 spatiality.	 However	 writing	 alone,	 Brenner	 collapses	representational	 state	 space	 into	 integral	 state	 space.	 The	 three	 dimensional	approach	appears	to	be	an	attempt	to	work	within	a	state	spatial	trialectic,	inspired	by	 Lefebvre’s	 trialectic	 of	 spatial	 practice,	 representations	 of	 space	 and	representational	space	(Lefebvre	1991,	245).	Brenner	does	not	elaborate	on	why	he	leaves	out	this	third	dimension	of	state	space	 in	his	personal	work;	but	the	reader	might	 infer	 that	 he	 is	 more	 comfortable	 working	 within	 a	 dialectical	 framework,	which	is	evident	when	analyzing	the	specifics	of	state	spatial	reproduction.	
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encouraging,	 regulating	 and	 manipulating	 geographies	 of	 economic	development.	 The	 neoliberalised	 states	 examined	 by	 Brenner	 use	 a	wide	 range	of	policy	 instruments—including	housing	policies,	 urban	and	regional	planning,	labour	regulations,	industrial	development	and	economic	 initiatives—to	 facilitate	 capitalist	 accumulation,	development	 and	 investment.	 State	 spatial	 strategies	 operate	within	state	space	in	the	integral	sense	(Brenner	2004,	92-93).	Strategies	and	projects	 work	 parallel	 and	 simultaneously.	 State	 spatial	 projects	decentralise	regulatory	authority	to	local	and	municipal	levels	leaving	cities	 and	 local	 government	 bodies	 to	 develop,	 plan	 and	 implement	place-specific	 economic	 policies.	 State	 spatial	 strategies	 seek	 to	encourage	 territorial	 competitiveness	 by	 ensuring	 the	 redistribution	of	capital	 to	 those	places	(cities,	municipalities	and	regions)	deemed	most	productive.	Brenner’s	 theory	 on	 the	 rescaling	 of	 statehood	 and	 what	 he	calls	 neo-localism	 is	 a	 useful	 reference	 point	 when	 discussing	 the	federal	programme	PAC-favelas	 (discussed	 in	Chapter	7).	However	 I	must	differentiate	my	use	of	state	spatial	strategies	and	projects	from	how	 he	 defines	 them.	 Brenner’s	 theorisation	 of	 the	 state	 follows	Jessop’s	neo-Marxist	approach	and	aims	to	understand	how	the	state	is	 spatially	 reproduced	 with	 the	 objective	 to	 neoliberalise	 socio-economic	 relations.	My	 research	 questions	 are	 concerned	with	 how	the	 state	 is	 spatially	 reproduced	 through	 favela	 integration	 in	response	 to	 the	dichotomous	urban	divide	between	 “the	 favela”	 and	“the	 city.”	 As	 suggested	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 a	 key	 claim	 of	 this	thesis	 is	 that	 favela	 integration	produces	 the	state	effect	by	spatially	producing	the	state	 ‘inside’	the	favelas,	thus	producing	the	favelas	as	‘within’	 the	 city.	 This	 objective	 is	 pursued	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 through	regulating	the	 flows	 in,	out	and	through	favela	spaces.	As	such,	 I	use	
state	 spatial	 strategy	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 efforts	 to	 integrally	 reconfigure	the	 favela/cidade	 divide;	 and	 state	 spatial	 projects	 in	 reference	 to	
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specific	 activities,	 regulations,	 and	 policies	 and	 coordinated	techniques	 employed	 materially.	 While	 this	 still	 corresponds	 to	Brenner’s	conceptualisation	of	state	space	in	the	integral	and	narrow	sense,	 it	 also	 parallels	 Mitchell’s	 discussion	 of	 the	 appearance	 of	[spatial]	 structure	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 the	 efficient	 organisation	 of	disciplinary	power	on	the	other.			 	 	
3.5	Territory	as	effect	Territory,	 until	 recently,	was	 left	 relatively	 unexplored	 in	 the	emerging	 state	 space	 literature	 because	 it	 is	 historically	 associated	with	 those	 approaches	 deemed	 statist.	 The	 often-cited	 critique	 is	Agnew’s	 (1994)	 “territorial	 trap”	 in	 which	 he	 notes	 a	 number	 of	assumptions	political	theorists	attach	to	territory:	that	states	operate	absolute	sovereignty	within	bounded,	demarcated	space;	that	political	and	 economic	 relations	 are	 “polarised”	 between	 the	 domestic	 and	international	 spheres;	 and	 that	 the	 state	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 a	container,	 or	 series	 of	 containers	 (Taylor	 2003),	 encompassing	 the	economy	and	society.	Agnew’s	critique	was	couched	in	the	debate	on	the	crisis	of	the	state	in	a	globalising	world.	Territory	has	conceptually	been	 re-imagined	 within	 the	 discipline	 of	 geography	 by	 Painter	 as	effect—following	Mitchell’s	the	state	effect.	Particularly	useful	is	that	his	relational-network	approach	 is	applicable	up	and	down	the	state	scale.	 It	 is	 the	 final	 conceptual	 tool	 necessary	 to	 analyse	 favela	integration	 as	 a	 state	 spatial	 strategy	 of	 territory.	 Below	 I	 review	Painter’s	 theory	with	 references	 to	 the	 Brazilian	 geographers	 Souza	(1995)	 and	 Haesbaert	 (2004),	 but	 first	 I	 review	 how	 scholars	currently	 employ	 territory	 to	 discuss	 the	 favelas	 in	 relation	 to	 state	power	in	order	to	distinguish	my	approach	here.	As	mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 when	 drug-trafficking	gangs	began	 to	operate	 systematically	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro	 and	exerted	
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increased	 control	 over	 daily	 life,	 researchers	 referred	 to	 gang	“territorialisation”	of	the	favelas.	In	some	cases	the	term	is	employed	without	 a	 discussion	of	 its	 conceptual	 history	 or	 literature	 and	with	various	degrees	of	nuance.	Often	the	author	simply	wishes	to	indicate	that	 the	 gang,	 not	 the	 state,	 operates	 a	monopoly	 of	 violence	within	the	bounded	space	of	the	favela	(Burgos	1998;	Goldstein	2003;	Vargas	2006).	 State	 discourse	 of	 favela	 pacification	 relies	 heavily	 on	“reclaiming	 territory”	 from	 the	gangs	 (Prouse	2013).	Others	 refer	 to	favelas	 as	 territories	 in	 order	 to	 call	 attention	 to	 their	 apparently	bounded	 unique	 spatial	 qualities	 (Koster	 2009;	 Izaga	 and	 Pereira	2014;	Olinger	2015).	While	Brenner	and	Elden	(2009)	wish	 to	make	an	explicit	distinction	between	territory	as	place	and	territory	as	state	space,	I	do	not	think	such	a	distinction	can	be	made	in	this	case.	Even	when	the	term	is	invoked	to	refer	to	a	favela	as	a	bounded	place,	the	implication	is	that	it	is	a	bounded	space	apart	from	the	state.	More	 nuanced	 uses	 make	 this	 obvious	 as	 they	 generally	correspond	 to	 Taylor’s	 (2003,	 101)	 definition	 of	 territoriality—“a	form	 of	 behaviour	 that	 uses	 a	 bounded	 space,	 a	 territory,	 as	 the	instrument	 for	securing	a	particular	outcome”—even	if	not	explicitly	referenced	 or	 constructed	 independently.	 For	 example,	 Cavalcanti	calls	territorialisation	a	“regime	of	power”	in	which	the	power	of	the	drug	 trade	 becomes	 objectified	 (materially	 consequential)	 through	the	 threat	 or	 use	 of	 force	 in	 the	 spaces	 of	 the	 favelas.	 Paired	 with	internal	and	external	discourse	constructing	the	favelas	as	domains	of	the	gangs,	the	boundaries	of	the	favelas	become	structural	principles	of	daily	life	(Cavalcanti	2007,	236–37).	Thus	the	theorisation	of	favela	territorialisation	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 rests	 on	 the	Weberian	 notion	 of	legitimate	 claim	 to	 a	monopoly	 of	 violence	 paired	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 the	state	 as	 bounded	 territorial	 power.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 favelas,	 the	state’s	power	stops	at	the	boundary	of	the	favelas,	in	part	because	the	gangs	performatively	patrol	the	space	and	claim	authority	through	the	
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use/threat	 of	 force,	 and	 in	 part	 because	 discursively	 the	 gangs	 are	recognised	 in	 media	 and	 quotidian	 discourse	 as	 in	 control.	 Thus,	scholarly,	 journalist,	 and	 vernacular	 understanding	 of	 favelas	 as	subject	 to	 the	 territorial	 rule	 of	 the	 gangs—or	 more	 recently	 the	
milicias26—discursively	reinforces	the	spatial	otherness	of	the	favelas	as	 [illegitimate]	 territories	 ‘outside’	 of	 the	 unnamed	 legitimate	territory	 of	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 city	 in	which	 the	 state	 presumably	 rules	unchallenged.		The	 construction	 of	 territorialisation	 as	 a	Durkheimian	 social	
fact27	has	proven	useful	 to	examine	 the	ways	 in	which	gangs’	use	of	force	 spatially	 produces	 the	 favela	 and	 effects	 residents’	 embodied	experience	of	 the	socio-spatial	 fragmentation	of	urban	space	as	 they	‘cross	over’	demarcated	boundaries	on	 their	way	 to/from	home.	But	in	such	cases	this	responds	to	territory	as	place	rather	than	territory	as	 state	 space.	 If	 used	 to	 describe	 state	 territoriality	 it	 falls	 into	Agnew’s	“trap”	and	a	statist	approach	to	space.		The	 Brazilian	 geographer	 Marcelo	 Lopes	 de	 Souza	 (1995)	develops	perhaps	the	most	thorough	concept	of	territory	at	the	urban	scale	 and	 territoriality	 in	 relation	 to	 organised	 criminal	 authority	 in	Brazil.	Drawing	 from	sources	as	diverse	as	Sun	Tzu,	Hannah	Arendt,	and	 Claude	 Raffestin;	 he	 understands	 territory	 most	 basically	 as	 a	concept	to	discuss	power	relations	that	define	and	bound	a	space.	He	recognises	 different	 territories,	 from	 the	 traditional	 nation-state—																																																								26	 While	 the	 milicias	 and	 trafico	 are	 both	 organised	 crime	 syndicates	 with	comparable	 behaviours,	 they	 are	not	 a	 perfect	 parallel	 in	 this	 example	principally	because	the	milicias	were,	at	least	at	their	origins,	composed	of	police	officers	with	strong	 and	 open	 connections	 to	 local	 politicians	 who	 defended	 the	 milicianos	territorialisation	 as	 doing	 the	 state	 a	 favour	 in	 combating	 drug	 trafficking	 and	keeping	peace.	In	that	sense,	the	milicias	were	discursively	produced	as	quasi-state	actors,	although	public	perception	and	the	modus	operandi	of	the	police	mafias	have	changed	significantly	in	recent	years.	There	is	still	very	little	research	published	on	the	milicias.	27	Durkheim	(1982)	defined	a	“social	fact”	in	The	Rules	of	Sociological	Method	as	any	behaviours	or	thoughts	that	individuals	coercively	incorporate	into	their	daily	lives	as	a	result	of	external	pressures.		
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reified	 through	 ideology	 and	 metaphor—to	 the	 complex	 quotidian	territorialisation	 of	 place,	 often	 with	 a	 distinct	 temporality,	 in	 the	metropolis	(for	example	zones	of	sex	work).	He	categorises	drug	gang	“command”	 of	 the	 favelas	 as	 “low	 definition	 territoriality”	 since	 the	disperse	groups	operate	in	open	conflict	with	one	another.	He	argues	that	 the	 specificities	 of	 gang	 territorialisation	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	necessitates	 building	 a	 “conceptual	 bridge”	 between	 the	 traditional	territory	 presupposing	 spatial	 contingency	 and	 network,	 the	 sewing	together	of	the	flows	of	people	and	goods	(Ibid.,	94)	acting	as	points	in	space.	 He	 proposes	 to	 call	 networked-territories	 “discontinuous	territories”	 as	 opposed	 to	 “continuous	 territories.”	 The	 defining	difference	 being	 that	 discontinuous	 territories	 are	 constructed	through	 networked	 points	 (people	 and	 objects)	 and	 continuous	territories	operate	unchallenged	across	 the	 surface	of	 space.	 For	 the	purposes	 of	 this	 project,	 I	 do	not	 see	 the	necessity	 of	 distinguishing	between	 continuous	 and	 discontinuous	 territories	 if	 the	 major	difference	 is	whether	 or	 not	multiple	 armed	 groups	dispute	 control.	The	undisputed	territory	is	still	a	product	of	networked	points;	and	in	the	 case	 of	 gang	 territorialisation	 of	 favelas,	 the	 space	 is	 always	 in	dispute—if	not	between	different	gang	factions	then	by	the	state.	Still,	Souza	 offers	 an	 early	 example	 of	 thinking	 through	 territory	 both	relationally	and	with	networks.		Territory	 as	 defined	 by	 Painter	 (2010)	 is	 the	 effect	 of	networked	 social	 technologies	 (technical	 and	material)	 that	produce	contiguous,	 continual,	 and	 bounded	 spaces.	 In	 relation	 to	 state	territory,	 this	 amounts	 to	 the	 appearance	 of	 state	 sovereignty	operating	 evenly,	 in	 some	 cases	 homogeneously,	 across	 bounded	space.	 Painter	 balks	 at	 academic	discourses	 that	 view	 “territory	 and	network	 [as]	 incommensurable	 and	 competing	 forms	 of	 spatial	organisation,	 and	 that	 territory	 thinking	 and	 network	 thinking	 are	mutually	 incompatible”	 (2010,	1093).	Territory	 is	produced	 through	
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socio-technical	processes,	following	Andrew	Barry’s	(2001)	definition	of	technology:	“a	concept	which	refers	not	just	to	a	[technical]	device	in	isolation	but	also	to	the	forms	of	knowledge,	skill,	diagrams,	charts,	calculations	and	energy	which	make	its	use	possible”	(cited	in	Painter	2010,	 1105).	 Painter	 continues:	 “from	 this	 perspective,	 effectuating	territory	 requires	 considerable	 inputs	of	 labour,	 expertise	 and	other	resources.	Moreover,	the	work	involved	is	continuous	and	repetitive.	Delimitation,	 contiguity	 and	 coherence	 have	 to	 be	 constantly	reproduced	 to	 sustain	 the	 effect	 of	 territory	 through	 time”	 (1105).	Examples	of	socio-technologies	that	Painter	studied	in	relation	to	the	production	 of	 English	 regions	 include	 various	 forms	 of	 mapping,	strategic	 policy	 documents,	 economic	 modelling,	 and	 benchmark	setting.	 In	 reference	 to	 favela	 integration	 we	 could	 include	 the	techniques	 of	 urban	 planning	 and	 governance,	 architectural	 plans,	mapping,	 policy	 documents—in	 short	 the	 activities	 and	 results	 of	state	spatial	projects.	Painter	is	not	alone	in	insisting	that	territory	and	networks	are	
not	 diametrically	 opposed.	 In	 debunking	 the	 “myth	 of	deterritorialisation,”	 the	 Brazilian	 geographer	 Haesbaert	 writes,	“today,	 territorialisation	 also	 means	 to	 construct	 and/or	 control	flows/networks	 and	 create	 symbolic	 references	 in	 a	 space	 in	movement,	 in	 and	 by	 movement”	 (2004,	 280).	 This	 idea	 that	 a	territory	 is	 maintained	 through	 meaningful	 repeated	 actions,	 in	particular	movement,	is	of	particular	interest	to	my	analysis	of	favela	integration,	both	because	of	the	attention	paid	to	critical	mobilities	as	well	as	the	types	of	technologies	the	strategy	of	integration	rolls	out	in	the	favelas.			
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3.6	Conclusions		 This	 chapter	 presented	 two	 separate	 but	 related	 theoretical	frames	 through	 which	 I	 analyse	 the	 paradigm	 of	 favela	 integration.	The	first	pairs	landscape	with	mobilities.	Examining	favela	integration	through	 the	 lens	 of	 landscape	 reveals	 spatial	 ideology	 at	 work.	 An	uninhabitable	 imagination	 of	 human	 ecology—in	 this	 case	 a	 city—landscape	 obscures	 dominant	 social	 relations	 and	 renders	 socio-spatial	 conflict	 passive	 and	 distant.	 Critical	 mobilities—focusing	 on	how	urban	space	is	experienced	and	how	political	relations	shape	that	experience—brings	social,	cultural	and	economic	power	dynamics	to	the	foreground.	 In	accordance	with	Soares,	 I	argue	that	the	state	has	devised	 and	 implemented	 policies	 that	 seek	 to	 alter	 the	working	 of	hegemonic	 landscape	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 favelas.	 I	 draw	on	Creswell’s	politics	of	mobility	 in	order	to	critically	understand	the	objectives	of	favela	 integration	 and	 to	 reveal	 how	 the	 proposed	 landscape,	 the	“integrated	 city,”	 is	 called	 forth	 to	 do	 political	 work.	 In	 addition	 to	building	on	emerging	literature	exploring	the	interaction	of	landscape	and	 mobilities,	 in	 applying	 this	 framework	 I	 demonstrate	 how	 the	politics	of	mobilities	can	be	a	useful	tool	to	examine	informal	housing	settlements,	especially	in	regards	to	state	interventions.		The	 second	 framework	 engages	 with	 state	 spatiality.	 In	bringing	 together	 Mitchell’s	 theorisation	 of	 the	 state	 effect	 with	Painter’s	 similar	 approach	 to	 territory	 as	 effect	 and	borrowing	 from	Brenner	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 of	 how	 states	 are	 reproduced	though	 strategies	 and	 projects,	 I	 have	 constructed	 a	 theoretical	approach	to	analyse	the	planning	and	governance	paradigm	of	“favela	integration”	 as	 a	 strategy	 that	 structures	 the	 state	 in	 relation	 to	society	 by	 producing	 the	 favela	 as	 state	 territory.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	interventions	 targeting	 the	 favelas	 for	 integration	 work	 to	 redefine	
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the	 favela-city	 divide	 by	 transforming	 how	 the	 state	 is	 spatially	reproduced	in	relation	to	the	favelas.	
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Chapter	4	–	Methodology	and	Methods			This	 chapter	 presents	 the	 methodological	 approach	 to	 the	research	 problem	 as	 well	 as	 methods	 of	 data	 collection.	 Discourse	analysis	 and	 participant-observation	 are	 well	 suited	 to	 address	 the	social,	political,	spatial	and	economic	complexities	of	the	current	state	interventions	 into	 the	 city’s	 favelas.	 The	 research	 design	 closely	follows	the	problem	and	questions	as	outlined	in	Chapter	One:	
• How	 is	 “favela	 integration”	 discursively	 produced	 and	defined	 by	 the	 state	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 as	 part	 of	 a	 larger	narrative	of	urban	reform	and	renewal?		
• How	 is	 the	 meaning	 of	 “integration”	 interpreted,	represented,	challenged,	or	appropriated	by	popular	media,	special	interest	groups	and	common	citizens?	
• In	what	ways	do	state	interventions	designed	to	“integrate”	the	favelas	transform	urban	space?		
• How	 do	 techniques	 of	 urban	 planning	 and	 governance	establish	 favelas	 as	 legitimate	 urban	 space	 subject	 to	 and	benefiting	from	state	rule?		The	 first	 two	 questions	 note	 discourse	 analysis	 as	 an	 approach	 to	examine	the	production	of	favela	integration	as	a	way	of	thinking	and	consider	 its	 implications	 for	 the	 notion	 of	 cityscape.	 Discourse	analysis	parallels	and	complements	participant-observation	and	semi-structured	 interviews.	 I	 do	not	present	 the	 research	 as	 ethnography	even	 though	 ethnographic	methodology	was	 pivotal	 to	 the	 research	design,	particularly	my	approach	to	questions	related	to	the	material	practice	of	favela	integration	as	a	state	intervention,	the	production	of	the	urban	space	mediated	through	state	projects,	and	the	socio-spatial	differentiations	 dependent	 on	 the	 favela/cidade	 categorical	 binary.	Additionally,	 three	 researchers	 who	 employed	 discourse	 analysis	 to	
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inform	 and	 guide	 their	 ethnographic	 inquiries	 were	 especially	influential	to	the	formative	ideas	to	my	research.	Emphasizing	discourse	analysis	within	ethnographic	inquiry	is	particularly	useful	when	the	researcher	engages	the	concept	of	‘state’	or	 the	 workings	 of	 policy	 and	 social	 programming.	 Gupta	 (1995;	2012)	argues	that	discourse	analysis	compensates	for	methodological	weaknesses	 of	 participant-observation.	 Face-to-face	 encounters	 “in	the	 field”	 and	 in	 close	 proximity	 to	 “the	 other”	 are	 not	 enough	 to	understand	 how	 the	 state	 is	 constructed.	 Research	 subjects	 and	informants	are	 contained	 to	a	 localised	area	 (the	 researcher-defined	field-site),	but	they	regularly	engage	with	media	operating	beyond	the	local	 geography.	 Discourse	 analysis	 allows	 an	 extension	 of	 the	analytical	 framework	 beyond	 the	 traditional	 geographically	 defined	locality	of	the	neighbourhood.		Employing	 on	 discourse	 analysis,	 Ferguson	 (1990)	 revealed	how	 the	 international	 paradigm	 of	 “development”	 consolidated	 a	specific	type	of	knowledge	necessary	to	construct	poor	countries,	and	socioeconomic	 relations	 of	 regions	 within	 poor	 countries,	 as	knowable	 objects	 that	 are	 subject	 to	 “development”	 knowledge.	Scholars	or	civil	servants	write	country	reports	and	project	plans	that	may	 directly	 contradict	 published	 data	 or	 their	 own	 personal	knowledge	in	order	to	construct	a	targeted	region/country	as	subject	and	responsive	to	the	tools	of	development.	Although	it	is	a	leap	from	“development”	 in	 Lesotho	 to	 “favela	 integration”	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	Ferguson’s	 observation	 that	 “thinking	 is	 as	 ‘real’	 an	 activity	 as	 any	other,	 and	 that	 ideas	 and	 discourses	 have	 important	 and	 very	 real	social	 consequences	 […]”	 (1990:	 xv)	 was	 especially	 helpful.	Consequently,	 I	 sought	 to	 design	 a	 research	 project	 that	 would	uncover	some	of	the	“very	real	social	consequences”	that	result	from	a	possible	 paradigm	 shift	 in	 thinking	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	the	favelas	of	Rio	and	state-stimulated	urban	development.		
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Finally,	 Tarlo	 conducted	 analysis	 on	 various	 genres	 of	 text—historical	 intellectual	 accounts,	 political	 propaganda,	 bureaucratic	documents,	and	a	museum	exhibition—in	her	study	of	The	Emergency	(1975-1977)	 in	 India	under	Prime	Minister	 Indira	Gandhi.	Discourse	permeates	 the	 “everyday”	 through	 various	 types	 of	 media;	 and	 the	strategy	 of	 collecting	 data	 for	 discourse	 analysis	 can	 simultaneously	engage	with	critical	reflexive	processes	that	define	ethnography.	Tarlo	blends	 the	 two	methods	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 she	 gathered	 productive	ethnographic	data	while	conducting	archival	research	 in	a	municipal	records	 office	 and	 while	 scrutinizing	 the	 historiography	 of	 Indira	Gandhi	and	her	family	in	their	family	home-turned	museum.		This	chapter	is	structured	in	eight	sections.	The	first	details	the	context	in	which	I	began	fieldwork	and	how	the	research	project	came	close	 to	 a	 radical	 change	 given	 the	 sudden	 appearance	 of	 urban	protests	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro.	 Section	 3.2	 builds	 on	 the	 literatures	 of	‘global	 ethnography’	 and	 multi-site	 ethnography,	 ultimately	 arguing	for	an	un-sited	field	through	the	application	of	Henri	Lefebvre’s	spatial	triad.	 In	 section	 3.3,	 I	 lay	 out	 the	 differences	 between	my	 approach	and	that	of	traditional	ethnography.	Discussed	in	greater	detail	below,	my	 approach	 lacked	 the	 process	 of	 embedding	 myself	 in	 a	 place,	community,	or	institution,	but	I	maintain	that	both	the	fieldwork	and	analysis	were	 fundamentally	 ethnographic.	 Sections	3.4,	 3.5,	 and	3.6	elaborate	on	each	of	 the	 three	 strategies	used	 to	 collect	and	analyse	data:	participant	observation,	discourse	analysis,	and	semi-structured	interviews,	 in	 that	 order.	 Finally,	 I	 discuss	 relevant	 ethical	considerations	before	closing	with	a	chapter	summary.		
4.1	Beginning	fieldwork	and	reflections	on	a	path	not	taken		Prior	 to	 initiating	 fieldwork	 the	 research	 design	 relied	 on	 a	hybrid	of	urban	ethnography	and	ethnography	of	 the	state;	however	during	 fieldwork	I	deviated	from	this	design	 in	two	significant	ways.	
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First,	 there	 was	 a	 temporary	 shift	 in	 focus	 during	 six	 months	 of	intense	urban	dissent	and	disruption	that	occurred	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro	in	 2013.	 The	 second	 deviation	 was	 the	 realisation	 that	 I	 could	 not	conduct	 traditional	 ethnography	 given	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 project’s	principal	 research	 question	 and	 constraints	 faced	 while	 in	 the	 field	(related	 to	 time,	 resources,	 and	 research	 ethics).	 Both	 of	 these	deviations	are	discussed	below.	Not	only	does	detailing	the	‘paths	not	taken’	enrich	the	methodological	discussion,	it	also	indicates	what	this	project	ultimately	pursued.	Moreover,	while	 this	monograph	neither	centres	 on	 popular	 resistance	 nor	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 traditional	ethnography,	 acts	 of	 dissent	 were	 ever-present	 during	 fieldwork	 as	well	as	analysis	and	the	production	of	data,	and	it	follows	many	of	the	principles	(if	not	the	form)	of	ethnography.		Formal	 fieldwork	 began	 in	 April	 2013	 and	 ended	 in	 October	2014.28	 After	 the	 first	 six	 months,	 I	 returned	 to	 London	 for	 two	months,	 during	 which	 I	 met	 with	 supervisors	 and	 presented	 and	discussed	 research	 progress	 and	 possible	 shifts	 in	 focus.	 A	 pressing	concern	 was	 whether	 to	 include	 the	 growing	 social	 movements	 of	dissent	into	my	research	design.	Roughly	two	months	after	my	arrival,	in	 mid-June	 2013,	 urban	 protests	 erupted	 across	 Brazil	 (Maricato	2013).	Rio	de	 Janeiro	quickly	became	 the	vanguard	of	urban	dissent	with	 regular	 protests	 and	 extended	 occupations	 outside	 the	governor’s	private	residence	and	the	Municipal	Legislature	(Venturini																																																									28	Prior	to	systematically	collecting	data,	I	conducted	three	preliminary	trips	to	Rio	de	 Janeiro	 between	 2010	 and	 2013	 totalling	 eight	 weeks	 in	 order	 to	 elaborate	 a	research	project	proposal,	 familiarise	myself	with	 the	city,	 collect	various	 relevant	texts	 (newspaper	 clippings,	 government	 promotional	 materials	 about	 urban	redevelopment,	 and	 scholarly	 books)	 and	 gain	 valuable	 language	 experience.	 I	learned	 Portuguese	 rapidly	 due	 to	 the	 language’s	 similarity	 to	 Spanish.	 Prior	 to	beginning	 the	 PhD,	 I	 lived	 in	 Buenos	 Aires	 from	 2008-2011	where	 I	 completed	 a	master’s	 degree	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Buenos	 Aires.	 In	 2010	 I	 began	 Portuguese	language	 classes,	 which	 continued	 through	 2011.	 After	 my	 move	 to	 London	 I	continued	 private	 study,	 largely	 through	 regular	 reading	 of	 Brazilian	 newspapers	and	 texts	 relevant	 to	 my	 research.	 I	 spoke	 fluently	 by	 the	 time	 I	 began	 formal	fieldwork.		
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2016).	 The	 street	 demonstrations	made	 for	 sensationalist	 headlines	that	 dominated	 the	 newspapers	 and	 vexed	 politicians	 for	 months	(Amar	 2013;	 Solano,	 Manso,	 and	 Novaes	 2014).	 Commentators	criticized	President	Dilma’s	and	the	PT’s	meek	support	of	protestors’	rights,	and	public	approval	of	Rio’s	Governor,	Sergio	Cabral,	dropped	to	 single	 digits,	 the	 lowest	 of	 any	 sitting	 executive	 politician	 in	 the	country	 (Saad-Filho	2013).	While	protests	 in	 June	and	 July	attracted	hundreds	 of	 thousands	 of	 Cariocas,	 participation	 withered	 by	September.	Relatively	small	street	marches	continued	semi-regularly	well	 into	 2014,	 particularly	 in	 the	 run	 up	 to	 and	 through	 the	 FIFA	Men’s	World	Cup	Tournament,	and	then	for	the	most	part	ceased.	As	a	critical	geographer	with	a	history	in	grassroots	organizing,	I	began	accompanying	the	protests,	which	were	profoundly	urban	and	relatable	 to	 the	 literatures	 that	 informed	 my	 research	 questions.	 I	frequented	 street	 demonstrations,	 protest	 encampments,	 activist	planning	 meetings,	 and	 social	 events.	 Some	 of	 the	 resistance	 was	directly	 related	 to	 my	 research,	 particularly	 protests	 organised	 by	favela	 activists.	 I	 continued	 to	 collect	 data	 following	 my	 defined	research	questions,	 collecting	news	and	popular	media,	political	 and	technocratic	texts	related	to	the	urbanisation	and	integration	of	Rio’s	favelas;	 but	 I	 also	 took	extensive	notes	while	 conducting	participant	observation	 of	 urban	 resistance	 and	 collected	 texts	 related	 to	 the	protests	with	the	objective	of	carving	out	a	significant	portion	of	my	dissertation	 to	discuss	urban	dissent	 and	 the	 right	 to	 the	 city.29	The	two-month	pause	in	my	fieldwork,	during	November	and	December	of	2013,	 provided	 opportunity	 to	 organise	 research	 materials	 and	contextualise	 the	 seemingly	 spontaneous	 grassroots	 dissent	 on	 the																																																									29	 Throughout	 the	 protests	 I	 wrote	 blogs	 and	 essays	 about	 the	 radical	 social	movements	organizing	and	leading	dissent	(Landesman	2013a;	2013b;	2014a),	the	particularities	of	favela-organised	protests	(Landesman	2014b),	and	the	significance	of	media	activism	and	citizen	journalists	in	both	reporting	and	producing	resistance	(Landesman	and	Davis,	Forthcoming).	
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one	hand	and	the	state	governance	and	planning	programmes	to	make	Rio	de	Janeiro	more	equitable	and	socially	cohesive	on	the	other	hand.	I	 synthesised	 my	 fieldwork	 and	 initial	 findings	 into	 a	 short	presentation	delivered	to	a	small	group	of	faculty	and	PhD	students	at	the	 LSE	 Department	 of	 Geography	 &	 Environment.	 Despite	 the	potential	 links	 between	 the	 new	 urban	 social	 movements	 and	 state	spatial	 strategies	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 following	 the	 protests	 as	 a	 new	principal	centre	to	the	research	would	have	meant	rapidly	designing	a	new	 set	 of	 research	 questions	 and	 put	 pressure	 on	 the	 ability	 to	complete	 fieldwork	 as	 events	 would	 determine	 research	 timing.	 I	decided	 to	 return	 to	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 and	 refocus	 on	 the	 original	objective	of	interrogating	the	paradigm	of	favela	integration.		Despite	 the	 decision	 to	 refocus	 the	 research	 on	 the	 state	paradigm	 of	 favela	 integration	 and	 the	 specific	 programmes	 and	projects	meant	 to	 realise	 the	 idealised	 integrated	 city,	 following	 the	protests	 and	 social	movements	proved	beneficial	 on	multiple	 fronts.	The	 public	 debates	 instigated	 by	 the	 protests	 rapidly	 advanced	 my	understanding	 of	 local	 politics,	 the	 legislative	 process,	 and	 public	security	 policies.	 Conducting	 participant-observation	 at	demonstrations,	 occupations	 and	 additional	 events	 brought	me	 into	contact	with	many	local	activists,	civil	society	actors,	 journalists,	and	state	employees	relevant	to	the	original	project.	One	contact	I	met	at	a	protest	in	July	2013	worked	at	the	municipal	Instituto	Pereira	Passos	(IPP),	 which	 administered	 UPP	 Social.	 He	 later	 introduced	 me	 to	various	 UPP	 Social	 employees	 and	 became	 a	 close	 friend.	 My	experience	following	the	protests	also	bought	me	some	“street	credit”	with	certain	audiences,	particularly	activists	but	also	critical	thinking	technocrats	and	architects	who	sympathized	with	the	protestors	and	found	 their	 right-to-the-city	 discourse	 enticing.	 On	 more	 than	 one	occasion	 I	 was	 introduced	 as	 a	 researcher	 of	 urban	 dissent	 or	 a	researcher	interested	in	state	urbanisation	of	 favelas	but	who	also	is	
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“very	involved	with	the	protests	of	2013.”	These	introductions	piqued	the	 interests	 of	 potential	 research	 participants.	 I	 would	 offer	 a	corrective	 contextualisation	 of	 my	 research	 objectives;	 but	 my	experience	 and	 perspective	 on	 the	 urban	 protests	 as	 a	 foreign	researcher	with	a	history	of	grassroots	organizing	provided	useful	as	a	 conversation	 topic	 in	 many	 situations.	 To	 some	 extent	 this	engagement	might	be	 considered	a	 form	of	 exchange—I	was	able	 to	offer	 insight,	with	 a	 certain	degree	of	 expertise	 and	 familiarity,	 on	 a	timely	topic	in	which	people	were	interested,	prior	to	soliciting	their	knowledge	 and	 expertise	 as	 architects,	 planners,	 or	 advocates	connected	to	the	state	programmes	I	was	examining.	Of	course,	these	exchanges	 were	 weighted	 to	 my	 benefit.	 Even	 so,	 in	 certain	 cases	conversations	 about	 the	 2013	 protests	 and	 urban	 resistance	 both	established	 common	 intellectual	 ground	 as	 well	 as	 signalled	 to	participants	my	critical	approach.	Lastly	 I	 believe	 that	 the	 seemingly	 spontaneous	 protests	 and	nascent	 urban	 social	 movements	 of	 2013-2014	 demanded	 critical	discussions	 about	 the	 current	 state	 of	 the	 city	 in	 the	 media,	professional	 associations	 and	 networks,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 ordinary	conversations	between	residents.	As	such,	many	research	participants	offered	 critical	 analysis	 of	 state	 interventions	 in	 the	 favelas,	 often	pointing	 out,	 unprompted,	 discrepancies	 between	 official	 discourse	and	 their	 lived	 experience.	 I	 cannot	 speculate	 as	 to	 whether	widespread	critical	reflection	resulted	from	the	protests—indubitably	many	 of	 my	 research	 participants	 have	 a	 long	 history	 of	 critical	thinking—but	I	have	no	doubt	that	 the	extended	moment	of	popular	resistance	in	2013-2014	and	the	various	movements	that	continue	in	its	 wake	 made	 dissent	 more	 visible	 and	 weakened	 the	 hegemonic	consensus	defining	favela	integration	and	the	integrated	city.		
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4.2	Defining	the	field	using	Lefebvre’s	spatial	triad	Conducting	 a	 thorough	 inquiry	 of	 the	 urban	 state	 requires	 a	departure	from	the	traditional	clearly	defined	field-site.	Because	“the	state”	 and	 “the	 city”	 are	 not	 reducible	 to	 neatly	 defined	neighbourhoods,	 the	 traditional	 site	 of	 urban	ethnography	 (Hannerz	2003),	 the	 field	necessarily	must	be	 constructed	on	a	different	 scale	according	 to	different	parameters.	A	growing	number	of	 researchers	have	begun	to	practice	and	advocate	for	multi-site	ethnography	since	George	Marcus’s	 (1995)	 influential	 article	 arguing	 that	 ethnographic	research	 in	 a	 transnational	 capitalist	 world	 requires	 researchers	 to	free	 themselves	 from	 the	 bounded	 limitations	 of	 single-sited	ethnography	 (for	 examples	 of	 multi-site	 ethnography	 of	 informal	housing	settlements,	see	Ghertner	2015;	M.	Richmond	2015).		The	 rise	 of	 globalisation	 as	 a	 field	 of	 study	 led	 to	 the	 global	
ethnography,	 for	which	Michael	Burawoy	and	his	 collaborating	 team	abandoned	 the	 Chicago	 School	 field-site	 in	 order	 to	 study	 the	relationships	between	constructed	“fields”	(Burawoy	et	al.	2000).	This	redesign	 of	 ethnography	 unsurprisingly	 results	 in	 pragmatic	 and	conceptual	 complications.	 Candea	 (2009)	 argues	 that	 multi-site	ethnography	 ignores	 the	 benefits	 of	 constructing	 a	 single	 site—principally	 the	 methodological	 benefits	 of	 clear	 inclusion/exclusion	criteria—and	that	it	naively	presumes	that	transgressing	a	single	site	invariably	results	in	a	more	complete	knowledge.	Cook	and	colleagues	(Cook,	Laidlaw,	and	Mair	2009)	support	Candea’s	critique,	noting	that	advocates	of	multi-site	ethnography	falsely	presume	that	single-sited	ethnographies	 are	 somehow	 less	 rich	 or	 less	 complex.	 They	 instead	move	conceptually	beyond	site	as	a	container	in	which	the	researcher	collects	data	by	applying	the	geographical	concepts	of	space,	place	and	
field.	Field,	they	argue	is	simply	“the	sum	total	of	all	the	points	in	the	network	 […]	 examined”	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 ethnography	 (Ibid.	 60).	
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Thus	 the	 researchers	 ‘un-site’	 the	 field	 in	 which	 the	 ethnography	occurs,	allowing	 the	researcher	 to	 follow	 leads	 to	diverse	places	and	spaces.		My	own	research	does	not	seek	 to	understand	 the	whole	of	a	world	system,	follow	ethnic	diasporas	or	migration	patterns,	examine	transnational	 capital	 flows	 or	 any	 research	 topic	 explicitly	 noted	 by	Marcus	 in	his	original	 call	 for	multi-sited	ethnographies.	Nor	does	 it	follow	 Burawoy’s	 theories	 of	 the	 globalisation	 of	 capital	 and	transnational	 labour.	 Nonetheless	 the	 debate	 is	 relevant	 to	 my	methodological	 framework	 because	 constructing	 a	 singular	 or	 finite	number	of	 field-site(s)	 as	 criteria	 for	 inclusion/exclusion	 is	 counter-intuitive	 to	 the	 research	 questions	 at	 hand.	 Favela	 integration	 is	discursively	 produced	 through	 an	 array	 of	media—political	 rhetoric	and	 technical	 documents,	mainstream	news	media	 and	 online	 social	networks—and	experienced	not	only	in	the	favelas	during	the	public	works	financed	by	the	state	programmes	but	also	favela	tourism,	baile	
funk	dance	parties	frequented	by	middle	class	youth,	artist	exhibitions	both	in	favelas	and	museums,	press	conferences	and	protests.	Rather	than	 privileging	 one	 or	 two	 specific	 places	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 and	gathering	data	 through	observing	and	participating	 in	 the	daily	 lives	of	 corresponding	 inhabitants,	 I	 collected	 data	 in	 order	 to	 trace	 the	socio-spatial	 process	 of	 favela	 integration	 and	 the	 re-visioning	 of	cityscape	across	the	city.	Over	the	course	of	my	fieldwork,	I	sought	out	where	 integration	 discourse	 was	 produced	 and	 practiced,	 or	alternatively	 where	 integration	 was	 contested	 and	 resisted	 through	countervailing	 discourse	 or	 acts	 of	 protest.	 Physical	 boundaries	demarcating	 the	 field-site	 are	 therefore	 supplanted	 by	 spatial	parameters	of	state	intervention.		In	order	 to	 translate	 this	 conceptualisation	of	 field-as-spatial-process	 into	 the	 pragmatic	 selection	 of	 networked	 points	 (to	 follow	Cook	 et	 al.	 2009),	 I	 rely	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Henri	 Lefebvre.	 Lefebvre	
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sought	 to	 lay	 the	 foundations	 for	 a	 ‘science	 of	 space’	 in	 his	 seminal	work,	The	Production	 of	 Space	 (1991)	 through	disassociating	mental	
space—which	he	characterised	as	realms	created	by	philosophers	and	intellectuals	 to	categorise	knowledge	by	discipline	and	 framework—and	physical	space—which	he	defined	as	the	practice	of	listing	things	in	 space—from	 social	 space.	 Social	 [ontological]	 space,	 argued	Lefebvre,	 is	 a	 set	 of	 ‘creative’	 relations	 and	 forms.	 Both	 ‘work	 and	
product’,	space	is	the	materialisation	of	‘social	being’’’	(Ibid.,	102).		The	concept	of	space	as	a	social	process—rather	than	a	static	background	 in	 which	 social	 relations	 and	 behaviours	 manifest—radically	 influenced	 the	 social	 sciences	 in	 what	 theorists	 label	 the	
spatial	 turn	 (Massey	 2005;	 Warf	 and	 Arias	 2009).30	 Lefebvre	conceptualised	 space	 as	 a	 concrete	 abstraction,	 “a	 universal	 form	 of	social	 practice”	 (Stanek	 2011,	 134).	 Building	 on	 Hegel	 and	 Marx,	Lefebvre	 states	 that	 space	 is	 both	 abstract—in	 the	 sense	 that	 as	 a	concept	it	generalises	distinct	materialities—and	real—giving	form	to	the	social	relations	necessary	to	engender	productive	forces	(although	he	does	concede	that	space	is	not	as	tangible	as	Marx’s	commodity	or	
money)	(Lefebvre	1991,	27).		Of	 the	 triad	 mental-physical-social	 space,	 Lefebvre	 further	conceptualises	 social	 space	 into	 a	 second	 dual	 triad	 of	 perceived,	conceived,	 and	 lived	 space	 and	 spatial	 practice,	 representations	 of	space	and	spaces	of	representation.	Most	Lefebvre	scholars	agree	on	the	pairing	between	the	parallel	triads	(that	is	perceived	space/spatial	practice,	 conceived	 space/representations	 of	 space,	 and	 lived	space/spaces	 of	 representation)	 as	 well	 as	 basic	 categorical	definitions	 of	 the	 triad	 terminology	 (Stanek	 2011,	 129).																																																									30	 Indeed	 the	 work	 of	 Lefebvre	 has	 become	 so	 widespread	 that	 his	 radical	positionality	 as	 a	 Marxist	 philosopher	 is	 often	 ignored,	 and	 indeed	 some	 of	 his	work—particularly	his	‘right	to	the	city’	framework	(1996)—has	been	appropriated	by	 mainstream	 liberal	 institutions	 and	 discourse	 (for	 example	 see:	 UN-Habitat	report	(2010)	titled	The	Right	to	the	City:	Bridging	the	Urban	Divide).	
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Representations	of	space,	or	conceived	space,	have	been	described	as	‘discourses	 on	 space’	 (Shields	 1999),	 and	 associated	 with	 fields	 of	knowledge	 (for	 example	 urban	 planning,	 mathematics,	 and	architecture):	 the	mental	 or	 imagined	 spaces	 of	maps,	 plans,	 design	schemata	and	so	on.	Lefebvre	warns	that	ideology	is	often	imbued	in	conceived	space	disguised	as	knowledge	(1991,	45)	and	subsequently	enacted	 through	 spatial	 practices.	 Spatial	 practices,	 or	 perceived	space,	 are	 material	 interventions	 into	 the	 physicality	 of	 the	environment:	 for	 example	 engineering	 works	 related	 to	infrastructure,	 housing	 complexes	 or	 constructed	 boundaries	 (walls,	demarcations	 of	 national	 territories	 etc…).	 Finally,	 spaces	 of	representation,	 or	 lived	 space,	 are	 fluid	 and	 defined	 by	 everyday	actions	 of	 those	 actors	 inhabiting	 space,	 appropriating	 symbols	 and	reproducing	 social	 meaning.	 Shields	 (1996)	 named	 lived	 space	discourses	of	space	(as	opposed	to	the	discourses	on	space	associated	with	 conceived	 space).	 These	 three	 interlocking	 and	 interdependent	processes	work	together	in	the	production	of	space.	Thinking	about	social	phenomena	 through	 this	 three-pronged	conceptualisation	of	 space	can	be	confusing.	The	difference	between	spatial	practices/perceived	space	and	spaces	of	representation/lived	space	 can	 seem	 particularly	 nuanced,	 subtle,	 or	 overlapping.	Conceived	space	is	identified	easily	enough	by	its	mental	abstraction;	like	a	photograph,	it	means	to	represent	something	more	complex.	It	relies	 on	 experiential	 knowledge	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 photograph)	 or	technical	 knowledge	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 an	 engineering	 blueprint)	 to	understand	the	implications	of	the	abstraction.	Perhaps	the	difficulty	in	 clearly	 delineating	 spatial	 practice	 from	 spaces	 of	 representation	(note	that	rigid	categorisation	is	not	the	objective	since	the	conceptual	triad	is	only	valid	when	considered	together)	is	that	these	two	spaces	both	seem	to	be	physical,	material,	and	tangible.	But	materiality	does	not	act	as	a	defining	attribute	in	Lefebvre’s	triad.	Spatial	practice	does	
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deal	 with	 physicality,	 but	 necessarily	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 subjective	interpretation	of	physical	form.	It	is	not	simply	what	we	see,	but	how	we	see	(and	 in	 the	 instances	of	 intervention,	how	we	act),	hence	 the	pairing	 of	 spatial	 practice	 and	 perceived	 space.	 Lived	 space	 is	 less	closely	associated	with	physical	form	and	more	concerned	with	social	meanings	 that	 are	 (re)produced	 when	 social	 actors	 appropriate	(inhabit)	physical	forms	through	spatial	(inter)actions.		As	 noted	 by	 Pierce	 and	 Martin	 (2015)	 the	 most	 common	application	of	Lefebvre’s	Production	of	Space	is	to	empiricise	one	leg	of	the	spatial	triad	in	order	to	analyse	a	set	of	data	while	abstracting	from	the	other	 two.	However,	 this	violates	Lefebvre’s	 insistence	 that	“the	 triadic	 relations	 are	 always	 simultaneous	 and	 co-constituting:	conception,	for	example,	never	proceeds	separately	from	the	traces	of	practice	or	experience,	and	must	always	be	simultaneous	rather	than	partial	or	fragmented”	(Ibid.,	1286).	The	authors	do	sympathize	with	colleagues	and	acknowledge	that	Lefebvre	seemed	uninterested	in	the	applicability	 of	 the	 spatial	 triad	 outside	 of	 historical	 analysis.	 They	argue	 that	 a	 relational-place	 approach	 is	 the	 best	 way	 to	 study	 the	production	 of	 space	 as	 a	 unity	 object,	 concluding	 that,	 “a	 relational	place-oriented	approach	exerts	a	kind	of	methodological	demand	that	researchers	acknowledge	the	epistemological	multi-dimensionality	of	places”	(Ibid,	1295).	In	dong	so	they	build	on,	and	critique,	the	work	of	Merrifield	(1993)	who	argued	for	a	reconciliation	of	the	two	concepts	through	 a	 Marxist	 dialectic—space	 as	 a	 process	 and	 place	 as	 the	concrete	 location—in	which	 the	 spatial	 triad	 liberates	place	 from	 its	Cartesian	confinements.		While	Pierce	and	Martin’s	paper	is	epistemologically	useful,	the	implications	for	fieldwork	methods	are	far	from	explicit	and,	similarly	to	 Merrifield,	 their	 arguments	 imply	 the	 application	 of	 a	 spatial	analytical	 framework	 to	 a	 bounded	 site	 or	 place.	 Increasingly	ethnographers	appear	 to	design	a	methodological	approach	with	 the	
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spatial	triad	in	mind—for	example	Rickly	(2016)	on	the	body	and	the	production	of	rock	climbing	spaces;	Petersen	and	Minnery	(2013)	on	the	meaning	 of	 home	 for	 older	 people	 living	 in	 retirement	 housing;	Shortell	and	Brown	(2016)	on	walking	and	urban	ethnography	of	The	European	 City;	 and	 Jones	 and	 Popke	 (2010)	 on	 a	US	Department	 of	Housing	 demolition	 and	 rebuild	 intervention.	 Predominantly,	however,	 urban	 ethnographers	 have	 applied	 Lefebvre’s	 theories	 on	the	production	of	space	as	a	theoretical	tool	of	spatial	analysis	rather	than	 as	 a	 guide	 towards	 a	 spatialised	 methodology	 (for	 example	Vargas	2006;	Zeiderman	2008).		Knott	goes	further	than	most	in	explicating	the	methodological	implication	 of	 Lefebvre’s	 theories	 in	 her	 decade-long	 project	 to	develop	 a	 spatial	 approach	 to	 studying	 religion	 (Knott	 2005;	 Knott	2009;	Knott	2015).	She	writes,	“the	aspects	of	space—developed	from	Lefebvre's	 spatial	 triad—provide	 a	 way	 of	 breaking	 open	 a	 place,	object	 or	 event	 with	 reference	 to	 its	 spatial	 routines	 and	representations”	(Knott	2009,	417).	She	argues	that	a	well-developed	spatial	 framework,	 building	 on	 Lefebvre’s	 Production	 of	 Space	 and	subsequent	 theorists	 associated	 with	 the	 spatial	 turn	 (D.	 Harvey	1992;	 Soja	 1996;	 Massey	 2005),	 constitutes	 a	 methodology	 as	 “a	system	 of	 principles,	 practices,	 and	 procedures	 applied	 […].	 Rather	than	 a	 set	 of	 practical	methods—which	we	 often	 associate	with	 the	idea	 of	 methodology—this	 approach	 is	 analytical	 and	 interpretive.	Although	 it	would	 certainly	 inform	 the	 collection	 of	 data,	 it	 is	 not	 a	guide	 to	 the	means	by	which	 those	data	 should	be	 collected”	 (Knott	2005,	176).		Following	 Knott,	 I	 submit	 an	 explicit	 methodological	operationalisation	 of	 Lefebvre’s	 triad	 to	 construct	 an	 un-sited	 field.	The	field,	that	spatial	process	producing	favela	integration,	supplants	the	 site	 in	 facilitating	 the	 locating	 of	 data.	 I	 thus	 engage	 with	 the	literature	on	global,	multi-	and	un-sited	ethnography	in	order	to	build	
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on	 the	 methodological	 applications	 of	 Lefebvre’s	 spatial	 theories,	particularly	 Knott’s	 acknowledgment	 of	 how	 those	 theories	 inform	the	collection,	if	not	the	method,	of	data.	By	naming	favela	integration	a	spatial	process	I	necessarily	triggered	the	spatial	triad,	which	in	turn	demanded	the	collection	of	data	corresponding	to	the	three	prongs	of	the	triad.	This	translated	into	seeking	out	those	locations	where	favela	integration	 was	 produced	 without	 fretting	 whether	 or	 not	 it	corresponded	to	a	fixed-location	field-site:	diverse	texts	that	produce	the	 policy	 and	 interventions	 meant	 to	 engender	 the	 integrated	 city	(laws,	 programme	 literature,	 expert	 analysis,	 political	 speeches)	 as	well	as	 texts	 in	response	(from	civil	 society,	news	media,	citizens	on	social	 media),	 research	 seminars	 on	 favelas	 and	 public	 policy	 at	universities,	 debates	 about	 improving	 auto-constructed	 homes	 as	complementary	 to	 social	 housing	 construction	 at	 the	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	Architects	Association,	the	physical	work	sites	of	project	interventions	and	 their	 finished	 results;	 art	 exhibitions	 and	 cultural	 events—from	the	 Art	 Museum	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 to	 an	 open-air	 photography	installation	 in	 the	 gardens	 of	 the	 National	 Palace,	 to	 a	 one-day	“cultural	occupation”	in	the	favela	of	Vila	Matinha	in	the	Complexo	de	Alemão—meant	 to	 curate	 comment	 and	 debate	 on	 the	 historic	transformations	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro	as	an	unequal	and	segregated	city;	public	 debates	 about	 gentrification	 in	 Vidigal	 or	 security	 and	 police	repression	in	Alemão,	or	the	screening	of	a	documentary	about	favela	tourism	projected	 on	 to	 a	white	 sheet	 hung	 between	 two	posts	 in	 a	public	square	in	the	middle-class	neighbourhood	of	Laranjeiras.	In	 sum,	 the	 field	 constructed	 around	 a	 spatial	 process	facilitated	my	own	movement	(both	physical	and	conceptual)	between	discursive	 and	 conceived	 imaginations	 of	 favela	 integration	(representations	 of	 space/conceived	 space);	 physical	 sites	 of	 state	territorialisation	 meant	 to	 spatially	 practice	 integration,	 such	 as	infrastructure,	 housing,	 or	 policing	 projects	 (spatial	
	 98	
practices/perceived	 space);	 and	 the	 quotidian	 experience	 of	integration,	 that	 is	 the	 everyday	 social	 processes	 and	 relationships	affecting	 and	 affected	 by	 the	 “integration”	 paradigm	 (spaces	 of	representation/lived	space).		
4.3	Ethnographic,	not	ethnography	My	 research	 design,	 questions,	 and	 fieldwork	 objectives	 are	characteristically	ethnographic;	however,	due	to	significant	deviations	from	traditional	methods	resulting	from	decisions	made	while	 in	the	field,	 I	 do	 not	 present	 this	 thesis	 as	 ethnography.	 In	 this	 section	 I	would	 like	 to	make	 a	 claim	 to	 an	 ethnographic	 approach,	 however	 I	first	 must	 acknowledge	 three	 principal	 differences	 that	 preclude	 a	claim	to	ethnography.	I	did	not	embed	myself	in	an	objectively	defined	field-site,	 case,	 or	 institution,	 with	 discernible	 inclusion/exclusion	criteria.	 Relatedly,	 data	 collection	 did	 not	 depend	 on	 my	 personal	relationships	 to	 participants	 or	 tacit	 knowledge	 of	 specific	 places.	Finally,	while	 reflexive,	 analysis	does	not	 continuously	make	explicit	my	own	experience	and	reflexions,	centre	around	finite,	in-depth	case	studies,	 or	 seek	 to	 explain	 socio-cultural	 phenomena	 from	 the	perspective	 or	 through	 the	 voices	 of	 a	 population	 specific	 to	 a	site/field/institution/case.		As	discussed	above,	multi-sited	and	un-sited	ethnography	have	emerged	in	recent	years	in	the	contexts	of	global	and	urban	research	(of	course	the	two	often	overlap).	While	these	progressive	approaches	challenge	 the	 Cartesian	 definition	 of	 field,	 ethnography	 still	fundamentally	 requires	 a	 level	 of	 embeddedness,	 a	 mutual	 adoption	between	 a	 researcher	 and	 a	 community.	 A	 less	 romanticized	characterisation	 may	 not	 require	 “adoption”	 which	 implies	 that	 the	researcher	 is	 considered	part	 of	 the	 community,	 if	 only	 temporarily.	Institutional	 ethnography	 or	 ethnography	 of	 infrastructure	 (for	example	 a	 road)	may	 not	 have	 an	 obvious	 community	 to	which	 the	
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researcher	 approximates	 assimilation.	 In	 such	 cases	 the	 researcher	must	 then	 embed	 themselves	 in	 the	 social	 relations	 that	 define	 the	field	 (for	 example	 see	Uribe	2016;	 P.	Harvey	2005).	 It	 is	 in	 part	 the	tension	of	the	insider/outsider	status	that	produces	rich	and	valuable	analysis	 that	 distinguishes	 ethnography	 from	 other	 qualitative	approaches	(Woodward	2008;	Kondo	1986).		The	privileged	quality	of	data	and	the	closeness	to	the	research	subjects	 requires	 a	 significant	 time	 investment	 in	 order	 to	 build	trusting	relationships	and	to	know	the	field-site,	that	is	to	inhabit	the	space	 in	 the	 Lefebvrean	 sense.	 This	 investment	 may	 be	 greater	 for	non-native	 ethnographers,	 who	 may	 find	 local	 participants	 curious	and	forthcoming,	but	nonetheless	face	handicaps	related	to	language,	local	 history	 and	 customs,	 shared	 social	 networks,	 and	 tacit	knowledge	 of	 place	 and	 culture.	 Non-native,	 and	 non-local,	researchers	 conducting	 ethnography	 in	 the	 favelas	 of	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	may	spend	months	selecting	a	site	and	finding	a	place	to	live,	and	then	months	 more	 building	 a	 local	 network	 of	 trusting	 and	 meaningful	relationships	 with	 neighbours	 and	 potential	 research-participants	(for	 e.g.	 Goldstein	 2003;	 Penglase	 2014;	 Cavalcanti	 2007).	Ethnography	of	 the	 state—for	 example	 through	an	 institution,	 office	of	 state	 bureaucracy,	 or	 project—have	 different	 but	 equally	challenging	barriers	to	entry.	Unless	data	collection	occurs	in	a	public	space,	 the	 researcher’s	 presence	 is	 most	 likely	 subject	 to	 approval	from	 authority	 figures	 before	 navigating	 the	 awkward	 logistics	 of	closely	 observing	 people	 as	 they	 work	 (for	 e.g.	 Gupta	 1995;	Sundaresan	2015;	Zeiderman	2016).		My	 research	 questions	 pertain	 to	 favela	 integration	 as	 a	paradigm—a	 way	 of	 thinking	 about,	 a	 way	 of	 seeing,	 urban	development	 in	 the	 context	 of	 segregation	 and	 inequality	 that	 has	influenced	 academics	 and	 experts,	 civil	 society,	 cultural	 activists,	technocrats,	 and	policy	makers—and	as	a	 collection	of	 state	policies	
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and	 programmes	 that	 target	 the	 favelas	 for	 intervention.	 These	programmes	are	diverse	in	tactics	but	all	profess	similar	objectives	of	ending	the	bifurcation	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	between	the	favela	(informal,	irregular,	 lawless,	 lacking)	 and	 the	 asfalto	 (legal,	 legitimate,	 state	regulated).	 This	 research	 project	 collected	 data	 on	 three	 of	 those	programmes:	(1)	Morar	Carioca,	the	evolution	of	the	celebrated	slum	upgrading	 programme	 Favela-Bairro,	 (2)	 the	 participatory	 data	 and	planning	programme	UPP	Social,	and	(3)	PAC-favelas,	also	a	project	to	“urbanise”	 favelas	 but	 with	 significant	 resources	 for	 “social	infrastructure”	 such	 as	 health	 centres	 and	 schools	 and	 a	predisposition	for	high	profile	“connective”	transport	architecture.	In	addition	to	these	three	programmes	(which	span	the	municipal,	state-province,	 and	 federal	 governments)	 I	 make	 regular	 mention	 of	 a	fourth	 programme,	 the	 “pacifying	 police”	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 UPP,	however	as	explained	in	Chapter	One	I	chose	not	to	focus	my	research	on	the	police	nor	urban	violence/security.	Embedding	myself	 into	all	three	of	these	programmes	simultaneously	or	sequentially,	while	also	leaving	 time	to	explore	 favela	 integration	by	non-state	actors,	would	have	been	impossible	to	achieve	in	equal	depth	given	time	limitations.		While	 the	 physical	 settings	 of	 ethnography	 have	 evolved	beyond	rural	and	easily	demarcated	single	sites,	the	classic	field	diary	and	 notebook	 remain	 standard-requisites	 of	 ethnography	 (Emerson,	Fretz,	and	Shaw	2011;	Goodall	2000).	I	kept	a	diary	while	conducting	fieldwork,	 both	 in	 notebooks	 and	 digitally.	 I	 took	 notes	 while	conducting	 participant	 observation	 during	 site	 visits,	 community	meetings,	 after	 interviews	 and	 conversations,	 and	 protests.	 I	 also	wrote	 regularly	 reflecting	 on	 the	 days	 and	 weeks,	 synthesizing	experiences	 into	 cohesive	 narratives	 or	 potential	 arguments.	 While	reflexive	 and	 detailed,	 I	 did	 not	 make	 writing	 diary	 entries	 a	 strict	habit,	 thus	 failing	 a	 basic	 requisite	 of	 the	 ethnography	 tradition.	Furthermore,	 while	 I	 often	 consulted	 my	 diary	 and	 notes	 while	
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writing	 the	 empirical	 chapters,	 I	 do	 not	 treat	my	 entries	 as	 data	 in	themselves,	 nor	 quote	 those	 entries	 at	 length,	 as	 is	 common	 with	reflexive	ethnographic	analysis	(Burawoy	2003;	Willis	and	Trondman	2000;	Goodall	2000).		My	position	avoids	the	methodological	turf	war	over	what	does	and	does	not	constitute	“real	ethnography”	(Agar	2006;	Ingold	2014)	while	 affirming	 that	 the	 strategies	 included	 in	 the	 ethnographer’s	toolkit	are	valuable	even	if	disassembled	from	the	whole.	Thus	I	view	this	research	as	a	similar	to	those	scholars	that	blur	the	boundaries	of	ethnography	 by	 incorporating	 methods	 such	 as	 discourse	 and	historical	analysis.	Not	only	have	I	built	my	research	questions	upon	a	base	 of	 literature	 rich	 with	 ethnographic	 analysis,	 I	 also	 borrowed	heavily	 from	 the	 tradition	 of	 participant-observation,	 reflexive	 field	notes,	extended	fieldwork,	and	analysis	that	required	the	synthesis	of	varied	qualitative	data.		
4.4	Participant	observation		Ethnographic	 inquiries	 privileging	 participant	 observation	have	 revealed	 new	 understandings	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 in	 a	thoroughly	 urban	 and	 globalised	 world.	 Although	 sociologists	concerned	with	the	social	order	of	political	and	economic	exclusion	in	urban	metropolises	promoted	 ethnographic	 grounded	 theory	during	the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 (Apter	 et	 al.	 2009),	contemporary	researchers	draw	from	a	broad	range	of	critical	social	theory	to	produce	and	promote	novel	forms	of	urban	ethnography	in	the	 age	 of	 the	 mega-city,	 globalisation,	 and	 neoliberalism	 (Snow,	Morrill,	and	Anderson	2003;	Bourgois	2002;	Bourgois	2009;	Burawoy	et	al.	2000;	Wilson	and	Chaddha	2009).	Likewise,	as	the	state	emerged	as	 a	 legitimate	 subject	 of	 ethnographic	 inquiry,	 participant-observation	 has	 presented	 valuable	 new	 analyses	 of	 the	 state’s	changing	 position	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 unyielding	 encroachment	 of	
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transnational	capitalism	(Auyero	2000;	Auyero,	Lara,	and	Berti	2014;	Billo	and	Mountz	2016;	Biehl	and	McKay	2012).		 Participant-observation	 that	 I	 conducted	 in	 the	 field	 can	 be	grouped	into	three	settings.	The	first	is	the	aforementioned	spaces	of	resistance.	 I	draw	 from	protests	and	community	meetings	organised	and	attended	by	 favela	 residents	 and	 civil	 society	directly	 related	 to	state	 interventions	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 “integration,”	 or	 more	 broadly	related	 to	 urban	 inequality,	 segregation,	 violence	 and	 social	 justice.	Protests	 and	 other	 acts	 of	 resistance	 were	 generally	 public	 and	publicized	on	social	media	and	reported	by	news	media.	By	showing	up	and	hanging	out,	marching,	and	listening	to	debates	(at	one	point	baking	 cookies	 and	 bringing	 food	 supplies	 to	 occupiers	 outside	 the	Governor’s	Leblon	penthouse,	outside	 the	Municipal	Legislature,	and	inside	 an	 indigenous	 museum	 and	 cultural	 centre	 adjacent	 to	 the	Maracanã	stadium),	I	met	activists,	organisers,	other	researchers,	and	local	and	international	journalists.	These	moments	led	to	discussions	and	 debates	 that	 I	 would	 later	 record	 in	 notebooks	 or	 as	 audio	dictations	and	would	consider	ethnographic	encounters	(Ingold	2014),	as	well	as	more	introductions	to	new	contacts	which	sometimes	led	to	formal	interviews	and	in	a	few	cases	friendships	that	continue	to	this	day.		 The	second	were	site	visits	to	various	favelas	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	where	Morar	Carioca,	PAC,	and	UPP	Social	were	operating.	The	project	where	 I	 spent	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 time,	 often	 for	 hours	 hanging	about	was	the	PAC	intervention	in	Complexo	do	Alemão,	in	particular	the	flagship	infrastructure	of	the	Teleférico	do	Alemão,	the	first	public	mass-transit	 gondola	 heralded	 by	 local	 and	 national	 politicians.	 I	toured	the	Teleférico	and	Complexo	(in	that	order)	with	a	World	Bank	contractor,	led	by	a	local	entrepreneur	tour	guide.	I	regularly	chatted	with	 residents	 as	 we	 shared	 a	 gondola	 cabin	 and	 employees	 at	 the	station,	librarians	and	doctors	at	their	places	of	work	inside	the	large	
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Teleférico	 stations,	 and	 shop	 owners	 in	 the	 vicinity.	 On	 a	 few	occasions	 I	 visited	 with	 friends—both	 local	 Brazilians	 and	internationals	 (such	 as	 the	 World	 Bank	 contractor)	 who	 were	intrigued	by	the	intervention	and/or	my	research	and	listened	to	their	thoughts	and	opinions.	In	the	case	of	UPP	Social	(described	in	depth	in	Chapter	 Six),	 I	 encountered	 fieldworkers	 in	 action	mapping	 parts	 of	Complexo	do	Alemão	 (as	well	 as	other	 favelas	 such	as	Santa	Marta),	hung	out	with	employees	during	happy	hours	and	after-work	dinners,	and	 in	 one	 instance	was	 able	 to	 sit-in	 on	 a	 training	 session	 for	UPP	Social	 favela	 resident	 fieldworkers	 after	 having	 conducted	 a	 group	interview	 at	 the	 Municipal	 Urban	 Planning	 Institute.	 Participant	observation	 of	 Morar	 Carioca	 was	 more	 structured:	 in-depth	conversations	with	architects	and	urbanists	 involved	past	or	present	with	the	program,	formal	interviews	of	two	architects	(one	junior,	one	senior)	 of	 the	 same	 intervention,	 and	 guided	 visits	 to	 that	 favela	 by	the	 president	 and	 vice	 president	 of	 the	 residents	 association	 early	during	 the	 construction	 (this	 favela	was	 not	 subject	 to	UPP	policing	and	was	controlled	by	a	trafficking	gang).		The	third	was	spaces	of	intellectual	debate,	cultural	events	and	art	 exhibitions.	 The	 interventions	 and	 socio-spatial	 reconfigurations	in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 are	 both	 spectacle	 and	 topic	 of	 heated	 debate	 in	various	mediums.	Already	mentioned	were	the	round	table	seminars	at	local	universities	and	professional	associations.	In	addition	I	sought	out	 cultural	 and	 artist	 exhibitions	 around	 the	 city	 that	 either	exemplified	the	integrated	favela—such	as	an	all	day	and	all	night	art	and	 music	 festival	 in	 the	 hip	 Zona	 Sul	 favela	 of	 Babilônia	 which	attracted	the	city’s	young	avant-garde	artists,	hipsters	and	queers	but	may	have	 fallen	short	on	community	participation—or	that	made	an	explicit	 critique	 of	 favela–cidade	 social	 relations—for	 example	 the	display	of	Anthony	Leeds	archival	photography	during	his	 fieldwork	in	the	favelas	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	titled	“What	Rio	Wanted	to	Deny”	(“O	
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Rio	que	se	queria	negar”)31	hosted	in	the	National	Palace	of	Catete,	the	permanent	 art	 installation	 of	 the	 favela	 model	 Morrinho	 (Angelini	2016;	 Angelini	 2015;	 G.	 Jones	 2011)	 at	 the	 Rio	 Art	Museum,	 or	 the	exhibition	of	amateur	photography	clubs	of	Complexo	do	Alemão	and	Complexo	da	Maré	 at	 the	Afro-Brazilian	Museum	of	Pretos	Novos.	 In	these	 cases	 I	 followed	 in	 the	 steps	 of	 Tarlo	 (2003),	 treating	 these	spaces	 as	 discourse	 producing	 as	 well	 as	 sites	 of	 possible	ethnographic	encounter.	Reflecting	back	on	 constructing	 the	 field	as	 spatial	process	of	favela	integration,	participant	observation	was	never	conducted	with	the	intent	to	analyse	a	specific	place,	event	or	action;	but	rather	with	the	 aim	 of	 dialoguing	 with	 qualitatively	 distinct	 data	 in	 order	 to	answer	how	the	process	of	favela	integration	was	practiced,	debated,	and	resisted.		
4.5	Discourse	analysis		Discourse	 analysis	 is	 a	 relatively	 new	 addition	 to	 the	methodological	 toolbox	of	 critical	 urban	geographers.	 In	 a	 review	of	the	practice	within	the	disciplinary	literature,	Lees	(2004)	argues	that	researchers	are	too	often	scant	on	the	details	of	their	specific	methods	for	 discriminatorily	 gathering	 texts	 and	 analyzing	 data.	 She	 lodges	two	 major	 critiques	 at	 urban	 geographers	 conducting	 discourse	analysis.	 First,	 she	 posits	 that	 most	 researchers	 are	 ignorant	 that	there	 exist	 two	 distinct	 approaches	 to	 the	 study	 of	 discourse:	structural	 Gramscian-Marxist	 and	 poststructural	 Foucauldian.	 The	former	 relies	 on	 an	 empiricist	 account	 of	 (political)	 rhetoric	 and	semantics	 to	 “discover	 particular	 narrative	 structures,	 issue-framing	and	how	storylines	close	off	certain	trajectories	of	thought	and	action																																																									31	Anthony	Leeds	(1925-1989)	was	a	well-known	anthropologist	who	spent	decades	researching	favela	residents	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	among	other	Latin	American	cities.	He	and	 his	 wife,	 Elizabeth	 Leeds,	 remain	 influential	 references	 of	 Brazilian	 urban	studies.	 The	 photography	 exhibition	 mentioned	 was	 curated	 from	 the	 Anthony	Leeds	archive	at	the	Casa	de	Oswaldo	Cruz,	donated	by	E	Leeds	in	2007.	
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at	the	expense	of	others”	(Ibid.	102).	 In	this	approach,	discourse	 is	a	tool	 to	 wield	 power	 and	 establish	 class	 hegemony;	 and	 discourse	analysis	 illuminates	 that	process	and	 facilitates	 the	 categorisation	of	actors	 into	 political	 groups.	 The	 second	 approach	 follows	 Foucault’s	theory	 that	 actors,	 objects	 and	 agents	 are	 produced	 through	discourse.	 Discourse	 analysis	 of	 the	 poststructuralist	 sort	 therefore	seeks	 to	 uncover	 the	workings	 of	 power	 relations	 by	 examining	 the	societal	 construction	 of	 so-called	 ‘regimes	 of	 truth’	 (Foucault	 1980).	Second,	Lees	charges	practitioners	of	Foucauldian	discourse	analysis	with	 obfuscating	 their	 exact	 data-collecting	 tactics	 and	 analytical	strategies.	Further,	while	critical	urban	scholars	mostly	classify	 their	discourse	 analysis	 as	 Foucauldian,	 she	 argues	 that	 they	 use	poststructural	analysis	 to	examine	the	construction	of	concepts	such	as	 “the	 city”	 or	 “the	 urban”	while	 implicitly	 relying	 on	 a	 Gramscian	concept	of	hegemony	to	make	up	for	Foucault’s	lack	of	explicit	theory	concerning	agency.		Outside	 of	 the	 geography	 discipline,	 discourse	 analysis	 has	long	 been	 used	 to	 examine	 state	 actions	 through	 the	 workings	 of	policy.	Despite	strong	criticism	of	 the	approach	by	some	researchers	across	disciplines	(I.	Parker	and	Burman	1993;	Antaki	et	al.	2002),	 it	has	continued	 to	gain	popularity	 in	 the	urbanist	academic	 literature.	Jacobs	 (2006)	 posits	 that	 the	method	 has	 proliferated	 in	 the	 face	 of	opposition	 because	 it	 facilitates	 a	 critical	 analysis	 of	 power	 and	ideology	within	 the	 policy-making	 process	 and	 because	 it	 addresses	the	 importance	 of	 language	 as	 productive	 and	 active.	 In	 a	 review	of	urban	 ‘policy-as-discourse’	 literature,	 Bacchi	 (2000)	 explains	 the	branches	 of	 discourse	 analysis	 distinctly	 from	 Lees.	 Rather	 than	separating	 the	 poststructural	 from	 the	 structural,	 she	 ignores	 the	Gramscian	 approach	 and	 focuses	 on	 the	 nuances	 of	 poststructural	analysis.	 She	 claims	 that	 within	 the	 policy-as-discourse	 literature,	definitions	 of	 ‘discourse’	 are	hazy	 and	 sometimes	 reduced	 to	 simple	
	 106	
rhetoric	or	strict	text	(readable	but	not	productive).	Furthermore,	she	lodges	 that	many	 researchers	 in	 the	 discipline	 define	 discourse	 and	select	 texts	 according	 to	 their	 political	 ideologies	 and	 research	agendas.	Whereas	those	following	the	trend	in	literary	deconstruction	see	 everything	 as	 text	 to	 be	 interpreted	 by	 the	 ‘reader’,	 social	deconstructionists—Bacchi	 categorises	 most	 policy-as-discourse	analysts	as	such—place	more	emphasis	on	the	production	of	the	text	itself.	 Further,	 the	 policy-as-discourse	 camp	 may	 be	 categorised	 as	“affirmative	 postmodernists”	 as	 opposed	 to	 “sceptical	postmodernists.”	 Here	 Bacchi	 follows	 Rosenau’s	 (1991)	 dualist	understanding	 of	 affirmative	 and	 sceptical	 postmodernism	 in	which	the	 ‘sceptics’	 treat	 modernity	 despairingly	 as	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	subject	 and	 the	 “impossibility	 of	 truth”	 whereas	 the	 “affirmatives”	remain	optimistic	that	positive	progressive	change	is	possible	(Bacchi	2000,	 47).	 The	 affirmative	 approach	 is	 an	 ideological	 necessity,	according	 to	 Bacchi,	 if	 the	 researcher	 seeks	 to	 offer	 practical	recommendations	for	improving	policy.	In	 reviewing	 contributions	 to	 the	 policy-as-discourse	literature,	 Bacchi	 argues	 that	 policy	 analysts	 view	 discourse	 as	 a	means	 through	 which	 dominant	 groups	 wield	 power.	 Whereas	researchers	 acknowledge	 the	 uses	 and	 the	 effects	 of	 discourse,	 they	tend	to	associate	uses	of	discourse	with	powerful	groups	or	dominant	classes,	 and	 effects	 of	 discourse	 with	 oppressed	 minorities	 or	subjugated	social	classes.	Those	already	wielding	power	exploit	their	privileged	 positions	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 policy,	 institutional	 positions)	 in	order	 to	 use	 discourse	 to	 their	 ideological	 and	 material	 benefit.	Discourse	 in	 turn	 moderates	 what	 can	 be	 said,	 pre-emptively	invalidating	certain	speech	and	silencing	certain	subjects.	Those	with	power	make	discourse	while	those	without	power	suffer	the	effects	of	discourse.	One	reason	 for	 this	 limiting	conceptual	 framework	within	the	policy-as-discourse	literature	is	that	policy	is	a	privileged	form	of	
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discourse,	 constructed	by	 actors	within	or	 close	 to	 state	 institutions	and	relying	on	power	relationships	defined	by	the	state	and	dominant	socio-political	and	economic	 interests.	 If	policy-as-discourse	analysts	focus	exclusively	on	state	policy,	it	is	far	too	easy	to	slip	into	the	above	false	dualism	of	associating	power	with	using	discourse	and	powerless	with	 suffering	 the	 effects	 of	 discourse.	 As	 a	 result,	 opportunities	 for	resistance	and	change,	or	the	recognition	of	resistance,	are	limited	to	the	 embodied	 experiences	 of	 policy—a	 post-discourse	 reactionary	stance—rather	than	challenges	to	policy	through	discourse.	The	 substantial	 contribution	 from	 the	 policy-as-discourse	approach	 to	my	methodology	 is	 the	premise	 that	social	problems	do	not	exist	a	priori	to	state	intervention.	Rather	policy	itself	discursively	constructs	the	problem	that	it	seeks	to	remedy	or	alleviate.	However,	this	study	does	not	privilege	policy	over	other	forms	of	discourse,	nor	is	 it	 defined	 by	 the	 bureaucratic	 implementation	 of	 policy	 or	 the	political	 processes	 and	 power	 dynamics	 often	 obscured	 by	 the	 dry,	technical	 language	 of	 policy.	 Policy	 is	 only	 one	 of	 the	 text	 genres	collected	while	in	the	field.	Some	of	the	critiques	of	discourse	analysis	raised	 by	 the	 policy	 analysts	 above	 are	 addressed	 simply	 by	expanding	 the	 texts	 selected,	 by	 understanding	 discourse	 as	relational,	 and	 discourse	 analysis	 as	 the	 consideration	 of	 various	types	of	 texts	produced	by	different	 social	 actors.	By	 including	 texts	constructed	by	popular	media,	 citizen-activists	 and	NGOs,	 I	 seek	out	discourses	 that	 question,	 challenge,	 influence	 or	 resist	what	may	 be	considered	 as	 the	 current	 dominant	 discourse.	 Further,	 by	contextualizing	policy-as-discourse	within	the	historical	development	of	 knowledge	 concerning	 the	 favelas,	 I	 seek	 to	delineate	 the	 various	non-state	actors	who	may	have	historically	 influenced	current	policy	making.	I	 followed	 a	 general	 guide	 to	 doing	 Foucauldian	 discourse	analysis	offered	by	Rose	(2007)	and	later	elaborated	by	Waitt	(2010).	
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In	this	approach	there	are	seven	‘stages’	meant	to	guide	(not	dictate)	the	 process	 of	 discourse	 analysis	 (see	 the	 methodological	 appendix	for	 this	 strategy	 presented	 in	 table	 form).	 In	 order	 to	 examine	 the	discursive	 production	 of	 favela	 integration	 and	 consider	 its	implications,	 I	 examine	 various	 texts	 produced	 by	 the	 state	 that	technically	 describe	 current	 projects	 and	 programmes	 meant	 to	integrate	 targeted	 favelas	 as	 well	 as	 political	 texts,	 either	 in	 the	context	of	party	and	electoral	propaganda	or	in	state-produced	media	aimed	to	educate	and	inform	the	public	about	the	current	government	interventions.		My	research	design	follows	the	theoretical	perspective	that	the	state,	 its	 functions,	 programmes	 and	 institutions	 are	 on	 some	 level	discursively	 produced	 externally	 and	 from	 ‘below’.	 State	 discourse	representing	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 city’s	 favelas	 and	 detailing	 the	intentions	 and	 objectives	 of	 public	 projects	 may	 be	 meticulously	managed	and	edited	before	public	consumption,	but	media	produced	by	 private	 enterprises	 or	 ordinary	 citizens	 often	 offer	 counter	narratives	 and	 alternative	 perceptions.	 One	 function	 of	 popular	 and	news	 media	 outlets	 is	 to	 inform	 and	 offer	 commentary	 on	governmental	 actions.	 Likewise	 citizen	 groups,	 non-governmental	organisations,	 favela	 resident	 associations,	 and	 activists	 respond	 to	government	 discourse	 and	 actions	 through	 communiqués,	 direct	actions,	 press	 releases,	 blogs,	 and	 social	 media	 posts.	 Evaluation	 of	such	materials	makes	for	a	richer	analysis	of	how	favela	integration	is	discursively	produced	by	the	state	while	simultaneously	produced	by	those	seemingly	‘external’32	to	the	state.																																																										32	Here	I	draw	on	the	over	simplified	notion	of	insider/outsider	status:	those	actors	employed	 by	 a	 government	 ministry	 or	 institution	 or	 those	 intimately	 related	 to	state	 projects	 are	 considered	 to	work	 ‘inside’	 the	 state	 system	while	 those	 actors	operating	in	the	private	sector	or	civil	society	are	considered	largely	‘outside’	of	the	state.	 The	 boundary	 between	 those	 ‘outside’	 and	 those	 ‘inside’	 is	 wholly	metaphorical.	 Where	 the	 state	 ends	 and	 civil	 society	 or	 private	 sector	 begins	 is	hardly	 ever	 clearly	 delineated,	 yet	 the	 inside/outside	 divide	 is	 reified	 largely	
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Relevant	 here	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 favela	 integration	 occurs	 on	 an	international	 stage,	 prompting	 international	 debate.	 The	 global	spotlight	 is	 principally	 due	 to	 the	 media	 attention	 surrounding	 the	FIFA	World	Cup	and	the	Summer	Olympic	Games,	but	also	in	part	due	to	 the	 novelty	 and	 scale	 of	 the	 state	 interventions,	 the	 trajectory	 of	urban	innovation	in	Brazil,	particularly	in	regards	to	informal	housing	settlements,	and	the	implications	for	other	Latin	American	cities	if	the	“Rio	model”	is	deemed	successful.		My	 approach	 to	 collecting	 texts	 for	 discourse	 analysis—be	 it	materials	related	to	the	protests	or	government	projects—did	not	rely	on	 software	 designed	 to	 collect	 and	 facilitate	 social	 media	 analysis,	nor	did	 it	 follow	any	 formulaic	 inclusion/exclusion	 criteria.	Rather	 I	discovered	texts	much	the	same	way	an	ethnographer	discovers	and	develops	 leads	 in	the	 field.	Sometimes	that	 involved	starting	with	an	expansive	 pool	 of	 texts,	 for	 instance	 the	 Facebook	 event	 pages	 of	 a	protest	 march	 or	 a	 keyword	 search	 in	 the	 archives	 of	 O	 Globo	newspaper.	 From	 that	 starting	 point	 I	 would	 narrow	my	 focus,	 pull	out	 and	 save	 relevant	 posts,	 photos,	 and	 news	 stories	 for	 further	consideration	 and	 eventual	 analysis	 of	 key,	 representational	 texts.	Conversely,	 sometimes	 a	 single	 document	 or	 photo	 that	 I	 happened	across	 online	 or	 mentioned	 by	 a	 research	 contact	 would	 pique	 my	interest.	From	that	singular	reference	point,	 I	may	expand,	collecting	similar	documents	or	 ‘following’	 that	 text	 to	 another.	An	example	of	this	logical	progression:	during	a	preliminary	trip	to	the	field	I	visited	Complexo	do	Alemão,	where	in	the	entry	hall	to	the	gondola	transport	system,	 there	 stood	 on	 display	 a	 photo	 exhibition	 titled	 “A	 Year	 of	Conquests”	 (Um	Ano	de	Conquistas)	 that	documented	both	 the	 initial	military	 occupation	 of	 the	 favela	 by	 the	 armed	 forces	 as	well	 as	 the	physical	 construction	 of	 the	 gondola	 infrastructure.	 Examining	 the																																																									through	discourse	reinforcing	the	social	perception	of	the	state	as	a	wholly	separate	entity	from	society	(Ferguson	and	Gupta	2002).	
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exhibition	and	how	passerby	and	visitors	 interacted	with	the	exhibit	was	an	ethnographic	encounter.	But	when	I	mentioned	that	I	had	seen	the	 exhibition	 to	 the	 social	 communications	 team	 of	 the	 private	company	 that	 operated	 the	 Teleférico	 do	 Alemão,	 they	 gifted	 me	 a	coffee	 table	book	 that	 included	 the	all	of	 the	photos	and	 texts	of	 the	exhibition.	The	book	thus	became	a	complementary	text	to	include	in	the	discourse	analysis.	Furthermore,	when	I	searched	online	for	some	of	 the	 quotes	 cited	 in	 the	 book	 attributed	 to	 executive	 politicians,	 I	‘discovered’	 the	complete	video	of	 the	official	 inauguration	speeches	by	 President	 Dilma,	 Governor	 Cabral,	 and	 Mayor	 Eduardo	 Paes	amongst	other	political	appointees.	While	much	of	 the	data	 I	 collected	on	 the	protests	and	urban	social	 movements	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 1	 was	 set	 aside,	 there	 are	some	significant	pieces	of	data	that	I	have	included,	and	certain	field	experiences	helped	to	shape	my	inquiries	after	returning	to	the	 field	in	 December	 2013.	 For	 example,	 protests	 organised	 by	 favela	residents	 often	 explicitly	 criticized	 or	 formulated	 demands	 of	 state	projects	 that	 constitute	 favela	 integration.	 In	 such	 cases,	 my	observations	 and	 related	 materials	 (news	 clippings	 or	 protest	pamphlets	 for	 example)	 are	 retained	 as	 examples	 of	 counter-hegemonic	discourse.	The	protests	also	turned	me	on	to	social	media	as	 a	 rich	 source	 for	material.	 During	 the	months	 of	 protests	 I	 spent	hours	 following	Twitter	hashtags	and	Facebook	posts,	 reading	blogs,	and	 comment	 threads	 pertaining	 to	 the	 protests	 as	 well	 as	 state	interventions	 in	 the	 favelas.	 I	 took	 screenshots	 and	 saved	 photos	 I	found	relevant	and	interesting	at	the	time,	and	in	some	cases	weaved	them	 into	 the	 intertextual	discourse	analysis,	particularly	 in	 relation	to	 power	 dynamics.	 Thus	 heeding	 Bacchi’s	 (2000)	 warning	 to	 not	present	dominant	discourse	as	the	only	discourse.	A	major	task	was	the	consideration	and	selection	of	texts,	and	finding	a	balance	between	different	genres	while	assuring	that	depth	
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of	 analysis	 is	 not	 sacrificed	 for	 breadth.	 See	 the	 methodological	appendix	for	a	table	of	texts	included	in	discourse	analysis,	separated	by	 genre	 (policy	 documents	 and	 technical	 reports;	 political	 rhetoric	and	propaganda,	news	&	popular	media,	and	citizen	media).	
4.6	Interviews	with	key	informants		Interviews	 and	 in-depth	 conversations	 with	 architects,	planners,	 social	 workers,	 resident	 activists,	 advocates,	 researchers,	and	programme/project	implementers	make	up	another	body	of	data	collected	during	fieldwork.	 In	total,	 I	conducted	formal	 interviews	or	had	 multiple	 in-depth	 conversations	 with	 28	 participants	 (see	methodological	 appendix	 for	 a	 table	 of	 these	 participants	 and	 their	occupation	or	roles	relevant	 to	my	research).	The	majority	of	 formal	interviews	 occurred	 during	 the	 final	 six	 months.	 I	 prepared	extensively	for	each	formal	interview	conducted,	and	only	conducted	interview	 with	 subjects	 I	 deemed	 as	 key-informants	 based	 off	 the	accumulating	 experience	 in	 the	 field.	 With	 three	 exceptions,	 all	interviews	 were	 conducted	 with	 participants	 that	 I	 met	 while	conducting	participant	observation	or	were	introduced	to	me	by	other	interviewees	or	contacts.33		I	had	significant	difficulty	and	ultimately	failed	to	obtain	access	to	employees	at	the	Municipal	Housing	Secretary	(SMH).	I	believe	this	was	a	result	of	various	factors:	i)	2014	was	an	election	year	(although	not	 for	 the	 municipality)	 and	 the	 mayor’s	 government	 wanted	 to	protect	 the	 party	 (PMDB	 held	 both	 the	 mayor’s	 and	 governor’s	offices);	 ii)	 the	 programme	 I	 wished	 to	 discuss,	Morar	 Carioca,	 had	
																																																								33	 Exceptions	were	 the	 President	 of	 the	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 professional	 association	 of	architects	(IAB-RJ),	which	designed	and	administered	the	competition	and	selection	of	 Morar	 Carioca	 projects,	 and	 the	 Supervia	 director	 of	 communications	 and	community	 relations	 and	 one	 of	 his	 team-members	 responsible	 for	 operating	 the	gondola	in	the	Complexo	do	Alemão.	In	both	these	cases	I	made	initial	contact	and	arranged	 for	 an	 interview	 via	 email	 (president	 of	 IAB-RJ)	 or	 navigating	 corporate	bureaucracy	of	communications	(Supervia).	
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received	 a	 string	 of	 bad	 press	 and	 criticism	 from	 local	 experts	 and	academics	 for	 the	 failure	 to	 appropriate	 funds	 and	 some	 creative	bookkeeping	 that	 reclassified	 dozens	 of	 pre-existing	 project	 designs	as	Morar	 Carioca	 projects	 even	 though	 they	 did	 not	 follow	 the	 new	programme	 methodology;	 and	 iii)	 a	 number	 of	 urbanists	 who	 had	signed	on	to	work	with	Morar	Carioca	both	within	the	programme	and	in	 a	 parallel	 civil	 society	 oversight	 committee	 quit	 as	 a	 result	 of	difficulties	 and	 failure	 to	 roll	 out	 promised	 projects.	 In	 lieu	 of	interviewing	 SMH	 employees,	 I	 did	 manage	 to	 interview	 a	 former	employee	(who	at	the	time	worked	for	the	IPP,	where	UPP	Social	was	housed),	one	of	the	programmes	design-consultant	from	civil	society,	a	 number	 of	 architects	 who	 designed	 a	Morar	 Carioca	 intervention,	and	 the	 president	 and	 vice	 president	 of	 the	 resident	 association	corresponding	to	the	same	intervention.		
4.7	A	note	on	ethics			 This	 last	 section	 provides	 a	 brief	 discussion	 of	 ethics	 during	fieldwork.	 Pragmatic	 ethical	 considerations	 most	 relevant	 to	 data	collection	revolve	around	privacy	and	consent	of	the	interviewees.	All	persons	who	spoke	to	me	at	length	about	their	work	understood	that	I	was	conducting	fieldwork	as	an	international	PhD	student	interested	in	critically	examining	the	state	paradigm	of	favela	integration.	In	the	majority	of	cases,	participants	received	an	email	 that	explained	both	my	 research	 objectives	 and	 my	 rationale	 for	 including	 them	 in	 the	research	data.	Data	 gathered	 through	 formal	 interviews	was	neither	personally	 intimate	 nor	 politically	 or	 criminally	 sensitive.	 Some	participants	 did	 express	 concern	 about	 their	 professional	relationships	and/or	advancement	if	they	expressed	critical	opinions	about	 their	 bosses,	 co-workers,	 politicians,	 or	 projects	 on	 they	worked.	Two	did	not	want	their	bosses	(whom	I	also	interviewed)	to	
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know	 they	 granted	 me	 interviews,	 and	 two	 additional	 participants	asked	me	 to	 change	 their	 names.	While	 I	made	neither	 violence	nor	corruption	 a	main	 talking	 point	 during	 our	 discussions,	 both	 issues	arose	from	time	to	time	with	interviewees	accusing	certain	politicians	or	 interest	 groups	 of	 corruption.	 Sometimes	 the	 participant	 directly	accused	 an	 individual	 of	 stealing	 public	 funds.	 Other	 times	 it	 was	implied	 through	 hand	 gestures,	 facial	 expressions	 and	 carefully	worded	emphasised	sentences.	Similarly,	a	few	interviewees	accused	co-workers,	bosses,	or	public	employees	of	ethical	corruption—not	of	the	 criminal	 sort	 but	 of	 anti-poor	 prejudice	 or	 a	 banal	 attitude	towards	 the	daily	 injustice	and	violence	witnessed	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro,	particularly	in	the	favelas.	While	the	majority	of	participants	gave	me	permission	 to	 use	 their	 full	 names,	 in	 order	 to	 respect	 those	 who	wished	to	remain	anonymous	and	to	protect	the	careers	of	those	who	voiced	critical	opinions,	I	have	changed	the	names	(and	in	a	few	cases	the	gender)	of	all	participants	except	 those	with	public	profiles	who	explicitly	granted	permission	to	use	their	full	names.		Most	 formal	 interviews	 were	 recorded	 digitally	 with	 the	consent	of	the	participants.	When	interviewees	preferred	not	to	use	a	recording	 device,	 I	 took	 notes	 during	 our	 conversation	 and	 would	often	record	my	own	voice	memos	after	the	interview	concluded.	I	did	not	 remunerate	 any	 interviewee	 in	 exchange	 for	 their	 participation;	however	in	the	few	cases	where	an	interview	was	conducted	at	a	café,	I	paid	for	the	coffee	and	cake.				
4.8	Conclusions		This	 chapter	 laid	 out	 the	 methodological	 approach	 to	addressing	 the	research	questions	and	detailed	 the	decisions	 I	made	based	 on	 events	 after	 initiating	 fieldwork	 in	 April	 2013.	 I	 aim	 to	contribute	to	literature	discussing	the	methodological	implications	of	
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Lefebvre’s	 theories	 on	 the	 production	 of	 space.	 In	 particular	 I	demonstrate	how	his	 spatial	 triad	of	 conceived,	perceived,	 and	 lived	space	 may	 be	 operationalised	 to	 construct	 the	 field	 of	 research.	 In	doing	 so	 I	 followed	 networked	 points	 in	 the	 un-sited	 field	 of	 favela	integration,	 collecting	 documents	 and	 texts	 for	 discourse	 analysis	(conceived	 space),	 speaking	 with	 experts,	 architects,	 project	employees	 and	 activists	 as	 well	 as	 visiting	 sites	 of	 intervention	(perceived	 space),	 and	 seeking	 out	 or	 waiting	 for	 meaningful	interactions,	 experiences	 and	 conversations	 about	 how	 the	 process	and	 paradigm	 of	 favela	 integration	 affects	 daily	 life	 in	 the	 “divided	city”	(lived	space).		Beyond	 some	 cases	 of	 textual	 and	 visual	 data—for	 example	architectural	 drawings,	 political	 propaganda,	 or	 programme	descriptions—very	 rarely	 do	 data	 points	 align	 with	 a	 single	 leg	 of	Lefebvre’s	triad.	I	did	not	tour	the	construction	site	of	a	Morar	Carioca	intervention	with	the	purpose	of	collecting	data	specific	to	the	spatial	practice	 (perceived	 space)	 of	 favela	 integration,	 and	 then	subsequently	 write	 up	 my	 field	 notes	 from	 various	 community	meetings	on	insecurity,	the	police,	or	gentrification	as	 lived	space.	To	do	so	would	have	repeated	the	mistakes	of	scholars	who	empiricise	a	single	 leg	 of	 the	 triad.	 The	 goal	 was	 not	 to	 disaggregate	 into	 three	trialectical	streams	of	data	(for	a	discussion	of	Lefebvrean	trialectics	see	 Soja	 1996),	 but	 rather	 to	 understand	 favela	 integration	 through	the	 triad	 and	 allow	 that	 explicitly	 spatialised	methodology	 to	 guide	my	 fieldwork.	 As	 discussed,	 this	 permitted	 the	 collection	 of	 data	through	interviews,	site	visits,	participant	observation,	varied	text	and	document	 collection	 from	 distinct	 places,	 institutions,	 programmes	and	 publications	 that	 together	 produce	 the	 spatial	 process	 favela	integration.	 The	 field,	 constructed	 as	 such,	 facilitated	 the	 weaving	together	of	data	points	that	might	otherwise	seem	fragmented.		This	 approach	 was	 challenging,	 and	 the	 organizing	 of	 texts,	
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transcribing	notes	and	interviews,	coding	and	connecting	the	diverse	data	to	form	narrative	arguments	was	laborious	and	time	consuming.	But	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 research	 objective—to	 interrogate	 favela	integration	at	the	city-scale	of	Rio	de	Janeiro—necessitated	a	complex	methodology.	The	following	chapter	puts	this	into	practice	in	order	to	examine	how	the	state	paradigm	of	integration	places	the	historically	banished	favelas	into	the	landscape	of	the	marvellous	city.			
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Chapter	5	–	A	Crisis	of	Landscape:	Urban	
Segregation	and	Favela	Integration	in	Rio	de	
Janeiro			 	“Somos	 um	 Rio,”	 the	 words	 appear	 as	 graffiti	 spray-painted	against	 a	 black	 wall.	 “We	 are	 one	 Rio”	 is	 the	 title-track	 of	 Eduardo	Paes’	mayoral	re-election	campaign	song.34	During	a	preliminary	trip	to	the	field	in	2012	I	saw	his	campaign’s	TV	advertisement:	a	music-video	clip	in	the	style	of	an	urban	hip-hop	dance	party	interlaced	with	sweeping	aerial	 footage	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	and	close-ups	of	seemingly	ordinary	 Cariocas	 smiling	 in	 their	 everyday	 surroundings.	 The	most	repeated	phrase	of	the	song,	a	male-female	duet,	is,	“I	live	in	the	favela	[o	morro]	and	she	 lives	 in	Zona	Sul.”	The	spatial	division	bridged	by	the	artists	(the	favela	and	wealthy	Zona	Sul)	parallels	another	division	conquered,	that	of	racial	segregation:	“I’m	big	and	black	[negão],	she	is	blonde	 with	 blue	 eyes.”	 The	 video	 pans	 a	 group	 of	 20-something	Cariocas,	 racially	 diverse	 and	 fashionably	dressed,	 dancing	 against	 a	night	sky;	not	unlike	the	open-air	parties	now	frequented	by	Zona	Sul	“playboys”	 and	 tourists	 atop	 the	 famous	 favela	 Vidigal.	 The	commercial	 then	 cuts	 to	 thousands	of	 commuters	disembarking	at	 a	busy	train	station,	 followed	by	shiny	new	Bus	Rapid	Transit	vehicles	whizzing	 by	 city	 traffic.	 Cut	 to	 favela	 Santa	 Marta,	 and	 the	 camera	pans	 the	hillside	 showing	densely	packed	homes,	 then	 transitions	 to	two	young	black	boys	playing	bare-chested	on	a	 laje	(a	 flat	rooftop).	We	hear	 the	duet	continue,	 “I	know	I’m	poor,	but	my	heart	 is	noble,	and	what’s	mine	is	hers.	/	And	today	I’m	no	longer	afraid	to	say	that	I	live	in	the	favela.	/	Because	the	city	changed,	it	renewed	and	became	more	beautiful.”																																																									34	 Somos	 um	 Rio	was	 also	 the	 name	 given	 to	 the	 coalition	 of	 19	 political	 parties,	including	President	Dilma’s	PT,	backing	his	candidacy.	
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	“Favela	 integration”	 is	 a	 paradigm	 in	 response	 to	 an	 urban	crisis.	 The	 crisis	 is	 cultural—in	 regards	 to	 how	 the	 city	 of	 Rio	 de	Janeiro	 is	 collectively	 imagined	 and	 socially	 reproduced	 at	 local	 and	global	scales—as	well	as	political—in	regards	to	what	tools	the	state	employs	 to	 respond	 to	 favela	 settlements	 in	Brazilian	 contemporary	democracy.	 Employing	 the	 landscape-mobilities	 framework	developed	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 this	 chapter	 argues	 that	 while	 historically	favelas	 were	 excluded	 from	 Rio’s	 landscape—the	 so-called	“marvellous	city”—through	demonisation	and	state	policies	of	violent	removal,	 contemporary	 advances	 in	 the	 constitutional	 right	 to	housing	 and	 protection	 against	 unfair	 eviction	 as	 well	 as	 growing	popular	politics	of	human	rights	has	produced	“favela	integration”	as	a	 paradigm	 of	 urban	 planning	 and	 governance	 supported	 by	 civil	society,	 development	 specialists	 and	 social	 scientists.	 Analysing	 the	discursive	 construction	 of	 “favela	 integration”	 reveals	 the	prioritisation	of	flows	of	people,	goods	and	services	in	and	out	of	the	favelas	 in	 order	 to	 include	 the	 favelas	 in	 the	 celebrated	 cityscape.	However,	 employing	 a	 framework	 of	 critical	 mobilities	 readily	identifies	that	certain	flows	of	goods	and	people	and	certain	forms	of	movement	have	been	prioritised	and	others	targeted	for	scrutiny	and	regulation,	revealing	the	power	dynamics	of	deeply	entrenched	urban	inequality	and	segregation.			
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Figure	5.1	-	"Somos	um	Rio"		
Still	image	of	opening	to	Mayor	Eduardo	Paes'	2011	campaign	re-election	
video,	"We	are	One	Rio"		 The	 chapter	 is	 structured	 into	 eight	 sections.	 Section	 5.1	historicises	 the	 bifurcation	 of	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 through	 the	 theoretical	lens	of	landscape	as	outlined	in	Chapter	3.	Building	on	Barbosa	(2012)	who	writes	that	in	contraposition	to	the	“marvellous	city”	the	favelas	constituted	a	crisis	of	 landscape,	 I	argue	 that	subsequent	production	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	as	a	“divided	city”	was	a	cultural	and	socio-political	
way	 of	 seeing	 that	 maintained	 the	 city	 as	 “marvellous”	 despite	condemnable	 inequality	 and	 segregation.	 Section	5.2	argues	 that	 the	divided	 city	 between	 the	 “marvellous”	 and	 the	 “miserable”	 proved	unsustainable	when	 the	 carioca	middle	 class	 perceived	 rising	 urban	violence	 and	 inequality	 as	 an	 existential	 threat.	 Due	 to	 expanded	rights	of	favela	residents	after	Brazil’s	return	to	democracy,	wholesale	eviction	was	no	longer	an	option;	and	“favela	integration”	emerged	as	a	 progressive	 response	 to	 unify	 the	 city	 and	 make	 Rio	 ‘whole.’	Returning	to	Mayor	Eduardo	Paes’	campaign	video	described	above,	I	examine	 the	 discursive	 production	 of	 the	 “integrated	 city”	 as	 a	hegemonic	 utopian	 landscape	 produced	 by	 the	 state	 in	 section	 5.3.	
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Turning	the	analysis	towards	policy	and	urbanist	interventions	in	the	favelas,	 section	 5.4	 traces	 the	 evolution	 of	 “favela-upgrading”	 to	“favela	integration”	by	examining	the	programmes	Favela-Bairro	and	Morar	 Carioca.	 I	 argue	 that	 state	 discourse	 of	 integration	 relies	 on	regulating	 flows	 of	 people,	 goods,	 and	 services	 in	 and	 out	 of	 the	favelas.		While	 the	 novel	 urban	 planning	 and	 governance	 paradigm	recognises	the	favelas	as	legitimate	urban	space,	section	5.5	discusses	how	 the	utopian	vision	 is	 still	 subject	 to	hegemonic	politics	 through	examining	the	competing	discourses	of	“the	 favela	 is	 the	city”	versus	“the	 favela	 belongs	 to	 the	 city.”	 This	 is	 particularly	 visible	 in	 how	police	“pacification”	of	the	favelas	is	represented	as	“liberating”	favela	residents	 and	 creating	 the	 necessary	 conditions	 for	 sustainable	urbanisation	 interventions,	 which	 in	 turn	 makes	 the	 favelas	marvellous	 and	 “opens”	 the	 historically	 stigmatised	 neighbourhoods	to	the	outside	world.	Section	5.6	takes	a	closer	look	at	the	importance	of	 the	 “right	 to	 come	 and	 go”	 within	 the	 paradigm	 of	 favela	integration,	 and	 applies	 Cresswell’s	 “politics	 of	 mobility”	 (2010)	 to	moving	 in,	 out	 and	 through	 favela	 space.	 I	 demonstrate	 how	 in	practice	 favela	 integration	 targets	 certain	 bodies	 in	 certain	 types	 of	movements	for	heightened	scrutiny	and	structural	violence.	Finally	in	section	 5.7	 I	 focus	 on	 a	 single	 intervention,	 a	 gondola	 transport	system	 named	 the	 Teleférico	 do	 Alemão,	 as	 a	 spectacular	 and	contested	 piece	 of	 integrating	 infrastructure	 in	 one	 of	 the	 most	infamous	 areas	 of	 the	 city.	 Through	 ethnographic	 description,	 I	analyse	the	politics	of	travelling	to	and	moving	through	Complexo	do	Alemão	as	a	marvellous	experience;	but	I	argue	that	the	infrastructure	is	 a	 sanitised	 form	 of	 witnessing	 the	 favela	 without	 actually	experiencing	 favela	 space,	 a	device	 that	 facilitated	 the	 totalising	 and	abstracting	 construction	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 as	 an	 “integrated	 city”	landscape.	I	review	the	chapter’s	main	arguments	in	section	5.8.	
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5.1	Rio,	a	cidade	maravilhosa,	a	cidade	partida		Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 has	 long	 been	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 cidade	
maravilhosa,	 or	 the	 marvellous	 city.	 The	 “natural”	 beauty—steep	hillsides	 facing	 expansive	 sandy	 beaches,	 green	 jungle,	 panoramic	views	and	consistently	stunning	sunsets—is	indeed	worthy	of	marvel.	Privileged	 views	 abound	 atop	 Sugar	 Loaf	 Mountain,	 or	 the	 iconic	statue	of	Christ,	or	after	a	steep	climb	in	the	National	Forrest	of	Tijuca.	The	 tagline,	 a	 cidade	maravilhosa,	 has	 three	 cited	 origins:	 a	 book,	 a	radio	 programme,	 and	 a	 samba.	 In	 1928	 Coelho	 Neto	 published	 a	collection	 of	 short	 stories	 titled	 A	 Cidade	 Maravilhosa	 in	 which	 a	painter	from	the	“city	of	dreams”	enchants	a	scrupulous	lady	from	the	countryside.	 Shortly	 thereafter	 in	 1933	 a	 popular	 radio	 programme	titled	“Chronicles	of	 the	Marvellous	City”	aired	to	a	general	audience	broadcasting	 tales	 of	 grandeur	 from	 the	 federal	 capital.	 The	 radio	programme	inspired	a	samba	march	titled	“Cidade	Maravilhosa”	as	an	ode	 to	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 which	 eventually	 became	 the	 municipality’s	official	hymn.		In	brief	review	of	the	history	covered	in	Chapter	2,	the	favelas	have	 been	 present	 since	 the	 early	 1900s	 and	 proliferated	 rapidly	throughout	the	latter	half	of	the	century.	They	have	long	been	spread	throughout	the	city,	including	notably	on	the	hillsides	visible	from	the	white-sand	 beaches	 and	 wealthy	 neighbourhoods	 of	 Zona	 Sul	(Perlman	 1976;	 Pino	 1997;	 Valladares	 2005).	 However	 the	 favelas	were	never	directly	included	in	the	marvellous	city.	Rather	they	were	considered	to	blight	the	natural	beauty	of	the	city	and	the	antithesis	of	modernity,	which	both	municipal	and	federal	governments	attempted	to	advance	(J.	de	S.	e	Silva	and	Barbosa	2005;	Fischer	2008;	Perlman	2010;	Gonçalves	2013;	B.	McCann	2014).		While	 various	 actors	 in	 government	 and	 wealthy	 society	attempted	 to	 wipe	 the	 favelas	 from	 the	 “noble”	 neighbourhoods	 of	
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Zona	Sul	and	downtown,	the	settlements	were	hardly	if	ever	included	in	plans,	calculations,	and	maps	published	by	the	government	and	the	journalistic	 press	 (Novaes	 2014).	 Novaes	 argues	 that	 the	“cartographic	 silencing”	 of	 the	 favelas	 during	 the	 early	 and	 mid-twentieth	 century	 represented	 the	 indifferent	 ignorance	 and	 lack	 of	knowledge	 that	characterised	 the	elite’s	attitude	 towards	 the	 favelas	as	well	 as	 the	expectation	 that	 the	 favelas	would	be	 removed	as	 the	city	modernised	through	urban	planning.	To	say	that	the	favelas	were	expunged	from	the	hegemonic	landscape	of	the	marvellous	city	is	not	to	 say	 that	 they	 were	 absent	 from	 public	 discourse	 and	 popular	culture.	Rather	they	were	flattened	of	their	complexity	and	humanity.	They	 served	 to	 represent	 social	 marginality,	 violence	 and	 danger	(Perlman	 1976;	 E.	 Leeds	 1996;	 Zaluar	 1995;	 Batista	 2003).	 As	Barbosa	(2012)	argues,	the	favelas	constituted	a	“crisis	of	landscape”.	Their	presence,	 stubborn	and	visible,	 challenged	 the	visual	narrative	of	 the	 marvellous	 city.	 To	 preserve	 the	 dominant	 mode	 of	 urban	growth,	one	that	was	prescribed	by	and	worked	in	the	interest	of	the	political	 elites,	owners	of	 industry,	 and	residual	Portuguese	nobility;	the	favelas	were	banished	from	the	marvellous	city,	both	figuratively	and	 materially.	 Early	 after	 the	 first	 clusters	 of	 precariously	 built	homes	began	 to	dot	 the	hillsides,	 they	were	 the	 target	of	 systematic	removal	and	prohibition	(Valladares	1978;	Fischer	2008;	Brum	2013).	Similarly,	 the	precursor	to	the	favelas,	cortiços	had	been	despised	by	the	wealthy	classes,	targeted	by	the	police,	represented	as	a	threat	to	public	health	and	morality	and	ultimately	destroyed	(J.	M.	de	Carvalho	1987;	 Chalhoub	 1996).	 As	 reviewed	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 Mayor	 Pereira	Passos	sought	to	replicate	Haussmann’s	Paris,	and	the	desired	urban	aesthetic	 of	modernity	 and	 progress	 required	 the	 demolition	 of	 the	favelas	 (Needell	 1983;	 M.	 Abreu	 1987).	 The	 French	 urbanist	 Alfred	Agache,	 a	medical	 doctor	 by	 training	who	was	 hired	 to	 present	 the	city’s	first	Master	Plan,	spoke	of	Rio	de	Janeiro’s	unparalleled	natural	
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beauty	 under	 threat	 of	 malignant,	 uncontrolled	 growth	 (Oliveira	2002;	 Fischer	 2008).	 Rio’s	 Rotary	 Club	 became	 a	 place	 for	 the	business	class	to	rally	behind	hygienist	campaigns	against	the	favelas.	The	 journalist	 Mattos	 Pimenta	 spoke	 to	 the	 club	 in	 1926	 exposing	what	historians	represent	as	a	common	attitude	of	the	wealthy:		
Whatever	 form	 the	 plans	 for	 the	 city	 might	 take,	 and	 even	 before	
their	 adoption,	 we	 must	 put	 an	 immediate	 end	 to,	 raise	 a	
prophylactic	 barrier	 against,	 the	 devastating	 infiltration	 of	 Rio	 de	
Janeiro’s	 beautiful	 mountains	 by	 the	 plague	 of	 the	 favelas—that	
aesthetic	leprosy,	which	began	over	in	the	hill	between	the	Central	do	
Brasil	 railroad	 and	 the	 Avenida	 do	 Cáes	 do	 Porto	 and	 has	 gone	
disseminating	 itself	 everywhere,	 choosing	 the	 newest	
neighbourhoods,	most	 blessed	with	 natural	 beauty,	 to	 fill	 with	 filth	
and	miserable	poverty	[…]”	
	(cited	in	Fischer	2008,	41).		 During	 mid-twentieth	 century,	 government	 anti-communist	hysteria	 was	 spatially	 focused	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 journalists	 and	politicians	spoke	of	a	“war	for	Rio	de	Janeiro”	against	the	communist	threat	 of	 the	 favelas	 (Perlman	 1976;	 Gonçalves	 2013).	 During	 that	same	 era,	 social	 scientists	 in	 Brazil	 concerned	 with	 the	 idea	 of	“underdevelopment”	associated	urban	poverty	and	the	favelas	closely	with	the	“inferior	circuit”	of	informal	economic	exchanges	(M.	Santos	1978);	and	theories	of	social	marginality	 fuelled	revanchist	attitudes	towards	 the	 favelas.	 Such	 attitudes	 lasted	 through	 the	 twentieth	century,	 such	 that	 between	 1962	 and	 1973,	 an	 estimated	 140,000	people	were	removed	from	their	homes	in	favelas	principally	located	in	the	wealthy	Zona	Sul	district	(J.	de	S.	e	Silva	and	Barbosa	2005).		The	material	effect	of	landscape	in	the	cidade	maravilhosa	was	the	 systematic	 persecution	 of	 the	 favelas	 and	 residents,	 and	 the	partial	relocation	of	poverty’s	spatial	form	to	the	outskirts	of	the	city.	
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Parallel	 to	 the	 landscape	 of	 the	 ‘marvellous’	 there	 developed	 a	landscape	 of	 misery,	 which	 Barbosa	 calls	 the	 “anti-landscape”.	 The	anti-landscape	 was	 composed	 of	 “marginal”	 bodies	 and	 stigmatised	neighbourhoods,	principally	the	favelas	and	public	housing	complexes	that	 had	 fallen	 into	 disrepair	 and	 gone	 through	 a	 process	 of	‘favelafication’.	 Despite	 all	 that	 favela	 residents	 had	 contributed	culturally	and	economically	to	Rio	de	Janeiro,	“the	favelas	were	never	recognized	 for	 their	positivity	and	 importance	 in	 the	construction	of	urban	space	 in	the	city	[…].	That	non-recognition	of	otherness	of	 the	rest	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro’s	 inhabitants	 has	 produced	 exclusionary,	intolerant	 relations	 that,	 in	 turn,	 reproduce	 the	 negation	 of	 a	primordial	 social	 right:	 the	 right	 to	 be	 [part	 of	 the]	 landscape”	(Barbosa	2012,	39).		This	denial	was	on	prominent	display	a	half-decade	later	at	the	Museum	 of	 the	 Catete	 Palace,	 which	 served	 as	 the	 presidential	residence	 from	1897	until	1960.	The	gardens	of	 the	Palace	hosted	a	photography	exhibition	titled	O	Rio	que	se	Queria	Negar:	as	favelas	do	
Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 no	 acervo	 do	 Anthony	 Leeds,	which	 translates	 to	 “The	Rio	 that	was	Rejected”	or	 “What	Rio	Wanted	 to	Deny:	 the	 favelas	of	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 in	 the	 archives	 of	 Anthony	 Leeds”.35	 The	 exhibition	consisted	of	 roughly	 two	dozen	photographs	 enlarged	 so	 they	 stood	well	 over	 a	metre	 off	 the	 ground	 (see	 figures	 5.2-5.4)	 depicting	 the	mid-twentieth	 century	 favelas	 and	 their	 residents	 going	 about	 their	daily	 lives.	 Interspersed	 with	 the	 images	 were	 lyrics	 of	 popular	sambas	of	that	era	signifying	the	politicised	nature	of	the	favelas	and	the	 resilience	 of	 the	 residents	 in	 the	 face	 of	 state	 prosecution	 and	prejudice.	Samba—the	famous	musical	tradition	that	originated	in	the	favelas	of	Rio	de	Janeiro—was	one	of	the	most	powerful	cultural	tools																																																									35	Anthony	Leeds	(1925-1989)	was	a	well-known	anthropologist	who	spent	decades	researching	favela	residents	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	among	other	Latin	American	cities.	He	and	 his	 wife,	 Elizabeth	 Leeds,	 remain	 influential	 references	 of	 Brazilian	 urban	studies.	
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of	favela	residents	to	produce	counter-hegemonic	discourse	(Oliveira	and	Marcier	2006;	Misse	1999).	Below	I	cite	the	lyrics	the	exhibition	curators	featured	by	the	sambista	Nelson	Sargento:	a	song	titled	“The	Charm	of	the	Landscape”	[Encanto	da	Paisagem]	(see	figure	5.4):		 Hill,	it’s	the	charm	of	the	landscape	Sensuous	character	of	rudimentary	beauty	Hill,	slow	and	primitive	progress	It’s	important	to	the	scenario	Inspiration	of	nature	In	the	topography	of	the	city	With	all	of	its	simplicity,	It’s	call	to	elevation	Passageways,	alleys,	and	shacks	Without	discrimination.	Hill,	shoeless	feet	on	the	stairway	Water	can	atop	the	head	Crude	auspicious	life	Children	without	future	and	without	school	If	they	aren’t	lucky	with	the	football	They	will	suffer	their	entire	lives	Hill,	your	samba	was	mined	Became	so	sophisticated,	It’s	no	longer	traditional	Hill,	it’s	beautiful	when	the	sun	rises	And	the	blemishes	result	from		Social	maladjustment.		
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Figure	5.2	-	"O	Rio	que	se	Queria	Negar"	
The	Opening	Plaque	of	the	photography	exhibition	in	the	garden	of	the	Palace	
of	Catete.		
	
Figure	5.3	–	Anthony	Leeds’	photographs	at	the	Catete	Palace.		
Photos	included	in	the	exhibition	documented	the	daily	lives	of	residents	as	
well	as	the	settlement’s	position	in	the	topography	of	the	city.		
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Figure	5.4	-	"Encanto	da	Paisagem"	by	Nelson	Sargento	
Lyrics	from	the	popular	samba	song	printed	as	part	of	the	photography	
exhibition.		
	The	 exhibition	 was	 bold.	 By	 placing	 the	 large	 photographs	along	 the	 entry	 walkway	 to	 the	 gardens,	 the	 curators	 brought	 the	shacks	 to	 the	 palace	 and	 obliged	 visitors	 to	 walk	 through	 a	representation	 of	 the	 favelas	 in	 the	 pristine	 park-like	 museum.	Sponsored	by	the	national	Ministries	of	Culture	and	Health,	 it	placed	the	 favelas	 in	 the	 historic	 centre	 of	 power	 of	 the	 Republic,	 the	 very	place	that	stood	for	Brazil’s	progress	and	housed	the	men	that	pushed	for	its	modernisation,	a	concept	that	excluded	the	favelas	on	the	hills.	The	 curators	 acknowledged	 in	 the	 first	 line	 of	 the	 introductory	billboard-sized	plaque	that	the	favelas	were	“vehemently	denied	as	an	integral	part	of	 the	 city”	 and	 challenged	 the	viewer	 to	 reflect	on	 the	city	as	a	whole	and	place	the	favelas	at	the	forefront	of	Rio	de	Janeiro.		Like	 Leeds,	 the	 celebrated	 poet	 and	 Pulitzer	 Prize	 winner	Elizabeth	Bishop	was	captivated	by	Rio	de	Janeiro,	where	she	lived	for	well	 over	 a	 decade.	 Bishop	 often	 wrote	 about	 the	 city,	 and	 more	generally	Brazil,	for	US	publications.	A	self-described	progressive,	she	was	 ironically	 partnered	 with	 a	 Brazilian	 aristocrat	 and,	 in	 stark	
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contrast	 to	 Leeds,	 moved	 amongst	 the	 richest	 and	 most	 powerful	elites	 of	 what	 was	 then	 Brazil’s	 capital	 city.	 A	 narrative	 poem	 she	titled	“The	Burglar	of	Babylon”	(published	by	The	New	Yorker	in	1964)	captures	 the	 precariousness	 of	 the	 favelas	 during	 that	 time	 and	 the	prejudiced	 vision	 of	 the	 city’s	 elites.	 It	 tells	 the	 saga	 of	 a	 violent	criminal	who	has	escaped	from	prison	and	went	home	to	visit	his	aunt	in	the	favela	Babilônia,	located	in	the	neighbourhood	of	Leme.	After	a	final	farewell	and	a	last	beer,	he	takes	refuge	in	an	old	fort	and	waits	for	a	squadron	of	army	soldiers	to	hunt	down	and	kill	him.	The	poem	is	 based	 on	 a	 true	 story,	 and	 Bishop	 and	 her	 partner,	 who	 kept	 an	apartment	in	the	neighbourhood,	watched	the	manhunt	unfold.	Below	I	cite	the	first	three	stanzas,	which	repeat	at	the	poem’s	end.		
On	the	fair	green	hills	of	Rio	
There	grows	a	frightful	stain;	
The	poor	who	come	to	Rio	
And	can’t	go	home	again.	
	
On	the	hills	a	million	people,	
A	million	sparrows	nest,	
Like	a	confused	migration	
That’s	had	to	light	and	rest,	
	
Building	its	nests,	or	houses,	
Out	of	nothing	at	all,	or	air.	
You’d	think	a	breath	would	end	them,	
They	perch	so	lightly	there.	
	Perhaps	Bishop’s	outsider	status	and	artist’s	sensitivity	allows	her	to	humanize	favela	residents	and	their	drama	to	survive	in	the	city.	She	quietly	 critiques	 the	 dominant	 gaze	 of	 the	wealthy	 and	middle	 class	when	 she	 names	 the	 favelas	 as	 “fearful	 stains”	 upon	 the	 beautiful	green	 hills.	 Literary	 scholars	 debate	 whether	 Bishop’s	 poem	 is	subversive	 or	 dismissive	 (Brogan	 2001)	 and	 her	 at–times	
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contradictory	 positions	 on	 Brazilian	 politics	 and	 culture	 (Moser	2012).	 But	 this	 poem,	 rarely	 considered	 among	 Bishop’s	 greater	accomplishments,	 exemplifies	 the	 growing	 fear	 of	 losing	 the	marvellous	landscape	to	the	millions	of	poor	migrants	“invading”	and	blighting	the	hillsides	with	such	precarious	homes	that	they	might	be	blown	 away	 by	 the	 wind.	 In	 comparing	 the	 urban	 migrants	 to	sparrows	building	nests,	she	exemplifies	the	dehumanisation	of	favela	residents.	The	othering	distance	between	the	favelas	and	the	wealthy	is	further	signalled	by	the	latter’s	use	of	binoculars	to	watch	the	police	manhunt	from	the	rooftops	of	their	apartments.	The	 revanchist	 state	 policies,	 the	 denial	 of	 the	 favelas	 as	constitutive	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 the	 proliferation	 of	 favelas,	 and	 the	escalation	of	systemic	violence	and	fear	resulted	in	the	cidade	partida,	or	 the	 divided	 city	 (literally	 the	 partitioned	 city).	 Rio	 began	 to	 be	discursively	produced	as	“the	city”	and	“the	favela”,	the	asfalto	(where	the	roads	were	paved)	and	“the	morro”	(the	hill	upon	which	the	poor	“invaded”	 to	 build	 barracos,	 or	 shacks).	 The	 city	 was	 understood	through	 this	 dichotomous	 categorisation	 as	 it	 was	 reproduced	 in	popular	 and	 news	media	 as	well	 as	 intellectual	 and	 academic	work.	Novaes	 (2014)	 documents	 how	 the	 favelas,	 previously	 silenced	through	 their	 absence	 in	 cartographic	depictions	of	 the	 city,	became	daily	references	to	drug	trafficking	and	violence.	In	the	“divided	city,”	newspapers	 began	 to	 map	 the	 favelas	 in	 relation	 to	 gang	 territory	conflicts	and	the	drug	trade,	producing	the	favelas	as	spaces	under	the	control	of	the	gangs	operating	as	“parallel	states.”	Perhaps	 the	 most	 famous	 depiction	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	dichotomously	 divided	 is	 the	 is	 the	 book	 by	 celebrated	 journalist	Zuenir	Ventura	titled	Cidade	Partida	published	in	1994	and	reprinted	
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10	times	by	200136.	Based	off	of	10	months	of	qualitative	journalistic	fieldwork,	Zuenir	 tells	 the	 story	of	 the	partitioning	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro	through	the	account	of	residents	of	the	infamous	favela	Vigário	Geral.	The	 narrative-styled	 non-fiction,	 which	 he	 calls	 a	 chronicle	 noir,	 is	reminiscent,	 in	 contrast,	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 popular	 radio	program	that	gave	Rio	its	tagline,	“Chronicles	of	the	Marvellous	City.”	The	 book	 was	 a	 resounding	 success	 and	 many	 consider	 Ventura	 a	progressive	 voice	 advocating	 for	 favela	 residents	 to	 this	 day.	 As	 a	columnist	for	O	Globo,	he	has	championed	the	so-called	“social”	side	of	“favela	 pacification”,	 advocating	 for	 the	 complete	 and	 total	regularisation	 of	 social	 services	 and	 economic	 activities	 within	 the	favela.	He	writes	in	2011	that	the	state	must	“bring	to	the	favela,	after	pacification,	 the	 conquests	 that	 the	 asphalt	 already	 enjoys,	 good	 or	bad”	 (Ventura	 2011).	 Ventura	 was	 not	 the	 first	 to	 speak	 of	 Rio	 de	Janeiro	 as	 divided	 in	 two,	 but	 his	 sensationalist	 and	 reductionist	depiction	 of	 the	 bifurcated	 city,	 and	 his	 subsequent	 work	 as	 a	prominent	 journalist	 has	 had	 lasting	 impacts,	 so	 that	 even	 some	development	specialists	and	scholars	advocating	for	favela	residents’	right	to	the	city	represent	Rio	as	a	“broken”	or	“divided”.		The	representation	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	popular	and	intellectual	media	 as	 a	 divided	metropolis,	 partitioned	 between	 the	 formal	 city	and	 the	 favela,	 has	 not	 gone	 unchallenged.	 Many	 activists	 and	academics	have	contested	the	notion	of	a	divided	city	and	some	have	responded	 directly	 to	 Ventura	 debunking	 the	 spatial	 metaphor	(Matiolli	 2012;	 J.	 de	 S.	 e	 Silva	 2003).	 As	 scholar-activist	 Jailson	 de	Souza	 e	 Silva	 asked	 in	 a	 Ted-X	Talk,	 divided	 for	whom?	 “The	 city	 is	divided	 for	 some;	but	not	 for	others”	 (2011).	Those	 “others”	are	 the	favela	 residents	 themselves	 who	 leave	 their	 homes	 and	neighbourhoods	and	move	about	the	whole	city	to	work,	study,	shop,																																																									36	Information	obtained	through	the	book’s	current	publisher,	Companhia	das	Letras,	via	telephone	conversation	on	10	February	2016.	
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and	 confront	 public	 bureaucracy.	 Artists	 and	 cultural	 activists	 have	also	 pushed	 back	 on	 the	 false	 division	 through	 film	 (Costa	 2013),	music,	 dance,	 theatre,	 and	 community	 art	 projects	 (Heritage	 2005;	Neate	and	Platt	2006;	Jovchelovitch	and	Priego-Hernández	2013).		The	 “divided	 city”	 operates	 as	 a	 visual	 imagination	 of	 Rio	 de	Janeiro	 that	 copes	 with	 violence	 and	 inequality,	 leaving	 the	“marvellous	 city”	 under	 threat	 but	 largely	 intact.	 It	 ignores	 the	decades-old	lessons	learned	from	the	debunking	of	social	marginality:	the	effects	of	 capitalist	urbanisation	and	 the	 inequitable	distribution	of	 its	benefits	(stark	inequality	and	urban	poverty)	do	not	constitute	its	 spatial	 materialisation	 (the	 favelas)	 as	 antithetical	 to	 the	 city	 or	marginal	to	its	society.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	part	and	parcel	to	urban	form	and	life.	The	relationships	are	intimate	and	interdependent.	The	working	of	landscape	is	to	negate	this	fact;	that	is,	as	Barbosa	asserts,	to	 deny	 the	 favelas	 and	 their	 residents	 the	 right	 to	 form	part	 of	 the	marvellous	city.	In	 summary,	 the	 social	 imagination	of	 the	cidade	maravilhosa	historically	 privileged	 the	 “natural”	 beauty	 of	 wealthy	neighbourhoods	 and	 vantage	 points	 of	 the	 city,	whereas	 the	 favelas	have	 always	 been	 seen	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 such	 beauty,	 disorder	 within	modernity,	 chaos	 disrupting	 progress.	 The	 favelas	 and	 other	 socio-spatial	 evidence	 of	 poverty	 are	 shamefully	 incongruent	 with	 the	marvellous	 and	 therefore	 ignored,	 hidden,	 despised,	 and	 expelled.	They	 were	 “anti-symbols”	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Barbosa	 and	 the	 state	responded	with	urban	policy	seeking	to	cleanse	them	from	privileged	and	 strategic	 areas.	 This	 engendered	 the	 cidade	 partida,	 also	 a	totalizing	 abstraction	 that	 mythically	 separates	 the	 miserable	 from	the	marvellous,	the	favela	from	the	city,	the	formal	from	the	informal.		
5.2	Searching	for	solutions	to	the	cidade	partida		 A	 new	paradigm	has	 emerged	 in	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 that	 seeks	 to	
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end	 the	 bifurcation	 of	 urban	 space	 between	 “city”	 and	 “slum,”	recognize	self-built	settlements	as	legitimate	neighbourhoods,	and	use	urban	 planning	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 foster	 social	 inclusion	 and	 spatial	integration.	 While	 progressive	 social	 scientists,	 politicians	 and	 civil	society	activists	had	 long	expressed	such	sentiments,	 the	affirmation	of	 favela	 as	 legitimate	 and	 positive	 urban	 space	 within	 state	 policy	and	 interventions	 is	 still	 relatively	 nascent.	 It	 began	 rather	 meekly	with	 “slum	 upgrading”	 programmes	 and	 continues	 with	 ambitious	planning	 interventions	 and	 broader	 governance	 objectives	 ranging	from	 public	 security,	 to	 health,	 to	 tourism	 and	 culture.	 Building	 on	Barbosa’s	 argument	 that	policies	of	 extermination	and	 re-housing	at	the	urban	periphery	in	the	mid-twentieth	century	were	a	response	to	“the	 favela	 problem”	 (a	 crisis	 of	 landscape),	 I	 argue	 that	 “favela	integration”	responds	to	the	deplorably	unequal	“divided	city”.		What	 prompted	 “favela	 integration”?	 In	 short,	 evicting	 favela	residents	and	demolishing	their	homes	became	 increasingly	difficult.	By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1970s,	 favela	 residents	 were	 organised	 and	politicized	 at	 the	 neighbourhood	 level	 and	 throughout	 the	metropolitan	 region	 by	 larger	 federations	 (McCann	 2014).	 Resident	associations	 and	 their	 increasingly	 influential	 networks	 of	 political	and	cultural	 actors	organised	 for	access	 to	water	and	electricity	and	successfully	resisted	when	threatened	with	eviction	(Gonçalves	2013,	McCann	2014).	Wide-scale	eviction	 turned	politically	untenable	with	Brazil’s	 gradual	 return	 to	 democracy:	 the	 military	 government	permitting	 local	 elections	 in	 1974,	 new	 rights	 gained	 by	 favela	residents	at	the	end	of	the	dictatorship	in	1985,	and	the	promulgation	of	 a	 “citizen’s	 constitution”	 in	 1988	 (Gonçalves	 2013).	 The	Constitution	 mandated	 municipal	 master	 plans,	 and	 the	 lauded	Statute	of	the	City	(passed	in	2001)	fundamentally	changed	the	 legal	rights	of	favela	residents	and	the	legal	responsibilities	of	governments	to	intervene	in	the	interests	of	favela	citizens.	
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The	 divided	 city—between	 the	 marvellous	 and	 the	miserable—proved	unsustainable	 for	 two	broad	reasons.	The	 first	 is	the	 aforementioned	 rights	 to	 housing	 and	 social	 services	 and	 the	political	 imperative	 of	 city	 governments	 to	 provide	 basic	 urban	services.	 Likewise	 with	 growing	 proportions	 of	 residents	 living	 in	favelas,	 in	 a	 country	 where	 voting	 participation	 is	 obligatory,	 the	favelas	 became	 important	 on	 the	 electoral	 maps	 even	 without	officially	recognized	home	addresses.	The	second,	that	I	want	to	focus	on	here,	 is	 that	reproducing	the	cidade	partida	 in	state	planning	and	security	policy	is	untenable	because	it	makes	for	an	intolerable	life	for	middle	 and	 upper-middle	 class	 Cariocas.	 I	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 direct	attention	 away	 from	 Rio’s	 poor	 and	 favela	 residents,	 who	 suffer	disproportionate	 levels	 of	 violence	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 cidade	 partida,	but	 the	 suffering,	 fear,	 and	 trauma	 experienced	 by	 the	middle	 class	was	 fundamental	 to	 forming	 the	 liberal	 consensus	 that	 something	
must	 be	 done.	 Below	 I	 elaborate	 on	 the	 claim	 that	 urban	 violence;	rooted	 in	 spatialised	 and	 racial	 inequality,	 segregation	 and	oppression;	grew	intolerable	to	the	middle	class.		The	 cultural	 and	 spatial	 division	 between	 the	 favela	 and	 the	
asfalto	 requires	 an	 intense	 and	 constant	 othering	 of	 the	 favelas	 and	their	 residents	 largely	 based	 on	 racism,	 xenophobia	 (especially	against	North-eastern	Brazilian	migrants)	and	anti-poor	 revanchism,	resulting	 in	 extreme	 suspicion	 and	 fear.	 This	 intensified	 during	 the	1990’s	 when	 violent	 crime	 and	 drug-related	 violence	 soared,	 and	sensationalist	 media	 constructed	 a	 gripping	 narrative	 of	 urban	warfare	between	police	and	criminal	gangs	in	the	favelas	(Leite	2001;	Penglase	 2007;	 M.	 H.	 M.	 Alves	 and	 Evanson	 2011).	 The	 threat	 of	favela-communism	had	waned,	but	Rio	de	Janeiro	was	still	at	war,	this	time	against	drug	 traffickers,	gangs,	and	street	bandits.	Fear	gripped	the	 city	 so	 tightly	 that	 it	 influenced	 urban	 design,	 policy	 and	development	above	the	ideals	of	citizenship	and	equity	(Souza	2005;	
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Souza	1999;	Lucas	2010;	Batista	2003).	The	induced	panic	politically	justified	extreme	measures	 taken	by	 the	police	and	state,	most	aptly	exemplified	 by	 the	 expression	 “a	 good	 bandit	 is	 a	 dead	 bandit,”	 an	opinion	 made	 famous	 by	 the	 police	 officer	 turned	 politician	 José	Guilherme	Godinho	Sivuca	Ferreira	(a.k.a.	Sivuca).37		Clamouring	 for	 “peace,”	 the	 Carioca	 middle	 class	 generalised	their	 moral	 revulsion	 at	 police	 massacres	 of	 the	 poor	 (especially	against	 children,	 e.g.	 the	 Candelária	 Massacre)	 with	 violent	 crime	committed	 by	 poor	 people	 categorised	 as	 social	 “marginals”	 and	presumed	 to	 live	 in	 the	 favelas.	This	 is	perhaps	best	 represented	by	the	 2000	 campaign	 “Basta!	 Eu	 Quero	 Paz”	 (Enough!	 I	 Want	 Peace),	launched	 by	 the	 politically	 influential	 civil	 society	 organisation	Viva	
Rio!	 Their	 “march	 for	 peace”	 drew	 over	 one	 hundred	 thousand	 city	residents	 in	 addition	 to	 memorializing	 victims	 of	 violence	 with	 a	large-scale	 mural	 downtown,	 “The	 Wall	 of	 Pain”	 (see	 Paim	 et	 al.	2004).	 The	Wall	 did	 not	 distinguish	 between	 those	 killed	 by	 armed	thieves,	assassinated	by	police	officers,	killed	by	rival	gangs,	or	caught	in	 crossfire	 between	 warring	 factions	 and	 the	 police.	 Rather	 the	organisers	sought	to	build	a	consensus	based	on	a	call	for	peace,	as	if	declaring	 a	 ceasefire	 could	 halt	 structural	 violence.	 While	 apolitical	discourse	resonated	across	socio-spatial	classes,	a	call	 for	peace	falls	short	 of	 a	 call	 for	 justice.	 And	 this	 liberal	 consciousness	 raising—
violence	 begets	 violence	 and	 violence	 affects	 us	 all—neither	 explicitly	connected	 violence	 to	 race/space/class	 inequalities	 nor	 resulted	 in	advancing	poor	 favela	 residents’	 claim	 to	 the	 city.	As	 such,	 the	push	for	 an	 “integrated	 city”	 is	 as	 much	 a	 result	 of	 middle	 class	exasperation	 at	 urban	 violence	 and	 desperation	 to	 feel	 safe	 in	 their																																																									37	 The	 full	 quote	 that	 Sivuca	 often	 repeated	 enthusiastically	 is	 “a	 good	 bandit	 is	 a	dead	 bandit,	 buried	 feet	 first	 so	 he	 doesn’t	 take	 up	 too	 much	 space.”	 He	 miss-attributed	 this	 quote	 to	 US	 General	 Custer	 in	 reference	 to	Native	 Americans:	 “the	only	 good	 Indian	 is	 a	 dead	 Indian.”	 However	 historians	 attribute	 that	 infamous	phrase	 to	 General	 Phillip	 Sheridan	 who	 reportedly	 said,	 “the	 only	 good	 Indians	 I	ever	saw	were	dead.”	
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homes	and	moving	throughout	the	city	as	it	is	an	attempt	to	guarantee	the	rights	of	poor	and	working	class	residents;	or	as	Barbosa	puts	it,	the	right	to	form	part	of	the	landscape.	This	liberal,	conflating	discourse	is	present	in	how	some	policy	makers	 and	 technocrats	 interpret	 their	 own	 social	 role,	 or	 social	responsibility,	 to	 affect	 change	 through	 state	 interventions	 in	 the	favelas.	 For	 example,	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Pereira	 Passos	 Institute	(IPP),	 the	 principal	 technical	 and	 information	 hub	 of	 municipal	planning,	 tells	 a	 personal	 story	 of	 violence	 that	 she	 interpreted	 as	 a	calling	to	public	service.	Having	“retired”	young	after	making	a	small	fortune	 in	 the	 private	 financial	 sector,	 she	 accepted	 a	 job	 with	 the	municipal	government	after	a	near	death	assault:			
Because	I	didn’t	want	to	bulletproof	my	car.	I	took	a	bullet,	I	
didn’t	want	to	bulletproof	my	car,	and	I	wanted	the	city	back	
before	 giving	 up.	 I	 said,	 I’m	 going	 to	 do	my	 part.	 […]	 Five	
years	 ago,	 almost	 six,	 I	 was	 shot.	 And	 I	 said,	 no,	 I	 want	 to	
work	[in	the	public	sector]	because	I	want	the	right	to	come	
and	go;	because	that	guy	[who	shot	me]	 is	poor	and	pitiful,	
and	 I	 want	 his	 son,	 his	 grandson,	 to	 have	 the	 same	
opportunities	as	my	grandson,	that	we	may	live	together	in	
this	 city,	 yeah?	 With	 respect	 to	 diversity	 of	 income	 and	
everything	else…		 (Eduarda	La	Rocque,	President	of	IPP)		The	 right	 to	 come	 and	 go,	 to	 move	 about	 the	 city	 without	 fear	 of	violence,	 is	 key	 to	 “favela	 integration”	 and	 is	 often	 repeated	 in	 state	texts	 referring	 to	 the	 imperatives	 of	 state	 programming.	 Violence	 in	the	 “cidade	 partida”	 reached	 a	 breaking	 point.	 Eduarda	 calls	 on	 her	personal	story	when	speaking	to	a	group	of	privileged	cariocas,	both	to	explain	why	she	 left	 the	 luxury	of	 the	private	sector,	as	well	as	 to	discursively	 build	 consensus	 among	 the	 elite	 that	 the	 only	 way	forward	is	through	socio-spatial	transformation	of	the	city.	La	Rocque	
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told	her	story	at	an	event	hosted	by	the	civil	society	organisation	Move	
Rio	 (she	 later	 repeated	 it	 to	 me	 during	 an	 interview).	Move	 Rio	 in	Portuguese	 translates	 to	 Change	 Rio,	 but	 the	 verb	 mover	 literally	means	 to	 physically	 change	 position	 or	 to	 advance	 forward.	 Here	 it	insinuates	 the	progressive	 transformation	 of	 the	 city	 in	motion.	 The	NGO	 is	 composed	 principally	 of	 young	 professionals	 and	 ambitious	students	from	elite	backgrounds	looking	to	network	and	engage	with	prominent	public	figures	and	officials.		The	venue	 for	La	Rocque’s	 speech	was	as	 indicative	as	 it	was	ironic.	Ironic	because	the	talk	concerned	the	municipal	government’s	“social”	 interventions	 in	 the	 pacified	 favelas,	 and	 was	 held	 in	 an	ostentatious	 room	 above	 the	 famous	 Brazilian	 jeweller	 Amsterdam	Sauer	showroom	in	Ipanema,	Zona	Sul.	It	took	place	shortly	after	the	one-year	anniversary	of	massive	urban	protests	in	Brazil	and	during	a	time	when	the	pacification	was	beginning	to	show	operational	failure	in	 the	 larger	 occupied	 favelas.	 Indicative	 because	 there	was	 nothing	exceptional	 about	 this	 elite	 space,	 wholly	 inaccessible	 to	 favela	residents,	as	the	site	of	debate	and	decision-making	concerning	public	policy	 and	 spatialised	 socioeconomic	 inequality.38	 This	 seems	 to	substantiate	 Souza’s	 claim	 that	 citizenship	 is	 eroded	 as	 the	 polis	 is	privatised	 in	 elite	 spaces.	 It	 is	 also	 precisely	 in	 such	 spaces	 that	 a	consensus	 was	 built	 among	 the	 city’s	 elite	 to	 endorse	 seemingly	progressive	 public	 policies	 that	 make	 up	 favela	 integration.	 La	Rocque’s	personal	narrative	attempts	to	do	 just	that,	 to	convince	the	elite	of	the	necessity	of	integration	not	just	to	ensure	the	rights	of	the	“poor	and	pitiful,”	but	 for	a	better	quality	of	 life	 for	 the	wealthy,	 for	their	right	to	come	and	go	without	need	for	a	bullet-proof	car.	Language	 referencing	 integration	 is	 included	 in	 public	 policy,	urban	 planning	 programmes,	 objectives	 of	 architects’	 design																																																									38	One	of	 the	heirs	 to	Amsterdam	Sauer	 is	a	 founding	member	of	Move	Rio,	which	may	explain	the	meeting	place.	
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interventions,	 and	 both	 civil	 society	 and	 academic	 writing.	 “Favela	integration”	and	the	“integrated	city”	exist	as	an	 idealistic	normative	vision	 of	 what	 should	 be,	 rather	 than	 as	 explicitly	 defined	 by	 policy	and	 state	 programmes.	 Viewed	 through	 landscape	 analysis,	 as	 an	ideological	vision	and	ordering	of	space	“favela	integration”	means	to	strive	toward	a	more	equitable	urban	democracy:	the	integrated	city.	Based	on	the	discourse	of	“integration”	the	solution	sought	is	not	the	end	of	the	favelas,	but	a	shared	urban	ideal	that	affirms	the	rights	of	all	 urban	 residents,	 guarantees	 social	 services	 based	 on	 status	 as	equal	citizens,	and	celebrates	spatial	difference.	We	might	 think	of	 it	as	a	cooperative,	give-and-take	dialectic	 in	which	the	city	as	a	whole	transforms.		
5.3	A	cidade	integrada,	utopian	visions	of	a	united	Rio	Political	rhetoric	typically	leans	toward	utopia	if	not	fantasy,	as	demonstrated	by	Mayor	Paes’	re-election	campaign	video	referenced	at	 the	 opening	of	 the	 chapter.	 The	 lyrical	 theme	of	 “Somos	um	Rio”,	especially	the	opening	line	“I	live	on	the	hill,	she	lives	in	Zona	Sul,”	is	reminiscent	of	a	song	titled	“Já	me	Acostumei”	(I’m	already	used	to	it)	by	 the	 musician	 Ah	 Muleke	 performed	 with	 the	 group	 Turma	 do	Pagode.	The	song	tells	the	story	of	an	impossible	love	between	a	man	and	woman	opposite	both	in	material	life	conditions,	demeanour,	and	personal	 taste	 in	music	and	 film.	The	opening	 line,	 “She	was	born	 in	Zona	Sul	and	I’m	from	the	favela”	is	nearly	identical	to	Paes	campaign	song.	 The	 significant	 difference	 is	 that	 in	 “Já	 me	 Acostumei”	 the	contrast	between	the	two	lovers	is	too	great,	and	the	love	is	doomed.	The	last	line	sings,	“I	already	know	how	it	ends.	/	It	doesn’t	matter,	I	love	you.”	In	contrast,	“Somos	um	Rio”	offers	a	vision	of	unity.	It	does	not	matter	 that	 one	 is	 of	 the	 favela	 and	 the	 other	 Zona	 Sul	 because	“the	city	has	changed”	and	reality	has	transformed	so	that	differences	are	celebrated.	In	an	integrated	Rio	de	Janeiro,	love	thrives.	
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Paes’	 music	 video	 clip,	 which	 aired	 as	 a	 TV	 commercial,	accompanied	a	 longer	16-minute	campaign	video	posted	to	YouTube	by	the	Mayor’s	re-election	campaign.	Eduardo	Paes	narrates	between	vignettes	of	projects	his	administration	accomplished	during	his	first	term,	 highlighting	 those	 that	 supposedly	 renovated	 stigmatised	neighbourhoods—interventions	 that	 encourage	 residents	 to	 visit	places	formerly	thought	of	as	‘far’	or	‘no-go	zones.’	He	states:	“I’m	very	happy	to	see	Rio	de	Janeiro	finding	 itself;	a	city	more	 integrated	and	united.	[…]	For	a	long	time	that	type	of	space	[of	leisure,	culture,	and	social	interaction]	only	existed	in	Zona	Sul,	but	I	committed	myself	to	bring	citizenship	and	dignity	to	all	parts	of	the	city.”	Here	we	have	 the	 imaginary	Rio	de	 Janeiro—divided	by	 race,	by	class,	by	spatial	category—striving	to	unite	through	diversity:	 the	“negão”	 from	the	hillside	 favela	 flirting	with	the	blonde-haired,	blue-eyed	 woman	 from	 a	 wealthy	 neighbourhood;	 the	 area	 once	considered	 the	 “last	 neighbourhood	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro”	 becomes	 a	destination	point	with	a	new	state-sponsored	cultural	centre.	Political	rhetoric	is	highly	invested	in	discursively	constructing	the	“integrated	city”,	 where	 flows	 of	 people	 and	 goods	 are	 uninterrupted.	 Scholars	working	at	Universidad	Federal	Fluminense	have	argued	that	a	selling	point	 for	 the	Bus	Rapid	Transit	 system,	pushed	by	Paes	government	with	federal	financing	and	tied	to	Rio’s	Olympic	bid,	also	calls	on	the	imagining	 of	 a	 city	 united	 through	 the	 advanced	 technology	 of	 bus-exclusive	 lanes,	 transporting	 workers	 from	 low-income	 areas	 and	tourists	from	the	airport	to	the	natural	centre	of	growth	and	home	to	the	 Olympic	 Village,	 the	 wealthy	 Barra	 de	 Tijuca	 (Gaffney	 et	 al,	forthcoming).	Employing	a	discourse	of	 integration	to	refer	to	public	transport	directly	 connecting	areas	of	 the	 city	 imagined	as	 separate,	Paes’	assertion	that	planning	during	his	term	of	office	uses	culture	and	the	arts	as	a	regenerative	tool	suggests	that	the	integration	paradigm	extends	beyond	even	the	favelas.	The	objective	is	the	integrated	city.		
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5.4	From	favela	upgrade	to	favela	integration	While	there	are	some	condemnable	contemporary	examples	of	anti-favela	eviction	 in	relation	to	 large	public	works	and	mega-event	constructions	 (Brum	 2013),	 these	 are	 the	 exception,	 not	 the	 rule.39	Since	the	1990s,	state	policy	targeting	the	favelas	accepts	their	semi-permanence	 (Gonçalvez	 2013).	 Correspondingly,	 scholars	 and	“experts”	 of	 urban	 development,	 poverty,	 and	 informal	 housing	settlements	began	to	have	some	effect	on	the	policy	and	programmes	drafted	as	 they	were	 incorporated	 into	the	state	planning	and	policy	apparatus.	 This	 section	 examines	 favela	 integration	 through	systematic	 urban	 planning	 programmes	 that	 were	 meant	 to	 largely	preserve	the	self-constructed	neighbourhoods’	form	while	improving	the	 urban	 infrastructure.	 The	 first	 major	 program	 targeting	 the	favelas	 on	 a	 large	 scale	was	 known	 as	 Favela-Bairro,	 designed	 by	 a	group	of	 planners	 and	 architects	 close	 to	 the	municipal	 government	(Fiori	et	al.	2000).	This	is	when	we	begin	to	hear	language	referencing	the	“integration”	of	favelas	into	the	formal	city.		Favela-Bairro	 was	 arguably	 the	 municipality’s	 first	comprehensive	 approach	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 favelas	 based	 on	legislated	 priorities	 and	 planning	 methodology.	 That	 is	 to	 say	 an	approach	 that	 did	 not	 call	 for	 or	 principally	 aim	 to	 eliminate	 the	favelas,	 and	 a	 scalable	 methodology.	 Its	 approach	 to	 urbanisation	represented	a	significant	shift	in	policy	in	that	it	did	not	prioritise	re-housing	 residents—indeed	 the	 programme	 explicitly	 discouraged	construction	 of	 new	 housing	 units	 except	 in	 cases	 where	 residents	were	 “removed”	 from	 areas	 deemed	 “high	 risk”	 of	 landslide	 or	 as	 a	
																																																								39	The	Rio	de	Janeiro	chapter	of	the	Comitê	Popular	de	Copa	e	Olimpíadas,	a	diverse	activist	 group	 consisting	 of	 residents	 affected	 by	 the	mega-events,	 academics	 and	students,	 has	 done	 an	 excellent	 job	 of	 documenting	 and	 publicizing	 arbitrary	evictions	and	human	rights	abuses	in	connection	to	the	2014	FIFA	Men’s	World	Cup	and	the	2016	Summer	Olympic	Games.	See	their	website	for	more	information	and	a	dossier	on	rights	abuses	published	in	2015:	http://rio.portalpopulardacopa.org.br/	
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result	 of	 widening	 a	 road	 (in	 some	 cases	 that	 amounts	 to	 a	 forced	eviction)—but	 focused	on	“collective	needs	of	 the	 favela	as	a	whole”	such	 as	 sanitation	 infrastructure,	 paved	 roads,	 public	 lighting,	 trash	collection	 points,	 and	 communal	 recreation	 areas	 (Fiori	 et	 all	 2000,	58).	 The	 principle	 behind	 Favela-Bairro	 was	 that	 if	 architects	 and	planners	 installed	 certain	 urban	 signifiers	 within	 the	 favela	 that	mirrored	planned	urban	space,	then	the	favelas	could	be	perceived	as	working-class	 neighbourhoods	 (Cavallieri	 2003;	 Gonçalves	 2013;	Miranda	2015).	Morar	 Carioca	 is	 the	 municipal	 government	 programme	 that	followed	Favela-Bairro.	The	 full	 name	of	 the	programme,	 translated,	reads	 The	 Municipal	 Program	 to	 Integrate	 Informal	 Precarious	
Settlements—Living	Carioca;	and	it	was	legally	adopted	into	the	city’s	
Master	Plan	 for	Sustainable	Urban	Development	 in	2012	by	executive	decree	 36388.	 Morar	 Carioca	 can	 and	 should	 be	 read	 as	 a	 sort	 of	policy	 upgrade	 of	 Favela-Bairro.	 The	 decree	 states	 that	 the	“accumulated	 experience	 of	 the	municipal	 administration	 in	 the	 last	decades	in	urbanisation	and	land	regularisation	of	favelas	and	public	housing	 developments	 (loteamentos)	 qualifies	 [the	 government]	 to	reach	more	advanced	levels	of	these	types	of	actions”.	This	 implies	a	linear	 progression	 of	 thought.	 If	 Favela-Bairro	 was	 principally	interested	 in	 “upgrading”	 the	 favelas	 until	 they	 resembled,	 or	 met	some	criteria	to	qualify	as,	a	“real”	neighbourhood	of	the	asfalto,	then	Morar	 Carioca	 discursively	 recognizes	 that	 the	 favelas	 have	 always	existed	 as	 both	 neighbourhoods	 and	 legitimate	 urban	 space.	 In	 the	typically	sensationalist	 language	connected	with	 the	Olympic	Games,	the	Municipal	Government	website,	A	Cidade	Olímplica	(“The	Olympic	City”	has	become	a	tagline	of	Mayor	Paes)	calls	the	programme	a	“true	revolution	in	the	concept	of	social	integration	[…]	bringing	citizenship	and	 dignity	 to	 a	 significant	 portion	 of	 the	 population	 that	 still	 lives	under	less	favourable	conditions.”		
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The	 political	 rhetoric	 claiming	 that	 planning	 interventions	deliver	citizenship	along	with	basic	urban	infrastructure	is	common	in	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 and	 has	 been	 parroted	 by	 both	 uncritical	 journalists	and	urbanist	intellectuals.40	While	many	observers	might	be	quick	to	dismiss	such	posturing	as	typical	of	bombastic	politicians,	it	serves	as	evidence	of	the	continued	reproduction	of	dichotomous	urban	space:	“the	 city”,	 which	 conforms	 to	 hegemonic	 notions	 of	 urbanity	 and	where	 residents	 are	 citizens,	 and	 the	 favela,	 settlements	 lacking	legitimizing	 infrastructure	 and	 where	 residents	 will	 have	 the	opportunities	 to	 become	 citizens	 after	 state	 interventions.	 The	fetishising	of	urban	infrastructure	as	conduits	of	citizenship,	following	Kaika	and	Swyngedouw	(2000),	ultimately	serves	the	expansion	of	the	marvellous	landscape	to	include	the	favelas,	even	when	embedded	in	contradictory	 discourse	 on	 urban	 social	 belonging.	 The	 mundane—paved	 roads,	 sewer	 lines—suddenly	 becomes	marvellous	 as	 if	 their	arrival	stimulates	something	as	intangible	and	fantastic	as	citizenship.		In	one	video	uploaded	to	YouTube	(since	removed)	by	the	Rio	municipal	 government	 to	 publicize	 the	Morar	 Carioca	 interventions,	brown	streams	of	raw	sewage	are	magically	turned	blue	in	what	can	only	 be	 a	 spectacularly	 exaggerated	 representation	 of	 installing	covered	 sewer	 lines.	 No	 on-site	 treatment	 facilities	 are	 installed	 as	part	 of	 favela	 urbanisation,	 and	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 Rio’s	 waste	remains	untreated	and	funnelled	directly	to	the	Guanabara	Bay	or	out	to	 the	 ocean.41	While	 the	 bad	 flows	 out	 in	 the	 promotional	 clip,	 the	good	 flows	 in	 on	 newly	 constructed	 roads	 that	 facilitate	 vehicle	access.	 In	 another	 video,	 a	 scene	 in	 an	 architecture	 studio	 shows	 a	group	 of	 presumed	 architects	 and	 engineers	 gathered	 around	 the																																																									40	For	example	see	Mehta’s	(2013)	write-up	of	security	and	planning	interventions	in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 in	 preparations	 for	 sporting	 mega-events;	 and	 my	 response	(Landesman	2013).	41	At	the	start	of	fieldwork	in	2013,	it	was	reported	that	less	than	40%	of	residents’	waste	was	collected	by	the	public	water	company,	Cedae	(Alencar	and	Schmidt,	2013).	
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technical	map	 detailing	 the	 favela	 and	 surrounding	 area.	 One	 of	 the	architects	 takes	 a	 thick	marker	 and	 draws	 a	 large	 circle	 outside	 the	limits	of	 the	 favela	and	begins	drawing	 large	arrows	outwards.	Such	markings	have	no	discernable	technical	value—and	the	same	footage	is	used	in	multiple	videos	supposedly	depicting	favela-specific	Morar	Carioca	interventions—but	it	reinforces	the	discourse	that	integration	increases	connectivity	and	facilitates	flows	in	and	out	of	the	favelas.		Without	 harping	 on	 claims	 to	 revolutionary	 status,	 there	 is	consensus	 among	 planners	 and	 urbanists	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 that	 the	vision	 and	 methodology	 of	 Morar	 Carioca	 is	 innovative,	 even	 when	compared	 with	 its	 celebrated	 predecessor,	 Favela-Bairro.	 Where	 as	Favela-Bairro	 spoke	 about	 “integrating”	 the	 favelas	with	 the	 “formal	fabric”	of	the	city,	the	standard	for	integration	was	whether	or	not	the	favela,	 after	 the	 intervention,	boasted	paved	 roads,	 acceptable	 levels	of	sanitation,	and	lighting	of	public	spaces.		Morar	Carioca	positions	itself	as	truly	“integrative”	because	of	its	relational	approach	and	systematised	community	participation.	In	an	interview	with	Pedro	da	Luz	Moreira,	President	of	the	Institute	of	Brazilian	Architects	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro,	and	one	of	 the	protagonists	of	Morar	 Carioca,	 he	 explained,	 “the	 difference	 between	 Favela-Bairro	and	Morar	 Carioca	was,	 exactly,	 our	 attempt	 to	 have	 a	 vision	 of	 the	favela	 inserted	 in	 the	collected	city	as	a	whole,	you	understand?	 […]	Favela-Bairro	was	 very	 localist,	 it	 looked	 only	 at	 the	 interior	 of	 the	favela	 and	 it	 didn’t	 look	 much	 at	 the	 exterior.”	 Michelle,	 a	 junior	architect	who	studied	Favela-Bairro	in	college	and	accepted	a	job	at	a	Rio	de	Janeiro	firm	in	order	to	work	on	Morar	Carioca,	explained	it	to	me	 like	 this:	 “Favela-Bairro	was	basic:	 street	 lights,	 basic	 sanitation,	new	 housing	 and	 that’s	 it.”	 Morar	 Carioca	 was	more	 “idealistic.	 […]	You	as	an	ordinary	citizen	could	go	to	the	favela	and	feel	it	was	part	of	the	city,	 the	 formal	city.”	Michelle,	who	sees	herself	as	a	progressive	architect-urbanist	and	a	fan	of	the	“vernacular	architecture”	found	in	
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self-built	 settlements,	 nonetheless	 classifies	 “ordinary	 citizens”	 as	non-favela	 residents	 and	 a	 qualitative	 measurement	 of	 successful	integration	would	be	visiting	a	favela	and	feeling	as	if	it	were	“formal	city.”		 	Planning	 interventions	 based	 not	 solely	 on	 what	 the	 favela	was	“missing”	on	the	inside	(roads,	sanitation	etc…)	but	in	relation	to	the	 surrounding	 neighbourhood	 and	 transport	 networks,	 was	 a	repeated	response	from	architect-planners	when	I	asked	them	about	the	 evolution	 of	 Morar	 Carioca	 as	 well	 as	 how	 they	 understood	planning	for	“integration”.	Thinking	with	the	new	paradigm,	there	is	a	preoccupation	with	‘opening’	up	the	favela,	facilitating	access	through	transport	 infrastructure	 for	 residents,	 state	 vehicles	 (trash	 trucks,	ambulances,	 police	 cars	 for	 example),	 and	 non-residents.	 This	perspective	 was	 institutionalised	 in	 the	 planning	 of	 the	 project	through	 the	“Social	Diagnostic,”	and	explained	 to	me	 in	an	 interview	with	Fede,	lead	architect	of	a	top-ranked	Morar	Carioca	intervention42	who	is	also	well	known	for	multiple	Favela-Bairro	interventions:		Fede:	 There	 is	 a	 fourth	 point	 important	 to	 Morar	 Carioca,	 beyond	
that	 social	 question,	 that	 I	 am	 remembering,	 beyond	 the	 [housing]	
improvements,	 there	 is	an	 important	point:	 that	 is	 the	expansion	of	
the	diagnostic	phase.	The	diagnostic	gained	a	little	more	time.	And	in	
addition	 to	 the	 local	 diagnostic,	meaning	 the	 diagnostic	 of	 the	 said	
favela,	 there	 was	 inserted	 in	 the	 scope	 that	 which	 the	 city	
government	 called	 the	macro	diagnostic,	 that	 is	 a	 diagnostic	 of	 the	
immediate	surroundings	of	the	favela.	Tucker:	More	territorial,	yes?	Fede:	More	 territorial.	 So	 then,	 looking	 to	do	what?	 Integration—a	
more	 profound	 integration	 between	 the	 favela	 and	 the	
neighbourhood	in	which	it	is	inserted.	So,	that	is	one	new	thing	that	
Morar	Carioca	brought	as	well,	which	 is	an	 interesting	point.	So	we																																																									42	 Fede’s	 firm	 was	 ranked	 number	 five	 out	 of	 the	 50	 winning	 Morar	 Carioca	proposals.	
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did	a	much	bigger	survey,	we	didn’t	stop	at	doing	a	local	diagnostic	
of	the	favela.	We	did	a	macro	diagnostic	as	well.	Looking	at	what?	In	
the	intervention	plan,	beyond	the	local	[internal]	 intervention,	there	
was	 what	 we	 called	 the	 plan	 of	 integration,	 such	 that	 the	 favela	
connects	with	its	immediate	surrounding.	That	is	what	we	called	the	
plan	of	integration.	So	we	looked	to	bring	benefits	that	the	city	had	to	
offer	next	 to	 the	 favela,	 so	 that	 it	would	become	 integrated	 into	the	
favela.	I’ll	give	an	example:	you	have	a	bicycle	path	passing	close	by	
the	 favela,	 why	 not	 bring	 that	 bicycle	 path	 inside	 the	 favela?	 To	
change	 its	route,	bring	 it	 inside	the	 favela	and	after	 it	continues	 it’s	
normal	 route.	 Not	 as	 the	 only	 solution,	 but	 as	 an	 alternative,	 for	
those	who	want	 to	 do	 that	 [follow	 the	path	 through	 the	 favela].	 So	
the	macro	diagnostic	and	plan	 for	 integration	were	very	 important,	
and	they	were	brought	by	the	new	scope	of	Morar	Carioca.	
	In	 this	 explanation	 of	 “integration”	 through	 a	 “macro	 diagnostic”	seeking	 to	 sew	 the	 favela	 into	 the	 urban	 fabric	 of	 the	 city,43	 the	relatively	 simple	 notion	 that	 planners	 should	 think	 about	 favelas	 as	part	of	their	surroundings	when	designing	interventions	as	both	novel	and	transformative.	Here	the	bicycle	path	threads	the	favela	with	the	neighbourhood	 to	 operationally	 deconstruct	 spatial	 boundaries	 by	giving	residents	and	passerby	the	option	of	cycling	through	the	favela	as	a	normalised	action.		The	use	of	 “territorial”	by	architects	and	planners	 to	describe	Morar	Carioca’s	approach	references	two	paradigm	shifts	in	Brazilian	and	 international	 planning	 practice.	 First,	 pragmatically	 it	 refers	 to	understanding	 the	 favela	 in	 relation	 to	 its	 encompassing	administrative	area	(which	are	sometimes	referenced	to	as	territories	given	that	they	are	demarcated	zones	of	governance),	of	which	there	are	34	in	the	municipality	of	Rio	de	Janeiro.	Antonio,	who	had	worked																																																									43	The	metaphor	of	sewing	together	urban	fabric	 is	common	among	architects	and	planners’	written	and	spoken	discourse	describing	favela	upgrading	and	integration	interventions.	 It	 calls	 to	 mind	 the	 city	 represented	 as	 a	 patchwork	 quilt,	 and	 the	architect-planners’	job	is	to	form	a	whole	following	a	cohesive	pattern.		
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for	the	Municipal	Housing	Secretary	overseeing	Morar	Carioca	before	moving	to	the	Institute	of	Pereira	Passos	also	described	Morar	Carioca	as	 “territorial”	and	 “relational”.	Hastily	 scribbling	on	a	bar	napkin	at	our	 first	 meeting	 at	 a	 restaurant	 near	 his	 office,	 he	 sketched	 three	non-contingent	squares	representing	three	distinct	favelas	in	one	area	of	the	city.	He	explained	that	under	Favela-Bairro,	each	of	the	favelas	would	require	a	separate	intervention,	and	in	many	cases	only	one	of	the	three	favelas	would	have	been	urbanised	since	it	was	unlikely	that	the	 government	 would	 implement	 three	 self-contained	 projects	 in	close	 proximity	 when	 resources	 are	 limited.	 He	 drew	 a	 tight	 circle	around	 one	 of	 the	 squares.	 Morar	 Carioca,	 however,	 allows	 the	architect-planning	team	to	design	an	intervention	for	all	three	favelas	in	 relation	 to	 each	 other	 (he	 drew	 connecting	 lines	 between	 the	squares)	as	well	as	in	relation	to	the	surrounding	formal	city	(he	drew	a	loose	circle	encompassing	most	of	the	napkin).	Second	and	more	abstractly,	“territorial”	and	“relational”	refer	to	 a	 shift	 in	 planning	 thinking	 from	 static	 architecture-focused	“blueprint	 planning”	 (called	 planejamento	 físico-territorial	 in	Portuguese)	 to	 a	 more	 interdisciplinary	 approach	 that	 incorporates	systems	thinking	and	understands	“planning	as	a	process”	(see	Souza	(2001b,	123–35).	Whereas	 the	 former	produces	a	plan	based	on	 the	ideal	 future,	 the	 latter	 grapples	 with	 the	 dynamic	 present.	 Better	planning,	or	more	planning,	has	long	been	considered	the	solution	to	the	 “favela	 problem”	 because	 analysis	 blames	 a	 lack	 of	 popular	housing	planning	as	a	principal	culprit	of	their	proliferation.	However	contemporary	progressive	planning	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro	no	 longer	 sees	urban	 planning	 as	 the	 means	 to	 get	 rid	 of	 slums,	 but	 rather	 as	 a	complex	 and	 dynamic	 process	 to	 stimulate	 and	 facilitate	 social	cohesion,	 local	 economy,	 and	 community	 resilience	 (see	 2015	 UN	Habitat	 International	 Guidelines	 on	 Urban	 and	 Territorial	 Planning).	Favela-Bairro	was	not	an	example	of	blueprint	planning—the	shift	in	
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planning	 thinking	 occurred	well	 before	 the	 program’s	 creation—but	because	 the	 plans	were	 contained	 to	 individual	 favelas	 (what	 Pedro	called	 localist)	 it	 prevented	 a	 dynamic,	 relational	 approach	whereas	Morar	Carioca	encourages	it	through	both	the	“macro	diagnostic”	and	the	“plan	for	integration”	as	explained	by	Fede.		 Defining	 “favela	 integration”	 in	 contemporary	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	goes	beyond	the	upgrading	paradigm	of	imitating	formality	within	the	favela	and	delivery	of	basic	services.	True	“integration”	requires	that	favelas	become	normal	 not	 just	 for	 their	 residents,	but	 also	 for	non-residents.	A	bicycle	path	is	a	simple	example	of	a	more	complex	idea.	Fede	and	others	strive	to	designate	favelas	as	places	to	frequent,	pass	through,	 and	 visit.	 Urban	 design	 here	 takes	 aim	 as	 the	 social	representation	and	spatial	experience	of	the	favelas.	Designing	bicycle	paths	 or	 building	 health	 clinics	 within	 the	 favelas	 are	 strategies	 to	“integrate”	the	favela	into	the	mundane	activities	of	city	residents,	and	they	feature	prominently	in	programme	propaganda	produced	by	the	municipal	 government.	 Fede’s	 example	 of	 a	 bike	 path	 to	 normalise	favela	 space	 also	 exposes	 the	 cautiousness	 of	 “favela	 integration”	discourse.	 His	 designed	 bike	 path—which	 as	 it	 happens	 never	materialised	due	to	budget	constrictions	that	surprised	observers	and	frustrated	 the	 responsible	 architects—gives	 riders	 the	 option	 of	cycling	 through	 the	 favela	 as	 an	 “alternative”	 route	 before	 rejoining	with	 the	 “normal”	 path.	 The	 division	 between	 the	 favela	 and	 the	“normal”	route	of	movement	would	persist;	but	within	“integration”	a	path	through	the	formerly	“no-go”	zone	is	now	presented	to	the	urban	subject	as	a	state-sanctioned	option.		
5.5	Competing	discourses:	the	favela	is	the	city	versus	the	
favela	belongs	to	the	city	In	 contrast	 to	 the	 paradigm	 of	 “favela	 upgrading”	 (globally	promoted	 by	 international	 development	 agencies	 as	 “slum	
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upgrading”)—defined	 through	 Favela-Bairro	 principally	 as	interventions	 to	 improve	 the	 material	 conditions	 of	 urban	infrastructure	 and	 semiotically	 approaching	 formal	neighbourhoods—“integration”	 thinking	 evolved	 and	 prioritises	 the	qualitative	experience	of	the	subject	moving	through	urban	space	and	attempts	 to	 deconstruct	 the	 socio-spatial	 barriers	 that	 mark	 the	favelas	as	other	and	illegitimate.	This	line	of	thinking	extends	beyond	interventions	designed	by	architects	and	planners.	As	we	saw	above,	integration	 shows	up	 in	political	 rhetoric	 that	 imagines	 the	 city	 as	 a	diverse,	harmonious	democracy.	As	a	paradigm	of	urban	governance,	“favela	 integration”	 seeks	 to	 appropriate	 the	 favela	 into	 the	 formal,	hegemonic,	urban	landscape.		There	are	numerous	discursive	examples	of	this	logic	in	state,	news	and	civil	society	media.	The	Secretary	of	Security	of	the	State	of	Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 responsible	 for	 the	 militarised	 occupation	 and	pacification	 of	 the	 favelas	 (UPP),	 literally	 pleaded	 with	 the	 middle	class	to	visit	the	favelas	in	order	to	support	the	pacification	efforts	as	part	of	the	integration	campaign.	On	the	UPP	webpage	(which	is	also	published	in	English	to	presumably	facilitate	foreign	press	inquires)	a	short	section	titled	“A	word	 from	the	Secretary”44	published	 in	2009	Jose	Beltrame	reads:			
By	the	end	of	2010	I	believe	we	will	have	logistic	conditions	to	occupy	
many	 [favela]	 communities.	 But	 as	 I’ve	 always	 repeated	 whenever	
questioned:	 either	 society	 embraces	 and	 welcomes	 these	 areas	 or	
nothing	 will	 actually	 change.	 Therefore,	 the	 police	 plea	 with	
everyone:	go	up	the	hill,	[the	favela]	belongs	to	the	city.	
	Echoing	Beltrame’s	claim,	when	security	 forces	“invaded”	 the	 largest	single	favela,	Rocinha,	in	2013,	the	most	widely	circulated	newspaper																																																									44	This	page	was	removed	and	the	passage	deleted	form	the	website	at	some	point	during	2015.		
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O	Globo,	declared	on	the	front	page	“Rocinha	is	ours”	(see	figure	5.5).	There	more	than	a	semantic	difference	between	“the	favela	is	the	city”	as	 so	many	 community	 activists	 and	 academic	 sympathizers	 declare	and	 “the	 favela	 belongs	 to	 the	 city”	 as	 Beltrame	 and	 the	 headline	assert.	 The	 “favela	 is	 the	 city”	 (a	 favela	 é	 cidade)	 is	 a	 declarative	performative	statement	seeking	to	rectify	the	historic	spatial	othering.	It	discursively	 implies	oppression	and	prejudice	as	 the	root	cause	of	the	divided	city	by	negating	that	dichotomy.	“The	favela	belongs	to	the	city,”	equally	performative,	assumes	authoritative	responsibility,	and	declares,	 ‘enough	 is	enough!	We	must	 take	back	 the	 favela.’	But	 take	back	 from	 what?	 Take	 back	 from	 whom?	 That	 unnamed	 subject—associated	 with	 crime,	 illegality,	 fear,	 poverty	 and	 insecurity—is	named	 as	 the	 culprit.	 Obscuring	 the	 historical	 social	 conditions	 that	stigmatised	 the	 favelas	 and	 produced	 the	 “cidade	 partida”	 is	 the	discursive	production	of	hegemonic	landscape.		
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Figure	5.5	–	A	Rocinha	é	nossa	
O	Globo	newspaper	headline	the	morning	after	Rocinha	was	invaded	by	
military	forces	in	preparation	for	UPP.	The	headline	reads,	“Rocinha	is	ours.	
Without	shots	and	in	less	than	2	hours,	State	retakes	3	favelas	and	re-establish	
services	to	100	thousand	residents.”	The	main	story	is	flanked	with	two	
quotes.	From	a	Rocinha	resident:	“I’ve	seen	a	lot	of	people	from	here	leave	
dead.	Now	we	have	hope	that	things	improve	and	that	the	public	authority	
doesn’t	continue	to	abandon	us.”	Opposite,	a	quote	from	a	resident	of	Gavea,	a	
wealthy	adjacent	neighbourhood:	“My	feeling	is	of	hope	and	satisfaction.	A	
new	era	has	begun	in	Rocinha	and	Vidigal.	The	occupation	eliminates	the	fear	
of	shootouts.”		
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		 On	the	days	that	favelas	are	invaded,	the	police	often	raise	the	Brazilian	national	 flag,	 the	Rio	de	 Janeiro	 state	 flag,	 and	 the	Military	Police	and	BOPE	flags	in	what	has	been	called	an	act	of	“colonisation	of	the	favelas	by	the	state”	(Freeman	2014).	The	claim	to	ownership—‘the	 favela	 is	 ours,	 it	 belongs	 to	 the	 city’—reinforces	 the	 historic	transformation	 from	 revanchist	 eviction	 (what	 Burgos	 (1998)	 calls	
remocionismo,	or	evictionism),	to	upgrading	and	finally	to	integration.	It	is	not	enough	that	the	favela	imitates	the	city.	There	is	a	hegemonic	consensus	 that	 drastic	 security	 measures	 are	 a	 pre-condition	 for	“favela	 integration”.	 And	 in	 political,	 technical,	 and	 news	media,	 the	Pacifying	 Police	 Units	 are	 packaged	 together	 with	 delivery	 of	 basic	services,	urbanisation	and	social	programming.	The	cited	headline	in	
O	 Globo,	 for	 example,	 also	 stated	 in	 the	 sub-headline	 that	 services	were	 re-established	 to	 100,000	 residents	 with	 the	 “retaking”	 of	 the	favelas.	This	is	patently	false	since	the	state	had	begun	urbanisation	of	Rocinha	 and	 Vidigal	 years	 prior	 to	 the	 police	 invasion.	 But	 this	manipulation	of	facts	and	history	shows	up	in	a	variety	of	texts.		There	 is	 no	 single	 document	 at	 any	 level	 of	 government	 that	defines	“favela	integration”	as	either	a	governance	paradigm	or	policy	objective,	 however	 in	 2012	 the	 federal	 Secretary	 of	 Strategic	Affairs	published	a	report	entitled	“Integration	between	Favela	and	City”.	The	publication	was	the	precursor	to	a	two-day	seminar	discussing	“favela	integration”	 co-sponsored	by	 a	 number	 of	 institutions,	 including	 the	federal	 Secretary	 of	 Strategic	Affairs,	 Institute	 of	 Pereira	 Passos,	 the	World	 Bank,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 consortium	 of	 private	 industry	 (Sistema	Firjan)	 and	 a	 civil	 society	 research	 institute	 (IETS).	 Rio’s	 top	 policy	makers,	including	both	the	Governor	and	Mayor,	along	with	the	city’s	chief	 planning	 experts,	 participated.	 The	 document	 lays	 out	 six	dimensions	in	order	to	achieve	“effective	and	sustainable	integration”	
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(see	 figure	 5.6).	 Of	 note	 here	 is	 that	 security,	 by	 means	 of	“pacification”	is	listed	as	the	first	dimension	and	treated	as	a	priori	of	further	 state	 actions:	 “there	 appears	 to	 be	 consensus	 that	 the	 first	stage	of	effective	and	sustainable	integration	is	necessarily	a	process	of	pacification,	with	careful	consideration	of	human	rights.”			
	
Figure	5.6	–	Effective	and	Sustainable	Integration	
Infographic	in	“Integration	between	the	favela	and	the	city”	produced	by	
Federal	Secretary	of	Strategic	Affairs	in	coordination	with	a	number	of	Rio	de	
Janeiro	local	government	offices.	The	graphic	lists	six	“dimensions”	bordered	
by	“presence	of	the	state	within	the	communities”	(on	the	left)	and	“social	
organization	and	strengthening	of	the	communities”	(on	the	right).	The	six	
dimensions	are	as	follows:	1.	Pacification,	promotion	of	public	security	and	
capacity	to	peacefully	resolve	conflicts.	2.	Reorganisation	of	institutions	and	
leadership	and	consequently	the	capacity	to	identify	local	necessities	and	
collective	action.	3.	Transition	towards	regularity/legality,	definition	of	
community	norms	and	guarantee	of	public	order.	4.	Re-establishing	equal	
opportunities	and	access	to	public	services	for	personal	development	and	
reduction	of	inequalities.	5.	Physical,	economic	and	symbolic	integration	for	
the	construction	of	identity	and	belonging.	6.	Resignify	meaning	of	youth.		
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	 	Similarly	 a	 report	 jointly	 published	 by	 the	 Municipal	Government	 and	 the	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 Chapter	 of	 the	 Institute	 of	Brazilian	Architects,	which	was	pivotal	 to	 the	development	of	Morar	Carioca	 methodology	 and	 selection	 of	 architecture	 firms	 to	 design	interventions,	 also	 toes	 this	 line	 of	 consensus.	 The	 edited	 volume	dedicated	 to	 the	 “Social	 Diagnostic”	 required	 of	 Morar	 Carioca	planning	 teams	 (explained	 above)	 includes	 an	 essay	 written	 by	Manoel	 Ribeiro,	 an	 architect-planner	 with	 extensive	 experience	implementing	planning	interventions	in	Rio’s	favelas.	He	writes,	“The	favelas	 currently	 are	 “integrated”	 with	 the	 city,	 yes,	 but	 in	 a	subordinated	 and	 perverse	 way.	 The	 great	 task	 is	 to	 change	 the	quality	of	that	integration,	and	the	UPPs	are	a	very	important	step	in	that	 sense,	 for	 they	 restore	 liberty	 in	 these	 territories”	 (2013,	 54).	Ribeiro’s	 statement	 is	 at	 once	 critical	 of	 the	 “integration”	 discourse,	since	 he	 affirms	 that	 favelas	 are	 already	 integrated	 to	 the	 city,	 and	officialist	in	his	agreement	that	“pacification”	is	necessary	to	“liberate”	the	 favelas.45	 The	 idea	 that	 “integration”	 necessarily	 starts	 with	 the	guarantee	of	public	security	through	the	means	of	militarised	invasion	and	 occupation	 of	 favela	 neighbourhoods	 is	 repeated	 over	 and	 over	until	the	UPPs	are	discursively	indissociable	from	the	delivery	of	basic	services	and	the	guarantee	of	favela	residents’	rights.																																																										45	The	affirmation	 that	 the	 favelas	 are	 already	 integrated	 into	 the	 city	mirrors	 the	argument	 against	 marginality,	 most	 famously	 advanced	 by	 Janice	 Perlman:	 “The	evidence	strongly	indicates	that	the	favelados	are	not	marginal	but	in	fact	integrated	into	 the	 society,	 albeit	 in	 a	 manner	 detrimental	 to	 their	 own	 interests.	 They	 are	certainly	not	separate	 from,	or	on	 the	margin	of	 the	system,	but	are	 tightly	bound	into	 it	 in	a	severely	asymmetrical	 form	(Perlman	1976,	195).	Perlman	argued	 that	rather	 than	 understanding	 the	 favelas	 and	 their	 residents	 through	 the	 lens	 of	marginality,	they	should	be	understood	as	perversely	positioned	to	the	formal	city,	so	 that	migrant	 labour	was	 cheaply	 extracted	without	 having	 to	 provide	 services	associated	with	 living	 in	 the	wealthy	 city.	 Ribeiro’s	 statement	 is	 therefore	 all	 the	more	 paradoxical,	 for	 he	 simultaneously	 references	 a	 body	 of	 literature	 that	identifies	 police	 power	 as	 a	 principal	 source	 of	 violence	 against	 favela	 residents	while	championing	the	new	UPP	as	a	liberating	power.	
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While	we	might	 understand	 the	 aforementioned	 examples	 as	state	agents,	insiders,	and	consultants	toeing	the	official	line,	external	observers	 have	 parroted	 the	 idea	 as	well.	 International	 consultants,	think	 tanks,	 researchers,	 and	 journalists	 have	 uncritically	 reviewed	and	 explained	 the	 UPPs	 as	 establishing	 peace	 and	 state	 presence	 in	the	favelas	as	the	first	step	toward	urbanisation	and	social	integration	(see	Stahlberg	2011;	Felbab-Brown	2011).	The	line	of	thinking	begins	with	 the	 Weberian	 notion	 that	 the	 state	 cannot	 function	 in	 favela	territories	 without	 operating	 a	 monopoly	 of	 violence.	 And	 while	holding	 up	 favela	 “pacification”	 as	 a	model	 for	 other	 countries,	 they	represent	 the	 occupation	 and	 circulation	 of	 police	 in	 the	 favelas	 as	agents	 that	 symbolically	 hold	 the	 door	 open	 for	 additional	 services;	hence	 “bringing	 the	 state	 to	 she	 slum.”	 The	 UPP	 security	 apparatus	deploys	charming,	high-ranking	officers	to	grant	interviews,	and	their	rhetoric	 is	 so	 well	 practiced	 to	 the	 point	 that	 the	 award-winning	writer	Suketu	Mehta	claimed	in	the	New	York	Review	of	Books	that	the	police	were	responsible	for	providing	social	services:		
Under	the	UPP	program,	elite	police	units—and	in	some	cases	
troops	 from	 the	 army	 and	 even	 the	 navy—invade	 the	 favelas	
and	stay	for	up	to	three	months.	Then	they	are	replaced	by	the	
regular	 police	 and	 squads	 of	UPP	civil	 servants.	 The	UPP	
establishes	schools	and	garbage	collection,	brings	in	public	and	
private	 companies	 to	 provide	 utilities	 such	 as	 electricity	 and	
television,	and	hands	out	legal	documents	such	as	employment	
and	 residency	 certificates.	 In	 the	 areas	 under	 its	 control,	
the	UPP	has	set	up	community	security	councils,	which	attempt	
to	 mediate	 conflicts	 between	 local	 hotheads	 before	 they	
spread.	(2013)		Space	does	not	permit	a	full	overview	of	the	UPP	and	their	operations,	but	suffice	to	say	that	the	UPP	do	not	have	“squads	of	civil	servants”	
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coordinating	basic	urban	or	social	services.	In	regards	to	local	security	councils,	the	community	dialogue	established	between	the	occupying	military	forces	and	community	members	in	the	Complexo	do	Alemão	during	 their	more	 than	 year-long	occupation	was	dismantled	by	 the	UPP,	 a	 fact	 that	was	 brought	 up	with	 ire	 at	 a	 community-organised	public	meeting	I	attended	in	2014	that	was	surrounded	and	filmed	by	heavily	 armed	UPP	officers.	One	of	 the	organisers	 later	 told	me	 that	they	 “indefinitely	 suspended”	 such	 meetings	 as	 a	 result	 of	 threats	made	by	UPP	officers.	Beyond	 factual	 inaccuracies	or	misunderstandings	of	 the	UPP	process,	 the	 irony	 of	 the	 consensus—that	 the	 UPP	 is	 necessary	 for	security	 and	 integration—is	 that	 it	 ignores	 two	 decades	 of	 planning	interventions	 of	 Favela-Bairro.	 In	 some	 cases	 (such	 as	 the	aforementioned	essay	by	Ribeiro)	architect-planners	who	worked	on	multiple	 integration	 projects	 without	 police	 presence,	 conduct	 an	about	 face	 and	 toe	 the	 line.	 Not	 only	 does	 it	 ignore	 the	 history	 of	
Favela-Bairro,	 it	 ignores	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 large-scale	 interventions	of	PAC-favelas	were	well	underway	prior	to	the	pacification	of	Complexo	do	 Alemão	 and	 Rocinha,	 for	 example;	 and	 that	 pacification	 is	 not	 a	precondition	for	Morar	Carioca	interventions.	Research	on	the	extent	to	which	 organised	 gangs	 influenced	 or	 hindered	 Favela-Bairro	 and	other	upgrading	interventions	is	scant.	A	recent	doctoral	dissertation	that	 comprehensively	 reviews	 slum-upgrading	 policies	 in	 Rio	 de	Janeiro	 from	 the	 late	 20th	 century	 until	 2012	 (Miranda	 2015)	 never	mentions	 the	 topic	 in	 part	 because	 architects,	 planners,	 and	 other	state	agents	are	prohibited	from	dialoguing	with	the	gangs	as	 if	 they	were	 legitimate	 territorial	 authorities.46	 The	 most	 comprehensive	evaluation	 of	 Favela-Bairro	 briefly	 states	 that	 the	 interests	 of	 the	gangs	are	presumed	to	be	expressed	through	the	recognised	resident																																																									46	Personal	communication	with	the	author.		
	 154	
associations	(Fiori	et	al.	2000).	This	assertion	is	substantiated	by	my	own	 interviews	 and	 conversations	 with	 architects	 and	 resident	association	 representatives.	 My	 objective	 is	 not	 to	 refute	 the	 claim	that	 police-enforced	 “public	 security”	 helps	 sustain	 successful	interventions,	but	rather	to	argue	that	a	linear,	sequential	association	between	“pacification”	and	“integration”	is	unsubstantiated.		The	 pacification	 police	 discursively	 unite	 the	 divided	 city	through	supposedly	guaranteeing	freedom	of	movement	and	“opening	up”	favela	neighbourhoods	to	flows	of	non-resident	visitors,	state	civil	servants,	 and	 private	 capital.	 Within	 the	 discourse	 of	 favela	integration,	 it	 is	 only	 after	 the	 police	 enter	 with	 force	 (the	 official	terms	 used	 by	 the	 security	 apparatus	 to	 describe	 the	 process	 is	“invade,	occupy,	pacify”)	and	dominate	the	space	through	visible	and	frequent	 foot	 patrols	 throughout	 the	 favela,	 that	 additional	 state	provided	or	facilitated	services	“arrive”.		The	UPP	are	also	a	key	actor	 in	making	the	 favela	marvellous	and	 thus	worthy	 of	 Rio’s	 landscape.	 In	 order	 to	 sell	 the	 programme	both	 to	 Rio’s	 population	 and	 to	 the	 international	 media,	 the	 UPP	officers,	 especially	 as	 the	 programme	 was	 rolled	 out,	 were	represented	 almost	 as	 caregivers	 in	 the	 favelas,	 rather	 than	 a	militarised	 police	 force.	 Their	 bilingual	 website	 boasts	 news-styled	stories	of	police	officers	hosting	 community	events,	 teaching	martial	arts	to	children,	feeding	the	hungry,	and	giving	free	guitar	lessons	(see	images	 3	 and	 4).	 These	 stories	 are	 highlighted	 by	 the	 state	 and	reproduced	 by	 popular	 media,	 thus	 serving	 the	 narrative	 that	pacification	 restores	 liberty	 and	 delivers	 dignity	 to	 favela	 residents:	marvellous	things	are	happening	in	the	favela.		
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Figure	5.7	–	Police	fishmongers		
Photograph	from	the	UPP’s	website	in	2014	shows	military	police	handing	out	
fish	 in	Chapeu	Manguiera.	The	 caption	 reads,	 “Around	50	people,	 young	and	
old,	received	the	donations	from	the	hands	of	the	police”.			
	
Figure	5.8	–	Party	with	the	UPP		
Photograph	 found	on	UPP’s	website	 in	2014	shows	 two	officers	singing	 for	a	
small	 crowd	of	 dancing	 children.	The	 caption	 reads,	 “The	 event	 occurred	on	
the	 corner	 of	 the	 community	 and	 with	 the	 presence	 of	 50	 children.”	 The	
accompanying	 story	 describes	 this	 as	 a	 Christmas	 event	 organised	 by	 the	
Coroa/Fallet/Fogueteiro	UPP	 that	 included	an	officer	dressed	as	 Santa	Claus	
who	distributed	presents	to	children.			As	 the	discourse	of	 integration	 focuses	on	 facilitating	 flows	 in	and	out	of	 the	 favelas,	 so	 too	does	 the	 counter-hegemonic	 response.	The	public	community	meeting	 in	Vidigal	referenced	above	was	part	
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of	a	series	of	events	titled	Fala	Vidigal	and	sponsored	by	the	resident	association	 and	 international	 NGO	 Catalytic	 Communities	 with	 the	purpose	 to	 debate	 the	 changes	 experienced	 in	 the	 favela	 post-pacification.	The	theme	of	the	second	debate	was	gentrification.	With	its	 stunning	 views	 of	 the	 Ipanema	 and	 Leblon	 shoreline,	 Vidigal	 has	seen	 a	 rapid	 influx	 of	 new	 residents,	 both	 foreign	 and	 native	Brazilians,	 who	 are	 willing	 to	 pay	 higher	 rents	 for	 the	 privileged	position.	While	gentrification	is	not	the	norm	for	the	majority	of	Rio’s	favelas,	 it	 is	a	documented	phenomenon	in	those	favelas	in	Zona	Sul,	almost	 all	 of	which	 have	 been	 “pacified.”	 Vidigal,	which	 successfully	resisted	eviction	in	the	1970s	through	strong	community	organisation	and	 leveraging	 support	 from	 sympathetic	 celebrities,	 is	 perhaps	 the	most	 “marvellous”	 of	 favelas,	 made	 evident	 by	 the	 numerous	 new	guesthouses	and	hostels,	a	sushi	restaurant	and	real	estate	investors.	During	fieldwork,	I	met	a	young	Brazilian	who	had	bought	two	small	homes	in	the	favela	and	sold	them	one	year	 later	making	substantial	profit.		At	 Fala	 Vidigal,	 Theresa	 Williamson,	 president	 of	 Catalytic	Communities	 and	 an	 influential	 interlocutor	 for	 international	students,	volunteers,	 journalists	and	academics;	argued	 that	 in	place	of	 a	 “recipe	 for	 integration”	 the	 state	 is	 following	 a	 “recipe	 for	gentrification”	 by	 facilitating	 the	 “regularisation”	 of	 basic	 services	immediately	 after	 the	 pacification	 process.	 Indeed	 a	 common	complaint	made	by	favela	community	leaders	is	that	the	first	people	to	enter	the	favela	after	the	police	invasion	are	the	private	companies	to	end	the	gato-Light	and	gato-NET	(illegal	electricity	and	cable/internet	hook-ups).	The	 formalisation	of	 these	basic	services	 is	 followed	by	a	“regularisation”	 of	 local	 businesses	 operating	 in	 various	 degrees	 of	informality.	Post	urbanisation,	via	Morar	Carioca	or	PAC-favelas,	tens	of	 thousands	of	 favela	homeowners	are	opting	to	regularise	 their	 lot	and	 receive	 a	 land	 title.	 According	 to	 Williamson,	 these	 new	
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conditions	 are	 attractive	 to	 foreigners	 and	 young	 professionals,	especially	 in	 geographically	 privileged	 Zona	 Sul	 favelas,	 forcing	 out	poorer	 residents	who	 cannot	 afford	 to	 pay	market	 price	 utility	 bills	and	increases	in	rent.		André	 Constantine,	 the	 then-leader	 of	 a	 radical	 community	activist	group	called	Favela	Não	Se	Cala	(The	Favela	Won’t	Shut	Up)	decried	 Morar	 Carioca	 and	 PAC-Favelas	 as	 “state	 agents	 of	gentrification.”	When	a	young	man	stood	in	front	of	 the	microphone,	an	 uncomfortable	 quiet	 settled	 the	 audience	 after	 he	 immediately	identified	himself	as	one	of	the	“gentrifiers”	mentioned	by	Williamson	(he	 used	 his	 fingers	 to	 mime	 quotes	 around	 the	 word).	 White,	Brazilian	and	working	in	theatre,	he	acknowledged	the	tension	in	the	changing	 community	 but	 professed	 love	 and	 respect	 for	 the	community:	“I	don’t	tell	people	I	live	in	a	favela.	I	tell	them	I	live	in	the	
neighbourhood	called	Vidigal.”	He	also	thought	more	attention	should	be	 paid	 to	 the	 positive	 effects	 of	 the	 influx	 of	 new	 residents,	particularly	 the	 increased	demand	 for	quality	services;	and	said	 that	“maybe	we	can	bring	a	bank	or	a	nice	hospital	to	Vidigal.”	Immediately	after,	 a	 young	 woman	 who	 had	 previously	 complained	 about	discriminatory	 treatment	 by	 the	UPP	 took	 the	microphone.	 She	 said	she	did	not	think	banks	moving	into	Vidigal	was	a	good	thing,	because	“people	will	 start	 losing	 their	 homes”,	 and	 looking	 at	 the	 crowd	 she	passionately	 declared,	 “I	 don’t	 want	 to	 live	 in	 a	 ‘community’47	 or	 a	‘neighbourhood.’	 I	 want	 to	 live	 in	 my	 favela,	 Vidigal.”	 The	 crowd	cheered.		
																																																								47	Comunidade,	 or	 community,	 is	 another	 name	 for	 favela	 in	Brazilian	 Portuguese.	Considered	 a	 euphemism	 by	 some,	 the	 term	 seems	 to	 have	 originated	 during	 the	mid-twentieth	century	by	favela	residents	and	organisers	in	order	to	fight	the	sigma	associated	with	the	favelas.	The	term	was	adopted	by	populist	politicians	and	is	now	used	 interchangeably	with	 favela.	Many	young	 favela	 residents,	 such	as	 the	young	woman	 cited	 here,	 have	 re-appropriated	 the	 word	 “favela”	 as	 a	 spatial	 identity	expressed	through	popular	culture.		
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5.6	Favela	integration	and	the	“right	to	come	and	go”	Rewriting	 the	 rules	 of	who	 enters	 and	 leaves	 the	 favelas	 has	been	key	since	the	beginning	of	this	new	phase	of	“favela-integration.”	This	is	often	referred	to	as	the	“right	to	come	and	go,”	or	the	“freedom	of	movement”	which	is	enshrined	in	Article	V	section	XV	of	the	1988	Brazilian	 Constitution	 (“a	 liberadade	 de	 locamoção”).	 Intended	 to	prevent	arbitrary	detention	by	the	State	during	times	of	peace	(habeas	
corpus),	 politicians	 and	 other	 state	 actors	 often	 invoke	 this	constitutional	 right	 when	 speaking	 of	 both	 “pacification”	 and	“integration”.	They	argue	that	the	UPP	guarantees	residents	the	right	to	enter	and	leave	their	own	communities.	One	could	validly	argue	that	police	pacification	facilitates	 free	movement	for	many	subjects	entering	and	leaving	favelas.	Gangs	have	territorially	controlled	many	favelas,	barring	entry	to	certain	subjects,	imposing	 curfews,	 and	 shutting	 down	 commerce.	 During	 territorial	disputes,	gun	battles	are	common,	and	residents	rightly	fear	to	move	about	and	return	home	after	dark	(Barcellos	2011;	M.	H.	M.	Alves	and	Evanson	2011).	However,	many	 residents	 also	 feel	 restricted	 by	 the	“pacifying”	forces,	particularly	men	and	youth	profiled	by	race	and	age	presumed	by	police	to	be	associated	with	or	sympathetic	to	the	gangs.	During	the	occupation	phase,	photo	documentation	of	school	children	stopped	 along	 the	 street	 and	 searched	 on	 their	 way	 to	 school	 was	widely	 shared	 on	 social	 media	 as	 were	 political	 cartoons	 depicting	similar	scenes	(Figures	5.8	and	5.9).		
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Figure	5.9	–	Soldiers	pat	down	school	children	
During	the	initial	phase	of	military	occupation	of	Complexo	do	Alemão,	the	
military	patrolled	the	largest	grouping	of	favelas	in	the	city	until	enough	UPP	
officers	could	be	trained.	Here	soldiers	have	stopped	a	group	of	men	and	boys,	
some	carrying	school	rucksacks,	and	ordered	them	to	stand	against	the	wall	
and	submit	to	a	body	search.	One	of	the	boys	covers	his	head	with	his	jacket,	
presumably	to	shield	his	face	from	the	camera.	The	image	was	widely	shared	
on	social	media	at	the	time.				 	
	 	
Figure	5.10	-	Latuff	Political	Cartoon	
A	cartoon	by	the	radical	artist	Latuff	seems	inspired	by	the	scene	depicted	in	
figure	5.9.	A	black	mother	packing	her	son’s	rucksack	(favela	homes	visible	
outside	the	open	window)	only	to	have	her	son	searched	outside	of	a	public	
school	with	a	frightened	look	on	his	face	by	a	BOPE	police	officer	(indicated	by	
the	scull	on	the	officer’s	uniform).	The	cartoon	was	widely	shared	on	social	
media	by	those	critical	of	favela	pacification.		
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	 “Pacification”	 that	 purports	 to	 integrate	 and	 guarantee	 the	right	 to	 come	 and	 go	 prioritises	 the	 regulation	 of	 certain	 bodies	 in	motion,	 including	 school	 children,	 adolescent	 males	 standing	 or	walking	 about,	 and	 motorcycles.	 Motorcycles	 and	 moto-taxis	 are	 a	primary	means	 of	 passenger	 transport	 and	 delivery	 of	 goods	 in	 the	favelas,	offering	 the	quickest,	most	agile	means	of	 transport	 through	congested,	 narrow	 streets	 and	 up	 and	 down	 steep	 hillsides.	 Police	treat	moto-taxis	with	suspicion,	despite	their	omnipresence,	due	to	a	presumed	association	with	drug	deliveries,	gang-related	errands,	and	thefts.	As	such,	motorcycles	are	often	stopped	by	police	 in	“pacified”	favelas	and	checked	for	proper	paperwork.	This	practice	seems	to	be	at	 its	 height	 during	 the	 initial	 occupation	phase,	when	 armed	 forces	overwhelm	 the	 territory	 to	 establish	 state	 security	 presence.	Residents	 of	 Complexo	 da	 Maré	 made	 many	 complaints	 on	 social	networks	 during	 the	military	 occupation,	 and	 a	 video	went	 viral	 on	Facebook	of	a	man	in	a	heated	argument	with	members	of	the	army,	dressed	 in	 fatigues	 and	 carrying	 assault	 rifles.	 In	 this	 video,	 the	subject,	 infuriated,	 demands	 his	 right	 to	 come	 and	 go	 without	arbitrarily	 being	 stopped.	 The	 officer	 repeatedly	 shouts	 him	 down,	referring	to	him	only	as	“cidadão”	(citizen),	acknowledging	his	rights	but	 insisting	 on	 his	 submission	 to	 a	 body	 search,	 and	 handing	 over	documents	relating	to	the	motorcycle’s	registration.	His	wife	films	the	encounter,	 insisting	 on	 her	 right	 to	 document	 the	 interaction	 when	soldiers	attempt	to	block	her	view.	The	video	was	even	covered	on	the	online	 news	website	 of	Extra,	 a	 subsidiary	 of	 the	media	 giant	 Rede	Globo,	 which	 noted,	 “At	 times	 it	 even	 appeared	 that	 the	 soldier	wanted	 to	 humiliate	 the	 pedestrian”.48	 There	 have	 been	 even	 more																																																									48	The	news	note	mistakenly	refers	to	the	man	as	a	pedestrian.	He	was	stopped,	with	his	wife,	while	riding	a	motorcycle,	which	is	shown	in	the	14-minute	video	uploaded	to	 YouTube	 and	 facebook	 and	 viewed	 by	 tens	 of	 thousands.	 See:	http://extra.globo.com/casos-de-policia/soldado-grita-com-moradores-durante-abordagem-no-complexo-da-mare-12749356.html	
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severe	 cases	 of	 police	 officers	 shooting	 moto-taxistas	 for	 failing	 to	stop	 when	 flagged	 down	 or,	 in	 one	 case,	 for	 carrying	 a	 hydraulic	carjack	 that	 apparently	 looked	 like	 a	 rifle	 to	 officers	 (Sansão	 2016;	Estadão	2015).		I	 spoke	with	 Julia,	 a	 past	 co-director	 of	 a	 library	 and	 cultural	centre	 in	 the	 Complexo	 de	 Manguinhos,	 which	 was	 included	 in	 the	PAC-favelas	 intervention.	 She	 had	 spent	 decades	 working	 in	 the	state’s	largest	and	oldest	museums	and	theatres,	but	she	told	me	that	after	 reading	 about	 the	 “social	 infrastructure”	 and	 cultural	 side	 of	PAC-favelas	 she	 enthusiastically	 volunteered	 for	 the	 programme	Biblioteca	 Parque	which	 built	 public	 libraries	 in	 three	 of	 the	 largest	favelas	 receiving	 PAC	 interventions.	 During	 our	 conversations	 she	convinced	me	of	her	passion	and	dedication,	and	described	the	work	as	a	collective	“revolution,	not	with	guns	but	with	books.”		I	asked	if	this	work	in	the	PAC	infrastructure	depended	on	the	UPP	and	favela	pacification.	She	smiled	and	said,	“No.	I	think	the	UPP	depends	 on	 the	 work	 of	 PAC.”	 Citing	 Beltrame,	 she	 insisted	 that	pacification	 can	 only	 succeed	 through	 sustained	 investments	 in	health,	culture,	and	education.	 I	pressed,	“Does	that	mean	PAC-social	[the	library	and	cultural	centre]	could	have	been	achieved	without	the	UPP?”	 She	 paused	 only	 briefly	 before	 saying	 no,	 and	 depicted	 the	programmes	 as	 interdependent.	 The	 gangs	 are	 “arrogant,”	 she	 said,	and	“acted	as	if	they	ran	everything.	Before	the	UPP	they	would	come	into	 the	 library	 with	 big	 guns!”	 She	 had	 to	 confront	 the	 leader,	 Big	Mike,	over	the	issue.	Fearful	and	against	the	advice	of	her	colleagues,	she	faced	him	after	he	entered	a	restricted	room	to	look	for	someone	on	the	surveillance	video	feed:		
‘This	library	is	for	all	residents.	And	you	are	welcome	to	come	to	the	
library	 and	 use	 the	 library	 whenever	 you	 want,	 because	 you	 are	 a	
citizen	and	it	is	your	right.	But	you	don’t	run	things	here.	This	here	is	
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space	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 I	 am	 the	 top	authority.	 You	 can’t	 go	 in	 that	
room	 and	 you	 can’t	 bring	 guns	 into	 the	 library.’	 He	 stood	 there	
looking	at	me	for	a	while—maybe	deciding	whether	or	not	to	kill	me	
[laughs]—but	then	he	patted	me	affectionately	on	the	shoulder	and	
responded,	‘You’re	right,	Ms	Julia.	My	bad.’	And	I	never	had	any	more	
problems	with	Big	Mike	again,	and	 the	 traffickers	 stopped	bringing	
in	their	guns.			The	story	appears	to	indicate	that	Julia	managed	to	negotiate	with	the	gang	over	 ‘appropriate	behaviour’	 in	regards	 to	 library	use—respect	institutional	 authority,	 no	 guns	 etc…	 But	 Julia	 says	 she	 “hated”	 the	traffickers,	 and	 that	 the	gang	 “imprisons	 the	 residents”	 and	 restricts	movement.	 “With	 the	 traffic,	 the	boundaries	are	 invisible.	You	never	know	 where	 you	 are,	 and	 if	 you’re	 crossing	 into	 a	 rival	 gang’s	territory.”	 The	 UPP,	 she	 says,	 improves	 access	 to	 the	 favelas	 and	guarantees	the	right	to	move	about.	Pacification	“gives	the	space	back	to	the	people.”		Nonetheless	 Julia	 spoke	 of	 multiple	 complications	 and	confrontations	 with	 the	 UPP.	 For	 example,	 while	 she	 successfully	negotiated	with	the	gangs	to	not	enter	the	library	armed,	she	had	no	luck	with	the	UPP,	whose	officers	would	enter	with	their	fingers	near	the	trigger	of	their	assault	rifles.49	This	made	the	residents,	especially	the	youth,	uncomfortable.	She	told	me	of	how	she	marched	up	to	the	UPP	commander	and	gave	him	the	same	speech	she	gave	Big	Mike:	the	library	is	public	space	in	which	she	is	the	highest	authority;	and	while																																																									49	UPP	officers	are	trained	to	patrol	with	their	fingers	near	the	trigger,	so	that	they	are	always	ready	for	a	possible	confrontation	with	armed	gang	members.	When	they	patrol	 in	 a	 police	 car	 they	 drive	with	 their	 gun	 barrels	 protruding	 from	 the	 open	windows	 (this	 is	 not	 unique	 to	 UPP	 in	 the	 favelas).	 In	 pacified	 favelas	 that	experienced	an	insurgence	by	the	previously	expelled	gangs,	I	witnessed	the	police	change	their	patrol	 tactics.	They	once	walked	through	the	streets	casually	 in	small	groups,	 but	 after	 confrontations	 they	 increasingly	 patrolled	 in	 single	 file	 and	hugging	 the	walls	 of	 homes	 and	 shops	 to	minimize	 their	 exposure.	 Those	without	rifles	 began	walking	with	pistols	 in-hand.	 The	UPP	Commander	 sympathised	with	Julia’s	 concern,	 but	 told	 her	 that	 finger-at-the-ready	 is	 programmed	 into	 their	behaviour,	and	meant	to	keep	the	officers	alive.		
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police	 officers	 have	 just	 as	much	 right	 to	 use	 the	 library	 as	 anyone	else,	 they	 should	 not	 enter	 with	 their	 rifles.	 I	 asked	 if	 her	 speech	worked.	 She	 laughed	 and	 said	 no.	 The	 police	 continued	 to	 come	 in	armed,	 mostly	 to	 use	 the	 computers.	 Additionally	 Julia	 told	 a	 story	that	 contradicts	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 UPP	 increase	 citizens’	 rights	 to	move	around	and	give	space	back	to	the	residents.	One	afternoon	Julia	was	sitting	in	her	office	when	some	young	children	 came	 running	 to	 find	 her:	 “Ms	 Julia!	 Some	 police	 are	 going	crazy	waving	their	guns	around!”	Julia	immediately	got	up	and	ran	to	see	 the	 commotion,	 furious	 because	 she	 had	 already	 told	 the	 UPP	Commander	that	officers	should	not	patrol	the	library	as	they	did	the	streets.	 Sure	enough	 the	police	had	 their	 guns	pointed	at	 a	 group	of	adolescent	 boys	 lined	 up	 against	 the	wall	with	 their	 hands	 on	 their	heads.	 They	 had	 been	 playing	 board	 games	 on	 the	 nearby	 tables.	“What	 do	 you	 think	 you’re	 doing?!”	 Julia	 asked	 the	 officers.	 They	responded,	 “Don’t	 worry,	 Ms	 Julia,	 we’re	 just	 checking	 their	documents.	 Because	 if	 they	 don’t	 have	 their	 documents	 we’ll	 take	them–”	 Julia	 interrupted,	 “Not	 in	 here	 you	 aren’t!	 This	 here	 is	 the	library	and	 I’m	 in	charge.	 I	am	the	representative	of	 the	governor	 in	this	space!”	The	police:	“But	Ms	Julia,	these	guys	are	marginals.”	Julia:	“Marginals	to	you	maybe,	because	you	don’t	know	them.	I	know	them.	I	know	their	families!”		I	 asked	 Julia	 if	 the	 police	 respected	 her	 authority.	 The	 police	did	 leave,	 she	 said,	 but	 they	 marched	 out	 with	 the	 adolescents	 at	gunpoint.	 A	 group	 of	 onlookers	 gathered	 and	 Julia	 sent	 some	 youth	who	 had	 not	 been	 caught	 in	 the	 dragnet	 to	 run	 and	 alert	 the	 boys’	families.	Making	a	scandal	was	the	surest	way	of	protecting	the	boys	from	possible	abuse.	There	 is	 no	denying	 that	 favela	 “pacification”	 facilitates	 entry	and	exit	 of	 the	 favelas,	 regulated	by	 the	 state	 rather	 than	 the	gangs.	However	it	remains	unclear	who	are	the	primary	beneficiaries.	While	
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non-residents	 are	 freer	 to	 come	 and	 go,	 including	 service	 providers	and	 public	 employees,	 residents	 themselves,	 particularly	 youth	 and	men,	experience	increased	friction,	often	forced	to	stop	and	submit	to	police	 search	 and/or	 intimidation.	 Not	 only	 are	 their	 movements	monitored	and	their	bodies	subject	to	search	as	described	above,	but	their	 activities	 are	 also	 limited.	 Widely	 popular	 baile	 funk	 parties,	which	are	historically	associated	with	the	drug	gangs,	are	immediately	prohibited	post-invasion	of	the	police.	This	violates	the	civil	rights	of	residents,	 but	 it	 was	 nonetheless	 codified	 by	 a	 Ministry	 of	 Public	Security	decree	in	2007	that	regulated	a	2006	gubernatorial	executive	decree.	 The	 resolution	 declared	 police	 authority	 to	 regulate	 all	cultural	and	social	events	in	the	“pacified”	favelas.	It	was	condemned	by	 civil	 society	 and	 legal	 scholars,	 eventually	 repealed	 by	 the	Governor	 in	 2013;	 however	 at	 an	Fala	 Vidigal	 (referenced	 earlier)	 I	heard	a	young	resident	denounce	the	police	for	continuing	to	prohibit	young	 residents	 from	 throwing	 parties	 in	 their	 neighbourhood,	effectively	 establishing	 an	 illegal	 curfew.	 In	 contrast	 the	 private	parties	 attended	 in	 newly	 opened	 nightclubs	 for	 comparatively	wealthy	tourists	and	Zona	Sul	“playboys”	were	allowed	to	continue	all	night	long.		
5.7	Making	the	favela	marvellous,	the	case	of	the	Teleférico	
do	Alemão	I	 now	 focus	 on	 a	 single	 intervention	 that	 embodies	 the	hegemonic	notion	of	 integrating	 the	 favelas	 into	 the	marvellous	city:	the	spectacularised	construction	of	a	cable-car.	Applying	a	landscape-mobilities	 analysis,	 the	 section	 describes	 travelling	 through	 Rio	 de	Janeiro	on	public	transport	with	a	destination	of	Complexo	do	Alemão,	where	 Governor	 Cabral	 with	 President	 Dilma,	 and	 Mayor	 Paes	inaugurated	 the	 gondola	 in	 2011.	 The	 Teleférico	 do	 Alemão	 was	financed	 through	 the	 federal	 stimulus	 package	 PAC,	 referenced	 in	
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Chapter	 1	 and	 discussed	 in-depth	 in	 Chapter	 7,	 and	 heralded	 as	representative	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 public	 investments	 in	 the	favelas	in	the	history	of	Rio	de	Janeiro.	I	argue	that	the	Teleférico	is	a	spectacular	 piece	 of	 infrastructure	 meant	 to	 symbolically	 and	materially	 connect	 the	 large	 favela	 complex	 to	 the	 public	 transit	system	 and	 integrate	 the	 favelas	 into	 the	 formal	 city.	 I	 begin	 the	description	as	a	journey	to	the	Teleférico	do	Alemão	as	a	destination	rather	 than	 starting	 point,	 and	 in	 doing	 so	 I	 make	 explicit	 that	 my	experience	in	the	field	did	not	mirror	that	of	Alemão	residents.	When	I	visited	 the	 Complexo,	 I	 travelled	 there	 as	 an	 ‘outsider’	 similar	 to	 a	tourist,	commuting	state	employee	or	visiting	official.50	The	journey	to	Complexo	do	Alemão	from	Zona	Sul	or	the	city	centre	 is	 relatively	 straightforward	 even	 if	 difficult	 for	 a	 foreigner	without	Portuguese	language	skills	(like	most	foreign	tourists).	As	the	newest	 tourist	 attraction,	 “Teleférico”	 flashes	 across	 the	 electronic	destination	 screen	 of	 the	 483	 bus,	 which	 runs	 from	 Copacabana	through	 Zona	 Sul	 and	 the	 city	 centre	 to	 Bonsucesso	 train	 station.	While	 the	bus	may	be	 the	most	direct	public	 transport	option	 to	 the	Teleférico,	it	certainly	is	not	the	quickest,	taking	over	an	hour	without	traffic.	During	peak	travel	 times,	when	traffic	becomes	an	 infuriating	stop-and-go	for	miles	at	a	time,	that	hour	and	a	half	can	easily	stretch	to	two	or	even	three	hours.	The	quicker	option	is	to	take	the	metro	to	Central,	 the	 downtown	 commuter	 train	 station,	 and	 then	 take	 the	Saracuruna	 line	 leaving	 from	 platform	 12	 to	 Bonsucesso,	 where	integration	to	the	Teleférico	is	relatively	seamless.		Above	 the	 platform	 fare-gates	 in	 Central	 train	 station	 there																																																									50	There	may	be	 some	major	differences	 to	how	 I	 travelled	 in	 comparison	 to	 state	officials—who	arrive	by	chauffeur-driven	car	—or	a	well-heeled	tourist—who	may	arrive	 in	 a	 taxi	 or	 tour	 van	 with	 a	 guide.	 Nonetheless	 this	 analytical	 position	 is	designed	to	reflect	my	methodological	approach,	ethnographic	but	not	ethnography.	I	did	not	embed	myself	within	the	Complexo	do	Alemão	nor	the	PAC	intervention	as	an	ethnographer	would;	and	I	make	no	clams	to	speak	from	the	perspective	or	about	the	lived	experience	of	Complexo	do	Alemão’s	80,000+	residents.		
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hang	large	white	signs	with	the	platform	number,	the	train	line	name	and	 final	 destination.	 Above	 platform	 12	 the	 sign	 additionally	 lists	
Teleférico—not	 Bonsucesso,	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão,	 or	 Teleférico	 do	Alemão,	the	gondola’s	branded	name,	but	simply	“Teleférico,”	same	as	the	flashing	LED	sign	on	the	busses.	This	indicates	that	the	Teleférico,	
not	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão,	 has	 become	 the	 destination	 point.	 This	 is	something	 of	 a	 novelty	 when	 compared	 to	 other	 established	attractions	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro.	 The	 Corcovado	 tram	 up	 to	 the	 iconic	Christ	 the	 Redeemer	 statue	 or	 the	 gondolas	 to	 the	 top	 of	 Sugarloaf	Mountain	 form	 part	 of	 the	 tourist	 attraction	 but	 they	 are	 not	 the	defining	experience.	Further	below	 I	discuss	how	 the	Teleférico	was	part	of	a	planning	strategy	to	“resignify”	Complexo	do	Alemão	form	a	no-go	 area	 to	 a	 destination	 point.	 But	 as	we	 can	 see,	 the	 gondola,	 a	form	 of	moving	 through	 space	 (and	 ‘above’	 the	 city)	 dominated	 the	spatial	representation.	The	commuter	trains	 in	Rio	de	Janeiro	stand	in	stark	contrast	to	the	metro.	Like	many	large	metropolises,	the	metro	fills	to	capacity	during	rush	hour,	a	particularly	uncomfortable	experience	during	the	muggy	summers.	Central	 station	also	can	be	daunting	as	 the	crowds	pour	 out	 of	 the	 car	 doors	 in	 a	 rushed	 shuffle,	 and	many	 passengers	begin	hurriedly	walking,	some	breaking	 into	a	run,	up	the	escalators	towards	 the	 train	 station	 in	 order	 to	 catch	 the	 next	 departure	 or	 to	beat	 out	 the	 other	 passengers	 in	 arriving	 first	 at	 the	 platform	 and	securing	 a	 seat	on	 the	 train.	Many	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro’s	 residents	who	live	 in	 the	 suburbs	 and	 work	 downtown	 or	 in	 Zona	 Sul	 have	exceptionally	 long	 commute	 times	 with	 multiple	 transfers.	 The	journey	 is	 costly	 as	 well	 as	 tiresome	 if	 they	 are	 not	 lucky,	 or	aggressive,	enough	 to	snag	a	seat	on	 the	crowded	 trains	and	busses.	While	the	metro	is	air	conditioned,	the	trains	are	not,	and	nor,	unlike	the	 metro	 do	 they	 run	 frequently.	 Passengers	 can	 wait	 for	 15-30	minutes	or	more	for	a	train,	which	are	commonly	delayed	during	rush	
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hour.	While	the	metro	is	kept	clean	and	orderly,	the	train	and	stations	are	 littered	 with	 trash	 and	 are	 in	 disrepair.	 Ticket	 turnstiles	 may	remain	 broken	 for	 weeks	 at	 stations	 far	 from	 the	 city	 centre,	 and	without	the	watchful	gaze	of	the	private	security	guards	in	the	metro,	fare	dodging	can	be	common.	The	gap	between	the	train	and	platform	at	some	stations	is	so	wide	that	even	I,	at	5”11	(177	cm)	have	had	to	leap	 in	 order	 to	 make	 the	 platform.	 Poor	 maintenance	 on	 the	 old	trains	 also	 result	 in	 door	 failures,	 which	 if	 the	 passengers	 cannot	physically	pull	the	door	shut	may	result	in	the	train	carrying	on	with	the	doors	ajar.	And,	while	the	security	presence	prevents	begging	and	informal	vendors	on	the	metro	but	tacitly	permits	music	performers,	the	 train	 is	 rife	 with	 vendors	 selling	 small	 refreshments	 and	 daily	goods	such	as	pens	or	socks	as	well	as	individuals	begging	for	money	or	 soliciting	 donations	 for	 social	 projects,	 most	 notably	 evangelical	Christian	homes	for	drug	rehabilitation.	The	metro,	which	serves	nearly	all	of	wealthy	Zona	Sul	and	the	business	district,	does	stretch	out	to	the	poorer	industrially	depressed	North	Zone,	however	the	expansion	towards	the	working	class	areas	is	recent	and	slow.	Many	of	the	stations	north	of	the	city	centre	were	inaugurated	in	the	1990s.	Public	transport	access	to	the	suburbs	was	(and	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 still	 is)	 facilitated	 by	 commuter	 train	 and	 an	uneven	 bus	 network	 and	 loosely	 regulated	 van	 services.	 Both	transport	 activists	 and	 some	 urban	 scholars	 have	 lodged	 that	 the	Metro	 is	 for	 the	 rich,	 while	 the	 poor	 receive	 substandard	 transport	infrastructure.	 This	 argument	 is	 seemingly	 substantiated	 by	 the	transport	planning	involved	with	the	Olympics—the	Metro	expansion	added	stations	in	Ipanema,	Leblon,	São	Conrado	(which	also	will	serve	the	 large	 favela	of	Rocinha)	 and	 continued	 to	 the	wealthy	 suburb	of	Barra	 de	 Tijuca.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 North	 and	West	 Zones	 gained	 Bus	Rapid	 Transit	 lines,	 which	 reached	 and	 surpassed	 capacity	 during	rush	 hour	 within	 a	 year	 of	 their	 inauguration	 as	 reported	 by	 local	
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journalists	 and	 foreseen	 by	 critical	 transport	 specialists	 (Victor	 and	Ribeiro	2015;	Funare	2014).		Figure	5.11	is	a	photograph	of	political	graffiti	I	snapped	from	a	BRT	 bus	 that	 runs	 from	 the	 international	 airport,	 through	 the	industrial	 working	 class	 and	 North	 Zone,	 before	 curving	 westward	until	 Barra	 de	 Tijuca.	 The	 graffiti,	 written	 on	 the	 wall	 of	 a	 private	home	not	far	from	the	Complexo	da	Maré,	reads,	“some	have	comfort,	others	 [the]	 BRT”.	 While	 middle	 class	 Cariocas	 in	 Zona	 Sul	 use	 the	metro,	 their	 counterparts	 who	 live	 in	 areas	 primary	 served	 by	 the	BRT,	traditional	buses,	and	train	are	more	likely	to	use	cars	(Kleiman	2011).	One	day	I	took	a	middle	class	Zona	Sul	native	familiar	with	my	research	 to	 see	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 via	 the	 Teleférico.	 When	 we	arrived	 at	 Central	 station,	 he	 sheepishly	 confessed	 that	 this	was	 the	first	time	he	had	ever	been	to	the	station	and	he	expressed	certainty	that	among	his	childhood	friends	only	those	from	or	with	family	in	the	suburbs	would	have	ever	used	the	trains.	In	Rio	de	Janeiro,	Central	is	considered	 dangerous	 and	 treated	 as	 a	 no-go	 place	 for	 those	privileged	enough	to	avoid	it.			
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Figure	5.11	–	BRT	graffiti	
Graffiti	reads	“some	have	comfort,	others	[have	the]	BRT.	Photo	taken	from	
the	BRT	line	serving	the	international	airport	Galeão.			 The	BRT	lines	were	included	in	Rio’s	“Olympic	legacy”	and	sold	to	 the	 public	 as	 an	 innovative,	 flexible	 and	 high-quality	 public	transport	solution	(Gaffney	et	al.	Forthcoming).	But	as	exemplified	by	the	graffiti	above	and	discontent	expressed	by	ridership,	 it	 stands	 in	equal	contrast	with	the	trains	to	the	metro.	The	Teleférico	do	Alemão,	heralded	as	the	first	instance	of	a	gondola	used	for	mass	transit	in	the	country,51	 is	a	different	story.	The	gondola	 journey	 from	Bonsucesso	train	 station	 to	 the	 final	 station	 of	 Palmeiras	 is	 3.5	 kilometres	 and	takes	on	average	16	minutes	in	one	of	the	152	gondola	cars,	each	with	a	 capacity	 of	 eight	 passengers.	 At	 each	 station	 the	 cars	 slow	 down	sufficiently	 on	 the	 platform	 to	 allow	 passengers	 to	 enter	 while	 its																																																									51	 Many	 architects	 as	 well	 as	 politicians	 boasted	 that	 the	 Teleférico	 was	 the	 first	mass	transit	system	of	its	kind	in	Brazil.	While	true	in	the	sense	that	the	Teleférico	was	envisioned	as	a	public	transport,	 legally	 it	does	not	qualify	as	a	“mass	transit”	system	because	even	at	 full	capacity	 it	cannot	 transport	enough	passengers.	While	this	may	seem	a	superficial	detail,	this	technocratic	definition	means	the	Teleférico	is	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 regulatory	 oversights	 as	 the	 busses,	 trains	 and	 metro	lines.		
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moving—facilitated	 by	 one	 or	 two	 attendants—or	 it	may	 come	 to	 a	complete	stop	to	allow	persons	in	wheelchairs	or	physical	difficulties	to	 board.	 Facilitating	 movement	 of	 people	 with	 disabilities,	 the	elderly,	 or	 otherwise	 sympathetic	 figures’	 (mothers	 laden	 with	shopping	 bag	 were	 often	 cited	 by	 enthusiastic	 politicians)	 up	 the	steep	 hills	 of	 the	 favelas	 of	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 was	 prominently	featured	in	political	and	press	discourse.		 Boarding	one	of	 the	bright	 red	 cable	 cars,	branded	by	 the	 ice	cream	company	Kibon	(originally	a	Brazilian	brand	now	controlled	by	the	 multinational	 Unilever),	 one	 hears	 classical	 music	 such	 as	 Bach	and	Mozart	 playing	 in	 the	Bonsucesso	Teleférico	 station.	Attendants	usher	passengers	into	the	cars,	which	are	not	air-conditioned	but	well	ventilated	 so	 that	 even	 in	 the	hot	 summers	a	breeze	 is	more	or	 less	constant	 once	 off	 the	 ground.	 No	music	 plays	within	 the	 cabins	 but	there	is	a	PA	speaker	system	that	announces	the	upcoming	stations	in	both	Portuguese	and	English.	The	gondolas	are	small	relative	to	those	used	 in	mountain	 ski	 resorts	 or	 at	 the	 Sugar	Loaf	Mountain.	 Each	 is	equipped	with	 two	 upholstered	 benches	 (each	 sitting	 four	 persons)	facing	 each	 other.	 Standing	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 car	 is	 possible,	 but	keeping	 one’s	 balance	may	 prove	 difficult	 since	 the	 cable	 car	 sways	considerably	with	the	wind.		 The	views	from	the	cable	car	between	stations	are	impressive.	In	the	gently	swaying	car,	one	looks	out	at	the	surrounding	mountains	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro	and	the	picturesque	bay	of	Guanabara.	Cut	 into	the	mountains	 bordering	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 are	 rock	 quarries	 and	 a	large	 power	 station.	 Looking	 down	 one	 sees	 thousands	 of	 homes,	some	 brightly	 painted,	 and	 narrow	 streets	with	 hundreds	 of	 people	walking,	 standing,	 biking	 and	 washing	 cars.	 Slowly	 driving	 white	combi-vans	navigate	parked	cars	on	the	narrow	roads	and	dozens	of	zipping	motorcycles.	One	sees	a	sea	of	laje-rooftops,	some	covered	by	corrugated	metal	or	tarps.	A	few	have	above	ground	pools,	many	have	
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laundry	hung	out	to	dry	in	the	sun.	A	few	of	the	lajes	that	are	directly	beneath	the	Teleférico	are	brightly	painted—one	mimics	the	Brazilian	flag,	another	with	the	colours	of	Flamengo	football	club.	I’m	told	that	these	lajes	can	be	rented	for	parties	and	barbecues.	On	top	of	the	lajes	are	 large	 water	 storage	 tanks,	 satellites,	 and	 resting	 dogs.	 During	election	season	one	will	see	hundreds	of	signs	of	all	sizes	with	the	face	of	a	local	politician	and	their	party’s	ballot	number.	Curiously,	I	have	never	seen	such	signs,	or	any	propaganda	for	that	matter,	aimed	in	a	manner	that	suggested	a	target	audience	from	above	(that	 is	 looking	down	from	the	gondolas),	save	the	branding	of	 the	gondola	cars	and	stations.	 One	 sees	 ubiquitous	 graffiti,	 tagging	 and	 many	 murals	 of	urban	art	on	the	sides	of	homes,	small	shops,	and	retaining	walls.	 		 The	 areas	 around	 the	 enormous	 pillars	 of	 the	 Teleférico,	 for	which	 thousands	 were	 evicted,	 stand	 bare	 and	 empty,	 save	 the	plentiful	 trash.	The	 trash-surrounded	 columns	are	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	stations,	which	are	well	kept	and	clear	of	litter.	When	passing	through	the	 stations	 between	 Bonsucesso	 and	 the	 final	 stop,	 Palmeiras,	 the	stations	 are	 most	 often	 empty	 save	 the	 attendants	 working	 the	entry/exit	points	and	occasional	private	security	guards.	UPP	officers	are	 often	 visible	 around	 the	 Teleférico	 stations	 given	 that	 the	 UPP	police	 stations	 in	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	were	 built	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	hills	 near	 the	 Teleférico	 stations;	 but	 they	 rarely	 enter	 the	 stations	themselves	 based	 on	 my	 observations.	 The	 hillside	 of	 Morro	 do	Alemão,	 between	 stations	Alemão	 and	 Itararé	 are	 nearly	 completely	covered	 in	houses,	and	 this	 is	one	of	 the	most	 impressive	views	one	sees	 from	 the	 Teleférico	 (see	 figure	 5.12).	 Corresponding	 to	 the	densest	areas	of	the	Complexo,	I	have	heard	tourists,	both	foreign	and	Brazilian,	refer	to	this	site	as	a	“sea	of	shacks”	[mar	de	barracos].	Most	homes	 are	 a	 standard	 cinderblock-grey;	 so	 those	 that	 are	 brightly	painted	pop	out	to	the	eye.	If	one	knows	where	to	look,	they	can	see	the	 former	 Complexo	 do	Alemão	headquarters	 of	 the	 cultural	 group	
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Afro	 Reggae,	 painted	 brightly	 in	 the	 pan-Africanist	 colours	 of	 red,	gold,	and	green.	The	group	was	forced	to	abandon	the	site	and	turned	over	 its	 projects	 to	 another	 NGO	 after	 the	 headquarters	 was	firebombed	 in	retaliation	 for	 the	outspoken	 founder’s	support	of	 the	favela	 pacification	 program,	 Governor	 Cabral,	 and	 Secretary	 of	Security	Beltrame.	There	are	few	roads,	and	fewer	still	that	can	allow	two	 cars	 to	 pass	 each	 other	 up	 and	 down	 the	 hills;	 but	 looking	 in	between	 the	densely	packed	homes	one	 sees	an	elaborate	 system	of	alleys	and	pathways,	stairs	and	groundwater	and	sewage	runoffs.			
	
Figure	5.12	-	A	sea	of	shacks	
The	view	of	Complexo	do	Alemão	from	the	Teleférico,	described	by	tourists	
and	Brazilian	local	‘outsiders’	as	a	“sea	of	shacks.”			 The	 last	 laje	 before	 arriving	 at	 the	 Palmeiras	 station,	 where	passengers	 are	 required	 to	disembark,	 is	 that	of	 an	empty	home,	 its	residents	 evicted	 after	 being	 declared	 “at	 risk”	 for	 landslide.	Curiously,	 this	 home,	 and	 many	 others	 that	 now	 stand	 empty	 for	years,	 is	mere	meters	 away	 from	a	 large	UPP	 station.	On	 top	of	 this	
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laje	 rooftop	 is	 written	 “S.O.S	 Complexo	 Alemão,”	 a	 social	 media	hashtag	 commonly	 used	 by	 social	 activists	 and	 youth	 of	 the	 favelas	when	documenting	police	violence,	abuse,	or	unfinished	public	works	in	 the	 neighbourhoods.	 The	 Palmerias	 station	 is	 host	 to	 a	 library,	community	 workspace,	 and	 family	 health	 clinic.	 Surrounding	 the	station	 is	 a	 spacious	 look-out	 points	 with	 panoramic	 views	 of	Guanabara	 Bay	 and	 the	 city.	 A	 small	 tourist	 market	 with	 regulated	stalls	 sells	arts,	 crafts	and	souvenirs	 from	 local	merchants	and	small	kiosks	sell	snacks	and	beer.			
	
Figure	5.13	-	SOS	Complexo	do	Alemão	
The	last	(former)	house	the	Teleférico	passes	over	before	reaching	Palmeiras,	
deemed	at	“high	risk”	of	being	washed	down	the	hill	during	heavy	rain	storms.	
The	#SOSComplexoDoAlemão	was	a	hashtag	popularised	during	2014	when	
confrontations	between	gang	members	and	police	became	common	as	did	
accusations	of	police	brutality,	unjustified	killings,	and	harassment	of	
community	activists	and	young	men.		 Palmerias,	 like	 the	 other	 four	 stations	 within	 Complexo	 do	Alemão	 stand	 out	 on	 the	 horizon,	 whether	 the	 viewer	 is	 on	 the	surrounding	 highways	 or	 looking	 up	 at	 the	 hills	 from	 inside	 the	favelas.	 The	 stations	 seem	 disproportionate	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	
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surrounding	 self-built	 homes	 and	 even	 tower	 over	 the	 largest	structures,	 the	 UPP	 stations.	 The	 Teleférico	 was	 designed	 to	 be	viewed	from	a	distance,	as	told	by	the	lead	architect	Jauregui.	Looking	at	his	 artistic	 rendering	 titled	 “view	 from	 international	 airport	 (new	presence),	localizing	Complexo	do	Alemão	in	the	landscape,”	we	see	a	romantic	rendering	of	the	stations	defining	the	skyline.	The	only	other	discernible	 objects	 in	 the	 sketch	 are	 the	 lights	 of	 homes	 dotting	 the	hillsides,	the	figure	of	Christ	the	Redeemer	statue,	and	the	prominent	church	 and	 pilgrimage	 site,	 Igreja	 de	 Nossa	 Senhora	 da	 Penha.	 The	Teleférico	 and	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 are	 barely	 visible	 to	 the	 naïve	eye.	 Figure	 5.14	 shows	 the	 view	 of	 the	 Teleférico	 from	 a	 viewpoint	similar	 to	 the	 one	 suggested	 in	 Jauregui’s	 landscape	 sketch.	 The	drawing	is	undoubtedly	inspired	by	Niemeyer’s	sketch	of	the	Buenos	Aires	skyline	or	his	re-imagination	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	by	plane.	Jauregui	greatly	admires	Niemeyer	work	and	ideology,	often	referencing	him	in	his	 written	 work,	 presentation,	 and	 interviews.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	Teleférico	 was	 meant	 to	 be	 seen	 from	 “outside”	 the	 favela	 (or	 by	outsiders)	 seems	 to	 fuel	 the	 accusation	 that	 the	 infrastructure	 was	“para	inglés	ver.”		I	will	 discuss	 this	 criticism	 in	 greater	detail	 in	Chapter	7,	 for	now	suffice	to	say	that	critics	suggest	the	gondola	system	is	something	of	 an	 aesthetic	 ruse,	 a	 highly	 visible	 intervention	 to	make	 it	 appear	that	 the	 government	 was	 delivering	 socially	 responsible	 projects	 to	favela	 residents	while	 in	 reality	 doing	 little-to-nothing	 or	 delivering	substandard	 interventions.	 Ironically,	 I	do	not	 think	that	 Jauregui,	or	the	 defenders	 of	 the	 Teleférico	 would	 dismiss	 the	 claim	 that	 the	Teleférico	was	meant	to	be	a	prominent	fixture	 in	the	Rio	de	Janeiro	cityscape.	 That	 is,	 it	 was	 meant	 to	 be	 viewed	 from	 the	 “outside”.	Indeed,	 Jauregui	 clearly	 stated	 in	 his	 interview	 with	 me	 that	 one	purpose	 of	 the	 Teleférico	 is	 to	 “resignify”	 the	 favelas	 and	 the	periphery	of	the	city.	
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Jáuregui:	The	 fact	 that	we	connected	 the	hilltops,	different	 than	the	
[gondola]	 in	Medellín,	which	 [has	 stations]	 connecting	 the	 hillsides.	
Here	we’re	on	 the	 top,	which	meant	upturning	 the	hill,	 because	 the	
traffickers	used	to	be	at	the	top.	There	weren’t	any	roads	that	lead	up	
there,	and	therefore	it	was	like	a	bunker.	[…]	The	Teleférico	came	and	
quickly	 upturned,	 from	 top	 to	 bottom,	 made	 accessible	 that	 which	
was	 inaccessible.	 And	within	 the	 landscape	 of	Rio,	 it	was	 placed	 on	
the	 top	 of	 the	 hills	 like…like	 a…as	 if	 it	were	 a	 Christmas	 lamp.	 The	
whole	 hill	 is	 there	 and	 on	 top,	 the	 lamp,	 which	 is	 the	 light	 that	
illuminates	the	top	of	the	hill.	It	literally	put	the	Complexo	do	Alemão	
on	 the	 map,	 because	 before	 one	 didn’t	 know	 where	 it	 was.	 They	
talked	about	in	the	newspapers:	the	police,	Complexo	do	Alemão,	they	
[the	 gang]	 killed	 [the	 journalist]	 Tim	 Lopez,	 the	 microwave,52	 and	
whatever,	everything	they	used	to	say	in	the	past.	I	mean,	before	the	
Teleférico	 the	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 was	 associated	 with	 an	
imaginary	totally	and	profoundly	negative.	With	the	Teleférico	it	was	
resignified,	and	that	which	was	negative	became	positive.	And	today	
the	place	is	more	visited	than	Christ	the	Redeemer.	Why?	Because	it’s	
a	lot	cheaper,	on	the	one	hand,	and	on	the	other	the	people	want	to	
see	what	a	favela	is	like,	and	it’s	an	experience.		
	Jauregui	thus	understands	the	Teleférico	beyond	its	use	value	to	 transport	 favela	 residents.	 He	 believes	 that	 the	 Teleférico	 adds	symbolic	socio-cultural	value	to	the	favelas	and	periphery	of	the	city.	Whereas	 before	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 was	 infamous	 for	 violence,	
																																																								52	Tim	Lopez	was	an	investigative	journalist	and	video	producer	for	Rede	Globo’s	TV.	He	had	previously	won	awards	for	investigative	pieces	showing	drugs	sale	points	in	Complexo	do	Alemão.	 In	 June	of	 2002	while	 filming	 a	 similar	 exposé	 in	 the	 favela	Vila	Cruzeiro	in	which	he	was	investigating	reports	of	sexual	exploitation	of	girls	at	parties	hosted	by	the	drug	gang,	he	was	kidnapped,	 taken	to	Complexo	do	Alemão	(also	largely	controlled	by	Comando	Vermelho),	where	he	was	brutally	tortured	and	eventually	 burned,	 stacked	 in	 rubber	 tires,	 an	 act	 known	 as	 “the	 microwave”.	Lopez’s	death	resulted	in	even	fewer	newspapers	willing	to	send	journalists	into	the	favelas	 carte	 blanche,	 which	 residents	 often	 condemn	 as	 contributing	 to	 the	lopsided	 coverage	depicting	 favelas	 as	 fortresses	 of	 criminality	 and	 themselves	 as	suspected	deviants.	Such	is	the	sentiment	that	Juaregui	references	in	drawing	on	the	history	of	Tim	Lopez.	
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people	who	 lived	 in	Zona	Sul	would	only	know	of	 the	huge	swath	of	favela	 space	 for	 the	murder	 of	 Tim	 Lopez	 (for	whom	 a	 PAC-funded	school	is	named	in	Alemão),	now	it	boasts	the	first	gondola	system	to	be	used	for	public	transit	in	all	of	Brazil.		
	
Figure	5.14	–	“Localizing	Complexo	do	Alemão	in	the	landscape”	
Head	architect	Jauregui’s	drawing	of	the	Teleférico	as	seen	from	the	
international	airport.		
	
Figure	5.15	-	Teleférico	do	Alemão		 If	 the	 above	 examples	 indicate	how	 the	Teleférico	do	Alemão	purposefully	 re-imagines	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão’s	 position	 in	 Rio’s	landscape	and	be	associated	with	a	positive	 social	 signifier	 from	 the	‘outside’	 looking	 in,	 according	 to	 the	 project’s	 protagonists,	 the	perspectives	of	residents	is	even	more	important:			
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In	a	community	in	which	one	could	not	walk,	now	one	can	fly.	
Imagine	the	dreams	of	that	society	which	can	now	come	and	go	with	
dignity.	
This	is	the	greatest	contribution	of	the	Teleférico:	that	it	guarantees	
mobility	to	the	largest	pacified	favela	in	the	State	of	Rio	de	Janeiro.	
The	 Teleférico	 is	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 development	 of	 self-esteem	 of	
Complexo	do	Alemão.	
These	 are	 the	 pillars	 of	 peace,	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 mutual	 respect	
between	the	citizens.	
(Jose	Lopez,	Secretary	of	Transportation	of	RJ	State)	
	The	 above	 text	 is	 a	 speech	 edited,	 truncated,	 and	 presented	almost	 as	 verse	 by	 the	 team	 behind	Um	Ano	 de	 Conquista,	 a	 coffee-table-sized	book	produced	by	Supervia	celebrating	the	pacification	of	Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 and	 the	 one	 year	 anniversary	 of	 the	inauguration	of	the	Teleférico.	It	is	an	example	the	fetishisation	of	the	project,	attributing	almost	supernatural	abilities	to	the	infrastructure.	Lopez	 implies	 that	before	 the	Teleférico	 [and	pacification]	one	could	not	even	walk	 in	Complexo	do	Alemão;	but	now,	after	 the	Teleférico	[and	pacification]	one	can	fly.	Who	exactly	could	not	walk	in	Alemão	is	left	unsaid,	but	since	we	know	for	fact	that	those	who	lived	in	Alemão	prior	 to	 pacification	 did	 indeed	 walk	 to	 and	 from	 their	 homes,	 and	took	 private	 collective	 transport	 within	 and	 around	 their	neighbourhoods,	Lopez	is	either	exaggerating	for	effect	or	referring	to	those	 who	 did	 not	 live	 in	 Alemão:	 those	 outsiders,	 tourists	 of	 the	Carioca	middle	 class,	who	did	not	 feel	 comfortable	 entering	Alemão.	Those	 outsiders	 can	 now	 enter	 and	 move	 around	 through	 parts	 of	Complexo	do	Alemão	in	a	controlled	environment	that	is	both	within	the	complex	of	favelas	and	yet	separate.	Similar	 to	 how	 foreign	 journalists	 uncritically	 repeated	 the	rhetoric	 of	 the	 favela	 pacification	 programme,	 many	 ‘outside’	commentators	 with	 supposed	 ‘insider’s’	 knowledge	 mimicked	 the	
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sensationalist	 rhetoric;	 believing	 that	 the	 installation	 of	 a	 cable	 car	transport	system	could	fundamentally	change	what	it	means	to	live	in	Complexo	do	Alemão:		
What	most	 outsiders	 forget	 to	 include	 in	 the	 equation	 are	
the	psychological	benefits	of	what	 they	call	a	Teleférico	here.	 In	 the	
old	days,	gondolas	were	for	rich	people	and	tourists	climbing	up	Pão	
de	Açucar	 to	 take	 in	 the	 sunset.	Sure,	people	 from	the	 favelas	could	
visit	 Pão	 de	 Açucar,	 but	 few	would	 feel	 comfortable.	 In	 the	 eyes	 of	
many	of	Brazil’s	ricos,	 they	were	the	gente	baixa.	They	belonged	up	
in	the	hills,	other	hills,	often	in	the	favelas	of	Rio’s	North	Zone.	
	 Now,	those	same	favela	residents	can	ride	up	and	down	their	
local	hills	easily	and	proudly,	and	perhaps	won’t	 feel	so	out	of	place	
the	next	time	they	visit	Pão	de	Açucar.	The	real	action	these	days	 is	
up	in	the	hills	close	to	home,	anyway.	[…]	
	 The	gondolas’	psychological	 impact	 isn’t	 just	another	check	
mark	on	this	benefits	side	of	the	equation.	It’s	a	source	of	self-respect,	
deep	at	the	root	of	quality	life	in	Rio’s	favelas.	With	self-respect	come	
more	 education	 and	 entrepreneurship,	 less	 violence,	 and	 boosts	 in	
physical	and	mental	health.	
	 	 	 	 Michael	Kerlin,	International	
Management	Consultant	“Favela	Gondolas	Offer	Pride	After	First	
Month”		
Rio	Times	Online,	9	August	2011		Kerlin	makes	explicit	the	fetishisation	of	the	Gondola	infrastructure.	Well-intentioned,	he	notes	how	favela	residents	generally	lack	access	to	pay-to-see	attractions	around	Rio	de	Janeiro.	Christ	the	Redeemer	and	Sugarloaf	are	 places	 strongly	 associated	 with	 Rio’s	 marvellous	 characteristics.	Complexo	do	Alemão,	even	with	its	panoramic	views,	was	not.	However,	the	 notion	 that	 the	 Teleférico	 imbues	 favela	 residents	with	 self-respect	confuses	being	the	subject	of	class,	race	and	place-based	oppression	and	stigma	 with	 lacking	 self-respect.	 Furthermore	 the	 suggestion	 that	 the	Teleférico	 and	 the	 corresponding	 self-respect	 would	 produce	 better	
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education	results	and	higher	 levels	of	entrepreneurship,	or	 that	 it	 could	decrease	violence	is	fantasy.	Nonetheless	Kerlin	is	on	track	when	he	notes	that	gondolas	have	historically	been	associated	with	tourism	and	wealth,	and	some	scepticism	of	the	Teleférico	may	relate	to	this	representation	of	cable-car	travel.	The	same	friend	who	sheepishly	admitted	to	never	having	set	foot	in	Central	train	station	also	confessed	when	aboard	the	Teleférico	peering	 down	 at	 Alemão	 that	 he	 felt	 as	 if	 he	 were	 on	 a	 ride	 at	 an	amusement	 park.	 And	 during	 preliminary	 fieldtrips	 near	 the	 date	 of	 its	inauguration	I	heard	cariocas	calling	the	Teleférico	“Disney	in	the	favela,”	joking	 that	 those	who	 could	not	 afford	 to	 send	 their	 children	 to	Disney	World	(a	common	treat	for	the	middle	class	and	wealthy	Brazilians	when	they	reach	adolescence)	could	take	them	for	a	ride	on	the	Teleférico.		
5.8	Conclusions	In	 this	 chapter	 I	 applied	 the	 analytical	 concepts	 of	 landscape	and	 critical	 mobilities	 as	 complementary	 tools	 to	 examine	 urban	planning	and	governance	in	relation	to	the	favelas	of	Rio	de	Janeiro.	I	concurred	 with	 and	 further	 substantiated	 Barbosa’s	 argument	 that	the	 favelas	 historically	 constituted	 a	 crisis	 in	 the	 landscape	 of	 the	marvellous	city	and	that	urban	policy	of	favela	eviction	and	peripheral	re-housing	was	a	response	to	the	crisis.	I	argued	that	the	banishment	of	the	favelas	from	the	marvellous	landscape	resulted	in	the	so-called	
cidade	partida—the	cultural,	political,	 economic	bifurcation	of	urban	space	between	the	favela	and	the	formal	city.	While	the	rich	continued	to	live	in	the	marvellous	city,	the	poor	were	increasingly	relegated	to	landscapes	of	misery.	The	response	 failed	 for	many	reasons—not	 least	of	all	due	 to	the	 inherent	contradiction	of	responding	to	critical	housing	shortage	by	destroying	housing	stock—but	ultimately	had	to	be	abandoned	due	to	 advances	 in	 democracy	 and	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	 divided	 city	 proved	unsustainable,	 a	 landscape	 crisis	 itself	 as	 violence	 and	 inequality	
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concomitantly	 skyrocketed	 during	 the	 final	 decades	 of	 the	 20th	century.	Favela	integration	emerged	as	a	solution	to	the	dichotomous	city,	 first	 as	 the	 urban	 planning	 approach	 exemplified	 by	 Favela-Bairro	 (slum	 upgrading),	 and	 then	more	 generally	 as	 a	 paradigm	 of	hybrid	planning	and	governance	interventions.	Seeming	to	adopt	the	progressive	 rhetoric	 of	 participatory	 democracy	 and	 the	 affirmation	that	 the	 favela	 is	 the	 city,	 “favela	 integration”	 discursively	 aims	 to	incorporate	 the	 favelas	 into	 the	 marvellous	 landscape,	 a	 right	historically	denied.	Analysing	 favela	 integration	 through	 official	 and	 urban	planning	 expert	 discourse,	 I	 argued	 that	 integration	 prioritises	 the	state-facilitation	 of	 new,	 and	 regulation	 of	 existing,	 flows	 of	 people,	goods,	services	and	capital	 in	and	out	of	 the	 favelas.	Planners	design	interventions	with	objectives	to	normalise	moving	in	and	out	of	favela	space,	 to	 facilitate	 the	 entry	 of	 state	 vehicles	 and	 service	 providers,	and	to	make	the	experience	of	travelling	through	the	favela	enjoyable,	even	marvellous.	The	 state	 security	 apparatus	discursively	produces	favela	 pacification	 as	 the	 a	 priori	 condition	 of	 the	 integrated	 city,	which	many	Brazilian	and	international	urbanists	support,	arguing	it	restores	freedom	of	movement	in	favela	spaces	and	opens	the	way	for	public	 and	 private	 service	 providers	 and	 commerce.	 However	 the	tactics	 of	 the	 UPP	 prioritise	 regulating	 and	 limiting	 the	 mobility	 of	favela	residents	in	contradictory	ways.	To	 exemplify	 how	 state	 interventions	 are	meant	 to	 place	 the	favelas	 in	 the	 marvellous	 landscape,	 I	 described	 in	 detail	 the	Teleférico	do	Alemão.	In	stark	contrast	to	working	class	commutes	in	non-wealthy	neighbourhoods	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro,	 the	 cable-car	 system	stands	 as	 a	 spectacular	 piece	 of	 infrastructure	 that	 relies	 on	 the	representation	of	gondola	 travel	 to	signify	 that	 the	 favela	 too	can	be	marvellous.		While	 “favela	 integration”	 successfully	 facilitates	 new	
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movement	 and	 produces	 certain	 privileged	 favela	 spaces	 as	marvellous,	it	does	so	inequitably	along	existing	social,	economic,	and	spatial	power	dynamics	in	Rio	de	Janeiro.	A	strengthened	civil	society	and	 increasingly	 vocal	 and	 radical	 grassroots	 movements	 led	 by	young	favela	residents	leaves	the	associated	projects	and	programs	of	integration	 open	 to	 critique,	 particularly	 on	 social	 media	 and	 a	diversifying	 online	 media	 market.	 Struggling	 against	 the	 hegemonic	discourse	 of	 the	 new	 “integrated”	 marvellous	 city,	 these	 subversive	actors	call	attention	to	that	which	landscape	seeks	to	obscure.			
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Chapter	6	–	An	Integrated	Favela	is	a	Governed	
Favela	
	 The	phrase	is	simple—a	favela	é	cidade—but	the	idea	that	the	favelas	constitute	a	legitimate	part	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	legally,	materially,	economically,	and	symbolically	is	profound	given	the	city’s	history	of	violent	 segregation	 and	 stark	 inequality.	 As	 reviewed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	hegemonic	discourse	produced	 the	 favelas	 as	pockets	of	 ‘non-city’—initially	as	internal	islands	of	rural	backwardness	and	subsequently	as	bastions	of	“social	marginality.”	The	previous	chapter	argued	that	the	“divided	 city,”	 between	 the	 asfalto	 and	 the	 favela,	 constituted	 a	landscape	crisis,	and	the	state	responded	by	promising	an	“integrated	city”	through	a	governing	paradigm	of	“favela	integration.”	Despite	the	progressive	aims	of	integration,	state	and	‘expert’	discourse	continues	to	 produce	 the	 favela	 by	 what	 it	 lacks	 according	 to	 ‘outside’	evaluation:	 basic	 services	 (sanitation,	 rubbish	 collection,	 road	maintenance,	 postal	 services),	 civil	 rights	 (education,	 healthcare,	public	 security,	 and	 mobility),	 and	 vague	 fundamental	 concepts	 of	citizenship	and	dignity.	With	explicit	objectives	to	end	the	bifurcation	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro	between	 the	 favela	and	 the	asfalto,	 the	state	 rolled	out	vertically	structured	urban	governance	and	planning	programmes	such	as	Morar	Carioca	and	the	UPP.	Official	narratives	claim	that	such	programmes	 deliver	 citizenship	 and	 secure	 freedom	 for	 favela	residents	even	though	these	are	themselves	subject	to	and	productive	of	hegemonic	power	relations.	Continually	defined	as	spaces	 lacking,	 integration	necessitates	intervention;	 and	 favelas	 are	 viewed	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 state-facilitated	 socio-economic	 development.	 Following	 Ferguson,	 this	chapter	argues	 that	 favela	 integration	must	produce	 the	 favela	as	an	object	of	 intervention.	For	Morar	Carioca,	such	a	process	began	with	
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its	 inclusion	 in	 the	 city’s	Master	 Plan,	 became	 clear	with	 the	 design	competition	 hosted	 by	 the	 IAB-RJ,	 and	 is	most	 obvious	 through	 the	methodological	 institutionalisation	 of	 the	 “plan	 for	 integration,”	created	 for	 each	 favela	 by	 the	 architect-urbanist	 teams	 prior	 to	approval	of	plans.	The	document	includes	synthesised	data	about	the	favela	and	how	the	planning	design	should	modify	the	neighbourhood	and	transform	its	relationship	to	the	surrounding	area.	The	systematic	collection	of	data	and	the	institutionalised	production	of	documents	is	the	process	through	which	a	favela,	or	the	favelas	in	general,	become	visible	 and	knowable	 to	 the	 state,	 informing	governance,	policy,	 and	planning.	 In	 addition	 to	 serving	 as	 a	 base	 of	 knowledge	 or	 favela-expertise	from	which	the	sate,	civil	society	and	private	interests	draw	to	 govern	 these	 previously	 “abandoned	 territories,”	 such	 processes	and	 products	 are	 essential	 to	 the	 production	 of	 the	 city	 as	 cohesive	territory	 (what	Painter	 calls	 the	 territory	 effect)	 and	 the	presence	of	the	 state	 as	 a	 tangibly	 structured	 relationship	 between	 citizens	 and	government	(what	Mitchell	calls	the	state	effect).		These	 arguments	 are	 presented	 in	 the	 telling	 of	 the	programme	known	as	UPP	Social.	The	programme	was	both	heralded	and	 misrepresented	 by	 the	 news	 and	 intellectual	 media,	 and	 often	misunderstood	by	Cariocas	and	even	state	actors.	Launched	by	the	Rio	de	Janeiro	State	government	in	2010,	the	programme	was	transferred	to	 the	 municipal	 government	 in	 2011	 where	 it	 was	 transformed	through	 a	 partnership	 with	 UN	 Habitat	 and	 renamed	 in	 2014	 as	Rio+Social	 before	 it	was	defunded	 at	 the	 end	of	 2015.	By	 the	 time	 I	began	 fieldwork,	 UPP	 Social	 had	 already	 been	 transferred	 to	 the	municipal	 government,	 housed	 at	 the	 Municipal	 Urban	 Institute	 of	Pereira	Passos	(IPP).53	UPP	Social	almost	immediately	failed	to	deliver																																																									53	 All	 interviews,	 conversations	 and	 observations	 presented	 in	 this	 chapter	 were	conducted	during	2013/2014,	while	UPP	 Social/Rio+Social	was	housed	 at	 the	 IPP	and	prior	to	the	programme’s	defunding.		
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what	its	originators	envisioned	and	the	state	government	promised—transparent	 resident	 participation	 in	 the	 development	 of	 localised,	multifaceted	public	security	policy	beyond	policing	to	accompany	the	Pacifying	 Police	 Units—and	 is	 often	 judged	 for	 that	 failure	 without	much	 attention	 to	 its	 reformed	 role	 at	 the	 municipal	 government	level.	This	chapter	presents	a	nuanced	and	critical	accounting	of	UPP	Social/Rio+Social.	 The	 objective	 is	 not	 a	 policy	 analysis.	 Rather	 the	concern	 is	how	the	programme	engendered	 favela	 integration	 in	 the	interests	of	state	territory.		The	chapter	is	divided	in	five	sections.	Section	6.1	discusses	the	origins	and	original	objectives	of	the	programme	at	the	Rio	State	level.	It	 notes	 the	 progressive	 vision	 of	 UPP	 Social	 and	 details	 how	 the	programme	was	ultimately	restrained	by	the	politics	of	participation	and	fell	victim	to	party	politics	within	the	ruling	coalition.	Section	6.2	follows	the	downsized	and	downgraded	programme	to	the	municipal	government	where	it	lacked	the	authority	to	continue	its	mandate	and	thus	 reinvented	 itself	 as	 a	 planning	 apparatus	 to	 facilitate	 citywide	favela	 integration.	 Under	 the	 stewardship	 of	 progressive	 urbanists,	social	scientists	and	technocrats	in	partnership	with	UN	Habitat,	UPP	Social	 eventually	 became	 Rio+Social	 (pronounced	 Rio	 Mais	 Social,	
mais	 meaning	 more)	 and	 attempted	 to	 integrate	 the	 favelas	 from	within	 and	 in-between	 state	 institutions.	 During	 this	 period,	 the	programme’s	 staff	 increased	as	 they	hired	dozens	of	 fieldworkers	 to	systematically	 collect	 data	 and	 produce	 reports	 on	 individual	“pacified”	 favelas,	discussed	 in	section	6.3.	 I	argue	that	 the	state	sees	the	favelas	through	these	supposedly	apolitical	technical	products	and	processes	which	produce	 the	 favelas	 as	 spaces	 ready	 for	 integrating	interventions.	 In	addition,	 these	social	 technologies—data	collection,	systematisation,	 and	 the	 modes	 of	 presentation	 (maps,	 tables,	summary	papers)—produce	the	favelas	as	urban	state	territory,	thus	by	 definition	 governable	 and	 governed.	 Section	 6.4	 considers	 the	
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remaining	 politics	 and	 neoliberal	 ideology	 obscured	 by	 technocracy	and	 the	 production	 of	 what	 Lefebvre	 would	 call	 abstract	 space	 as	Rio+Social	struggled	to	maintain	relevance	and	identity	as	something	akin	 to	 an	 in-house	 favela-consulting	 firm	 of	 the	 municipal	government.	 I	 conclude	with	 a	 summary	of	 claims	and	 the	 chapter’s	contributions.	
6.1	The	origins	of	UPP	Social		Favela	 “pacification”	 through	 the	Pacifying	Police	Units	began	in	 2008	 and	 rapidly	 expanded	 in	 the	 subsequent	 five	 years.	 As	 the	programme	rolled	out	to	various	favelas	around	the	city’s	South	Zone	and	 eventually	 the	 peripheral	 West	 and	 industrial	 North	 zones,	opinion	 polls	 showed	 residents	 within	 and	 without	 favela	neighbourhoods	 welcomed	 the	 UPPs	 expansion.	 The	 UPPs	 were	deemed	 an	 immediate	 success	 by	 government	 officials	 and	 the	popular	media,	 a	 step	 in	 the	 right	 direction	 by	 cautious	 progressive	academics;	and	the	units	encountered	little-to-no	resistance	for	nearly	seven	years	(Cano,	Borges,	and	Ribeiro	2012;	Foley	2014;	World	Bank	2012;	 Felbab-Brown	 2011).54	 As	 the	 UPP	 “invaded”	 and	 “occupied”	the	favelas,	a	number	of	complications	arose	from	having	removed	to	so-called	 “parallel	 state”	 and	 associated	 services	 that	 the	 gangs	provided	 to	 favela	 residents.55	 Exposing	 the	 vacuum	 of	 governance																																																									54	The	exception	was	Complexo	do	Alemão,	which	was	host	to	one	of	Rio	de	Janeiro’s	top	 drug	 gang	 bosses	 and	 which	 the	 police	 attempted	 to	 “take”	 without	 prior	announcement	 or	 unofficial	 negotiation.	 As	 a	 result	 the	 invasion	was	 a	 live	 on-air	spectacle	of	urban	warfare	televised	on	Globo	TV	and	resulting	in	‘civilian’	casualties	(P.	R.	de	Oliveira	2013;	Barreira	and	Maurilio	Lima	Botelho	2013;	S.	Abreu	and	Silva	2013).	After	the	occupation	of	Alemão,	the	police	never	again	attempted	to	invade	a	favela	 without	 advanced	 announcement,	 giving	 the	 gang	 leaders	 opportunity	 to	retreat	and	avoid	heavy	shootouts	and	crossfire	casualties.	55	 The	 basic	 argument	 of	 the	 “parallel	 state”	 is	 that	 the	 favelas	 and	 other	 spatial	peripheries	experience	a	vacuum	of	power	when	 the	 state	 fails	 to	deliver	 services	and	 implement	 policy,	 including	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 through	policing	 (E.	 Leeds	 1996).	This	 in	 turn	 delegitimizes	 the	 state’s	 authority	 within	 the	 favela	 and	 allows	 for	criminal	 groups	 to	 flourish	 through	 their	 own	 “law	 enforcement”	 policies	 and	strategies	as	well	as	supporting	 individual	residents	and	 families	 in	 times	of	acute	need.	 The	 gangs	 themselves	 have	 been	 documented	 embracing	 the	 idea	 of	 the	
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and	services,	the	residents	turned	to	the	police	as	the	new	“bosses”	of	the	 favelas	 to	 mediate	 conflicts	 or	 provide	 individualised	 social	assistance.	 It	 was	 not	 long	 before	 State	 Secretary	 of	 Security,	 Jose	Mariano	 Beltrame,	 was	 making	 public	 statements	 reminding	 the	public	(and	perhaps	indirectly	his	boss	and	colleagues)	that	the	“UPPs	are	 not	 a	 panacea”	 and	 cannot	 be	 charged	 with	 solving	 socio-economic	 inequality	 or	 the	 provision	 of	 urban	 services	 (cited	 in:	Bortoloti	and	Nogueira	2010;	also	see	Beltrame	2014).	The	UPP	was	meant	 to	 pave	 the	way	 for	 other	 government	 sectors	 to	 “enter”	 the	favelas	 post-pacification	 in	 order	 to	 address	 the	 state’s	 historical	“abandonment”	of	the	neighbourhoods.	It	 was	 the	 above	 context	 that	 birthed	 the	 programme	 UPP	Social,	conceived	and	designed	by	a	group	of	politically	involved	social	scientists	within	the	Rio	de	Janeiro	State	Secretary	of	Social	Assistance	and	Human	Rights.	A	policy	paper	written	by	two	of	the	programme’s	visionaries,	 Ricardo	 Henriques	 and	 Silvia	 Ramos	 (2011)	 details	 the	political	 context	and	objectives	of	UPP	Social.56	The	 text	begins	with	the	 recognition	 that	 police	 pacification	 has	 three	 objectives:	 (i)	 to	reclaim	favelas	territorialised	by	criminal	groups,	(ii)	to	deliver	peace	and	 tranquillity	 so	 that	 local	 populations	 may	 enjoy	 the	 benefits	 of	citizenship,	and	(iii)	to	end	the	logic	of	urban	warfare	that	have	long	characterised	police	operations.	Importantly,	the	paper	notes	the	UPP	programme	is	not	designed	to	end	the	war	on	drugs	or	criminality	in	general	 or	 to	 decrease	 socioeconomic	 inequality.	 In	 doing	 so	 the	authors	 are	 in	 agreement	 with	 Beltrame,	 who	 made	 a	 habit	 of	insisting	 that	 favela	 pacification	 would	 not	 solve	 the	 social	 ills	 that																																																									parallel	state	(Larkins	2015),	and	while	supported	by	some	scholars	(e.g.	Goldstein	2003)	 the	 idea	 is	 contested	by	others	 (e.g.	Arias	2006).	 See	Braehler	 (2014)	 for	 a	review	of	the	debate.	56	Henriques	headed	 the	programme	as	 Secretary	of	 Social	Assistance	 and	Human	Rights.	 Ramos	 is	 an	 academic	 researcher	 and	 former	 Sub-secretary	 of	 Security	under	 Luis	 Eduardo	 Soares	 in	 Anthony	 Garotinho’s	 government,	 credited	 with	developing	a	police	strategy	on	which	the	UPP	programme	was	modelled.	
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defines	 the	 cidade	 partida.	 Thus	 the	 authors	 argue	 that	 the	 UPPs	should	not	be	considered	a	model	of	policing	to	be	replicated	around	the	country.	It	is	specifically	designed	to	confront	the	particularities	of	a	city	where	organised	crime	challenge	the	state’s	territorial	claim	to	the	monopoly	of	legitimate	force.	The	policy	paper	further	argues	that	while	the	UPP	creates	the	conditions	for	the	“arrival	of	the	republic”	to	the	 favelas	as	 the	authors	claim,	 it	does	not	constitute	 the	republic’s	arrival	 because	 uncontested	 control	 over	 favela	 space	 does	 not	inherently	guarantee	citizenship	and	rights.		UPP	 Social	 was	 created	 as	 the	 programme	 to	 consolidate	pacification.	According	to	Henriques	and	Ramos:		
[The]	principal	objective	was	the	consolidation	of	 territorial	control	
and	 the	pacification	of	areas	with	Pacifying	Police	Units;	 and	not	a	
general	 programme	 to	 combat	 poverty	 and	 inequality.	 […]	 UPP	
Social	 was	 designed	 to	 make	 pacification	 sustainable,	 promote	
citizenship	and	socioeconomic	development	in	those	areas	and	finally	
to	 contribute	 to	 realising	 the	 integration	 of	 those	 areas	 into	 the	
whole	of	the	city	(2014,	3).		In	other	words,	the	territorial	goals	of	favela	integration—the	“arrival	of	the	republic”—would	only	be	fully	realised	and	sustained	through	the	work	of	non-police	programmes	coordinated	by	UPP	Social.		An	 ethnographic	 study	 realised	 by	 the	 Secretary	 of	 Public	Security	 informed	 the	 design	 of	 the	 programme,	 initially	 piloted	 in	three	 of	 the	 “pacified”	 favelas	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2010	 (Cidade	 de	 Deus,	Providência,	 and	 Borel).	 A	 total	 of	 10	 “axes”	 of	 action	 were	determined	 to	 “consolidate”	 the	 pacification	 process,	 four	 of	 which	were	 considered	 immediate	 priorities:	 (i)	 “citizenship	 and	togetherness”	 [convivênvia],	 which	 facilitated	 transparent	communication	 between	 residents,	 organisations,	 the	 UPP	 unit,	 and	state	institutions;	(ii)	“legal	democracy”	to	mediate	conflicts,	orientate	residents	 about	 legal	 services	 and	 regulations,	 and	 coordinate	management	of	public	spaces;	(iii)	“reducing	youth	violence”	through	
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alternative	sport	and	leisure	activities	and	specialised	programmes	in	response	 to	 the	 educational	 and	 socioeconomic	 conditions	 of	 gang-affiliated	 youths;	 and	 (iv)	 “territorial	 and	 symbolic	 integration”	through	interventions	that	valorise	favela	neighbourhoods	and	public	spaces	 as	 equally	 constitutive	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 as	 the	 surrounding	‘formal’	neighbourhoods.57		The	 idea	 that	 UPP	 together	 with	 UPP	 Social	 “brings	 the	republic”	 to	 the	 favela	 appears	 to	 toe	 the	 line	 of	 official	 discourse	reviewed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter:	 that	 favela	 integration,	 and	 in	particular	 the	 militarised	 occupation	 and	 pacification	 of	 favelas,	constitutes	 the	“arrival”	of	 the	state.	But	 the	organising	 team	behind	UPP	 Social’s	 design	 are	 critical	 thinkers,	 and	 many	 have	 worked	 in	civil	 society	 or	 public	 service	 for	 years.	 They	make	 explicit	 that	 the	discourse	of	the	“abandoned	favela”	until	the	police	arrival	is	false:		
When	 the	UPPs	 enter,	 one	 of	 the	 frequent	 phrases	 used	 to	 describe	
the	 situation	 of	 the	 favelas	 in	 the	 speech	 of	 police	 authorities,	
community	 leaders,	 politicians	 or	 NGO	 activists	 is,	 “the	 public	
authority	 has	 been	 absent	 [here]	 for	 decades.”	 In	 many	 cases,	 this	
statement	 rings	 false	 to	public	 servants	present,	 for	 example	 school	
directors	that	have	led	learning	centres	inside	a	favela	for	more	than	
15	years.	The	same	could	be	said	for	healthcare	workers,	COMLURB	
[public	waste	company]	managers,	representatives	of	CEDAE	[water	
company],	the	social	worker	from	CRAS	(Social	Assistance	Reference	
Centre)	[…]	(Ibid.,	7)	
	The	 authors	 go	 on	 to	 list	 a	 number	 of	 other	 public	 employees	who	form	 part	 of	 the	 expansive	 governing	 apparatus	 that	 have	 been	operating	 in	 the	 city’s	 favelas	 for	 decades.	 Astutely	 the	 authors	
																																																								57	The	additional	six	focus	points	of	UPP	Social	as	originally	conceived:	(v)	poverty	reduction,	 (vi)	 human	 development,	 (vii)	 productive	 and	 dynamic	 economic	inclusion,	(viii)	quality	of	life,	(ix)	diversity	and	human	rights,	and	(x)	infrastructure	and	natural	environment.	
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observe	 that	 the	 “favelas	 constitute	 a	 paradoxical	 case	 of	 both	 the	‘absence’	 of	 the	 state	 and	 its	 uncoordinated	 ‘presence’	 through	hundreds	of	projects,	very	often	designed	in	order	to	compensate	for	weak	 public	 policy”	 (Ibid.,	 8).	 The	 crux	 of	 UPP	 Social	was	 therefore	designed	 to	 coordinate	 effective	 management	 of	 non-police	interventions	that	responded	to	demands	and	needs	of	local	residents	in	accordance	with	favela-specific	public	policy.		When	 I	 spoke	 with	 Jailson	 de	 Souza	 e	 Silva,	 who	 was	 Sub-secretary	of	 Social	Assistance	and	Human	Rights	and	a	key	 figure	 in	the	creation	of	UPP	Social,	he	told	me	that	UPP	should	have	stood	for	Units	 of	 Public	 Policy	 (a	 phrase	 he	 repeated	 at	 public	 events	 after	leaving	 his	 role	 in	 government).	 As	 the	 co-founder	 of	 a	well-known	NGO	 in	 Complexo	 da	 Maré,	 the	 Observatório	 de	 Favelas,	 the	 PT	activist,	 university	 academic,	 and	 public	 servant	 (he	 had	 previously	served	as	the	Secretary	of	Education	of	Nova	Iguaçu,	a	municipality	on	the	periphery	of	the	metropolitan	region	of	Rio),	Jailson	advocated	for	the	 complete	 overhaul	 of	 public	 security	 policy,	 beginning	 with	 the	demilitarisation	 of	 the	 police	 and	 a	 reconceptualisation	 of	 public	security	 that	 would	 broaden	 the	 scope	 beyond	 strategies	 of	 control	and	punishment.	While	stopping	short	of	 calling	 for	 the	 former,	UPP	Social	was	envisioned	to	do	the	latter.	Otherwise,	according	to	Jailson,	the	favelas	would	simply	transfer	control	from	the	gang	to	the	police.	Real	 progress	 would	 involve	 the	 local	 communities	 to	 generate	demands	 and	 contribute	 to	 local	 solutions.	 The	 unpublicised	 reason	they	 included	 “UPP”	 in	 the	 programme	 name	 and	 described	 the	programme	as	a	coordinated	effort	with	police	to	“consolidate	favela	pacification”	was	 to	downplay	 the	 threat	of	a	competing	programme	and	 to	 play	 to	 the	 popularity	 and	 prioritised	 position	 of	 the	 UPP.	Ironically,	while	at	least	some	of	UPP	Social’s	creators	disapproved	of	branding	 the	 programme	 with	 police	 pacification,	 the	 security	apparatus	 also	 disapproved	 of	 linking	 the	 UPP	 with	 social	
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programmes.	As	noted	by	Beltrame	in	a	2011	newspaper	interview:		
I	don’t	like	the	name	UPP	Social.	UPP	is	UPP.	They	said	it	[UPP	Social]	
in	some	interview	and	it	stuck;	but	I’m	against	it,	because	the	UPP	is	
not	social,	it	allows	the	social,	it	permits	the	social	to	happen.	Beyond	
that,	if	UPP	Social	begins	to	not	deliver,	it	could	take	me	down	with	it.	
I	don’t	want	that.	 (Bottari	and	Gonçalves	2011,	no	page	number)	
	When	I	interviewed	UPP	Social	staff,	the	standard	explanation	of	 why	 the	 programme	 moved	 from	 the	 state	 to	 the	 municipal	government	 included	a	vague	mention	of	 “politics,”	but	 they	 insisted	that	 the	move	made	sense	because	responsibility	 for	solving	most	of	the	problems	brought	up	by	residents	during	the	public	meetings	lies	with	the	municipal	government.	For	example:		
The	 housing	 programme	 is	 the	 municipality’s	 responsibility.	
Investigating	 geotechnical	 risk	 is	 the	 municipality’s	 responsibility	
too,	 as	 are	 programmes	 of	 health.	 Even	 though	 the	 Family	 Health	
strategy	 is	 a	 federal	 programme,	 the	 management	 falls	 to	 the	
municipalities.	 Furthermore,	 basic	 education	 is	 also	 attributable	 to	
the	municipality.	So,	all	of	that	is	to	say	that	the	principal	services,	in	
fact,	are	municipally	managed.	So	 that	 is	one	of	 the	motives	 for	 the	
move	 [of	UPP	 Social	 from	 the	 state	 to	 the	municipality].	 There	was	
also	 a	 political	 juncture,	 but	 there	 was	 already	 the	 movement	
towards	 acknowledging	 that	 because	 all	 of	 those	 services	 are	
managed	by	the	municipality…		(Carolina,	Institutional	Management,	UPP	Social)	 	Carolina	 is	 correct	 when	 she	 says	 most	 urban	 services	 like	 road	maintenance,	 sanitation,	 and	 housing	 planning	 are	 legal	responsibilities	 of	 the	municipal	 government.	 Primary	 family	 health	care	 is	 also	a	 legal	 responsibility	of	municipal	governments,	 and	Rio	de	 Janeiro	has	made	significant	 investments	and	progress	relative	to	
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other	 Brazilian	 cities	 in	 its	 “Family	 and	 Community	 Health”	programme.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 state	 government	 operates	 a	 vast	network	 of	 urgent	 and	 advanced	 health	 care	 facilities,	 and	 basic	education	is	split	between	the	two	governments	with	the	municipality	running	most	primary	schools	and	pre-school	daycares,	and	the	state	running	most	secondary	schools	(although	this	split	is	not	perfect).		Some	 of	my	 research	 contacts	were	more	 forthcoming	 about	the	 political	 aspect	 behind	 the	 shift.	 PT	 formed	 part	 of	 PMDB’s	 15-party	 coalition	 state	 government,	 and	 PT	 led	 the	 Secretary	 of	 Social	Assistance	and	Human	Rights	as	part	of	 the	alliance.	Both	 Jailson	de	Souza	 e	 Silva	 and	 Ricardo	 Henriques	 were	 PT	 party	 members,	however	 according	 to	 multiple	 sources	 Henriques	 was	 considered	more	 technocrat	 than	 partisan	 and	 had	 good	 relations	 with	 PMDB	politicians.	 In	 2011,	 irregularities	 were	 uncovered	 within	 the	Secretary	and	PT	leadership	used	it	as	an	excuse	to	replace	Henriques	with	 the	 ambitious	 politician	 Rodrigo	 Neves,	 a	 PT	 state	 congress	representative	who	was	gearing	up	to	run	for	Mayor	of	Niteroi	across	the	 Guanabara	 Bay.	 Governor	 Cabral	was	weary	 of	 PT	 trying	 to	 use	UPP	 Social	 as	 a	 party	 legacy	 in	 an	 eventual	 electoral	 challenge	 to	PMDB.	 It	was	supposedly	 the	Governor	who	decided	 that	UPP	Social	could	not	stay	in	the	Secretary	of	Social	Assistance	and	Human	Rights;	and	 so	 he	 found	 a	 position	 for	 Henriques	 with	 the	 municipal	government	 under	Mayor	 Eduardo	 Paes	 (PMDB)	 and	 arranged	with	the	Mayor	for	the	programme	to	follow.	Career	politician,	ex-Governor	and	 ex-Secretary	 of	 Security	 Anthony	 Garotinho	 (at	 that	moment	 in	opposition	 to	 PMDB)	 wrote	 on	 his	 personal	 blog	 that	 Cabral	 was	“giving	 with	 one	 hand	 and	 taking	 away	 with	 the	 other,”	 since	 UPP	Social	was	 the	 “only	 social	programme	of	any	 important	 in	 the	state	[government],”	the	“filet	mignon	of	social	[programming]”	(Garotinho	2011).	 The	 manoeuvre	 reportedly	 left	 PT	 leaders	 furious,	 and	 the	sudden	institutional	change	 left	most	external	observers	confused	as	
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to	 how	 UPP	 Social	 would	 fulfil	 its	 mandate	 at	 a	 municipal	 institute	devoted	primarily	 to	 the	collection	of	urban	planning	data	and	map-making.	In	the	following	section	I	examine	UPP	Social’s	crisis	of	identity	and	 renovation	 after	 it	 moved	 from	 the	 State	 Secretary	 of	 Social	Assistance	 and	 Human	 Rights	 to	 the	 relatively	 obscure	 IPP	 in	 2011	and	 a	 change	 in	 leadership	 in	 2012.	 This	 transition	 is	 important	 to	understand	 how	 the	 idea	 of	 favela	 integration	was	 constructed	 as	 a	type	 of	 governance	 imperative	 beyond	 politics	 and	 how	 integration	came	 to	 require	 specialist	 knowledge	 and	 sophisticated	 data	(discussed	in	6.3).		
6.2	Becoming	Rio+Social		When	the	municipal	government	announced	the	phasing	out	of	Rio+Social	 in	 2015,	 the	 local	watchdog	website	Rio	 On	Watch	 ran	 a	story	 titled	 “The	 death	 of	 UPP	 Social:	 failing	 to	 make	 participation	work,”	 which	 lambasted	 the	 programme	 as	 feckless,	 token	participation	 (Bentsi-Enchill,	 Goodenough,	 and	 Berger	 2015).	 If	 the	authors	had	wished	to	evaluate	UPP	Social	on	the	effectiveness	of	 its	participatory	methodology,	the	story	should	have	been	run	four	years	earlier,	 in	 2011	 when	 it	 was	 transferred	 to	 the	 IPP	 and	 lost	considerable	institutional	authority.		UPP	 Social	 was	 a	 misunderstood	 programme	 from	 the	 start,	often	 confused	 with	 the	 police	 or	 as	 a	 participatory	 governance	initiative.	 During	 its	 initial	 phase	 in	 the	 state	 government,	 the	most	tangible	 actions	were	 connected	 to	 the	 first	 of	 the	 four	 focus	 points	listed	 above:	 citizenship	 and	 togetherness.	 The	 project	 was	 named	“vamos	combinar”	(loosely	translatable	as	 let’s	work	together)	which	gave	 the	 impression	 of	 a	 pact	 or	 legitimate	 negotiations	 between	residents	 of	 recently	 pacified	 favelas	 and	 the	 police.	 In	 reality,	 the	programme	 had	 little-to-no	 influence	 over	 the	 police.	 Evident	 in	
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Beltrame’s	quote	above,	the	police	saw	UPP	Social’s	responsibilities	as	necessary	but	wholly	separate	from	the	mandate	of	pacification.	While	community	meetings	 facilitated	by	UPP	Social	with	 the	participation	of	 UPP	 officers	 had	 ended	 by	 the	 time	 fieldwork	 started,	 videos	 on	social	 media	 (since	 deleted)	 showed	 tense	 and	 raucous	 verbal	confrontations	of	indignant	residents	complaining	about	how	officers	disrespect	 them.	 Media	 activists	 and	 scholars	 noted	 that	 residents	stated	 their	 priorities	 in	 the	 community	 forums	 as	 resident-police	relations	and	investments	in	education	and	healthcare;	but	UPP	Social	turned	around	and	prioritised	basic	services	like	trash	collection	and	the	 regularisation	 of	 electricity	 (T.	 Smith	 2011;	 Cath	 2012).	Furthermore,	 the	 downshift	 from	 state	 to	 municipal	 government	occurred	before	 it	 could	 implement	 substantial	 programming.	While	
vamos	combinar	continued	during	the	first	year	or	so	of	UPP	Social	at	the	 IPP,	 according	 to	multiple	 contacts	with	 IPP,	 the	mayor	 ordered	the	 end	 of	 public	meetings	 that,	 in	 his	 view,	 had	 accomplished	 little	more	than	to	make	the	government	look	bad.		UPP	Social	remained	under	the	directorship	of	Henriques,	who	was	named	President	of	the	IPP,	and	his	deputy,	José	Marcelo	Zacchi,	who	was	part	of	the	original	team	and	named	Director	of	Projects	at	the	 IPP.	 Henriques	 and	 Zacchi	 maintained	 the	 conceptual	 vision	 of	UPP	 Social,	 but	 revamped	 and	 expanded	 the	 programme	 in	partnership	with	 UN	Habitat.	Within	 two	 years	 both	 Henriques	 and	Zacchi	 left	 the	 IPP	 and	 returned	 to	 civil	 society,	 and	 the	 IPP	 came	under	 the	 leadership	 of	 Eduarda	 La	 Rocque	 whose	 personal	 call	 to	public	service	after	“taking	a	bullet”	was	referenced	in	Chapter	Five.58	Below	I	describe	 the	programme	as	 it	had	taken	shape	by	the	 time	I																																																									58	Henriques	went	on	to	lead	Instituto	Unibanco,	the	corporate	social	responsibility	arm	of	Itaú	bank	(not	to	be	confused	with	Itaú	Social).	Zacchi	helped	found	the	Casa	Fluminense,	a	non-governmental	organisation	that	advocates	for	inter-municipality	sustainable	urban	planning	at	the	greater	metropolitan	scale,	and	after	a	obtaining	a	masters	degree	from	Harvard’s	Kennedy	School	of	Government,	he	returned	to	head	Casa	Fluminense	as	its	General	Coordinator.	
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began	fieldwork	in	2013.		While	 hosted	 at	 the	 IPP	 and	 financed	 by	 the	 municipal	government	 with	 loans	 from	 the	 World	 Bank,	 UPP	 Social	 was	 run	through	 a	 partnership	with	UN	Habitat,	which	 technically	 hired	 and	paid	 UPP	 Social’s	 140	 employees	 (at	 the	 time	 I	 interviewed	 UN	Habitat’s	 project	 assistant	 assigned	 to	 UPP	 Social	 and	 the	 Country	Director).	 The	 international	 organisation	 brought	 to	 the	 programme	knowledge	 from	 its	 Global	 Network	 on	 Safer	 Cities	 and	 the	 similar	initiative	 of	 “social	 urbanism”	 and	 the	 “integrated	 urban	 plan”	 of	Medellín.59	Programme	leaders	in	the	UN	office	and	IPP	attempted	to	depoliticise	 UPP	 Social	 and	 to	 focus	 on	 building	 a	mission	 of	 favela	expertise	and	evidence-based	articulation	between	state	actors:	
The	participation	of	a	UN	agency	will	always	protect	a	programme	
from	politics	 a	 bit.	 The	UN	brings	 neutrality,	 an	 exemption	 of	 sorts	
that	no	other	Brazilian	agency	 could	bring,	 because	 the	UN	doesn’t	
participate	 in	moments	of	political	negotiations	within	 the	 country.	
We	are	 an	 inter-governmental	 organisation,	 so	we	 represent	Brazil	
and	 all	 other	 members	 of	 the	 organisation,	 but	 we	 bring	 that	
impartiality	and	neutrality.	And	that	applies	to	all	of	our	projects.	In	
all	of	them,	absolutely,	we	do	not	participate	[in	politics].	Sometimes	
we	 don’t	 even	 have	 knowledge	 about	 the	 [political]	 reality	 because	
our	workers	have	a	very	specific	profile.		(Rayane,	Country	Director,	UN	Habitat)	
	
For	a	while	 it	was	very	difficult,	 the	beginning	of	UPP	[Social].	Very	
difficult.	 Because	 it	 is	 a	 programme	 that	 is	 in	 an	 area	 extremely	
politicised.	So	the	Vice-Mayor,	Adilson	Pires	[PT],	who	is	Secretary	of	
Social	 Development,	 wanted	 to	 take	 the	 programme,	 which	 is	 a	
programme	 managed	 through	 UN	 Habitat…and	 the	 Mayor…	 Are	
there	 any	 journalists	 here?	 [laughter]	 But	 it’s	 true.	 True	 story.	 Just																																																									59	The	programme	director	of	UPP	Social,	Marcelo	Zacchi	has	previously	consulted	for	the	World	Bank	and	UN	Habitat	on	the	“Safe	Cities”	program,	which	may	explain	why	UN	Habitat	felt	confident	in	taking	on	a	direct	role	in	the	programme	in	the	less	politicised,	technocratic	IPP.		
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don’t	put	this	on	Facebook!	Everything	else	is	OK	[laughter].		(Eduarda	La	Rocque,	President	IPP,	speech	hosted	by	MOVE	Rio)	
	
[When]	Ricardo	Henriques	assumed	the	Presidency	of	IPP	its	mission	
transformed	 more	 to	 promote	 social	 development	 with	 the	
introduction	 of	 UPP	 Social,	 and	 since	 the	 time	 of	 my	 stewardship	
we’ve	focussed	on	sustainable	development.	So,	we	finally	defined	our	
mission	and	our	 vision,	 and	 that	 is	 to	 do	all	 types	 of	 information—
produce	data,	do	it	correctly,	generate	information,	studies,	research	
and	 do	 the	 work	 of	 articulating	 so	 that	 the	 information	 creates	
transformation	 in	 favour	 of	 sustainable	 development	 in	 the	 city	 of	
Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 and	 quality	 of	 well-being.	 […]	 There	 were	 a	 lot	 of	
people	who	thought	that	UPP	Social	shouldn’t	be	within	the	IPP.	It’s	a	
question	of	very	complex	politics,	and	we	can	get	into	that	later.	But	
since	 the	 beginning,	 I	 defended	 that	 it	 was	 a	 dignified	 use	 of	
information	 to	 create	 change.	 So	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	 my	
stewardship,	 I	 transformed	 UPP	 Social	 into	 a	 strictly	 technical	
programme	 of	 qualified	 information	 and	 articulation.	 We	 are	 not	
responsible	for	anything	that	is	actually	done	in	the	favelas.		(La	Rocque,	interview)	Politics	 had	 saturated	 UPP	 Social’s	 brand,	 including,	 perhaps	especially,	the	name.	After	the	programme	left	the	State	government,	its	new	home	was	as	far	from	an	association	with	the	police	as	it	could	get	 institutionally.	 The	municipal	 government	 has	 no	 authority	 over	police	 operations,	 and	 the	 IPP	 had	 no	 history	 of	 working	 with	 the	State	 police.	 While	 in	 theory	 UPP	 Social	 would	 coordinate	 with	 the	UPPs,	my	 contacts	 in	 Rio+Social	 told	me	 that	 relations	 between	 the	two	programmes	were	strained	from	the	beginning.	Nonetheless	UPP	Social	was	 still	 commonly	 confused	with	 the	police	programme.	The	UN	Habitat	professionals	told	me	one	of	their	first	recommendations	was	to	change	the	name,	a	sentiment	felt	by	many	of	those	involved	in	the	programme	during	my	 fieldwork.	One	of	my	contacts	at	 the	 IPP,	Roberto,	told	me	on	multiple	occasions,	“It’s	a	terrible	name.	It	should	have	 never	 been	 named	 that.”	 In	 addition	 to	 failing	 to	 separate	 its	
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brand	 from	 the	 police,	 favela	 pacification	 had	 become	 increasingly	politicised	 and	 controversial.	 Community	 activists	 began	 to	 call	attention	 to	 authoritarian	 practices	 and	 policies	 of	 the	 UPP,	 critics	pointed	 out	 that	 the	 culture	 of	 the	 war	 on	 drugs	 had	 not	 been	sufficiently	tamed	within	the	military	police,	and	academics	began	to	claim	 its	 operations	 followed	 an	 enemy-insurgent	 strategy	 (Muggah	and	 Mulli	 2002;	 Foley	 2014)	 and	 with	 the	 principal	 objectives	 of	“securing	 the	Olympic	 city”	 and	accumulation	 through	dispossession	(Gaffney	2012;	Freeman	2012;	Freeman	2014;	Vargas	2013;	Olinger	2015;	Penglase	2016).		The	 perceived	 link	 between	 UPP	 Social	 and	 the	 UPP	 put	 the	UPP	 Social	 programme	 at	 risk,	 existentially	 and	 physically,	 because	the	 programme	 now	 had	 dozens	 of	 fieldworkers	 travelling	 to	 the	pacified	favelas	on	a	regular	basis	to	liaise	with	community	leaders	or	collect	data	for	mapping	projects:		
The	 name	 is	 wrong,	 UPP	 Social.	 Everyone	 thinks	 we	 are	 the	
communitarian	 arm	 of	 the	 police.	 Our	 field	 agents	 have	 difficulty	
walking	 around	 because	 they	 are	 being	 confused	 [with	 the	 police].	
[They	 think]	we’re	mapping	 out	where	 the	 drug	 dens	 are	 [boca	 de	fumo].		 (La	Rocque,	interview).			In	 addition	 to	 delinking	 UPP	 Social	 from	 the	 UPPs	 to	 avoid	confusion	and	depoliticise	the	work—Eduarda	argues	that	to	sustain	the	 work	 of	 Rio+Social,	 the	 programme	 had	 to	 “become	 the	 state”	rather	 than	 remain	 part	 of	 the	 [partisan]	 government—the	 name	change	 opened	 the	 door	 to	 applying	 their	 model	 and	 objectives	beyond	 pacified	 favelas.	 As	 pointed	 out	 above,	 the	 UPPs	 are	specifically	designed	to	recuperate	territory	“lost”	to	organised	crime.	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 has	 more	 than	 1,000	 favelas,	 many	 of	 which	 are	described	as	“peaceful”	or	“tranquil”	by	residents	to	indicate	they	are	
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not	 controlled	 by	 drug	 trafficking	 gangs	 or	 violent	 militias.	 In	 such	cases	they	do	not	need	pacification,	but	they	still	need	integration.	 If	there	is	a	model	built	for	replication	across	Rio	de	Janeiro	(or	in	other	cities),	 it	 was	 not	 police	 pacification	 but	 rather	 UPP	 Social	 as	 an	initiative	 to	coordinate	 the	dozen	dysfunctional	arms	of	 the	state.	La	Rocque	as	well	as	multiple	IPP	managers	told	me	they	saw	no	reason	why	 Rio+Social	 should	 continue	 privileging	 only	 “pacified”	 favelas.	Indeed	 to	 do	 so	 would	 end	 up	 exacerbating	 inequalities	 between	favelas	on	a	two-tiered	system.		The	 principles	 and	 objectives	 of	UPP	 Social/Rio+Social	 at	 the	IPP	 continued	 the	 original	 principles	 and	 general	 objectives	 of	 the	programme,	 but	 the	 approach	 evolved	 substantial	 differences.	 For	one,	 the	 programme	was	 no	 longer	 understood	 through	 the	 lens	 of	consolidation	 of	 favela	 pacification	 but	 principally	 through	 the	integration	 paradigm.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 utopian	 discourse	 of	 the	integrated	 city	 presented	 in	 Chapter	 Five,	 those	 steering	 Rio+Social	have	a	more	elaborated	vision	of	what	favela	integration	entails:	
For	 the	 city	 to	 be	 integrated,	 you	 first	 need	 to	 have	 delivery	 of	
services	 in	 an	 equal	 manner	 to	 the	 whole	 city.	 All	 citizens	 must	
receive	the	same	services	of	the	same	quality.	For	example,	if	you	go	
to	a	place	[in	a	favela]	and	ask	‘Do	you	have	water?’	[They’ll	respond]	
’Yes,	 I	 have	 water.’	 So	 in	 the	 statistics	 you	 count	 that	 person	 as	
having	water.	But	 if	 you	ask,	 ‘Do	 you	have	water	 every	day?’	 [They	
may	 respond,]	 ‘Ah,	 no.	 Here	 at	 my	 house	 I	 have	 water	 two	 days	 a	
week.’	 So	 something	 is	 wrong.	 Beyond	 that	 [equal	 services	
throughout	the	city],	you	need	to	think	of	the	whole	planning	of	the	
city.	You’ll	never	have	an	integrated	city	if	you	continue	thinking	in	a	
sectoral	manner.	 I	believe	our	difficulty	 is	with	getting	governments	
to	achieve	a	vision	of	territorialised	policy.	 If	you	look	at	a	territory	
in	an	integrated	manner,	that	 is	to	say	holistically,	you	will	see	that	
which	is	working	and	isn’t	working	in	that	territory.	Now,	if	you	only	
look	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 education,	 you’ll	 only	 see	 education.	 You	
won’t	be	able	to	see	if	health	[care]	is	working,	if	social	assistance	is	
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working,	if	the	economy	is	working,	if	it	takes	a	resident	four	hours	to	
get	to	work.		
(Rayne,	Country	Director,	UN	Habitat)	
	
Tucker:	 When	 we	 talk	 about	 UPP	 Social	 and	 Rio+Social,	 are	 we	
talking	 about	 the	 evolution	 of	 one	 programme,	 or	 are	 we	 talking	
about	 two	 separate	 programmes?	 Can	 you	 name	 the	 moment	 that	
UPP	Social	became	Rio+Social?	
Eduarda:	I	think	it	was	a	natural	evolution,	and	in	the	future	we	are	
going	to	broaden	our	scope	of	actions	in	two	axes.	Well,	in	reality	the	
old	 UPP	 Social	 had	 three	 axes:	 an	 axis	 of	 information,	 an	 axis	 of	
articulation,	 and	 an	 axis	 of	 municipal	 public	 services.	 Public	
municipal	services	was	kind	of	mixed	up,	confused	with	information.	
So	 we	 have	 those	 three	 things.	 Rio+Social	 is	 continuously	 more	
focussed	 on	 the	 axis	 of	 municipal	 public	 services	 that	 City	 Hall	 is	
providing	in	the	favelas.	And	there	is	the	axis	of	information,	which	is	
the	core	business	of	the	IPP.	But	we	are	more	and	more	working	in	
partnership	 with	 communities,	 complementing	 orthophoto	 [aerial	photography]	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 information	 gathered	 by	 the	 field	
agents	 with	 the	 residents,	 conducting	 opinion	 polls	 of	 sorts	 and	
including	 that	 information	 on	 the	 MRP	 [Rapid	 Participatory	 Map,	explained	in	section	6.3].			As	 we	 see	 from	 these	 quotes,	 Rio+Social	 understands	 favela	integration	 principally	 through	 urban	 governance	 and	 territorial	planning	(as	opposed	to	vertical,	sectoral	planning).	Insisting	that	the	favelas	are	 legitimate	urban	space,	 they	also	recognise	the	 favelas	as	deserving	 of	 a	 differential	 approach	 given	 political	 history	 and	 local	material	 differences	 between	 self-built	 and	 formally	 planned	 and	regulated	neighbourhoods.	Furthermore,	the	quotes	speak	to	a	vision	of	 a	 coordinated	 state	 equipped	 with	 favela-specific	 knowledge	developed	in	partnership	with	local	residents	and	community	groups.		This	 brings	 to	 mind	 conversations	 I	 had	 with	 a	 disaffected	former	 employee	 of	 PAC-Social	 (discussed	 at	 length	 in	 Chapter	 7),	
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who	was	 so	 frustrated	with	 the	dysfunction	of	different	 state	offices	and	agencies	that	she	doubted	it	could	be	explained	in	words:	“I	don’t	even	know	if	I’m	relaying	enough	to	you	so	you	understand	the	extent	of	the	problem.”	Discussing	what	favela	integration	meant	to	her	work	she	 exclaimed,	 “What	 about	 integration	 of	 the	 state!”	 The	 model	 of	UPP	Social	was	designed	to	address	the	structural	dysfunction	of	the	state	that	inhibits	integration	of	the	favelas.	One	UPP	Social	employee	described	 their	 work	 as	 facilitating	 a	 dialogue	 between	 the	“territories”	 [the	 favelas]	 and	 the	 various	 state	 secretaries	 and	agencies	that	neither	have	experience	responding	to	local	demands	of	favela	 residents	 nor	 the	 tradition	 of	 working	 across	 sectors.	 In	 that	sense,	 UPP	 Social	 was	 favela	 integration	 through	 integration	 of	 the	state.			
6.3	Seeing	the	favela	–	data	and	the	favela	as	
governable/governed	space		This	section	examines	the	practices	of	UPP	Social/Rio+Social	in	order	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 the	 programme	 produces	 the	 territory	
effect,	 that	 is	 the	 appearance	 that	 the	 state’s	 sovereign	 authority	 to	govern	 operates	 evenly	 across	 urban	 space	 (Painter	 2010).	 Below	 I	describe	 the	 structure	 of	 UPP	 Social/Rio+Social,	methodologies,	 and	the	 resulting	material	 products:	maps	 and	other	data-rich	materials.	Building	 on	 Painter,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 tools	 of	 UPP	 Social	 are	 social	technologies	that	produce	the	favelas	as	state	territory.		The	UPP	 Social	 programme	was	 divided	 into	 three	managing	departments.	 Territorial	 Management	 had	 teams	 dedicated	 to	 each	“pacified”	 favela	 [complex]	 consisting	 of	 a	 team	 leader,	 one-to-three	assistants	depending	on	the	size	of	the	favela(s)	and	field	agents.	Each	team	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	 systematic	 collection	 of	 data	 on	 the	ground,	 organising	 projects	 or	 events,	 and	 liaising	 with	 community	members.	As	a	 rule,	 the	 field	agents	were	 residents	of	 the	 favelas	 in	
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which	 they	worked.	 IPP	 staff	 trained	 these	 agents	 through	 seminars	and	 in-field	 practice;	 and	 they	 were	 the	 only	 position	 within	 UPP	Social	that	were	explicitly	recruited	from	the	favelas.	The	data	sought	by	 the	 teams	 are	 primarily	 cartographic	 and	 qualitative	 and	 result	from	close	contact	with	residents	and	the	material	environment:		
[The	information]	is	more	qualitative	because	we	are	there	to	see	the	
local	 demands.	 We	 are	 taking	 pictures;	 we	 are	 qualifying	 the	
information	 that	we	bring	 to	 the	 inside	of	 the	 institute	 [IPP]	 so	 the	
information	 can	 be	 validated	 and	 result	 in	 real	 transformation	
within	 the	 territory.	 The	 team	 is	 always	 moving	 through	 the	
communities.	We	don’t	have	a	base	of	operations	in	the	favela.	All	the	
systematisation	 [of	 data]	 is	 done	 here	 [at	 IPP].	 So	 we	 are	 always	
circulating,	talking	with	leaders.	Let	me	explain:	the	first	moment	of	
our	arrival	is	with	the	resident	association	presidents.	You	go	to	the	
associations,	 converse	 with	 the	 presidents,	 understand	 a	 little	 bit	
about	 the	 dynamic	 of	 that	 territory.	 Afterwards	 you	 map	 out	 the	
organisations	of	that	territory,	who	are	the	other	leaders	and	so	on.	
Using	 that	 information	 you	 go	 out	 collecting	 demands	 [of	 the	
population],	which	you’ll	also	observe	while	 in	 the	 field,	be	 it	 in	 the	
area	 of	 education,	 health,	 conservation,	 trash	 collection…	 We	 are	
able	to	strengthen	some	actions	within	the	territory	directly.		(Rosane,	Team	Leader,	Territorial	Management)		The	information	collected	by	Territorial	Management	is	passed	to	 the	 second	department,	Housing	 Studies,	whose	 job	 is	 to	 organise	the	 field	data	and	triangulate	with	pre-existing	data	 from	the	census	and	other	state	information.	This	is	then	presented	as	both	descriptive	and	analytical	documents,	some	of	which	are	public	and	published	on	IPP’s	website	and	some	of	which	are	used	for	internal	regulation	and	communication	(these	documents	and	products	are	discussed	further	below).	This	 is	 the	 crux	of	what	Eduarda	La	Rocque	 refers	 to	 as	 the	“core	 business”	 of	 IPP,	 the	 production	 of	 data	 and	 management	 of	knowledge.	The	data,	which	is	referred	to	as	“qualified	data”—which	
	 201	
means	 systematically	 collected	 data	 “elaborated”	 in	ways	 specific	 to	favela	spaces	and	residents	demands	or	needs—becomes	knowledge	when	 it	 is	 organised	 and	 presented	 in	 forms	 sharable	 with	 actors	outside	 of	 the	 programme	 to	 modify	 and	 improve	 the	 mundane	activities	of	the	sate	(such	as	trash	collection	or	mail	delivery)	and/or	inform	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 public	 policy.	 Mayor	 Eduardo	 Paes	 had	previously	 pledged	 to	 “urbanise”	 all	 of	 the	 city’s	 favelas	 through	Morar	 Carioca	 by	 2020.	 The	 documents	 and	maps	 produced	 by	 the	Rio+Social	 Housing	 Studies	 department	 on	 each	 favela	 would	 have	been	an	 immediate	 source	of	data	 and	 contacts	 for	 the	architectural	firms	contracted	to	design	the	interventions.		This	 officially	 sanctioned	 on-demand	 territorial	 knowledge	was	 articulated	 by	 the	 third	 department	 of	 UPP	 Social/Rio+Social,	
Institutional	Management,	which	had	the	responsibility	of	 interfacing	with	 state	 sectoral	 services,	 private	 businesses,	 and	 civil	 society.	According	to	the	UPP	Social	model,	this	occurred	in	multiple	contexts.	The	 first	was	 the	 articulation	 of	 a	 local	 demand	 to	 the	 proper	 state	actor	 with	 the	 authority	 to	 respond.	 The	 “strong	 listening”	 in	 the	favela	by	the	field	workers	identified	residents’	demands	or	observes	a	“need,”	which	was	“qualified”	by	precise	data,	and	translated	into	an	“ask.”	 Continuing	 the	 conversation	 cited	 above,	 Rosane	 and	 Carla	provided	an	example:		
Rosane:	 There	 was	 an	 institute,	 Raízes	 em	 Movimento,	 that	 was	
organising	 an	 event	 and	 wanted	 to	 reorder	 the	 trash	 disposal	 and	
collection	 in	 that	 region	 [of	 Complex	 do	 Alemão].	 […]	 Carlinha	
[assistant	of	the	Complexo	do	Alemão	Territorial	Management	team]	
was	 already	 talking	 with	 Comlurb	 [municipal	 trash	 collection	
company]	 since	 before	 I	 joined	 the	 team.	 They	 wanted	 more	 trash	
bins	in	four	strategic	points	along	Avenida	Central.	We	were	able	to	
facilitate	 with	 Comlurb	 50	 bins	 at	 five	 strategic	 points	 all	 along	
Avenida	Central.	An	action	was	planned	the	same	day	 that	 involved	
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the	Municipal	 Centre	 of	Health	 in	 Alemão,	 in	which	 the	 community	
health	 agents	 went	 door	 to	 door	 pamphleting	 and	 educating	 the	
people	about	the	necessity	of…	because	it	doesn’t	do	any	good	to	just	
improve	 logistics	 of	 trash	 collection	 if	 you	 don’t	 also	 have	 an	
educational	 campaign	 that	 reorganises	 the	 actual	 discarding	 of	
trash.	
Tucker:	 So	 the	 educational	 campaign	 was	 organised	 by	Raízes	 em	Movimento?	
Rosane:	No,	it	was	coordinated	by	the	community	health	agents	that	
took	the	initiative—	
Carla:	 In	 reality	 it	 was	 a	 movement	 called	 Pensa	 Alemão,	 that	
together	with	UPP	Social,	 Raízes	 em	Movimento,	 Comlurb,	 personal	
from	their	administrative	network,	together	diverse	actors.	
Tucker:	And	you	all	offered	what	exact	services	for	this—	
Rosane:	That	articulation	between—	
Carla:	 For	 example,	 they	 had	 been	 trying	 to	 get	 the	 attention	 of	
Comlurb	 and	 they	 weren’t	 able	 to.	 Our	 participation	 made	 that	
possible.	
Rosane:	Our	articulation	with	the	administrative	region	as	well.	
	In	 this	 example,	 the	 placement	 of	 rubbish	 bins	 along	 the	 major	thoroughfare	 through	 the	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 involved	 an	established	NGO	(Raízes	em	Movimento),	a	community	activist	group	(Pensa	 Alemão),	 community	 health	 workers	 from	 a	 health	 centre	(who	 as	 a	 rule	 live	 in	 or	 near	 the	 areas	 they	 work),	 the	 municipal	waste	 collection	 (Comlurb)	 and	 finally	 the	 corresponding	Administrative	 Region	 (of	 which	 Complex	 do	 Alemão	 is	 one	 of	 26	within	 the	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 municipality).	 Municipal	 services	 and	companies	 such	 as	Comlurb	 are	not	 set	 up	 to	dialogue	directly	with	resident	associations.	While	the	community	health	workers	form	part	of	the	state	governing	apparatus,	they	are	employed	by	the	NGO	with	a	government	contract,	and	are	at	the	bottom	of	a	fairly	rigid	internal	hierarchy	that	does	not	grant	them	any	privileged	knowledge	or	clout	outside	 of	 health	 clinic	 in	which	 they	work.	While	 Comlurb	 realises	
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the	trash	collection,	the	Administrative	Region	also	needed	to	approve	the	change	of	service.	UPP	Social	served	as	the	one	articulating	force	that	“knew”	everyone	in	an	otherwise	segregated	system.			
	
Figure	6.1	–	Municipality	of	Rio	de	Janeiro,	Planning	Areas	and	Administrative	
Regions	(2014)	
The	municipal	government	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	divides	the	city	into	five	
“Planning	Areas”	and	34	Administrative	Regions.	Some	of	the	largest	favelas	
and	favela	“complexes”	(groupings	of	contingent	favelas)—such	as	Rocinha	
(27)	in	the	South	Zone,	Cidade	de	Deus	[City	of	God]	(34)	in	the	West	Zone,	and	
Complexo	do	Alemão	(29),	Maré	(30),	and	Vigário	Geral	(31)	in	the	North	
Zone—constitute	their	own	administrative	region.			 Another	 example	 is	 working	 with	 EMOP	 (the	 state	 of	 Rio	 de	Janeiro	 public	 works	 company)	 to	 redirect	 funds	 from	 a	 cancelled	construction	 project	 to	 install	 wheel	 chair	 accessible	 ramps	 in	community	 buildings	 in	 Morro	 da	 Mineira	 in	 Catumbi	 (near	downtown)	 when	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Residents	 Association	approached	 the	 Territorial	 Management	 team.	 Similarly	 the	 team	worked	with	 an	 educational	NGO	who	 ran	 focus	 groups	with	 school	children	 to	evaluate	perceived	risks	 in	 the	neighbourhood.	Based	on	
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the	consensus	that	cars	and	motorcycles	sped	by	the	school	entrance	and	 ignored	 the	 crosswalk	 signal,	 they	 created	 a	 campaign	 asking	motorists	 to	 respect	 the	 stoplight	 and	 programme	 staff	 guided	 the	resident	 association	 president	 through	 the	 bureaucratic	 process	necessary	 to	 solicit	 speed	 bumps	 from	 the	 corresponding	municipal	office	of	traffic	planning	and	engineering	(CET-Rio).		
	
	
Figure	6.2	-	"UPP	Social:	information	transformation	and	integration".	
Displayed	on	former	version	of	programme	website	while	hosted	at	IPP,	prior	
to	name	change.		When	Eduarda	arrived	at	the	IPP—a	job	she	took	only	because	it	 came	with	UPP	Social—she	did	not	understand	 the	 institute’s	 role	within	 the	 state.	 Moreover	 she	 said	 nobody	 there	 could	 give	 her	 a	straightforward	 answer:	 “After	 five	 meetings	 with	 the	 directors,	nobody	knew	how	to	 tell	me	what	exactly	 the	 IPP	did.	 I	 came	to	 the	conclusion	that	what	the	IPP	does	is	knowledge	management	from	the	beginning	of	its	history.”	Eduarda	calls	the	institute	a	“treasure	chest”	of	 information	 that	 when	 pursued	 with	 an	 agenda	 (such	 as	 favela	integration)	has	 transformative	potential.	The	main	products	of	UPP	Social	 fit	 with	 the	 historical	 mission	 of	 production	 of	 data	 and	management	 of	 knowledge.	 One	 such	 example	 is	 the	 “Territory	
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Panorama”	produced	for	each	pacified	 favela	or	 favela	complex.	This	document	was	a	systematised	representation	of	the	favela(s)	through	the	 lens	 of	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 data	 and	 cartography.	Employees	 from	 the	 Housing	 Studies	 team	 would	 consolidate	information	from	the	national	census	and	additional	sources	of	official	data	carried	out	by	projects	such	as	Morar	Carioca	or	PAC-favelas.		The	Panoramas	uploaded	to	IPP’s	website	are	just	the	tip	of	the	iceberg	 according	 to	 UPP	 Social	 workers.	 Most	 of	 the	 information	collected	 and	 organised	 by	 the	 teams	 working	 in	 the	 field	 is	 only	accessible	internally.	When	I	asked	why	they	did	not	make	all	of	their	data	 public,	 I	 was	 given	 a	 few	 different	 answers.	 First,	 there	 is	 the	magnitude	of	data	 and	 the	question	of	how	 to	present	 it	 in	 a	 logical	and	easily	digestible	manner	online.	A	considerable	task	when	there	is	no	clear	demand	 for	 such	a	 service,	 especially	when	 the	programme	had	 its	budget	significantly	reduced	when	 it	was	renewed	 in	2013.60	Second,	much	of	the	data	was	collected	to	facilitate	government	action	within	the	favelas	and	communication	with	local	actors.	Some	of	this	information	 would	 actually	 be	 inappropriate	 to	 make	 public.	 For	example,	 the	 IPP	produced	a	who’s-who	contact	 list	 of	 each	pacified	favela:	 resident	 association	 presidents,	 informal	 community	 leaders,	NGO	workers,	school	administrators,	health	workers,	youth	workers,	business	owners	and	entrepreneurs.	These	individuals	both	facilitated	data	 collection	and	mapping	of	 local	demands	but	 also	were	 contact	points	with	whom	the	IPP	could	connect	to	state	institutions	looking																																																									60	UPP	 Social	while	 at	 the	 IPP	was	 financed	 through	 Inter-American	Development	Bank	and	the	World	Bank	loans.	Because	the	loans	included	multiple	projects,	some	of	which	overlap	and	many	of	which	seem	to	differ	in	execution	than	as	proposed	in	the	 loan	agreements,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	measure	exactly	how	much	was	spent.	When	the	 programme	 was	 first	 announced,	 the	 Mayor	 projected	 a	 total	 budget	 of	 R$1	billion	 for	 the	 first	 two	 years,	 however	 it	 appears	 that	 calculation	 includes	 all	urbanisation	 and	 integration	 projects	 in	 the	 favelas,	 whether	 or	 not	 managed	 by	UPP	 Social	 or	 the	 IPP	 (Schmidt	 2011).	 This	 stands	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	municipal	budget	documents	 in	2013	that	show	a	mere	R$27	million	over	 the	 following	 four	years	(Cinco	2013).	
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to	improve	services	in	a	local	area	as	well,	private	businesses	looking	for	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 investment	 opportunities,	 or	 civil	society	 looking	 for	 local	 partners.	 The	 third	 reason	 was	 political	 in	nature:	much	of	the	data	was	pinpointing	local	problems	reported	by	residents,	 institutional	 failures	 and	 demands	 to	 improve	 subpar	 or	missing	 services.	 While	 making	 public	 such	 data	 would	 serve	 the	interests	 of	 resident	 and	 civil	 society,	 the	 state	 interest	 is	 for	 using	data	to	improve	internal	communications	and	problem	solving	as	well	as	to	publicly	demonstrate	their	successes,	not	failures.	The	 most	 elaborate	 data	 strategy	 of	 Rio+Social	 was	 GIS	(geographic	 information	 system)	 mapping	 technology.	 The	 Rapid	Participatory	Map	(MRP	for	Mapa	Rápido	Participartivo)	was	a	novel	project	 of	 the	 programme	 meant	 to	 transform	 the	 relationship	between	 favela	 residents,	 the	 larger	 neighbourhoods	 and	 the	 state.	The	first	stage	was	the	cartographic	work	cataloguing	the	streets	and	alleyways	in	the	favela	so	that	each	home	could	be	numbered	with	an	address.	This	makes	possible,	 if	not	fact,	 the	delivery	of	mail	directly	to	homes	rather	than	residents	paying	 for	a	service	similar	 to	a	post	office	 box	 at	 the	 local	 residents	 association.	 A	 state-recognised	address	is	also	necessary	when	filing	reports	with	public	(and	in	most	cases	private)	 service	providers.	Once	 the	 streets	were	mapped	 and	homes	 numbered,	 data	 about	 existing	 services	 and	 social	infrastructure	 are	 layered	 on	 the	 map:	 schools,	 day	 care,	 health	centres,	 social	assistance	offices,	 sports	 facilities	etc…	Finally	a	 third	process	was	carried	out	by	the	Territorial	Management	team	with	GIS	equipment	 to	survey	 the	 favelas	and	register	demands	and	points	of	micro-interventions,	such	as	point	of	open	sewage	or	trash	heaps	that	attract	 vermin,	 standing	 water	 that	 poses	 risks	 for	 mosquito	 borne	illnesses,	 crumbling	 roads	 or	 walls.	 The	 favelas	 were	 divided	 into	“micro	areas”	determined	by	the	field	teams	during	the	data	collection	process	based	on	preliminary	analysis.	These	areas	do	not	necessarily	
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correspond	 to	 divisions	 defined	 by	 the	 residents	 themselves	 but	rather	 the	researchers’	 interpretation	of	 the	neighbourhoods	 (now	a	constructed	 “field”	 of	 research)	 based	 on	 similarities	 in	 home	structure,	 quality	 of	 infrastructure	 (roads,	 footpaths,	 sanitation),	topography	or	data	relating	to	social	welfare.	The	process	is	labour-intensive	and	time	consuming.	It	is	also	a	misnomer,	as	there	is	little	participatory	about	the	process	except	the	field	 agents	 who	 are	 from	 the	 favelas	 where	 they	 work	 and	 gather	information	 based	 on	 assistance,	 tips	 and	 advice	 from	 residents.	 I	encountered	 a	 two-person	 team	 conducting	 the	 third	 round	 of	 the	MRP	in	favela	Santa	Marta	in	December	of	2013.	When	I	spotted	them	they	 were	 crouching	 down	 to	 look	 under	 house	 structures	 on	 the	steep	hill	 to	evaluate	 the	water	ways	and	check	 to	 see	 if	 there	were	any	points	where	rubbish	was	collecting,	blocking	rain	water	run	off,	and	providing	breeding	grounds	for	dengue-transmitting	mosquitoes.	I	 approached	 and	 we	 chatted.	 One	 of	 the	 Territorial	 Management	assistants	 was	 conducting	 in-field	 technology	 and	 methodology	training	with	a	local	field	agent.	She	explained	they	were	spending	the	whole	day	in	that	micro	area	of	the	favela,	and	they	would	devote	the	following	day	to	a	different	micro	area.	Once	the	team	conducted	their	survey	of	each	micro	area	the	final	product	would	be	a	rich	visual	and	numerical	 data	 set	 representing	 the	 socio-spatial	 everyday	 of	 favela	residents.	The	MRP	was	designed	as	a	 sort	of	 ‘living	map’	 that	 could	be	periodically	updated	by	field	agents	who	are	in	constant	contact	with	the	 community	 and	 residents	 The	 GIS	 technology	 allows	 for	 the	desegregation	of	data	 into	 “micro-regions”	within	 single	 favelas,	 and	even	 street-by-street	 statistics	 that	 would	 allow	 targeted	improvement	 of	 specific	 services,	 such	 as	 trash	 collection,	 without	that	 sector	 having	 to	 conduct	 its	 own	 in-dept	 evaluative	 analysis	 or	rely	 on	 less	 specific	 general	 data	 or	 non-systematic	 data	 (such	 as	
	 208	
resident	complaints).	Completed	MRP	are	shared	with	relevant	state	secretaries,	 for	 example	 the	 Municipal	 Housing	 Secretary	 (SMH)	 or	EMOP	 as	 planning	 tools.	 According	 to	 Rio+Social	 programme	 staff,	they	made	 a	 point	 of	 presenting	 the	MRP	 as	 a	 “diagnostic”	 not	 as	 a	sophisticated	list	of	“demands”	on	the	other	agencies.	Apparently	this	helped	 smooth	 relations	 across	 sectoral	 techno-bureaucracies	 that	resisted	the	initial	posture	of	UPP	Social	as	coordinating	ushers	within	the	state.	These	 technologies,	 or	 statecraft	 (Scott	 1998),	 are	 means	through	which	the	state	“sees”	or	“knows”	the	 favelas.	The	MRP	was	considered	 to	 hold	 special	 value	 because	 it	 allowed	 the	 state	 to	narrow	 in	 on	 exactly	 where	 and	 specifically	 how	 the	 state	 could	intervene	in	order	to	achieve	integration.	Aligned	with	the	UN	Habitat	vision	 of	 favela	 integration	 defined	 by	 equal	 provision	 of	 quality	services	 and	 guaranteed	 rights,	 La	 Rocque	 viewed	 the	 detailed	 GIS	maps	 layered	 with	 information	 as	 a	 systematic	 methodology	 to	measure	how	well	the	state	is	performing.	This	qualified	spatial	data	are	 “indicators	 of	 integration,”	 a	 type	 of	 roadmap	 that	 shows	where	the	 state	 needs	 to	 go	 in	 its	 quest	 to	 even	 out	 governance	 and	regulation	 throughout	 the	 city.	 La	 Rocque	 makes	 clear	 that	 while	Rio+Social	 had	 the	 explicit	 focus	 of	 [pacified]	 favelas,	 there	 is	 no	reason	why	this	model	should	not	be	scaled	up	to	all	favelas	of	the	city	and	scaled	out	to	non-favela	neighbourhoods.		Such	 statecraft	 makes	 favela	 spaces	 legible,	 reducing	 an	otherwise	“large	and	complex	reality”	into	a	“set	of	categories	that	will	facilitate	summary	descriptions,	comparisons,	and	aggregation”	(Scott	1998,	 77).	 Rio+Social’s	 quest	 to	 produce	 data	 and	 manage	“knowledge”	coincides	neatly	with	Scott’s	five	characteristics	of	state	simplifications	in	order	to	create	new	truths	through	aggregation	and	eventually	facilitate	“advanced	rule,”	that	is	changing	the	daily	habits	of	its	citizens:	(i)	interested,	utilitarian	facts	that	are	(ii)	documentary	
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(able	 to	 be	 represented	 through	 numbers	 or	 verbal	 category),	typically	(iii)	statistics	that	are	(iv)	aggregate	facts	about	systems	(e.g.	transportation	networks)	or	persons	(e.g.	employment	statistics),	and	that	 (v)	 are	 standardised,	 permitting	 collective	 and	 comparative	assessments	(Ibid.,	80).	The	MRP	and	 favela	Panoramas	are	material	products	 of	 favela-specialised	 knowledge	 fitting	 to	 Scott’s	 five	characteristics	in	order	to	simplify	the	“the	favela,”	a	categorical	form	of	 urbanity	 about	 which	 the	 state	 had	 limited	 “knowledge”	 and	minimal	 information	 sharing.	 When	 I	 interviewed	 La	 Rocque,	 she	confessed	that	the	work	was	“much	more	difficult	than	I	imagined,”	in	part	due	to	inter-sectoral	politics	and	in	part	because	the	favela	“is	a	very,	 super,	 hyper	 complex	 social	 fabric,	 and	 very	 politicised.”	 The	MRP	 and	 many	 of	 the	 diagnostic	 “products”	 of	 Rio+Social	 are	sophisticated	 technologies	 meant	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 complexity.	 The	MRP	presents	many	layers	of	data,	but	by	constructing	the	favela	as	a	
field	 of	 study	 where	 data	 is	 collected	 and	 categorised,	 the	 finished	product	abstracts	from	unnecessary	complexities	such	as	politics	and	competing	interests.	Rather	it	makes	the	favelas	legible	as	comparable	object-spaces	 in	which	 to	 intervene	with	 specific,	 evidence-informed	objectives.		 Rio+Mais	 Social	 data	 and	 “diagnostic”	 research	 are	 in	 clear	contrast	 to	 how	 data	 and	 “knowledge”	 were	 used	 prior	 to	 the	integration	paradigm.	Valladares	(2005)	documents	decades	of	official	data	being	used	to	justify	the	ideology	of	favela	eradication,	beginning	with	 the	 first	 Favela	 Census	 in	 1949.	 Had	 Rio+Social	 succeeded	 in	expanding	 its	 reach	 beyond	 pacified	 favelas	 and	 sustained	 the	institutional	methodology	specific	 to	 the	city’s	 favelas,	 it	would	have	constituted	 the	 first	 citywide	 systematic	 approach	 to	 creating	 a	clearing	 house	 of	 “favela	 knowledge”	 meant	 to	 facilitate	 better	provision	 of	 public	 services	 and	 inform	 local	 policies.	 For	 Scott,	 this	process	equates	to	“internal	colonialisation”,	with	statecraft	employed	
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to	 make	 populations	 and	 space	 neatly	 legible	 as	 a	 grand	 project	 of	utopian	unification	and	control.		 Beyond	 favela	 legibility	 and	 facilitating	 modern	 state	governance,	 the	 “qualified	 data”	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 producing	 the	favelas	 as	 territory.	 The	 strategies	 and	 techniques	 that	 UPP	Social/Rio+Social	 employees	 qualify	 as	 social	 technologies	 (Painter	2010;	 T.	 Mitchell	 1999)	 that	 produce	 a	 spatial	 continuity	 of	 state	governance	 within	 and	 throughout	 the	 favelas.	 An	 overt	 example	occurred	 in	 2014	 shortly	 before	 UPP	 Social	 was	 rebranded	 as	Rio+Social.	 For	many	weeks	 I	 had	 heard	 from	 contacts	 that	 a	 name	change	 was	 imminent	 but	 as	 it	 turns	 out	 the	 announcement	 was	delayed	 at	 the	 order	 of	 the	 Mayor,	 who	 wanted	 priority	 given	 to	number	 crunching	 and	 a	 systematised	presentation	 of	 data	 showing	how	much	money	the	municipal	government	had	invested	in	pacified	favelas.	 The	 information	 was	 touted	 at	 the	 news	 conference	announcing	 the	 name	 change	 and	 on	 a	 redesigned	 website	 of	Rio+Social	 with	 info-graphics	 boasting	 investment	 in	 health,	education,	urbanisation,	and	with	accompanying	information	detailing	how	 many	 schools	 were	 built,	 favelas	 urbanised	 and	 so	 on.	Additionally,	 an	 interactive	 map	 allowed	 users	 to	 explore	 the	investments	 and	 social	 infrastructure	 in	 each	of	 the	pacified	 favelas.	When	a	user	clicked	on	a	specific	“territory,”	a	detailed	map	could	be	downloaded	 that	 showed	 the	 limits	of	 the	pacifying	police	units	 and	the	 location	of	schools,	health	centres,	public	sporting	arenas,	public	assistance	offices	 among	other	public	 service	providers	 (see	Figures	6.2	and	6.3).	Thus	not	only	did	Rio+Social	employ	statecraft	to	render	the	 favelas	 visible	 to	 state	 bureaucracy	 but	 also	 it	 simultaneously	employed	 social	 technologies	 to	 make	 visible	 the	 benevolent	 state	within	the	favelas,	thus	begging	the	interpretation	that	the	favela	is	the	
city;	the	favela	is	governed	territory.			
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Figure	6.3	-	"Rio+Social,	discover	the	services"		
This	 navigable	 map	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 is	 the	 homepage	 of	
www.riomaissocial.org	(still	accessible	as	of	September	2016).	The	text	on	top	
of	 the	map	 reads:	 “Information	 about	 urbanisation,	 housing,	 schools,	 infant	
development	 spaces,	 family	 clinics,	 culture	 and	 leisure.	 The	 Rio+Social	 is	
present	in	all	of	the	communities	[favelas]	that	received	police	pacifying	units	
as	well	as	in	the	Complexo	da	Maré.	Explore	the	map	and	discover	the	services	
offered	 in	 these	 territories.”	Beneath	 the	map	are	 the	numerically	measured	
investments	 in	 the	 pacified	 favelas	 ($R2.1	 billion	 between	 2009	 and	 June	
2016),	 and	 subsequently	 categorised	 by	 education,	 family	 health	 coverage,	
Morar	Carioca,	and	mitigation	of	geotechnical	risk.					
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Figure	 6.4	 -	 "UPP	 Social,	 Public	 Infrastructure	 in	 the	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão”	
This	map	 is	 downloadable	 from	 the	 “Complexo	 do	 Alemão”	webpage	within	
the	 “Territories”	 tab	of	Rio+Social’s	website.	The	red	 line	demarcates	 the	15	
recognised	 favelas	 composing	 the	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão.	 The	 blue	 lines	
demarcate	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 four	 UPPs	 that	 patrol	 the	 Complexo.	 Schools,	
health	 centres,	 social	 assistance	 centres	 and	 other	 public	 direct	 service	
providers	 are	 marked	 by	 colour-coded	 dots	 throughout	 and	 within	 the	
immediate	vicinity	of	the	favelas.	
	
6.4	In-house	favela	consulting	firm	–	a	neoliberal	model?	Nearly	everyone	I	 interviewed	within	UPP	Social	 thought	that	after	moving	 from	the	State	 to	 the	Municipal	government	and	under	the	 charge	 of	 Eduarda	 La	 Rocque,	 the	 programme	 became	 less	political	 and	 more	 technocratic.	 However	 Lefebvre	 warns	 that	conceived	 space;	 that	 which	 is	 concerned	 primarily	 with	measurements,	 statistics,	 and	 technical	 drawings;	 often	 obscures	ideology.	 Furthermore	 international	 and	 government	 development	projects	 that	 approach	 poverty	 reduction	 and	 socioeconomic	development	 from	 self-proclaimed	 apolitical	 positions	 have	 been	shown	 to	 advance	 hegemonic	 politics	 and	 power	 relations,	 even	 if	they	 are	 less	 explicitly	 partisan	 (Ferguson	 1990).	 In	 this	 section	 I	
	 213	
critically	examine	 the	claims	of	a	depoliticised	Rio+Social.	 I	 consider	to	 what	 extent	 Rio+Social	 advanced	 neoliberal	 ideology	 under	 the	leadership	 of	 La	 Rocque;	 and	 I	 note	 that	 programme	 staff	 are	 well	aware	 of	 how	 their	 efficacy	 is	 limited	 or	 shaped	 by	 free	 market	ideology.		While	discussing	 the	 transformation	of	UPP	Social,	 one	of	my	interviewees	 inadvertently	 recognised	 that	 depoliticising	 the	programme	within	the	less	authoritative	IPP—a	state	office	La	Rocque	called	 “second	 tier”	 in	 comparison	 to	 her	 previous	 position	 at	 the	prominent	Secretary	of	Finance—dampened	the	ambitions	of	the	UPP	Social:	
I	think	the	most	significant	change	was	that	it	became	less	ambitious	
and	more	focussed.	As	far	as	initially,	the	idea	was	to	have	Unidades	
de	 Política	 Pública,	 to	 coordinate	 all	 the	 services	 in	 the	 favela.	 But	
that	requires	very	good	relations	with	the	other	departments,	which	
is	 almost	 impossible	 because	 of	 lots	 of	 politics	 and	 many	 other	
reasons.	 So	 now	 instead	 of	 trying	 to	 coordinate	 all	 of	 those	 other	
Secretaries,	the	idea	is	to	provide	other	Secretaries	with	information	
and	 consultancy	 and	 communication	 with	 social	 organisations;	
rather	 than	 going	 to	 them	 and	 saying,	 “Look,	 we	 have	 1000	
complaints	that	the	sewer	system	isn’t	working.	You	have	to	go	fix	the	
sewer	system.”		 (Peterson,	UPP	Social)	As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 Mayor’s	 PMDB	coalition	 had	 19	 total	 parties	 jockeying	 for	 position	 within	 the	governing	 apparatus	 (RJ	 State	 governing	 coalition	 had	 15	 parties).	Competition	 to	maintain	visibility	 and	achieve	 successes	 that	 can	be	touted	in	the	next	campaign	season	is	fierce.	Historically	the	IPP	was	never	 a	 prominent	 department.	 It	 does	 not	 have	 the	 standing	 of	 a	Secretary,	 but	 rather	 an	 institute	 that	 answers	 to	 the	 Casa	 Civil	(Mayor’s	 Office)	 but	 speaks	 with	 none	 of	 its	 authority.	 One	 IPP	employee	mentioned	to	me	that	UPP	Social	had	such	difficulty	trying	
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to	coordinate	the	other	municipal	Secretaries	that	the	Mayor’s	Office	had	to	make	a	round	of	calls,	on	two	different	occasions,	insisting	that	UPP	 Social’s	 counterparts	 return	 phone	 calls	 and	 emails,	 hand	 over	requested	data,	and	show	up	for	inter-sectoral	meetings.		La	 Rocque	 responded	 astutely.	 Recognising	 she	 lacked	 the	authority	 to	 command	 the	 attention	 or	 the	 activities	 of	 other	departments,	 she	 returned	 to	 the	 “core	 business”	 of	 the	 IPP,	 data	management,	and	re-imagined	the	role	of	UPP	Social.	Below	I	excerpt	part	 of	 my	 interview	 with	 La	 Rocque	 when	 she	 explains	 how	 her	history	 in	 finance	 and	 running	 a	 risk	 management-consulting	 firm	influenced	her	then	current	project	in	the	public	sector:		
La	 Rocque:	 These	 days	 I	 see	 the	 IPP	 as	 a	 consulting	 company,	 so	 I	
bring	that	notion	to	the	people	who	work	here.	
Tucker:	In	this	context	the	clients	are	the	other	state	organs?	
La	Rocque:	We	have	numerous	clients,	principally	other	organs	of	the	
municipal	 government.	 We	 are	 kind	 of	 like…our	 business,	 our	
product,	 is	 information—qualified	 information	and	articulation.	 So,	
our	 clients	 are	 the	 service	 providing	 Secretaries	 [Secretarias	
finalísticas],	which	provide	municipal	 government	 services,	 but	 also	
the	 favela	 residents—principally	 of	 the	 favela	 but	 also	 residents	 of	
the	city	as	a	whole,	because	we	have	that	 focus	 in	Rio+Social,	yeah?	
So	 the	 favelas	 are	also	 our	 clients	 as	much	as	 the	 service	 providers	
and	 the	 private	 sector.	 We	 produce,	 we	 have	 a	 significant	 asset	
[ativo],	which	is	knowledge	of	Rio:	the	whole	cartographic	base,	all	of	
the	 information	 and	 data,	 social	 indicators	 on	 demographics,	
populations,	urban	conditions	etc…		For	 La	 Rocque	 reimagining	 Rio+Social	 and	 the	 IPP	 as	 a	consulting	firm	additionally	depoliticises	the	work,	for	the	other	state	offices	 and	 Secretaries	 are	 not	 competitors	 but	 clients;	 and	 rather	than	coordinating	the	actions	and	delegating	responsibilities	to	other	departments,	 they	 would	 provide	 them	 with	 products	 (“qualified”	
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data)	 and	 services	 (consulting	 expertise)	 in	 the	 case	 they	wanted	 to	improve	 performance.	 Critical	 readers	 will	 have	 already	 detected	 a	neoliberal	ideology	within	the	revamped	Rio+Social	under	La	Rocque.	Her	bold	embrace	of	market-speak	is	unsurprising	given	her	14	years	of	work	in	the	financial	sector	prior	to	entering	government.61	Indeed	she	 resists	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 state,	 insisting	 that	 she	 is	 a	 “non-governmental	 individual”	 (indivíduo	 não	 govermental,	 ING);	 and	when	pressed—she	 is	 after	 all	 the	head	of	 a	 government	 institute—she	 concedes	 that	 she	 is	 temporarily	 of	 the	 state	 and	 purposefully	mismatched	the	Portuguese	verb	to	be—“eu	estou	do	estado,	não	sou	do	 estado”—to	 emphasise	 that	 she	 is	 simply	 ‘passing	 through’	 and	does	not	plan	on	a	long	career	as	part	of	the	state.		Beyond	 the	 discursive	 reconceptualisation	 of	 Rio+Social’s	work,	 there	 are	 additional	 concrete	 practices	 and	 proposals	 that	suggest	 the	 programme	 advances	 neoliberal	 ideology	 while	 fleeing																																																									61	 La	 Rocque’s	 personal	 narrative	 of	 why	 she	 entered	 government	 was	 briefly	mentioned	 in	 Chapter	 5.	 At	 a	 speech	 delivered	 at	 an	 elite	 networking	NGO	 called	MOVERio,	she	told	the	audience	how	she	was	never	motivated	by	money	and	did	not	relate	 to	 her	 colleagues	 and	 others	 in	 her	 social	 circle	 who	measured	 success	 by	levels	 of	 conspicuous	 consumption.	 While	 she	 possesses	 a	 PhD	 in	 economics,	 La	Rocque	 did	 not	 feel	 that	 academia	 was	 sufficiently	 hands-on,	 and	 eventually	 she	became	interested	in	public	service	to	improve	Rio	de	Janeiro,	her	adopted	city.	Due	to	 her	 privileged	 social	 position,	 she	 was	 well	 connected	 with	 political	 and	government	 elites	 and	 eventually	was	 invited	 to	 serve	 as	 Secretary	of	 Finance	 for	the	municipal	government.	She	accepted	on	the	condition	that	she	would	not	have	to	participate	in	party	campaign	activities—she	insists	she	has	no	political	ambitions.	While	 serving	as	Secretary	of	Finance	 she	was	 interested	 in	how	 to	use	Municipal	money	to	stimulate	sustainable	development	and	a	more	equitable	city.	She	sought	out	Henriques	and	Zacchi	from	UPP	Social’s	beginning	to	explore	collaboration.	She	says	employees	within	the	Secretary	of	Finance	would	poke	fun	of	her	and	joke	that	“she	 likes	 the	 poor.”	According	 to	 La	Rocque,	when	Henriques	 left	 the	 IPP,	Mayor	Paes	 offered	 her	 the	 job	 knowing	 that	 she	was	 interested	 in	 social	 programming.	Her	 departure	 from	 one	 of	 the	most	 powerful	 Secretaries	 to	 an	 obscure	 institute	reportedly	raised	eyebrows,	however	she	asserts	that	she	has	no	regrets.	La	Rocque	left	the	IPP	before	Rio+Social	was	defunded	in	order	to	head	O	Pacto	do	Rio	(The	Rio	Pact)	 which	 is	 a	 similar	 model	 of	 articulation	 between	 government,	 private	 for-profit	 corporations,	 and	 civil	 society	 (NGOs	 and	 academia)	 meant	 to	 encourage	“sustainable	development”	and	greater	equality	 in	 the	metropolitan	area	of	Rio	de	Janeiro.	By	design	the	Pact	blurs	the	boundaries	of	the	state	to	the	point	it	is	difficult	to	 understand	 exactly	 how	 the	 initiative	 is	 structured.	 La	 Rocque	 continues	 to	operate	within	 the	municipal	government,	however	 the	Pact	has	 launched	both	an	NGO	and	a	business	to	liaise	with	civil	society	and	the	private	sector.		
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from	 partisan	 politics.	 Most	 immediately,	 the	 labour	 of	 UPP	 Social	employees	 is	 far	more	precarious	 than	public	 employees,	 since	 they	are	 hired	 and	 paid	 by	 the	 UN	Habitat	 office	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 even	though	 the	 financing	 comes	 from	 the	 municipal	 government.	According	 to	 the	 UN	Habitat’s	 country	 director,	 this	 arrangement	 is	neither	 uncommon	 for	 UN	 Habitat	 nor	 unique	 within	 the	 Brazilian	state	 apparatus	 when	 creating	 a	 new	 governance	 project	 with	 an	uncertain	 future.	 As	 such,	 employees	 do	 not	 benefit	 from	 collective	representation,	do	not	receive	the	same	workers	rights	as	permanent	state	 employees,	 and	 were	 not	 hired	 according	 to	 a	 standardised	meritocratic	selection	process	(concursso	público)	but	rather	through	UN	Habitat’s	established	sub-contracting	process.	A	 less	 structural	 but	more	 prominent	 example	 that	 produces	material	 results	 in	 the	 favela	 are	 public-private-partnerships,	 an	operational	model	La	Rocque	aggressively	pursues.	When	I	asked	her	what	advantages	or	risks	she	saw	with	PPPs	she	quickly	corrected	me:			
Tucker:	Can	you	talk	to	me	a	bit	about	PPPs?	What	is	the	purpose	of	
partnering	 with	 the	 private	 sector	 in	 the	 favelas?	 What	 are	 the	
advantages	or	the	risks,	and	what	sorts	of	PPPs	do	you	pursue?	
La	 Rocque:	 “Ah,	 well,	 we	 have	 public-private-participatory-
partnerships,	yeah?	They	have	to	be	participatory.	
Tucker:	OK,	PPPPs…	
La	 Rocque:	 Yeah,	 it’s	 a	 PPPP.	 Because	 it	 has	 to	 originate,	 be	 built	
together	with	 participation	 from	 the	 community,	 right?	 As	 it	 is,	we	
don’t	see	the	traditional	sort	of	PPP	because	we	generally	work	with	
the	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 areas	 of	 the	 businesses.	 The	
majority	are	initiatives	of	businesses	that	want	to	enter	that	market	
with	 profit	 objectives	 and	 then	 they	 will	 revert	 some	 part	 [of	 the	
profits]	back	to	the	community.			La	Rocque	clearly	believes	that	private	sector	participation	is	integral	to	favela	integration.	Of	course	the	favelas	already	bustle	with	private	
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business,	 but	 they	 happen	 to	 be	 small	 independent	 businesses	 that	have	operated	unregulated	for	years	or	event	decades.	UPP	Social	has	not	 ignored	 small	 business	 owners—in	 fact	 they	 have	 run	 pilot	projects	to	support	and	stimulate	local	entrepreneurs.	But	the	sort	of	partnerships	 that	 La	 Rocque	 covets	 is	 significant	 investment	 from	large	 corporations	 or	 consortiums	 in	 collaboration	 with	 the	government	 in	 order	 to	 jump-start	 “sustainable”	 economic	development.	To	date,	 interest	 from	the	private	sector	appears	to	be	lacking	 and	 the	 favelas	 are	 viewed	 by	 La	 Rocque	 as	 a	 marketing	opportunity	 for	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 (CSR).	 Rio+Social	obliges,	 and	 positions	 itself	 as	 an	 authoritative	 interlocutor	 for	 CSR	departments	looking	to	“give	back”	to	the	favela	communities.	One	of	the	major	 beneficiaries	 of	 favela	 pacification	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 is	the	 electric	 company	 Light,	 which	 operates	 a	 state-sanctioned	monopoly.	 As	 noted	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 once	 the	 police	pacification	 process	 begins,	 “services	 are	 regularised,”	meaning	 that	residents	 have	 to	pay	 for	 their	 electricity,	without	 public	 subsidy	or	credit,	 post	 pacification.	 It	 makes	 good	 business	 sense	 that	 Light	would	 feel	a	“social	responsibility”	 to	 invest	 in	pacified	 favelas	given	how	much	it	stands	to	profit	from	their	pacification.			
For	 example	 you	 have	 the	 project	 of	 Light,	 which	 is	 a	 private	
company,	 that	 came	 to	 us	 and	 said,	 “We	 would	 like	 your	 help	 to	
spend	 some	 funding	 that	 we	 have	 earmarked	 to	 renovate	 sporting	
areas	 in	pacified	areas.”	The	 [UPP	Social]	 fieldworkers	had	mapped	
all	 of	 them.	 So	 we	 have	 that	 product—the	mapping	 of	 all	 the	 ball	
courts,	 plazas,	 and	 leisure	 spaces	 in	 all	 of	 the	 pacified	 favelas—all	
mapped	out.	We	took	that	to	Light,	and	the	field	team,	together	with	
Light	and	community	 leaders,	 thought	about	which	spaces	were	the	
best	spaces	to	renovate.	Because	[The	Complexo	do]	Alemão	doesn’t	
just	have	two	courts,	yeah?	It	has	thousands.	So	they	thought	which	
areas	 should	 be	 prioritised,	 which	 would	 have	 the	 biggest	 impact?	
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[…]	After	that,	Light	wanted	to	hire	a	“cultural	mobiliser”	from	there	
to	run	cultural	and	sporting	programming.	They	wanted	to	advertise	
[for	 the	 position]	within	 all	 the	 institutions	 there,	which	 is	 another	
product	that	the	Territorial	Management	has:	the	mapping	of	all	the	
NGOs	and	community	organisations	in	the	favelas,	including	even	the	
local	“auntie”	that	runs	a	daycare	and	library	in	her	home	and	offers	
after-school	help.	It’s	all	mapped.		
(Bruna,	Territorial	Management,	Rio+Social)		Examining	 favela	 upgrading,	 demolition	 and	 resettlement	projects	 in	 Recife,	 Nuijten	 and	 colleagues	 argue	 that	 neoliberalism	“manifests	 in	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 state,	 private	 companies	 and	 citizens	together	 are	 responsible	 for	 (re)constructing	 urban	 space”	 (2012,	157).	Implemented	by	a	progressive	municipal	government	according	to	 participatory	 principles,	 the	 authors	 argue	 that	 such	 projects	 are	one	 example	 of	 “actually	 existing	 neoliberalism”	 (Brenner	 and	Theodore	2002)	under	 a	 leftist	 government	 in	 the	 global	 south.	The	so-called	 PPPPs	 of	 Rio+Social	 also	 speak	 to	 the	 neoliberal	 co-production	of	 favela	 space,	 state	 intervention,	 and	 favela	 integration	as	 occurring	 by	 residents,	 private	 industry	 and	 the	 state	 as	 equal	partners	in	harmony.	While	the	Nuijten	and	colleagues	conducted	an	ethnography	within	a	specific	favela	experiencing	a	state	intervention	and	major	housing	and	urban	infrastructure	investments	(see	Koster	and	 Nuijten	 2012;	 Koster	 2009),	 this	 thesis	 demonstrates	 how	 the	state	 operates	 with	 the	 same	 ideology	 from	 a	 centralised	 position	managing	data	and	cultivating	and	 facilitating	 relationships	between	dissimilar	actors	(for-profit	companies	and	 local	community	 leaders;	school	children,	NGOs,	and	street	traffic	officials).		Given	 these	 points,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 Rio+Social	 corresponds	 to	Rio	 de	 Janeiro’s	 modern	 history	 of	 neoliberal	 development	 and	business-like	 public	 administration	 (Compans	 2004).	 Nonetheless	 I	stop	 short	 of	 concurring	 with	 scholars	 who	 paint	 the	 programme	
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(often	 misrepresenting	 it	 as	 the	 final	 phase	 of	 pacification)	 as	 a	neoliberal	 agent	 facilitating	 accumulation	 through	 dispossession	 as	part	 of	 mega-event	 planning	 strategies	 (Rekow	 2016;	 Poets	 2015;	Prouse	2013;	 Saborio	2013).	Rather	 I	 posit	 that	 the	programme	 sits	rather	 awkwardly	 as	 a	 reformist	 coping	 mechanism	 to	 the	militarisation	 of	 favela	 space.	 Below	 I	 give	 an	 example	 of	 this	positionality	in	the	context	of	favela	gentrification.		As	 UPPs	 spread	 to	 favelas	 around	 the	 South	 Zone,	 urbanists	and	 activists	 began	 debating	 gentrification.	 This	 narrative	 of	 pricing	out	renters	in	the	favelas	was	introduced	and	pushed	to	the	forefront	of	 public	 debate	 by	 foreign	 academics	 and	 visiting	 journalists	 and	graduate	 students	 working	 closely	 with	 Teresa	 Williamson	 of	Catalytic	Communities,	the	NGO	who	publishes	the	watchdog	website	
Rio	 On	 Watch.	 For	 decades	 the	 favelas	 were	 viewed	 as	 evidence	against	the	forces	of	gentrification,62	but	as	house	prices	skyrocketed	in	the	city	and	favelas	underwent	pacification	and	urbanisation,	many	researchers	 and	 critical	 academics	 began	 arguing	 that	 gentrification	had	taken	hold	in	the	favelas	(Frischtak	and	Mandel	2012;	Cummings	2013;	Sánchez	and	Broudehoux	2013).	During	 fieldwork	 I	 would	 broach	 the	 topic	 of	 gentrification	during	interviews	with	various	state	actors	involved	in	implementing	interventions	 of	 integration.	When	 I	 ask	 if	 they	were	worried	 about	how	the	various	infrastructure	upgrades	and	police	pacification	might	affect	 rental	 prices	 and	 gentrification,	 most	 shrugged,	 not	 out	 of	carelessness	 but	 helplessness.	 Some	 said	 they	 were	 aware	 of	 the	debates,	 but	 outside	 of	 the	 privileged,	 relatively	 small	 favelas	 in	 the	South	 Zone,	 they	 were	 unaware	 of	 actual	 data	 documenting	 favela	gentrification.	 My	 objective	 here	 is	 not	 to	 wade	 into	 the	 debate																																																									62	 I	 recall	 a	 professor	 of	 geography	 at	 UFRJ	 advising	 a	 master’s	 student	 in	 2010	against	 writing	 about	 the	 threat	 of	 gentrification	 in	 the	 Porta	 Maravilha	redevelopment	 scheme	 because,	 “gentrification	 is	 something	 that	 happens	 in	Europe	and	United	States—it	isn’t	an	issue	here.”	
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regarding	gentrification,	but	rather	to	highlight	the	critical	reflexivity	of	 many	 state	 actors.	 In	 early	 2014	 I	 was	 accompanying	 a	 senior	employee	 of	 IPP	 to	 a	 university	 where	 he	 gave	 a	 guest	 lecture	 to	graduate	class	on	urban	planning.	On	our	way	we	discussed	work,	the	protests,	and	urban	politics.	I	told	him	about	the	debates	I	attended	in	Vidigal	(discussed	in	Chapter	5)	and	how	about	how	a	radical	activist	from	 Favela	 Não	 Se	 Cala	 called	 the	 programmes	Morar	 Carioca	 and	PAC-favelas	 “state	 agents	 of	 gentrification.”	 I	 asked	 him	 if	 he	 was	worried	 that	 the	 interventions	meant	 to	 integrate	 the	 favelas	would	end	 up	 forcing	 out	 the	 poorest	 residents.	 He	 responded	 slightly	exasperated:	 “And	what?	What	 are	we	 doing	 to	 do?	 Should	we	 stop	urbanising	 the	 favelas?”	 He	 pointed	 out	 that	 technocrats	 such	 as	himself	 and	 those	 running	 favela	 urbanisation	 programmes	 have	 no	power	 over	 the	 housing	 market	 and	 argued	 that	 the	 debate	 must	happen	 at	 a	 broader	 political	 level.	 The	 point	 of	 contesting	gentrification	 should	 not	 be	Morar	 Carioca,	 he	 insisted,	 but	 rather	public	 policies	 that	 regulate	 and	 encourage	 the	 private	 housing	market.	Until	there	is	an	option	for	urbanists	to	design	interventions	that	 could	 be	 protected	 form	 private	 real	 estate	 interests	 his	 hands	are	tied.		This	example	of	a	state	agent	of	favela	integration	recognising	how	neoliberal	market	relations	shape	and	limit	the	strategies	that	he	and	others	design	and	implement	was	not	rare	during	my	fieldwork.	Especially	 within	 the	 IPP	 I	 became	 close	 enough	 with	 some	 of	Rio+Social’s	employees	to	share	my	forming	critique	of	the	neoliberal	aspects	of	the	programme.	I	mentioned	that	La	Rocque’s	background	in	finance	capital	seemed	to	influence	how	she	pursued	partnerships	with	private	industry,	and	how	she	viewed	the	IPP	as	serving	“clients”	akin	 to	 a	 consulting	 firm.	 On	 such	 occasions,	 these	 employees	acknowledged	the	critique	but	suggested	that	La	Rocque	was	more	of	a	sheep	 in	wolf’s	clothing.	One	contact	 joked	that	his	mission	was	 to	
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show	that	she	is	less	of	a	fan	of	the	neoliberal	market	than	she	herself	believed,	and	in	my	interview	with	La	Rocque	she	confessed	that	she	“used	 to	be	a	 lot	more	radical”	 in	her	belief	of	 free	market	solutions	prior	to	taking	over	the	IPP	and	Rio+Social.	This	 suggests	 that	 while	 programmes	 such	 as	 UPP	Social/Rio+Social	 do	 operate	 in	 “actually	 existing	 neoliberal”	governing	 apparatuses,	 many	 of	 the	 state	 actors	 charged	 with	implementation	 are	 neither	 ignorant	 nor	 villains.	 Rather	 they	recognise	how	their	actions	are	limited	and	reproductive	of	neoliberal	market	ideology,	and	some	may	even	try	to	contest	such	forces.	While	the	 technical	 strategies	 used	 to	 collect	 data	 and	produce	 knowledge	and	 statistics	 obscure	 ideology,	 it	 need	 not	 only	 serve	 hegemonic	ideology.	The	original	conception	of	UPP	Social	could	be	seen	as	a	type	of	 Trojan	 horse	 attempting	 to	 carve	 out	 a	 space	 for	 popular	participation	 within	 the	 public	 security	 and	 governance	 apparatus.	While	 defeated	 and	 relegated	 to	 the	 technical	 department	 IPP,	 the	programme	 maintained	 progressive	 discourse	 and	 objectives	 while	insisting	 that	 its	 new	 technical	 approach	 in	 partnership	 with	 UN	Habitat	depoliticised	its	nature.	While	the	data	and	social	technologies	serve	 state	 objectives	 of	 deeper	 knowledge	 and	 greater	 control,	reformist	technocrats	and	civil	society	actors	use	the	same	technology	and	 data	 to	 pressure	 the	 government	 to	 provide	 better	 quality	education,	 health,	 and	 urban	 services,	 for	 which	 exist	 legitimate	citizen	demand.	
6.5	Conclusions		While	 many	 scholars	 have	 considered	 favela	 pacification	through	 the	 lens	 of	 military	 counter-insurgent	 tactics	 in	 order	 to	wrest	control	of	the	favelas	away	from	drug-trafficking	gangs	(Larkins	2015,	 Gaffney	 2012,	 Freeman	 2014)	 this	 chapter	 details	 the	 less	considered	 yet	 equally	 pivotal	 state	 spatiality	 of	 governance	 if	 the	
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statement,	a	favela	é	cidade	is	to	be	fully	realised	and	sustained.	I	have	argued	 that	 UPP	 Social	 was	 designed	 to	 address	 the	 fragmented	sectoral	 governance	 that	 for	 decades	 have	 characterised	 the	 state’s	presence	 in	 the	 favelas,	 that	 perverse	 paradox	 of	 uncoordinated	presence	 of	 the	 state	 noted	 by	 the	 programme's	 originators.	 The	technocratic	 transformation	 of	 UPP	 Social	 into	 Rio+Social	 operated	social	technologies	associated	with	urban	planning	and	contemporary	(neoliberal)	 governance	 constructed	 the	 favelas	 as	 governable	spaces—that	 is	 to	 say	 knowable,	 measurable	 and	 subject	 to	systematic	 bureaucratic	 service	 provision—and	 therefore	 ready	 for	intervention	 and	 capable	 of	 integration.	 Additionally,	 and	contradictorily,	 those	 same	 technologies	 produced	 data	 products	meant	to	convince	residents	that	the	favelas	are	indeed	governed,	that	the	state	 is	present	and	providing	health	and	education	services	and	continues	 to	 invest	 in	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 well	 being	 of	 favela	residents.		I	 also	 discussed	 Rio+Social’s	 production	 of	 state/official	knowledge	of	 the	 favelas	 and	evidence-based	expertise	 as	obscuring	politics	while	 advancing	 neoliberal	 interests	 and	 state	 power.	While	Rio+Social	 is	 subject	 to	 and	 reproductive	 of	 neoliberal	 political	relations	in	some	form,	I	caution	against	dismissing	the	programme	as	an	agent	of	neoliberalism.	Given	that	“actually	existing	neoliberalism”	allows	for	local	mutation	and	contradictions,	I	offered	a	more	nuanced	analysis	and	highlighted	what	I	consider	both	internal	reflexivity	and	contestation	within	the	state.	The	programme’s	progressive	goals	and	employees	are	reflexive	and	critical	of	how	they	are	restrained	by	the	hegemonic	structural	conditions	of	the	governing	apparatus.		The	 present	 chapter	 examined	 how	 the	 state	 seeks	 to	territorialise	favelas	through	technocratic	strategies	of	data	collecting,	statistics	 and	 mapping.	 The	 subsequent	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 more	significant	material	 interventions—large-scale	housing	and	transport	
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infrastructure	in	some	of	the	largest,	most	iconic,	and	most	infamous	favelas	of	Rio	de	Janeiro.				
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Chapter	7	–	Favela	Integration	and	the	Territory	
Effect	
	
		 This	 chapter	 analyses	 the	 last	 of	 the	 three	 major	 state	interventions:	the	Accelerated	Growth	Programme,	or	PAC-favelas.	In	Chapter	5	I	argued	that	“favela	integration”	constitutes	a	paradigm	of	urban	 governance	 and	 planning	 meant	 to	 address	 the	 historic	bifurcation	of	urban	space.	Through	the	construction	of	a	 landscape-mobilities	 analysis,	 I	 demonstrated	 that	 “favela-integration,”	 and	 in	turn	 the	 “integrated	 city,”	 relies	 on	 the	 facilitation	 and	 regulation	of	flows	in,	out,	and	within	targeted	favelas.	I	argued	that	the	hegemonic	discourse	 of	 landscape,	 the	 integrated	 city,	 obscures	 how	 state	interventions	reproduce	power	dynamics	that	historically	segregated	Rio	de	Janeiro.	In	Chapter	6	I	argued	that	the	acceptance	of	favelas	as	legitimate	 urban	 space	 are	 subsequently	 constructed	 as	 governable	spaces	 through	 the	 production	 of	 spatial	 expertise.	 Tracing	 the	relatively	 short-lived	 programme	 of	 UPP	 Social/Rio+Social,	 I	demonstrated	 how	 an	 intervention	 originally	 conceived	 as	 political	and	 participatory	 was	 reshaped	 to	 produce	 seemingly	 apolitical	technocratic	 knowledge	 meant	 to	 facilitate	 interventions	 into	 the	favelas	as	object-spaces	for	development	and	social	inclusion.	I	argued	that	this	favela-specific	knowledge,	produced	through	descriptive	and	inferential	quantitative	and	qualitative	data,	serves	favela	integration	in	two	connected	functions:	first	as	a	technocratic	lens	through	which	the	state	sees	 the	 favelas	as	objects	needing	 intervention	and	second	as	 the	 effectuation	 of	 territory.	 For	 Painter	 (2010),	 building	 on	Mitchell	 (1999),	 territory-as-effect	 is	produced	 through	 the	 constant	workings	 of	 socio-technical	 practices	 that	 maintain	 the	 illusion	 of	
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sovereign	 governance	 operating	 evenly	 throughout	 space.	 However,	Painter	writes	from	a	context	in	which	state	territory	is	undisputed.			 The	objective	of	this	chapter	 is	to	demonstrate	how	territory	is	effectuated	 at	 the	 urban	 scale	 specifically	 in	 relation	 to	 favelas	 as	contested	 spaces;	 pockets	 of	 the	 city	 that	 are	 understood	 as	 lost	 or	abandoned,	 outside	 of	 daily	 governance.	 The	 chapter	 supports	 the	claim	 that	 favela	 integration	 is	 a	 state	 spatial	 project	 of	 territory	realised	 through	 place-specific	 interventions	 that	 serve	 spatial	objectives	 of	 municipal,	 state-province,	 and	 national	 governments	alike.	While	the	previous	chapter	focused	on	socio-technical	practices	concerned	 principally	with	 data,	 visual	 knowledge,	 and	 institutional	planning	 and	 partnerships,	 this	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 large-scale	material	 interventions	 in	 housing,	 sanitation,	 transportation	 and	social	 infrastructure.	Whereas	 Painter,	 following	 his	 theory	 on	 state	
prosaics,	exemplifies	how	the	products	of	specialised	technical	labour	of	 state	 actors—policy	 strategies	 and	 reviews,	 statistics	 and	mappings,	 and	 modelling	 and	 economic	 target	 goals—produces	 the	“effects	 of	 contiguity,	 continuity	 and	 boundedness”	 (Painter	 2010,	1103),	 I	argue	 that	 the	effectuation	of	 territory	 in	cases	of	contested	urban	 space	 such	 as	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 between	 the	 so-called	 informal	housing	 settlements	 and	 formal	 city,	 additionally	 relies	 on	 socio-technical	practices	that	are	spectacular	and	exceptional.			 The	 chapter	 is	 structured	 into	 seven	 sections.	 Section	 7.1	reviews	 the	 structure	 and	 significance	 of	 PAC,	 and	 details	 how	 the	programme	invested	in	large-scale	favela	urbanisation	projects	in	Rio	and	explore	the	political-spatial	objectives	of	the	federal	government	investing	 in	 local	 favelas.	 Section	 7.2	 engages	 with	 literature	considering	the	scaling	of	statehood	and	state	space	under	neoliberal	governance.	 In	 addition	 to	 noting	 Klink’s	 claim	 that	 PAC	 signifies	 a	“rolling	 out”	 of	 the	 developmental	 state	 at	 the	 national	 scale	 in	contrast	 to	 neoliberal	 Europe,	 I	 argue	 that	 PAC-favelas	 represents	 a	
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‘rolling	 in’	 of	 state	 sovereignty	 into	 areas	 previously	 considered	‘outside’	 of	 state	 control.	 I	 continue	 this	 argument	 in	 Section	 7.3	where	I	use	PAC-favelas	in	the	Complexo	do	Alemão	as	an	example	of	the	state	 reclaiming	 the	 ‘lost’	 territories	of	 the	 favelas.	 I	 then	offer	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	flagship	project	of	PAC-favelas	in	Alemão,	the	Teleférico	 first	 described	 in	 Chapter	 5.	 Section	 7.4	 reviews	 how	 the	project	 largely	 failed	 to	achieve	 its	explicit	objectives,	but	succeeded	in	 producing	 regulated	 and	 controlled	 space	 useful	 to	 the	 state’s	broader	 objectives	 of	 territory.	 I	 then	 offer	 an	 example	 of	 how	 the	infrastructure	 provided	 opportunity	 for	 continued	 electoral	 gain	when	the	gang	reasserted	its	spatial	claims	and	reportedly	barred	the	Governor	from	campaigning	within	the	Complexo	do	Alemão.	Finally	I	‘make	room’	for	an	explicitly	feminist	analysis	of	favela	integration	in	7.6.	 While	 exploratory	 in	 nature,	 I	 document	 the	 gendering	 of	 the	“social”	 side	 of	 favela	 integration	 as	 both	 feminine	 and	 devalued.	 I	further	 argue	 that	 the	 state	 practices	 territory	 in	 the	 favelas	with	 a	paternalist	 quality,	 protecting	 and	 helping	 the	weak	 and	 vulnerable	(women,	 children,	 elderly	 and	 sick)	 while	 policing	 and	 punishing	those	 bodies	 deemed	 as	 threatening	 and	 “marginal.”	 I	 close	 the	chapter	in	7.7	with	a	summary	of	the	principal	claims.			
7.1	Federal	investments	in	local	favelas		 Until	 now	 this	 thesis	 has	 examined	 favela	 integration	exclusively	 through	 projects	 implemented	 by	 the	 municipal	 or	 the	state-province	 governments	 within	 the	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 municipal	area.63	 The	 bulk	 of	 data	 examined	 in	 this	 chapter	 relates	 to	 a	wide-																																																								63	Favela	Pacification	 through	 the	UPP	units	 is	a	borderline	exception	given	 that	 it	falls	 under	 the	 guise	 of	 the	 State	 Secretary	 of	 Security	which	 had	 drawn	 plans	 to	deploy	 the	 UPP	 in	 favelas	 outside	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 municipality,	 but	 at	 time	 of	writing	had	not	implemented	those	plans.	The	fact	that	no	favelas	outside	of	the	city	have	been	“pacified”	may	support	claims	that	UPP	is	exceptional	to	Rio	de	Janeiro	as	an	 Olympic	 City	 or	 that	 the	 programme	 has	 not	 sustained	 the	 desired	 results.	
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reaching	 federal	 programme	 that	 designed	 and	 implemented	 local	interventions	 in	 Rio’s	 favelas	 in	 coordination	 with	 the	 state	government.	While	the	focus	of	my	analysis	 is	explicitly	at	the	urban	scale,	one	of	the	findings	of	this	research	is	that	the	programmes	and	interventions	 that	 make	 up	 favela	 integration	 serve	 territorial	 and	state	 spatial	 strategies	beyond	 the	 local	 and	municipal	 scales.	As	we	see	 in	 this	 chapter,	 PAC-favelas	 was	 instigated	 by	 the	 federal	government,	 originally	 envisioned	 by	 local	 ‘favela	 experts’	 and	urbanists,	and	managed	by	the	state-province	government.			 This	section	outlines	the	structure	of	PAC	as	a	national	spatial	economic	 strategy	 as	 well	 as	 the	 origins	 of	 PAC-favelas	 and	interventions	in	Rio	de	Janeiro.	Relying	on	government	texts,	existing	academic	 literature,	 and	 interviews,	 the	 immediate	 objective	 is	 to	demonstrate	how	the	 interventions	benefit	 the	 territorial	projects	of	the	city,	state,	and	national	governments.	I	rely	on	this	data	to	engage	with	 literature	 concerning	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 state	 space,	 the	rescaling	 of	 the	 state	 through	 urban	 development	 strategies	 and	 in	particular	 Brenner’s	 argument	 (2004)	 that	 under	 global	 neoliberal	capitalism	we	have	witnessed	a	rescaling	of	the	state	from	the	federal	to	 the	 urban	 scale	 and	 a	 reconfiguration	 of	 socio-spatial	 economics	from	spatial	Keynesianism	to	competitive	urbanism.		 The	Programa	 de	 Aceleração	 do	 Crescimento	 (Programme	 for	Growth	 Acceleration),	 or	 PAC,	 was	 a	 federal	 stimulus	 package	designed	by	the	government	of	Lula	in	2007	with	a	three-year	budget	of	 slightly	 more	 than	 R$500	 billion	 (roughly	 US$277	 billion	 at	historical	 exchange	 rates).	 At	 the	 time,	 Brazil	 was	 cash-rich	 after	experiencing	 sustained	 economic	 growth	 due	 to	 the	 worldwide	commodities	 boom,	 the	 discovery	 of	 immense	 oil	 reserves	 off	 the																																																									However	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 it	 has	 not	 expanded	 beyond	 the	municipality	 due	 to	 the	concomitant	economic	recession,	fiscal	and	political	crises	that	have	hit	the	state	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	with	particular	force.	
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coast	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro	state,	and	 foreign	 investment	associated	with	the	so-called	BRIC	phenomenon	(The	Economist	2009).	Indeed	foreign	investment	in	Brazil	reached	a	point	that	national	authorities	became	concerned	 that	 the	 economy	 would	 “overheat”	 and	 thus	 increased	taxes	on	incoming	capital	flows	to	stave	off	further	appreciation	of	the	Real	 against	 the	 US	 Dollar	 (Pearson	 2011;	 Wheatley	 and	 Beattie	2009).	When	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 hit	 in	 2008,	 Brazil	 remained	insulated	 in	 part	 due	 to	 high	 government	 spending	 associated	 with	PAC	 and	 extension	 of	 social	 welfare	 programmes	 such	 as	 the	conditional	 cash-transfer	 programme	 Bolsa	 Familia	 and	 the	subsidized	 housing	 financing	 mechanism	 Minha	 Casa	 Minha	 Vida	(MCMV)	 (Madrid	 2012).	 In	 official	 government	 reviews,	 the	 PAC	 is	presented	as	a	successful	national	economic	strategy	during	a	global	economic	recession.64		 The	 first	 four	 years	 of	 PAC	 (2007-2010)	 focussed	 principally	on	 large	 infrastructure	projects:	 energy	 facilities,	highways,	 airports,	shipping	 ports,	 bridges—high-impact,	 labour-intensive	 projects	meant	to	facilitate	long	term	private	investment	and	mobility	of	goods	and	capital	while	immediately	putting	thousands	to	work.	The	stated	objective	 was	 to	 reach	 consistent	 GDP	 growth	 of	 five	 percent.	Government	 data	 shows	 construction	 of	 roads	 and	 highways	increased	 76%,	 and	 similar	 increases	 in	 construction	 of	 commercial	and	 residential	 buildings	 (41%)	 and	 sanitation	 infrastructure	(64%).65	 During	 these	 boom	 times	 statistics	 show	 unemployment	shrank	from	9.3%	in	2007	to	4.3%	in	2014.66																																																										64	For	example	see:	“Balanço	completo	do	PAC:	4	Anos	2007-2010”	(2010)	65	On	the	“legacy”	of	PAC	I	see:	“Lançamento	Do	PAC	2”	(2010).	66	 Amid	 the	 political	 crisis	 and	 impeachment	 scandal	 of	 2016,	 President	 Lula	defended	 his	 and	 President	 Dilma’s	 governments	 by	 citing	 the	 stimulus	 packages	and	 fiscal	 policies,	 comparing	 Brazil’s	 unemployment	 rate	 to	 Finland	 and	 Sweden	(see	 interview	with	Greenwald	2016).	The	unemployment	 figures	cited	above,	and	invoked	 by	 Lula,	 come	 from	 the	 official	 statics	 reported	 by	 IGBE	 (The	 Brazilian	Institute	of	Geography	and	Statistics).	 Some	economists	 accuse	 the	government	of	manipulating	the	official	statistics	to	underreport	unemployment;	and	indeed	IGBE’s	
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	 When	Lula	announced	a	second	round	of	PAC	financing	in	2009	(PAC	II)	 it	was	 thus	 in	 the	context	of	Brazil’s	growth	during	a	global	economic	 recession	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 a	 president	 who	challenged	dominant	neoliberal	market-ideology	long	before	the	2008	financial	 crisis	 first	 hit	 the	 United	 States.	 It	 also	 preceded	 national	elections	 in	 2010	 when	 President	 Lula’s	 Worker’s	 Party	 (PT)	 and	allies	 were	 reeling	 from	 a	 vote-buying	 corruption	 scheme	 in	 the	Senate	 known	 as	 Mensalão.67	 In	 2005	 Lula	 plucked	 the	 relatively	obscure	 and	 politically	 unblemished	 technocrat,	 then	 Minister	 of	Energy	 and	 Mining	 Dilma	 Rousseff,	 to	 lead	 the	 Casa	 Civil	 (the	executive’s	office	 is	 referred	 to	 as	Casa	Civil	at	 all	 levels	of	Brazilian	government).	Lula	also	charged	Dilma	with	coordinating	PAC,	a	move	that	garnered	national	media	attention	and	provided	an	 institutional	base	 to	 build	political	 relationships	 across	 the	 country.	 The	political	opposition	 claimed	 that	 PAC	 I	 favoured	municipalities	 controlled	 by	PT	and	allies	and	later	that	Lula	and	Dilma	used	PAC	II	as	an	excuse	to	informally	 campaign	 for	 her	 presidency	 outside	 of	 the	 official	campaign	season.68																																																										categorical	 qualification	 of	 employment	 is	 broad.	 For	 example,	 those	 who	 report	working	without	remuneration,	 those	who	are	receiving	unemployment	 insurance,	and	a	portion	of	those	receiving	state	welfare	payments	under	Bolsa	Familia	are	not	included	in	the	statistics.	Nonetheless,	even	conservative	estimates	(for	example	the	labour	 organisation	 DIEESE	 calculates	 figures	 that	 are	 roughly	 double	 those	 of	IBGE)	show	a	decrease	in	unemployment	during	the	time	period.	67	 The	 corruption	 scandal	Mensalão	 (roughly	 translatable	 as	 monthly	 allowance)	was	unprecedented	in	scale.	Lula’s	chief	of	staff	and	chosen	successor,	 José	Dirceu,	was	 forced	 to	 resign	 and	 return	 as	 a	 congressional	 representative	 to	 the	 lower	house.	Tried	by	the	Supreme	Court,	he	was	eventually	found	guilty	of	coordinating	the	 vote-buying	 payments	 and	 sentenced	 to	 seven	 years	 in	 prison	 in	 2012.	 Lula	continues	to	defend	Dirceu	by	noting	that	no	material	evidence	was	ever	presented	against	 him.	 This	 is	 true—the	 Supreme	 Court	 convicted	 Dirceu	 based	 on	 a	 legal	theory	 known	 as	 domínio	 do	 fato	 (dominion	 of	 the	 fact),	 which	 argues	 that	conviction	may	be	justified	by	the	facts	of	overwhelming	converging	circumstantial	evidence.	 See	Michener	 and	Pereira	 (2016)	 for	 a	 review	of	 the	Mensalão	 case	 and	scandal	 in	 political	 context.	 In	 2016	Dirceu	was	 found	 guilty	 and	 sentenced	 to	 an	additional	 23	 years	 for	 corruption	 charges	 related	 to	 the	 pay-to-play	 scandal	investigated	by	operation	Lava	Jato	(car	wash).		68	Political	campaigning	in	Brazil	may	only	occur	during	a	specified	window	before	an	 election.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 writing	 it	 was	 restricted	 to	 the	 45	 days	 preceding	 an	
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	 In	 addition	 to	 substantially	 increasing	 the	 amount	 of	 money	invested	 (from	R$650	 to	 R$955	 billion),	 PAC	 II	 developed	 financing	streams	that	prioritised	what	is	referred	to	as	“social	infrastructure.”	The	programme	classified	projects	into	six	categories:	(i)	Better	City,	(ii)	 Community	 Citizen,	 (iii)	Minha	 Casa	Minha	 Vida,	 (iv)	Water	 and	Electricity	for	All,	(v)	Transportation,	and	(vi)	Energy.	Comparatively,	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 received	more	 PAC	 financing	 than	most	 other	 states,	including	 the	 state	 of	 São	 Paulo,	 which	 is	 both	 more	 populous—roughly	44	million	versus	16	million—and	has	a	 substantially	 larger	economy—R$1.7	 billion	 in	 2103	 compared	 with	 Rio’s	 626	 million;	although	the	GDP	per	capita	is	roughly	the	same	(about	R$39,000	for	SP	and	R$38,000	for	RJ).	Nonetheless	the	federal	government,	through	PAC	I,	invested	more	than	R$400	billion	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	compared	to	slightly	 under	 R$350	 billion	 in	 São	 Paulo	 (see	 Figure	 7.1).69	 Project	analysis	 of	 PAC	 I	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 reveals	 that	 70%	 of	 funds	 were	energy-related,	with	the	objective	to	facilitate	the	transportation	of	oil	
																																																								election,	although	it	is	common	for	political	parties	to	organise	public	events	while	abiding	by	the	regulations.	President	Lula	and	Chief	of	Staff	Dilma	(who	had	not	yet	declared	 her	 candidacy)	 travelled	 to	 select	 PAC	 sites	 around	 the	 country	 for	groundbreakings,	 inaugurations,	 or	 to	 check	 in	 on	 progress.	 See	 Guerreiro	 and	Giraldi	 (2008)	 for	 news	 coverage	 of	 PAC	 I	 used	 to	 reward	 PT	 mayors.	 In	 2010	opposition	 parties	 complained	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Electoral	 Tribunals	 that	 Lula	 and	Dilma’s	site	visits	to	PAC	projects	constituted	illegal	campaigning	(D.	Abreu	2009).	In	 a	major	 shift	 of	managing	PAC,	 President	Dilma	moved	 the	 coordination	 to	 the	Ministry	of	Planning	after	taking	office	in	2011	by	executive	decree.	But	reinforcing	the	 inherent	 politicisation	 of	 PAC,	 Dilma	 reversed	 that	 decree	 in	 2016	 amidst	pending	impeachment	proceedings	and	the	Lava	Jato	corruption	scandal	when	she	invited	Lula	to	serve	as	her	Chief	of	Staff	and	coordinate	PAC	III	 in	a	move	seen	to	shield	him	from	investigators	(“Dilma	Tira	PAC	Do	Planejamento	E	Transfere	Gestão	para	a	Casa	Civil”	2016).	After	Vice	President	Michel	Temer	 took	office	as	 Interim	President	 once	 President	 Dilma	 was	 suspended	 pending	 impeachment	 trials,	 his	government	imposed	austerity	measures	during	recession	and	fiscal	crisis,	including	a	major	scaling	back	of	PAC	investments,	suspending	some	projects	in	execution	and	cancelling	others	in	the	pipeline.		69	 It’s	 worth	 noting	 that	 projected	 investments	 and	 executed	 budgets	 are	 not	 the	same.	 PAC	 investments	 have	 changed,	 been	 delayed	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 curtailed.	Therefore	the	numbers	cited	are	meant	to	display	the	significance	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	 regional	 federal	 investment,	 and	 do	 not	 accurately	 describe	 how	much	money	was	appropriated	and	spent.	
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and	 gas	 from	 the	 coastal	 and	 offshore	 drilling.70	 The	 second	 largest	expenditure	designation	of	funds,	accounting	for	21%,	was	the	‘social	infrastructure’	associated	with	urbanisation	of	precarious	settlements	(Machado	et	al.	2010).		
	
Figure	7.1	-	PAC	investments	by	state	2007-2010	(in	billions	of	Reals)	
This	graph,	depicting	approved	funding	for	PAC	projects	(in	blue)	and	already	
appropriated	funds	(in	pink)	by	2010	shows	how	Rio	de	Janeiro	and	São	Paulo	
stand	out	as	the	two	states	that	received	significantly	more	PAC	investment	
than	other	Brazilian	states.	Source:	(Machado	et	al.	2010)			 		 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 as	 to	 why	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	received	disproportionate	financing	through	PAC	in	comparison	to	the	other	 states.	 The	 booming	 petroleum	 economy	 is	 the	most	 obvious.	Major	infrastructure	was	needed	in	order	to	exploit	the	vast	reserves	of	oil	found	near	the	coast	and	offshore	of	Rio	de	Janeiro.	Less	explicit	is	that	Lula	and	PT’s	most	 important	partner	in	their	ruling	coalition	was	the	PMDB,	 the	most	powerful	party	 in	Congress	which	conducts	politics	 through	 deep	 local	 networks	 of	 patrimonial	 clientelism	(Winters	2015;	Power	 and	Zucco	2009;	Baiocchi	 2003;	Roett	 1999).																																																									70	 State-run	 oil	 company	 Petrobras	 announced	 in	 2006	 the	 discovery	 of	 massive	offshore	oil	and	gas	deposits	in	the	pre-salt	layer	off	the	coast	of	the	state	of	Rio	de	Janeiro.	Named	after	the	former	president,	the	Lula	Oil	Field	(originally	named	the	Tupi	Oil	Field	until	2010)	is	considered	the	most	significant	discovery	in	the	past	30	years	(Fick	2009)	and	indicates	Brazil’s	proven	oil	reserves	as	the	15th	largest	in	the	world	according	to	the	CIA	World	Fact	Book.	
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Lula,	 and	 subsequently	 Dilma,	 maintained	 close	 ties	 with	 Rio	 de	Janeiro	 Governor	 and	 Mayor	 (both	 from	 PMDB),	 and	 PT	 abstained	from	running	candidates	 for	executive	office	 in	 the	municipality	and	state	until	 the	2014	elections	when	relations	 frayed	and	 the	alliance	broke	during	the	impeachment	process	of	2016.	PMDB	refrained	from	running	 a	presidential	 candidate,	 and	 throughout	 their	presidencies,	Lula	 and	 Dilma	 campaigned	with	 Paes,	 Cabral,	 and	 Pezão	 in	 Rio	 de	Janeiro.	 This	 relationship	 increased	 after	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 won	 the	Olympic	 bid	 in	 2009	with	 strong	 support	 from	 then	 President	 Lula.	But	 why	 use	 PAC	 to	 invest	 in	 favela	 urbanisation	 when	most	 other	projects	serve	the	interests	of	big	industry?		 PAC-favela	was	a	mechanism	to	roll	out	MCMV	in	dense	cities	with	 expansive	 favelas.	Many	urbanists	 consider	 the	MCMV	national	strategy	 a	 step	 backwards	 despite	 representing	 the	most	 significant	financial	 commitment	 to	 social	 housing	 than	 any	 other	 previous	government	 (E.	 A.	 Nascimento	 2014;	 Rolnik	 2015).	 A	 hybrid	neoliberal	model	that	favours	private	capital	interests	over	quality	of	life	 and	 quality	 of	 construction,	 the	 programme	 seems	 to	 ignore	lessons	 learned	 through	 favela	 urbanisation	 campaigns	 such	 as	Favela-Bairro	 and	 repeat	 the	 logic	 of	 favela	 eradication	 of	 the	historical	 Banco	 Nacional	 de	 Habitação	 (BNH)	 (Compans	 2012).71	However,	 MCMV	 is	 structured	 in	 a	 way	 that	 allows	 municipal	 and	state-province	 governments	 to	 fold	 the	 programme	 into	 local																																																									71	 The	 BNH	 was	 established	 in	 1964	 by	 the	 military	 dictatorship	 as	 a	 national	strategy	 to	 stimulate	 home	 ownership.	 A	 lasting	 legacy	 is	 the	 labour	 provision	requiring	employers	to	contribute	a	percentage	of	worker	salaries	to	a	fund	which	can	be	accessed	in	order	to	buy	a	home	or	in	times	of	illness	or	unemployment.	This	provision	benefitted	only	those	working	in	the	formal	sector.	For	the	majority	of	the	poor	working	in	the	informal	economy	and	living	in	the	favelas,	an	agency	known	as	COHAB	(Company	of	Popular	Housing)	used	BNH	funds	to	build	low-cost	apartment	complexes.	 In	Rio,	 COHAB	worked	with	 the	 agency	CHISM	 (Coordination	of	 Social	Interest	Housing	of	the	Greater	Rio	Metropolitan	Area,),	which	had	the	explicit	goal	of	ensuring	a	city	without	favelas.	While	CHISM’s	mandate	allowed	for	interventions	that	we	would	now	consider	 slum	upgrading,	 it	 largely	pursued	 favela	eradication	through	 demolition	 and	 construction	 of	 social	 housing	 complexes	 See	 Perlman	(1976),	Valladares	(1978).		
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strategies.	For	example,	the	RJ	municipal	government	accesses	MCMV	financing	when	building	new	housing	blocks	as	part	of	Morar	Carioca	interventions.		 According	 to	 architect-urbanist	 Pedro	 Luz	 de	 Moreira	 the	decision	 to	 dedicate	 PAC	 funds	 towards	 favela	 urbanisation	 was	 in	part	 due	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 urbanists	 who	 had	elaborated	 Favela-Bairro	 and	 Morar	 Carioca	 programmes.	 Moreira	was	 the	 vice-president	 of	 the	 Instituto	 Arquitetos	 do	 Brasil-Rio	 de	Janeiro	(IAB-RJ,	The	Brazilian	Institute	of	Architects)	during	the	time	that	 Morar	 Carioca	 and	 PAC	 were	 created	 and	 president	 when	 I	interviewed	him.	He	believes	 that	MCMV	was	born	of	closed-minded	thinking,	but	that	local	advocates	were	able	to	persuade	federal	actors	to	create	a	hybrid	model	through	PAC:			
Pedro:	The	mentality	installed	in	the	Ministry	of	Cities	thinks	like	this:	
‘No,	 now	 that	 Brazil	 is	 a	 great	 country,	 it	 doesn’t	 need—its	 the	
seventh	 largest	 economy	 of	 the	 world—it	 doesn’t	 need	 to	 urbanise	
favelas	 anymore.	 We	 are	 going	 to	 build	 housing	 complexes	 for	
everyone	and	then	we	finish	with	the	Brazilian	favelas.	When	in	fact,	
that	 is	 to	 say,	 we’ve	 already	 had	 various	 clashes.	 Indeed	 the	 very	
creation	of	PAC-favela	was	our	attempt	 to	 influence	 the	Ministry	of	
Cities	 by	 saying	 this:	 ‘Damn,	 but	 favela	 urbanisation	 is	much	more	
sophisticated	 than	 building	 housing	 complexes.’	 And	 from	 that	
emerged	PAC-favela	and	what	not.	
Tucker:	 So	 PAC-favela…I	 didn’t	 know	 it	 emerged	 from	 Rio	
organisations.	
Pedro:	In	part	yes,	 in	 large	part	yes,	 if	 I’m	not	mistaken.	There	is	no	
PAC-favela	in	São	Paulo	[for	example];	PAC-favela	is	only	in	Rio.	
		 To	be	clear,	there	is	no	stream	of	PAC	funding	officially	named	
PAC-favelas.	Under	PAC	I	urbanisation	interventions	were	categorised	as	social	and	urban	infrastructure	and	in	PAC	II	categorised	as	MCMV	with	 some	 overlap	 with	 Community	 Citizen	 which	 included	 health	
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centres,	schools,	and	nurseries.	Nonetheless	people	that	I	interviewed	as	 well	 as	 the	 news	 media	 routinely	 refer	 to	 such	 interventions	 as	“PAC-favelas”.	However,	Rio	de	 Janeiro	was	not	even	 included	 in	 the	first	 12	 states	 that	 reportedly	 won	 PAC	 projects	 to	 “urbanise	precarious	 settlements”	 (Pariz	 and	 Colon	 2007).	 Nonetheless,	 The	Ministry	of	Cities	quickly	approved	multiple	interventions	in	Rio	and	the	 projects	 received	 a	 disproportionately	 large	 portion	 of	 funding	(R$3.59	billion	by	2010),	although	less	than	São	Paulo	which	received	R$5.52	billion	for	favela	“urbanisation”	(Chaves	and	Vieira	2010).			 While	 Pedro’s	 statement	 about	 the	 origin	 of	 PAC-favela	 is	technically	 incorrect,	 it	 speaks	 to	 the	 larger	 narrative	 of	 favela	integration,	not	mere	upgrading.	Moreira	is	right	in	the	sense	that	Rio	de	 Janeiro	pioneered	a	novel	approach	 to	urbanisation	based	on	 the	accumulated	 experience	 of	 Favela-Bairro	 and	 the	 paradigm	 of	integration.	 Unlike	 PAC-financed	 favela	 urbanisation	 in	 other	 states,	interventions	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro	appear	unique	 in	pairing	 spectacular	connective	architecture	with	social	infrastructure.	In	this	context	PAC-favelas	 continue	 the	 city’s	 long	 history	 as	 an	 “urban	 laboratory”	 of	planning	 interventions	 in	 the	 self-built	 neighbourhoods	 (Olinger	2015;	Gonçalves	2013;	Perlman	2010;	Portes	1979).			 The	 story	 of	 how	 the	 PAC-favela	 project	 sites	were	 chosen	 is	worth	 noting.	 While	 I	 could	 not	 definitively	 verify	 its	 truthfulness	through	official	documents	or	news	stories,	numerous	people	close	to	the	 projects	 gave	 me	 the	 same	 account:	 Lula,	 determined	 to	 fund	projects	 in	 Rio’s	 favelas	 at	 the	 PAC	 scale	 (significant,	 highly	 visible	impacts)	took	a	helicopter	tour	with	Governor	Cabral	over	the	largest	and	most	 notorious	 favelas,	 and	 decided	 that	 Rocinha,	 Complexo	 do	Alemão,	 and	 Complexo	 de	 Manguinhos	 would	 all	 be	 sites	 of	
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investment.72	I	posed	the	question	to	Renata	and	Nicole,	Director	and	Coordinator	of	PAC-Social	(respectively),	during	an	interview:			
Tucker:	 Do	 you	 know	 how	 Manguinhos	 was	 selected	 for	 PAC?	
Because	 I	 heard	 a	 story	 that	 Lula	 was	 in	 Rio	 and	 visited	
Manguinhos—	
Nicole:	Yeah,	that’s	the	story.	Well,	I	wasn’t	around	for	that	process,	
but	 the	 story	 that	we	 hear	 is	 that	 the	 Governor	 and	 President	 flew	
around	 the	 city	 in	 order	 to	 choose	 the	 communities	 that	 would	
receive	 [projects].	 And	 the	 criteria	 were:	 the	 biggest	 communities	
with	the	largest	indices	of	all	the	problems.	
Renata:	With	the	worst	indices.	
Nicole:	Yeah,	with	 the	worst	 indices.	And	Rocinha,	Manguinhos,	and	
Alemão	were	chosen.	And,	in	fact,	they	are	the	biggest.		 Their	statement	may	raise	some	red	flags	with	readers	familiar	with	Rio	de	Janeiro	because	it	does	not	perfectly	match	with	either	the	city’s	 favelas	 or	 the	 PAC-favelas	 interventions	 in	 it.	 Nicole	 implicitly	acknowledges	this	when	she	says,	“that’s	the	story,”	as	 if	referencing	an	origin-myth	of	PAC-favelas.	If	the	government	wanted	to	target	the	largest	 favelas,	 then	what	 about	 Complexo	 da	Maré,	 population	 130	thousand?	According	to	research	participants	I	spoke	to,	PAC	skipped	over	Complexo	da	Maré	because	it	had	been	subject	of	a	project	in	the	1980s	 under	 Projeto	 Rio,	 financed	 by	 the	 Banco	 Nacional	 de	Habitação.73	 In	 addition	 to	 size	 and	 social	 welfare	 indicators	 the	criteria	 included	 evaluation	 of	 previous	 urbanisation	 campaigns.																																																									72	 Pavão-Pavãozinho,	 a	 Zona	 Sul	 favela	 in	 Ipanema	 that	 received	 an	 elevator	connecting	it	with	the	metro	station	was	also	chosen	for	the	first	round	of	PAC	I	but	is	largely	left	out	of	the	narrative.	73	 Projeto	 Rio,	 known	 nationally	 as	 Promorar,	 was	 an	 early	 example	 of	 the	 state,	under	 the	 dictatorship,	 pursuing	 urbanisation	 rather	 than	 demolition	 and	 re-settlement.	 The	 novel	 approach	 was	 a	 result	 of	 consolidated	 and	 effective	 local	pressure	by	 residents	who	otherwise	 faced	 large-scale	eviction	 in	order	 to	build	a	complex	of	social	housing	similar	to	Cidade	de	Deus	or	Vila	Kennedy	(Pandolfi	and	Grynszpan	 2002).	 Projeto	 Rio	 in	 Maré	 was	 the	 exception	 to	 what	 would	 have	otherwise	been	Promorar	serving	BNH’s	ideology	of	favela	eradication.		
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Furthermore,	what	 role	did	poverty	and	other	 indicators	play	 in	 the	selection?	A	systematic	analysis	of	descriptive	statistics	would	reveal	many	 smaller	 but	 poorer	 favelas,	 although	 such	 indicators	 tend	 to	obscure	the	high	levels	of	inequality	within	larger	favelas	(Preteceille	and	Valladares	2001).	Rocinha,	and	the	Complexos	do	Alemão	and	de	Manguinhos,	 have	 pockets	 of	 abject	 poverty	 and	 as	 a	 whole	 have	among	 the	 lowest	 indices	 for	 ‘human	 development’	 and	 ‘social	progress’	in	Rio	de	Janeiro.	Nonetheless	many	of	their	residents	have	well-constructed	homes	and	lower-middle	class	living	standards.		Finally,	 this	 origin	 story	 ignores	 that	 PAC	 financed	interventions	 in	 favela	 Providência	 as	 part	 of	 the	 port	 revitalisation	project,	 in	 Pavão-Pavãozinho	 in	 Zona	 Sul,	 and	 Complexo	 de	 Lins	 in	Zona	 Norte.	 This	 discrepancy	 is	 probably	 explained	 by	 the	 two	categories	 of	 PAC-favelas	 interventions:	 the	 first	 category	 of	 large-scale	 multi-year	 projects	 that	 were	 selected	 by	 joint	 negotiated	decision	 between	 the	 federal	 government	 and	 municipal	 or	 state	governments	(a	process	known	as	pactuacão	federativa).	The	second	category,	which	covers	the	majority	of	PAC-favela	interventions	but	of	significantly	 lesser	 scale	 (in	 terms	 of	money	 invested,	 generally	 less	than	R$10	million),	were	approved	 through	an	annual	 “open	call”	of	project	 proposals	 (chamada	 para	 seleção	 pública)	 through	 the	Ministry	 of	 Cities.	 The	 large-scale	 projects,	 such	 as	 the	 three	 large	favelas	 discussed,	 became	 flagship	 interventions,	 emblematic	 of	 the	“sophistication”	(as	Moreira	put	it)	of	PAC-favelas	even	if	they	are	the	exception,	not	the	rule.		As	 a	 spatial	 strategy	 of	 development,	 the	 PAC	 interventions	reproduced	the	federal	state	at	the	scale	of	the	city.	Given	the	political	alliance	 between	 PT	 and	 PMDB-RJ,	 along	 with	 significant	 federal	investments	 in	 the	 state	 and	 city,	 it	 is	 of	 no	 surprise	 that	 Lula,	 and	subsequently	 Dilma,	 visited	 the	 city	 often.	 To	 evaluate	 where	investments	 would	 be	 made,	 to	 announce	 the	 projects,	 check-in	 on	
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progress	 and	 inaugurate	 finished	 projects	 of	 PAC	 or	 the	 various	sporting	and	political	mega-events.	After	Lula	left	office,	he	and	other	PT	insiders	began	to	devise	a	plan	to	break	PMDB’s	hold	on	the	region,	and	 relations	 between	 the	 two	 parties	 frayed.	 Journalists	 noted	 a	marked	reduction	in	how	often	President	Dilma	visited	the	city	(P.	C.	Pereira	and	Bruno	2013)	and	PT	decided	to	contest	PMDB	in	the	race	for	state	governor.74	During	these	trips	to	check	in	on	PAC,	Lula	would	often	 travel	 around	 the	 city	 by	 helicopter.	 None	 of	 the	 three	 large	favela	 “complexes”	 had	 been	 occupied	 in	 the	 first	 process	 of	 the	militarised	pacification,	so	prior	to	his	visits,	the	police	would	conduct	a	 “shock	 of	 order”	 to	 prepare	 for	 his	 visit.	 Lula	would	 swoop	 down	from	the	skies	and	fly	off	once	official	business	concluded	(see	Freire	2008).			 Lula	 called	 attention	 to	 and	 justified	 the	 decision	 to	 dedicate	significant	 resources	 to	 some	 of	 the	 poorest	 areas	 of	 the	 city.	 As	reported	 by	O	 Globo	 newspaper	 (Freire	 2010),	 at	 the	 opening	 of	 an	urgent	care	health	clinic	(UPA)	in	the	West	Zone	in	May	of	2010,	Lula	stated	to	the	press:		
The	other	day	I	was	hovering	around	Pavão-Pavãozinho	[a	favela	situated	
in	Copacabana,	in	the	South	Zone]	in	a	helicopter,	and	I	saw	the	fantastic	
elevator,	 that	will	 take	 the	people	 from	 the	 top	of	 the	hill	 to	 the	metro.	
Certainly	someone	will	look	at	that	and	say:	‘that	Sergio	Cabral,	that	Lula,	
and	 that	 Eduardo	 Paes	 are	 jackasses.	 Instead	 of	 spending	money	 on	 a	
music	centre	 for	 the	 rich	 they	are	making	an	elevator	 for	 the	poor.	The	
poor	 having	 more	 is	 what	 strengthens	 the	 calves,’75	 he	 said,	 receiving																																																									74	 This	 decision	 was	 perhaps	 cemented	 after	 the	 2013	 protests,	 during	 which	Governor	Cabral’s	approval	rating	plummeted	to	be	the	worst	of	any	governor	in	the	country	 (DataFolha	 2013).	 He	 resigned	 six	 months	 before	 his	 term	 ended,	reportedly	 to	 give	 visibility	 to	 his	 Vice	 Governor	 and	 chosen	 successor,	 Luis	Fernando	de	Souza,	known	as	Pezão	 (bigfoot),	who	ultimately	won	 the	election	as	the	incumbent.	75	Pobre	tem	mais	é	que	engrossar	a	canela	is	not	a	common	idiom	in	Portuguese.	Here	I	translated	 it	 literally	 because	 I	 am	 unaware	 of	 any	 equivalent	 expression	 in	 English.	 It	serves	as	a	hierarchical	body	metaphor—if	society	were	a	body,	 the	poor	would	be	the	
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applause	 from	 residents	 of	 poor	 communities	 and	 a	 large	 claque	 of	
political	allies.	[…]	
‘Soon,	 soon,	 we’re	 going	 to	 inaugurate	 a	 gondola	 in	 the	 Complexo	 do	
Alemão,	 so	 that	homemakers	don’t	 have	 to	hike	up	 the	 slope	with	 their	
shopping.	But	 there	 are	 people	who	don’t	 like	 that	we	 spend	money	 on	
that.	Those	people	want	to	keep	Copacabana	pretty	because	it’s	the	face	of	
Brazil	to	the	world,	but	the	poor	must	be	treated	with	respect	and	dignity,’	
Lula	finished.	 Citation	from	Globo	G1	news	article			Lula’s	 statement	 is	 telling.	 First,	 it	 ties	 together	 three	 levels	 of	 political	governance,	working	 together	at	 the	 local	 scale:	 the	 federal	government	coordinating	 action	 with	 state-province	 and	 municipal	 executives	 to	devote	public	resources	to	build	 infrastructure	of	grandeur	explicitly	 for	poor	citizens.	Second,	it	adopts	language	typical	of	the	labour	syndicalist	turned	 president—bombastic,	 frank,	 and	 working	 class	 macho—he	oversees	 the	 project	 from	 a	 helicopter,	 symbolic	 of	 the	 power	 of	 the	executive	 surveying	 the	 city.	 From	 his	 position	 of	 hyper-mobility	 he	praises	an	intervention	that	facilitates	the	mobility	of	the	poor,	a	“fantastic	elevator”	that	connects	the	favela	with	the	metro	that	historically	serving	the	city	centre	and	wealthier	Zona	Sul	while	the	public	buses,	trains	and	network	 of	 informal	 vans	 and	moto-taxis	 served	 the	working	 class	 and	urban	 peripheries	 (Caiafa	 2013;	 Kleiman	 2011).	 Lula	 thus	 couches	 this	investment	as	infrastructure	of	social	mobility	that	pre-empts	the	insults	of	a	(presumably	bourgeois)	“somebody”	who	will	accuse	him,	Cabral	and	Paes	 of	 being	 “jackasses”	 for	 spending	 money	 on	 the	 poor—on	 poor	female	homemakers	at	that—rather	than	investing	in	high	culture	in	order	to	maintain	Copacabana	as	the	beautiful	postcard	of	Brazil.			 The	 discursive	 representation	 of	 local,	 state,	 and	 federal	governments	acting	as	a	cooperative	unit	is	a	pattern	in	Lula’s	rhetoric.	For																																																									legs,	 the	 foundation	 for	 standing	 and	 that	which	 propels	 the	 body	 forward.	 Therefore,	investing	in	infrastructure	that	serves	the	poor,	so	that	the	poor	have	more,	strengthens	the	foundations	of	society.	
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example,	 two	years	 earlier,	 at	 a	PAC-RJ	 groundbreaking	 ceremony,	 Lula	called	Dilma	the	“mother	of	PAC”.	In	the	same	statement	he	lays	out	very	clearly	the	political	figureheads	of	PAC	projects	at	each	government.	While	“mother”	Dilma	coordinated	PAC	across	 the	country,	 then	vice	governor	Pezão	was	the	“father	of	PAC	in	Rio	de	Janeiro”	and	coordinated	PAC	at	the	state	level.	And	speaking	directly	to	the	benefactors	of	PAC	in	the	favelas,	he	told	them	that	they	would	need	to	hold	Dilma	and	Pezão	accountable,	who	would	then	“hold	 the	mayor	accountable,	so	 that	 the	mayor	get’s	a	move-on”	(Freire	2008).			 If	 the	 official	 narrative	 of	 why	 the	 government	 chose	 Rocinha,	Complexo	do	Alemão	and	Manguinhos	is	poverty	eradication,	the	urbanist	technocrats	 suggest	 a	 more	 nuanced	 decision	 making	 process.	 For	example	Moreira	suggests	that	PAC-favelas	showed	federal	policy	makers	and	 implementers	 that	 large	public	works,	 those	worthy	of	 the	national	brand	 PAC,	 could	 translate	 to	 “sophisticated”	 favela	 integration	 rather	than	 the	 old	 ways	 of	 the	 BNH—the	 razing	 of	 favela	 homes	 and	 the	construction	 of	 social	 housing.	 The	 head	 architect	 of	 PAC	 projects	 in	Alemão	and	Manguinhos,	 Jorge	 Jáuregui,	suggested	that	one	reason	why	he	was	tapped	for	projects	was	that	he	had	already	conducted	extensive	research	 in	 the	 communities	 and	 published	 architectural	 plans	 for	possible	interventions.	A	similar	research	project	headed	by	architect	Luiz	Carlos	 de	Menezes	 Toledo	was	 conducted	 in	 Rocinha	 prior	 to	 the	 PAC	project.	 This	 research	 was	 heralded	 as	 participatory	 and	 based	 on	 the	architects’	deep	knowledge	of	community	needs,	however	the	planning	of	the	 PAC	 projects	 was	 rushed	 and	 marred	 by	 criticism	 that	 the	interventions	were	anti-democratic	(see	section	7.4).		 Through	sketching	out	the	structure	of	PAC-favelas	and	it’s	origin,	we	can	identify	some	of	the	programme’s	utility	beyond	the	infrastructure	use-value:	 the	 interventions	 called	 PAC-favelas	 simultaneously	 acted	 as	part	 of	 a	 national	 stimulus	 package	 to	 stave	 off	 the	 global	 recession,	strengthened	the	regional	party	alliance	between	PT	and	PMDB	in	Rio	de	
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Janeiro,	contributed	to	the	building	of	the	“Olympic	City”	and	thus	Rio	as	Brazil’s	 “postcard”	 to	 the	 world,	 furthered	 presidents	 Lula	 and	 Dilma	political	 claims	 to	 devote	 significant	 federal	 resources	 to	 improving	 the	lives	of	Brazil’s	poorest	citizens,	gave	the	politicians	a	legitimate	excuse	to	visit	 the	 second	 most	 populous	 city	 frequently	 prior	 to	 and	 during	campaign	seasons,	and	finally	provided	a	highly	visible	example	of	multi-scalar	governmental	cooperation	between	what	is	often	characterised	as	a	disjointed	 and	 dysfunctional	 relationship	 between	municipal,	 state,	 and	national	governments.76	The	 following	builds	on	this	data	 to	discuss	 the	political	economy	of	PAC-favelas	in	relation	to	multi-scalar	state	space.		
7.2	“Rolling	out”	the	state	through	PAC-favela		Brenner’s	 theorisation	 of	 neoliberal	 rescaling	 of	 state	 power,	institutional	hierarchies,	and	economic	development	policy	prove	useful	if	not	prescriptive.	PAC	is	a	state	spatial	strategy	of	economic	development	and	growth	that	shifts	the	implementation	of	projects	‘down’	the	hierarchy	to	the	state	and	municipal	governments.	While	the	strategy	clearly	seeks	to	use	state	resources	in	order	to	drive	capitalist	growth	in	various	private	sectors,	 it	 does	 not	 mimic	 a	 transition	 from	 ‘spatial	 Keynesianism’	 to	competitive	 neo-localism.	 As	 Klink	 points	 out,	 Brazil	 never	 followed	 a	
																																																								76	 The	 dysfunctional	 intergovernmental	 relationship	 Continued	 after	 the	 2014	elections	when	PT	irked	PMDB-RJ	and	decided	to	contest	the	Governor’s	office,	and	continued	 to	 deteriorate	 until	 the	 two	 parties	 split	 in	 spectacular	 fashion	 when	Congress	initiated	impeachment	proceedings	against	President	Dilma,	facilitated	by	the	Rio	congressman	Eduardo	Cunha	who	served	as	Speaker	of	 the	House	until	he	was	removed	by	the	Supreme	Court	due	to	corruption	charges.	Simultaneously,	Rio	de	Janeiro	state	and	city	experienced	fiscal	crisis	and	were	unable	to	make	payroll	or	federal	debt	payment,	even	in	2016	when	the	city,	state,	and	federal	governments	are	all	led	by	PMDB	politicians	(Romero	2016).	In	relation	to	urban	planning	and	the	favelas,	 scholars	 have	 long	 noted	 how	 municipal	 and	 state	 maps	 of	 the	 city	 and	favela	limits	differ,	sometimes	substantially.	One	concrete	example	would	be	of	a	set	of	 stairs	 that	 climb	 “the	 back	 end”	 of	 the	 favela	 Providência	 in	 downtown	 Rio	 de	Janeiro.	When	 I	 visited,	 half	 of	 the	 staircase	 was	 neat	 and	 even,	 recently	 redone,	while	the	other	half	was	cracked	and	crumbling.	A	researcher	conducting	research	in	 the	 favela	 explained	 that	 the	 two	 halves	 correspond	 to	 different	 urbanisation	projects,	one	by	the	state	and	the	other	by	the	municipality.		
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model	of	strategic,	even	economic	development	that	Brenner	documents	in	Western	Europe.	Rather,	Klink	argues	 that	 the	 transition	 from	spatial	strategy	of	growth	poles	and	privileging	certain	metropolitan	regions	(Rio	de	 Janeiro	 chief	 among	 them)	under	 the	military	 regime	 to	 a	neoliberal	developmental	 state	 seeking	 international	 competitiveness	 “has	 been	accompanied	 by	 a	 remarkable	 number	 of	 continuities,	 which	 have	 not	been	sufficiently	highlighted	in	the	literature	on	state	spatial	restructuring	in	 Brazil”	 (Klink	 2013,	 1183).	 PAC	 continues	 to	 privilege	 some	 regions,	including	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 more	 than	 others;	 and	 the	 two-method	selection—one	 through	 an	 open	 call	 for	 applications	 from	 state	 and	municipal	governments	and	the	other	through	pactuação	federal	(e.g.	the	major	PAC-favela	interventions	in	Rio	de	Janeiro)—continue	to	allow	non-transparent	 deal-making	 between	 politicians	 and	 between	 state	institutions	and	oligopolistic	construction	companies.	The	unevenness	and	contradictions	 that	 characterise	 the	 neoliberal	 transition	 in	 Europe	 are	neither	new	nor	neoliberal	in	Brazil,	but	rather,	as	Klink	writes,	historical	continuities.	 Far	 from	 discounting	 the	 critiques	 of	 neoliberalism	 in	 the	“global	North,”	this	research	does	echo	those	who	argue	that	neoliberalism	has	not	produced	universal	socio-economic	and	spatial	qualities	and	must	be	 studied	 and	 considered	 from	 various	 contexts	 of	 the	 “global	 South”	(Klink,	Oliveira,	and	Zimerman	2013;	Nuijten,	Koster,	and	de	Vries	2012;	Parnell	and	Robinson	2012;	Ferguson	and	Gupta	2002;	Ferguson	2006).		Understanding	PAC	and	MCMV	as	the	“rolling	out”	of	a	centralised	developmental	and	technocratic	state,	Klink	argues	that	reconfigurations	of	scale	are	important	to	consider.	If	such	significant	national	investments	centralise	regulatory	authority	through	for	example	MCMV	best	practices	model	 provided	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	 Cities	 (Rolnik	 et	 al.,	 no	 date)	 or	 the	Statute	of	the	City,	such	authority	is	often	skirted	through	contestations	of	scale	by	local	actors	(Klink,	Oliveira,	and	Zimerman	2013;	Rolnik	and	Klink	2011).	 PAC-favelas	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 exemplify	 how	 these	 scalar	relationships	 play	 out.	 It	 also	 suggests	 that	 analysis	 of	 state	 space	 and	
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reconfiguration	under	neoliberalism	should	take	inter-scalar	politics	into	consideration.	The	temporary	alignment	of	priorities	of	the	federal,	state,	and	municipal	governments	and	the	interests	of	the	respective	stewarding	political	 parties	 resulted	 in	 the	 rapid	 approval	 of	 unprecedented	investment	in	the	favelas.	The	contestations	of	scale	worked	both	up	and	down	 the	 state	 hierarchy.	Whereas	MCMV	 and	 PAC-favela	 urbanisation	interventions	navigate	 around	 federal	 regulations,	 local	 actors	 in	Rio	de	Janeiro—the	 progressive	 architect-urbanists	 with	 a	 history	 of	 favela-
bairro—exerted	their	influence	‘upwards’	so	that	PAC-favelas	adopted	the	more	sophisticated	approach	of	favela	integration.		A	 focus-point	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 the	 reproduction	 of	 state	 space	through	 favela	 integration.	 I	 argue	 that	 PAC	 in	 the	 favelas	 and	 the	paradigm	 of	 integration	 as	 a	 state	 spatial	 strategy	 is	 more	 than	 the	converging	 interests	 of	 capital	 and	 government	 in	 order	 to	 restructure	socio-economic	 relations	according	 to	neoliberal	urban	competitiveness.	In	addition	to	“rolling	out”	the	developmental	state,	as	Klink	argues,	PAC-favelas	constitutes	a	‘rolling	in’	of	the	state	through	reterritorialisation	of	urban	space.	The	 targets	of	 this	strategy	are	pockets	of	 the	city	 that	are	discursively	 produced,	 with	 very	 real	 material	 consequences,	 as	abandoned	by	the	state	and	thus	operating	independent	and	disconnected	from	the	formal	and	cohesively	governed	city.	To	advance	this	argument,	eventually	 arriving	 at	 the	 effectuation	 of	 territory	 through	 state	interventions	in	the	favelas,	I	must	look	outside	of	Brenner’s	theorisation	of	 state	 spatiality.	As	 reviewed	 in	Chapter	3,	Brenner	 conceives	of	 state	spatiality	 through	 the	 dialectic	 of	 state	 space	 in	 the	 “narrow”	 and	 state	space	in	the	“integral”	sense,	but	his	categorical	definitions	lack	people	and	individual	or	collective	agency.	This	may	result	from	the	deviation	of	the	theoretical	triadic	model	that	he	and	others	offer	in	which	a	third	category,	“representational	 state	 space,”	 followed	 Lefebvre’s	 original	 model	 to	highlight	local	knowledge	and	power	relations	in	the	context	of	territory	and	 the	 everyday	 subjectivities	 and	 contestations	 of	 state	 spatiality	
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(Brenner	et	al.	2003).		The	 origin	 myth	 of	 how	 President	 Lula	 decided	 with	 Governor	Cabral	which	 favelas	would	 receive	PAC	 investments	 and	 the	proximity	that	 Lula	 and	 Dilma	 maintained	 to	 the	 projects	 speak	 to	 the	reconfiguration	federal	state	and	local	space.	There	are	parallels	here	with	Harvey’s	(2005),	ethnography	of	a	road	in	the	Peruvian	Andes,	which	recounts	a	fable-like	tale	repeated	by	local	residents	who	were	visited	unannounced	 by	 President	 Fujimori	 in	 a	 helicopter.	 Pleased	 by	 the	town’s	hospitality	but	aghast	by	the	poor	condition	of	the	school	and	dangerous	 conditions	 of	 the	 road	 (as	 informed	 by	 the	 residents)	 he	promised	 repairs	 and	 a	 new	 school	 before	 flying	 off	 again	 in	 his	helicopter.	 For	 Harvey,	 the	 visit	 re-scaled	 the	 remote	 town’s	relationship	 with	 state	 power.	 The	 President’s	 passing	 through,	unremarkable	 for	 him	 yet	 historic	 and	 ceremonious	 for	 the	 town,	increased	 the	 legibility	 of	 the	 residents	 and	 resulted	 in	 concrete	federal	 investment.	 However,	 the	 conditions	 of	 Fujimori’s	 visit—his	hyper	 mobility	 that	 allowed	 him	 to	 access	 the	 town	 via	 helicopter	rather	than	the	crumbling	road,	his	blank	refusal	to	sign	his	promises	of	development	 into	the	town’s	book	of	official	acts—simultaneously	reinforced	the	unequal	hierarchy	of	power	between	the	townspeople	and	 chief	 of	 the	 modern	 state	 and	 central	 power.	 Similar	 power	dynamics	are	at	play	when	President	Lula	tours	the	city	from	the	sky,	and,	gazing	down	at	the	governed	subjects,	decides	to	act	in	very	real	immediate	ways.	When	the	president	did	visit	a	favela	on	the	ground,	there	 were	 also	 immediate	 effects	 for	 the	 residents,	 as	 the	 police	carried	out	“shocks	of	order”	in	preparation.		In	 calling	 attention	 to	 the	 visual	 perspective	 of	 the	 President	and	 Governor	 as	 they	 consider	 governing	 priorities	 from	 a	 state-owned	 helicopter,	 I	 follow	 scholars	 who	 call	 for	 more	 attention	 to	vertical	 urbanism	 (Graham	 and	 Hewitt	 2012)	 and	 in	 particular	ethnographic	 interrogation	 of	 power	 and	 height	 (Harris	 2015).	 In	
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similar	 fashion	 to	 urban	 planners	 who	 survey	 the	 city	 aerially—for	example	 Koolhaas’	 consideration	 of	 Lagos	 (Hecker	 2010)	 or	 Le	Corbusier’s	 airplane-sketched	 modernist	 plans	 for	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	(Morshed	 2002)—Lula	 and	 Cabral,	 reportedly,	 considered	where	 to	intervene	 based	 on	 their	 visual	 interpretation	 of	 urban	 inequality	backed	 up,	 again	 reportedly,	 by	 statistical	measurements	 of	 poverty	and	 quality	 of	 life.	 Morshed	 likens	 this	 perspective	 to	 the	 decisive	vision	 of	 a	monarch.	 I	 would	 add	 that	 the	 perspective	 is	 inherently	patriarchal.	For	even	 though	 the	governing	decisions	are	based	on	a	sweeping,	 flattening	 vision	 and	 statistical	 aggregation,	 Lula	discursively	 produces	 PAC-favelas	 as	 protecting	 the	 poor	 from	bourgeois	 politics	 and	 improving	 the	 daily	 lives	 of	 favela	 residents	(the	archetype	‘woman	with	her	shopping	bags’)	through	world	class	infrastructure.	As	it	happens,	the	infrastructure	he	celebrates	is	a	pale	imitation	 of	 the	 hyper-mobility	 that	 government	 executives	 and	 the	conspicuously	wealthy	use	 to	 travel	 through	urban	space	by	moving	above	 it.	 Moreover,	 Lula	 naming	 Dilma	 (then	 chief	 of	 staff)	 the	“mother	 of	 PAC”	 and	 Vice	 Governor	 Pezão	 the	 “father	 of	 PAC”	reiterates	 the	 paternalist	 relationship	 between	 ‘needy’	 citizens	 and	powerful	governing	actors.			
7.3	Reclaiming	territory		 PAC-favelas	 is	 constructed	 as	 a	 programme	 that	 reclaims	 lost	urban	space	and	brings	the	favelas	into	the	fold	of	urban	governance.	At	the	 inauguration	 of	 the	 Teleférico	 do	 Alemão	 in	 2011,	 Mayor	 Paes	echoed	 the	 rhetoric	 about	 inter-governmental	 cooperation,	 saying	that	 Cabral	 changed	 the	 politics	 of	 confrontation	 between	 the	municipal,	state,	and	national	governments	in	which	everyone	blamed	and	cursed	everyone	else.	But	now	they	all	work	together	because	the	governments	have	aligned	their	objectives.	And	“we	are	going	to	keep	
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working	 together	 and	 construct	 a	 city	 that	 is	 marvellous	 for	everyone.”	He	 then	rhetorically	situated	 the	PAC	 intervention	within	the	broader	citywide	project	of	integration:		
There	is	a	street	in	RJ	called	Rua	São	Miguel	in	between	the	Mayor’s	
official	 residence	 and	 the	mayor’s	 office,	 the	 official	 administrative	
centre	 São	 Sebastião.	 And	 I	 remember	 when	 I	 first	 moved	 into	 the	
official	residence	that	in	order	to	get	to	work	we	had	to	take	a	detour	
because	 that	 street	was	one	of	 those	places	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro	where	
the	people	and	the	authorities	couldn’t	go	because	it	was	a	territory	
that	didn’t	belong	 to	 the	city.	Rua	São	Miguel	 is	a	 small	 example	of	
one	of	 the	most	 severe	 cases	 that	 happen	 in	 this	 city;	 and	 the	most	
severe	case	in	this	city,	without	any	doubt,	is	this	place	we’re	at	right	
now:	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão,	 Complexo	 da	 Penha,	 all	 of	 the	
surrounding	 neighbourhoods—I’m	 talking	 about	 Inhaúma,	 Penha,	
Bomsucesso,	Ramos,	Higienópolis.—in	sum	all	of	the	neighbourhoods	
that	 are	 around	 here,	 they	 were	 neighbourhoods,	 and	 not	 just	 the	
comunidades	 [favelas],	 but	 also	 the	 surrounding	 neighbourhoods,	
were	areas	that	people	couldn’t	go.	And	the	Mayor	couldn’t	be	mayor,	
not	fully.	[…]	
To	this	obra	de	paz	[police	pacification],	we	add	the	intervention	of	
the	 Teleférico.	 And	 what	 is	 that?	 It’s	 not	 just	 a	 work	 of	 aesthetics.	
Sure	 it	has	a	 touristic	aspect,	and	 its	an	 innovative	project,	but	 this	
here,	 Ms	 President,	 this	 here	 is	 a	 new	 city;	 here	 in	 Complexo	 do	
Alemão	and	Complexo	da	Penha—but	just	in	Alemão	there	lives	150,	
200	 thousand	 people	 […]	 And	 what’s	 going	 on	 here,	 with	 the	
Teleférico	and	with	 the	PAC	 interventions,	 and	by	 the	way	we	have	
achieved	 100%	 coverage	 for	 family	 and	 community	 health	 here	
[applause].	But	what’s	going	here	is	a	revolution.	(Broadcast	on	national	state-run	television	channel	TV	NBR	on	7	July	2011)			The	Mayor	of	Brazil’s	second	largest	city,	in	front	of	the	Governor	and	 President,	 declared	 that	 his	 authority	 was	 fragmented	 and	severely	limited—that	upon	entering	office,	he	could	“not	fully”	be	
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mayor	of	Rio	de	Janeiro.	Even	as	mayor,	perhaps	especially	so,	his	own	 mobility	 was	 curtailed	 between	 his	 official	 residence	 and	office	given	that	part	of	the	route	was	“territory	that	didn’t	belong	to	 the	 city.”	 Moreover,	 he	 suggests	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 has	 a	radiating	effect	on	the	entire	surrounding	region.	Naming	any	and	all	 of	 the	 contingent	 neighbourhoods	 surrounding	 Complexo	 do	Alemão	as	 “areas	where	people	 could	not	go,”	 indicates	not	only	the	Mayor’s	complicity	in	favela	stigmatisation	but	also	suggests	a	lack	of	 knowledge	about	 the	place	 in	which	he	 stands	and	more	broadly	 the	 North	 Zone	 (see	 figures	 7.2	 and	 7.3).	 He	 groups	Complexo	da	Penha	with	Complexo	do	Alemão,	a	common	mistake	made	by	the	media	when	reporting	gang/police	violence	that	irks	the	Complexos’	social	media	users.	Moreover	apparently	he	does	not	know	how	many	people	live	in	Complexo	do	Alemão.	The	2010	census,	which	 the	municipal	 IPP	 cites	 in	official	documents,	puts	the	population	of	 the	15	 favelas	at	 just	over	60	 thousand	people	(See	 figure	 7.4).	 Census	 data	 has	 been	 known	 to	 underestimate	favela	population,	and	some	documents	produced	by	the	state	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	through	its	PAC	office	estimate	a	population	of	100	thousand	 based	 off	 their	 independent	 census.	 But	 mayor	 Paes’	refers	 to	 some	 150	 or	 200	 thousand	 people,	 a	 significant	difference.	 He	 further	 says	 the	 entire	 region—Complexo	 do	Alemão,	Complexo	da	Penha	and	five	contingent	neighbourhoods	(all	together	home	to	roughly	300	thousand	cariocas	according	to	census	data)—was	composed	of	places	“people	could	not	go”.			 Such	a	statement	seems	beyond	exaggeration	for	a	sitting	mayor	to	make	standing	before	an	audience	composed	in	part	of	people	who	 live	 in	 that	 ‘no-go’	 area.	 But	 it	 fits	with	 the	mayor’s	before-and-after	 discourse	 of	 the	 integrated	 city	 reviewed	 in	Chapter	 5:	 that	 through	 public	 investment	 in	 Rio’s	 peripheries,	through	favela	integration,	the	fractured	city	becomes	whole.		
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Figure	7.2	-	Complexo	do	Alemão	satellite	image	
A	closer	look	at	Complexo	do	Alemão	using	satellite	imagery.	The	limits	of	the	
Complexo	are	outlined	in	purple	with	the	Teleférico	lines	dotted	in	pink	
between	the	five	stations	and	connected	to	the	Bonsucesso	train	station	on	the	
Saracuna	line	dotted	in	red.	The	11	largest	favelas	composing	the	Complexo	
are	labelled.	Source:	(L.	B.	D.	Santos	2014)		
	
Figure	7.3	-	Complexo	do	Alemão	and	surrounding	neighbourhoods	
The	group	of	15	favelas	is	located	in	the	city’s	North	Zone.	Mentioned	by	Paes	
but	not	labelled	on	this	map	are	Higienópolis,	bordering	the	south	of	Morro	do	
Adeus	and	Mourão	Filho,	and	Inhaúma,	southwest	of	Parque	Alvorada.	
Complexo	da	Maré,	which	is	visible	from	the	hills	of	Complexo	do	Alemão	lies	
east	of	Bonsucesso,	between	highway	101	(Avenida	Brasil)	and	the	Fundão	
island,	host	to	a	large	university	campus	(UFRJ)	and	Petrobrás	facilities.	
Further	north	is	Rio’s	international	airport.	Source:	Google	Maps.	
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Figure	7.4	–	Demographics	of	Complexo	do	Alemão	
Table	sourced	from	the	“Panorama	do	Complexo	do	Alemão”	compiled	by	
Rio+Social	(discussed	in	Chapter	5)	lists	the	15	favelas	composing	the	
Complexo	with	corresponding	population,	number	of	households,	average	
habitants	per	household,	total	area,	and	density	(in	that	order).			 However	bombastic	 the	Mayor’s	 rhetoric,	 it	 does	 reflect	PAC-favelas	ambitious	objectives	in	the	Complexo	do	Alemão.	As	described	by	its	lead	architect,	if	Favela-Bairro	constituted	localist	interventions,	PAC-favela	constitutes	a	project	at	the	city	scale.			
The	 programme	 [Favela-Bairro]	 opened	 up	 possibilities	 to	 finance	
projects	 in	 the	 favelas—before	nobody	did	projects	 in	 the	 favelas—
architects,	that	is.	So	it	opened	a	space	of	practice	and	thinking	about	
the	reality	of	the	informal.	[…]	The	programme	Favela-Bairro	works	
at	a	small	scale,	a	medium	scale	and	a	large	scale	[in	reference	to	the	
size	of	the	favelas].	[…]	The	programme	sought	to	place	the	favela	in	
relation	to	the	neighbourhood—and	that	had	never	been	done—and	
to	 do	 that	 we	 had	 to	 work	 with	 infrastructure,	 learn	 how	 to	 work	
with	 the	 infrastructure	 engineers,	 with	 local	 networks,	 drainage	
networks…	to	work	with	a	very	tight	cost-benefit	budget,	for	example	
3,500	dollars	per	family	in	Favela-Bairro.	For	1000	families	we	would	
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have	to	do	the	entire	urbanisation	of	the	place	for	3.5	million	dollars.	
[…]	 Favela-Bairro	 gave	 us	 the	 background,	 a	 base	 of	 references.	
Afterwards,	when	Lula	came	with	PAC,	he	put	up	a	lot	more	money	so	
that	we	didn’t	have	to	work	just	in	one	or	two	favelas	at	a	time,	but	
with	 whole	 complexes:	 13	 favelas	 in	 Alemão,	 11	 favelas	 in	
Manguinhos,	and	Rocinha	is	a	very	large	favela.	[…]	So	PAC	allowed	
us	 to	 pass	 from	 the	 small,	medium	and	 large	 scale	 to	working	at	 a	
truly	territorial	scale.	
(Jorge,	PAC-Alemão	architect)	
	As	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	Favela-Bairro	was	deemed	“localist,”	“internal,”	 or	 “inward-looking”	 urban	 planning	 while	 Morar	 Carioca	(and	more	broadly	favela	integration)	is	considered	to	be	“territorial”	and	 “relational”,	 that	 is	 planning	 an	 intervention	 in	 relation	 to	 its	surroundings	 to	 facilitate	a	social	process.	When	 Jáuregui	states	 that	the	 significant	 budget	 and	 objectives	 of	 PAC	 surpassed	 that	 of	planning	for	the	small,	medium,	or	large	favelas	and	permitted	him	to	think	 of	 favela-urbanisation	 at	 the	 territorial	 scale,	 here	 he	 signals	something	 other	 than	 relational	 planning.	 He	 means	 that	 the	interventions	of	PAC	were	meant	 to	have	a	significant	 impact	on	the	surrounding	 geography	 of	 the	 intervention—both	 materially	 and	symbolically.	Jáuregui	himself	is	a	fan	of	Lefebvre,	and	thinks	spatially,	such	that	PAC-favelas	should	reconfigure	the	social	space	of	the	favela	in	relation	to	its	immediate	surroundings	as	well	as	the	larger	city.	For	a	grouping	of	favelas	as	large	as	Complexo	do	Alemão,	that	is	so	large	that	it	spans	three	neighbourhoods	and	constitutes	its	own	municipal	administrative	region,	that	is	an	ambitious	project.		The	 major	 PAC-favela	 projects	 in	 Rio	 (those	 associated	 with	the	 origin-myth	 described	 above)	 all	 have	 the	 following	 aspects:	typical	urbanisation	(road	paving	and	widening,	stairs	and	sidewalks	through	the	becos	or	alleyways,	public	lighting,	renovation	of	existing	common	 areas,	 and	 home	 removal	 and	 relocation	 from	 areas	
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categorised	 as	 “high	 risk”	 for	 flooding,	 landslide,	 or	 structure	collapse),	 “social	 infrastructure”	 in	 the	 form	 of	 shopping	 areas,	cinemas,	 libraries	 or	 cultural	 centres,	 state	 social	 services	infrastructure,	 and	 prominently	 visible	 architecture	 that	 serves	 as	 a	connector	 between	 the	 favela	 and	 the	 surrounding	 area.	 This	connective	 architecture	 is	 significant	 for	 its	 symbolic	 statement	 on	integration	 and	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 state;	 but	 it	 also	 has	 been	sensationalised	 by	 the	 press	 and	 criticised	 as	 spectacle	 by	 scholars	(Larkins	2015).	In	Rocinha	this	point	is	a	bridge	originally	conceived	by	Niemeyer	(and	adapted	by	Jáuregui)	as	well	as	plans	for	a	gondola	transport	 system.	 In	 Pavão-Pavãovinho	 a	 64-metre	 (23	 stories)	elevator	 connects	 the	 metro	 with	 the	 top	 of	 the	 hill	 facilitating	resident	access	and	providing	views	of	the	marvellous	city	for	visitors.	PAC	interventions	have	all	been	disruptive	and	required	the	removal	of	 thousands	 of	 homes	 and	 the	 re-housing	 of	 tens	 of	 thousands	 of	residents.77		While	 Chapter	 5	 chapter	 used	 a	 landscape-mobilities	 analysis	 to	argue	 that	 favela	 integration	 responds	 to	 the	 socio-political	 crisis	 of	 the	divided	 city,	 the	 present	 chapter	 builds	 on	 Chapter	 6	 to	 examine	 the	spatial	 practices	 of	 the	 state	 in	 order	 to	 territorialise	 the	 favelas.	 Paes	speaks	 of	 the	 combined	works	 of	 favela	 pacification	 and	 the	 Teleférico	along	with	the	additional	PAC	interventions	as	a	revolution	that	restores	the	right	 to	come	and	go	to	residents,	and	that	restores	his	authority	as	mayor	 to	 govern	 and	 deliver	 services	 (such	 as	 health	 care)	 to	 the																																																									77	Those	“removed”	can	take	a	cash	payout	(calculated	based	on	the	structure,	not	the	 land	 for	 which	 they	 have	 no	 legal	 title)	 or	 accept	 a	 unit	 in	 a	 new	 housing	complex	build	according	to	MCMV	regulations.	Both	PAC-favela	national	standards	and	Morar	Carioca	stipulate	that	residents	should	be	re-housed	on-site	or	adjacent	to	 their	 community,	 however	 there	 have	 been	 instances	 where	 the	 number	 of	“removed”	 families	 surpassed	 the	 quantity	 of	 new	 units	 built.	 Similarly	 MCMV	construction	has	been	delayed	or	suspended	and	those	families	are	left	in	a	housing	bureaucratic	 limbo,	 receiving	 (if	 they	 are	 lucky)	 a	 paltry	 R$400	 per	 month	 in	housing	assistance.	While	I	was	conducting	fieldwork,	a	cinderblock	one	room	home	in	Complexo	do	Alemão	could	cost	up	to	R$500-600	to	rent.		
	 251	
population.	 Jorge	 notes	 the	 paradigmatic	 shift	 in	 urban	 planning	 that	characterise	this	spatial	strategy.	With	the	combined	resources	and	multi-scalar	 state	 commitment,	 state	 interventions	 into	 the	 favelas	 go	 from	placing	 the	 favela	 in	 the	neighbourhood	to	placing	 the	 favela	 in	 the	city.	These	 links	 between	 the	 once	 fractured	 city	 and	 the	 “revolutionised”	whole	 city	 is	 favela	 integration	 working	 as	 a	 “state	 spatial	 strategy	 of	territory”	 (Brenner	 and	 Elden	 2009)	 in	 that	 it	 produces	 the	 notion	 of	bounded	space	 that	 is	not	homogeneous	 in	quality—the	 favela	does	not	stop	being	the	favela—but	subject	to	homogeneous	sovereignty.			
7.4	The	Teleférico	and	state	space		This	 section	 and	 the	 next	 contribute	 to	 the	 discussion	regarding	 favela	 integration	 as	 a	 project	 of	 territory	 by	 examining	how	 the	Teleférico’s	 form	and	 functions	produce	 state	 space.	Thus	 I	respond	to	Brenner	and	Elden	(2009)	who	argue	that	the	production	of	state	space	and	territory	are	concomitant.		The	Teleférico	of	Alemão	and	other	gondola	transport	in	Rio78	have	 garnered	much	 attention	but	 little	 systematic	 analysis.	 General	policy	 and	 programme	 analyses	 have	 noted	 an	 increase	 of	 cable-car	and	 similar	 transport	 infrastructure	 included	 in	 favela-urbanisation	proposals	as	a	novelty	or	planning	trend	(Izaga	and	Pereira	2014;	L.	A.	de	 S.	 Pereira	 2011;	 Leitão	 and	 Delecave	 2011).	 The	 touristic	marketing	 of	 the	 Teleféricos	 have	 been	 noted	 as	 paradoxically	transforming	 long-time	 social	 problems	 into	 a	 mega-event	 tourist	attraction	 that	 may	 contribute	 to	 favela	 gentrification	 (Guimarães	2015;	Cummings	2013).	Larkins	sees	PAC-favelas	through	the	lens	of	pacification,	 and	 argues	 that	 the	 urbanisation	 and	 symbolic	infrastructure	are	part	of	a	project	of	 “removing	and	relocating	poor																																																									78	The	historic	“first	favela”	of	Providência	inaugurated	a	gondola	in	2014	as	part	of	the	port-redevelopment	project	and	the	PAC-Rocinha	project	also	plans	on	building	a	gondola	despite	sustained	resistance	from	residents.	
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people	 and	 attracting	 new	 kinds	 of	 residents”,	 as	well	 as	 a	 strategy	lifted	 from	 global	 counter	 insurgence	 theory	 in	 order	 to	 convince	residents	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 state	 intervention	 (2015,	 148).	 Similarly	Freeman	 (2014),	 focussing	 mostly	 on	 evictions	 in	 Providência	 with	some	 reference	 to	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão,	 views	 the	 Teleféricos	 as	 a	state	project	to	“thin”	the	favelas	and	install	a	Foucauldian	regime	of	control.		The	few	researchers	who	have	closely	analysed	the	Teleféricos	and	 PAC-favelas	 planning	 process	 have	 focussed	 on	 the	 project’s	stated	 objectives.	 In	 such	 cases	 the	 cost	 of	 construction	 is	 noted	 as	unjustifiable,	 the	 infrastructure	 itself	 underused,	 and	 its	 imposition	draconian	with	an	eye	on	inflating	construction	and	MCMV	budgets	as	well	as	its	symbolic	touristic	value	(Andrade	2009;	Trindade	2012;	L.	B.	D.	Santos	2014).	Additional	criticisms	by	resident-activists	and	non-resident	 advocates	 include	 that	 the	 Teleférico	 do	 Alemão	 serves	 a	small	 fraction	 of	 the	 favelas’	 residents	 (13%	 according	 to	 a	 statistic	without	a	clear	source),79	that	it	unnecessarily	displaced	thousands	of	residents,	 and	 that	 it	 has	 failed	 both	 to	 attract	 a	 sense	 community	ownership	and	to	deliver	significant	economic	benefits	as	a	celebrated	tourist	attraction.	While	such	project	analysis	is	important	for	citizens	to	hold	their	governing	officials	accountable,	my	objective	here	is	not	to	 analyse	 the	 gondola	 system’s	 failures	 but	 rather	 to	 understand	what	 the	 infrastructure	does,	 what	 are	 the	 productive	 results	 of	 the	Teleférico?																																																										79	 The	 statistic	 that	 claims	 only	 13%	 of	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 residents	 use	 the	Teleférico	 was	 often	 cited	 by	 activists	 and	 critics	 who	 claimed	 the	 infrastructure	was	a	“white	elephant.”	I	never	saw	critics	cite	a	source,	and	I	even	asked	a	couple	activists	I	knew	who	spoke	out	against	the	Teleférico	where	they	got	that	statistic.	They	shrugged	and	said	that	it	was	the	number	community	activists	in	Rocinha	were	using	 as	 evidence	 against	 building	 a	 Teleférico	 in	 Rocinha.	 Eventually	 I	 found	 the	figure	 cited	 in	 news	 stories	 about	 the	 Teleférico	 one	 year	 after	 inauguration.	Supervia	 had	 reported	 ridership	 data	 and	 13%	 of	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 residents	had	registered	with	 the	company	 to	obtain	special	 travel	 cards	granting	 them	two	free	rides	per	day.	By	2014,	that	number	had	risen	only	slightly,	to	about	17%.		
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The	Teleférico	consists	of	six	stations	including	the	entry	point	in	 the	 Bonsucesso	 train	 station,	 temporarily	 known	 as	 Bonsucesso-Tim	 while	 the	 telecommunications	 multinational	 had	 leased	 the	naming	 rights	 from	 Supervia	 train	 company.	 The	 integration	 station	between	 the	 train	 and	 the	 Teleférico	 is	 large,	 consisting	 of	 an	exhibition	area	and	public	bathrooms	before	the	ticket	barrier,	as	well	as	administrative	offices.	During	my	fieldwork	I	saw	three	temporary	exhibitions	 and	 one	 seemingly	 permanent	 exhibition	 in	 the	 publicly	accessible	 exhibition	 hall.	 The	 first	 corresponded	 to	 the	 gondola’s	inauguration—a	 photography	 exhibition	 documenting	 both	 the	Teleférico	 construction	and	 the	military	occupation	of	 the	Complexo	through	 the	 lenses	 of	 the	 Alemão	 Photography	 Club.	 The	 small	billboard-sized	 photographs,	 which	 commuters	 and	 visitors	 walked	through,	 depicted	 progress	 and	 hope—the	 military	 occupation	 as	“peace	making”	 and	 the	 Teleférico	 as	 transformative.	 The	 following	year	I	saw	a	literary	installation	celebrating	two	well	known	Brazilian	authors—Raul	 Pompeia	 and	 Aluísio	 Azevedo—whose	 work	 often	centred	 on	 the	 lives	 of	 Brazilians	 living	 in	 tenement	 housing.	 The	exhibition	 corresponded	 to	 a	 literary	 festival	 focussing	 on	 Rio	 de	Janeiro’s	 “peripheries”	 known	 as	 FLUPP	 (A	 Festa	 Literatura	 das	Pereferías).	The	festival	was	originally	organised	in	2012	by	the	State	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	connection	with	favela	pacification	(hence	the	UPP	in	 the	 acronym).	 FLUPP	as	well	 as	 the	 exhibition’s	 introductory	 text	produces	 the	 favelas	 and	urban	peripheries	 as	places	of	 growth	and	promise	and	the	Teleférico	as	“one	of	the	principal	symbols	of	the	new	times,	of	this	new	class	C	[the	new	middle	class],	of	these	protagonists	raised	 in	the	new	political	scene.”	Shortly	 thereafter	a	contemporary	art	project	sponsored	by	the	Federal	Ministry	of	Culture,	worked	with	the	aesthetics	of	 the	 favela	and	the	view	point	of	 the	Teleférico.	One	installation	was	exhibited	 in	 the	Bonsucesso	station	and	various	 laje	rooftops	 visible	 from	 the	 cable	 cars	were	 used	 as	 display	 canvasses	
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for	 contemporary	 artists.	 What	 these	 exhibitions—produced	 by	 RJ	Sate	 or	 Federal	 ministries	 (including	 Mins.	 Of	 Culture,	 Transport,	Security)	 with	 various	 corporate	 sponsors—have	 in	 common	 is	 the	idea	that	Rio	de	Janeiro	and	Brazil	are	in	a	defining	moment	of	history	in	 which	 the	 favelas	 are	 central	 to	 economic,	 cultural	 and	 political	progress.	This	is	made	explicit	by	the	permanent	display	produced	by	the	 IPP	 titled	 “From	 Cortiço	 Cabeça	 de	 Porco	 to	 the	 Teleférico	 do	
Alemão:	 120	Years	of	History	of	Popular	Housing	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro.”	The	 display	 is	 structured	 as	 a	 timeline	 with	 photos	 and	 text	documenting	 state	 policy	 towards	 housing	 of	 the	 poor	 working	classes,	honestly	depicting	the	violence	and	forced	evictions	suffered	by	 the	 poor	 throughout	 the	 20th	 century	 until	 the	 innovation	 of	Favela-Bairro	 and	 finally	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 popular	neighbourhoods	 through	 pacification,	 urbanisation,	 and	 large-scale	investments	like	the	Teleférico.		The	 Teleférico	 stations	were	 designed	 by	 the	 architect	 based	on	 the	 gondolas	 in	 Medellín,	 Colombia,	 as	 dynamic	 social	 and	economic	 hubs—eventually	 becoming	 centres	 of	 work,	 play,	transport,	 and	 culture.	 I	 spoke	 with	 a	 number	 of	 State	 employees	involved	 in	 PAC-favelas	 that	 visited	 Medellín.	 Their	 educational	exchange	tours	of	social	urbanism	projects	 in	Medellín,	 including	the	gondolas	 and	 Biblioteca	 de	 España,	 left	 them	 feeling	 inspired,	 and	they	returned	to	Rio	de	Janeiro	with	the	expectation	that	residents	of	Rio’s	 favelas	 would	 embrace	 the	 same	 infrastructure.	 However	 the	original	vision	or	potential	of	the	Teleférico	of	Alemão	is	far	from	the	reality.	 Pedro	 da	 Luz	 Moreira	 told	 me	 that	 the	 Governor	 and	 other	politicians	pressured	Jáuregui	to	include	a	gondola	in	his	PAC	project	because	 they	 liked	what	 they	saw	during	 their	educational	exchange	trip	 to	 the	Colombian	 city.	 Jáuregui	had	not	previously	 considered	a	Teleférico	in	his	extensive	study	and	plan	of	Complexo	do	Alemão.			
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Pedro:	There	was	a	story	on	Globo	by	a	journalist.	She	interviewed	a	
series	 of	 residents	 in	 Alemão	 and	 they	 said,	 “No,	 I	 don’t	 use	 the	
Teleférico.”	Because	 if	we	were	 to	 look	at	 the	 structure	of	Alemão,	
the	greatest	density	is	in	the	valleys	and	the	Teleférico	goes	between	
the	ridges,	it	connects	the	summits.	So	in	this	report	the	guy	says,	“I	
have	 a	 problem	 with	 my	 leg,	 and	 I	 can’t	 walk	 up	 400	 and	 such	
degree	 incline	 to	get	 to	 the	Teleférico	station,”	you	 follow?	“I	get	a	
moto-taxi	from	here	[home],	and	the	moto-taxi	takes	me	wherever.”	
So	the	Teleférico	in	Alemão	became	a	tourist	apparatus—which	is	a	
good	 thing.	 I	 don’t	 think	 that’s	 bad,	 because	 it	 plays	 that	 role	 to	
bring	 people	 from	 outside	 of	 the	 community	 to	 visit	 the	comunidade.	 That	 is	 a	 good	 thing.	 But	 it	 wasn’t	 thought	 of,	
absolutely,	 to	be	used	 like	 that.	Different	 than	Medellín,	where	you	
see	 that	 the	 interventions	were	 thought-out	actions,	planned.	Here	
they’re	not…	To	me,	in	Brazil,	in	the	field	of	favela	urbanisation,	that	
who	came	to	dictate	the	programmes	are	the	collective	interests	of	
the	owners	of	industry.	
Tucker:	 Do	 you	 think	 the	 Teleférico	 of	 Alemão	 was	 simply	 an	
imitation	of	Medellín?	
Pedro:	Yes,	without	much	coherency.	
Tucker:	Because	the	politicians	wanted	to	see	a	Teleférico?	
Pedro:	Exactly.	
Tucker:	So	Jorge	delivered?	
Pedro:	Exactly,	I	think	that’s	right.				 Most	 of	 the	 five	 stations	 are	 empty	 of	 people	 and	 devoid	 of	commerce,	despite	the	fact	that	banks	and	ATMs	were	placed	in	two	of	the	 stations.	 (Figure	 7.5	 lists	 the	 six	 stations,	 accompanying	bureaucratic	 or	 social	 infrastructure,	 and	 corresponding	 population	and	households	 (in	 absolute	numbers)	 according	 to	 the	most	 recent	census	 data.)	 All	 stations	 have	 public	 bathrooms,	 a	 rarity	 in	 favelas	given	the	lack	of	public	buildings.	The	largest	stations	are	Alemão	and	Palmeiras,	which	contain	a	number	of	offices	and	community	spaces.	Notably	 the	 first	 national	 post	 office	 was	 opened	 in	 the	 Alemão	station,	 along	 with	 a	 federal	 social	 assistance	 office	 (Centro	 de	
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Referência	 de	 Assitência	 Social	 or	 CRAS)	 which	 has	 the	 objective	 of	offering	services	of	“social	protection”	to	“vulnerable	populations”	and	connecting	 individuals	 to	 existing	 welfare	 programmes,	 a	 social	security	office	where	retired	populations	may	access	the	state	pension	bureaucracy,	 office	 spaces	 for	 youth	 programmes	 and	 cultural	projects	as	well	as	a	multi-use	community	space	that	is	used	to	teach	dance	 and	 martial	 arts.	 Based	 on	 my	 observations,	 Alemão	 station	experiences	 the	 most	 traffic	 from	 residents	 because	 of	 its	 social	infrastructure,	 especially	 related	 to	 youth	programming.	 Curiously,	 I	saw	 the	 post	 office	 was	 often	 shut	 during	 normal	 business	 hours	without	explanation.			 Despite	 the	model	of	bustling	 local	economic	and	social	hubs,	save	 the	 cultural	 installations	 described	 above	 the	 stations	 serve	principally	as	host	 to	 state	offices.	For	example	Baiana	 station	holds	the	offices	of	a	Post	of	Urban	and	Social	Guidance	(or	the	Portuguese	acronym	 POUSO),	 a	 programme	 run	 by	 the	 Municipal	 Secretary	 of	Urbanism	 that	 forms	 part	 of	 the	 paradigm	 of	 favela	 integration	 (for	overview	see:	Paula	2006;	for	programmeme	evaluation	see:	Vial	and	Cavallieri	2009).	POUSOs,	which	originated	during	Favela-Bairro,	are	centres	 established	 by	 the	 municipal	 government	 within	 favelas	targeted	for	“integration”	and	“urbanisation.”	A	mix	of	social	workers,	architects,	and	engineers	staff	each	centre,	promoting	and	counselling	residents	 to	 construct	 or	 expand	 their	 homes	 according	 to	 standard	building	norms.	They	also	facilitate	the	legal	bureaucratic	process	for	residents,	when	eligible,	who	wish	to	obtain	legal	documents	such	as	“Habit-se”,	 which	 recognizes	 that	 the	 structure	 followed	 building	codes	 and	 facilitates	 obtaining	 the	 legal	 title	 of	 a	 property.80																																																									80	During	Favela-Bairro,	the	issued	documents	recognised	the	residents’	ownership	of	the	structures,	not	the	 land,	and	thus	bureaucratically	recognised	the	 legal	right	to	stay	put	that	most	favela	residents	gained	with	the	1988	constitution	(exceptions	abound)	as	well	as	allowing	residents	to	register	the	purchase	and	sale	of	the	house	with	 the	 General	 Registry	 of	 Property	 (Registro	 Geral	 de	 Imóveis).	 However	 the	
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Discursively	 the	 programme	 is	 described	 by	 the	 municipal	government	within	the	paradigm	of	 integration	discussed	 in	Chapter	5:		
The	 Municipal	 Secretary	 of	 Urbanism,	 traditionally	 dedicated	 to	
planning,	licensing,	and	enforcement	of	the	legal	city,	now	has	begun	
to	work	with	the	 informal	city”	(emphasis	added).	POUSOs	have	the	
objective	of	“promoting	the	urbanistic	normalisation	of	our	city.	[…]	
One	can	no	 longer	 ignore	the	reality	of	 the	urban	environment.	The	
Municipal	 Secretary	 of	 Urbanism	 broke	 with	 tradition	 of	 working	
only	with	the	legal	city,	 initiating	a	new	era	of	Carioca	urbanism	by	
beginning	to	work	with	the	real	city	as	is,	composed	in	great	part	by	
irregular	 settlements”	 (“Posto	 de	 Orientação…”	 2010,	 emphasis	
added).		This	description	references	the	dichotomous	divided	city—that	which	is	“legal”	and	that	which	is	“informal”—as	an	historical	 falsehood,	an	error,	and	that	to	govern	according	to	such	a	dichotomy	was	a	denial	of	 reality.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 municipal	 government	 through	 “favela	consolidation”,	 Favela-Bairro,	 and	 POUSO	 breaks	 with	 that	 error	 in	judgement	and	decides	to	confront	the	material	conditions	of	the	“real	city”,	a	city	of	favelas.		Returning	 to	 the	 Teleférico,	 Palmeiras	 station	 is	 the	 last	 stop	and	 all	 passengers	 are	 required	 to	 disembark.	 The	 station	 holds	 a	library,	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 network	 of	 public	 state	 network	 called	
Bibliotecas	Parque	Estadual	 created	by	the	State	Secretary	of	Culture	in	2010	and	managed	by	a	non-governmental	organised	(known	as	a	Social	 Organisation81)	 since	 2014.	 The	 library	 consisted	 of	 an																																																									current	municipal	 government	 has	 promoted	 the	 granting	 of	 official	 land	 titles,	 a	policy	 also	 supported	by	 the	national	 government	 and	 included	 in	 the	Ministry	 of	Cities’	instruction	manual	for	PAC-favela	interventions.	81	 Social	 Organisations,	 or	 Organizações	 Sociais	 (OS),	 are	 non-governmental	 legal	entities	 with	 the	 explicit	 purpose	 of	 delivering	 or	 managing	 a	 social	 service.	 A	common	example	of	an	OS	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	are	family	and	community	health	clinics.	See	 Fernandes,	 (R.	 C.	 Fernandes	 1994),	 who	 founded	 one	 of	 the	most	 prominent	NGOs	in	Rio	de	Janeiro,	Viva	Rio,	which	operates	as	an	OS	in	the	health	care	market.	For	a	critique	with	a	focus	on	how	these	organisations	work	in	the	favelas,	see	Sinek	(2012).	
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exhibition	 area,	 book	 collection	 and	 reading	 area,	 a	 computer	 lab,	auditorium,	 and	 community	 multi-purpose	 room;	 however	 in	September	 of	 2014	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 library	 was	 controversially	ceded	 to	 install	 a	 health	 clinic	 roughly	 four	 weeks	 before	 elections	(discussed	below).		The	Teleférico	stations	might	be	regarded	as	highly	regulated,	protected,	 connected	 state	 spaces	 within	 the	 sprawling	 favela.	 It	allows	 the	 state	 privileged	 and	 consistent	 access	 to	 the	 area.	 For	example,	 when	 IMF	 President	 Christine	 Lagarde	 attended	 a	 Central	Bank	event	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro	 the	 transport	 technology	permitted	 the	international	financier	to	witness	the	state’s	actions	in	the	city’s	poor	communities	 despite	 violence	 between	 the	 gangs	 and	 police.	 News	stories	note	that	“Lagarde	insisted	in	visiting	Alemão	despite	violence,	but	the	tour	was	quite	quick	and	she	did	not	walk	through	the	streets”	due	to	concerns	over	a	gun	battle	the	night	before.82	Instead	she	rode	the	gondola,	stopping	at	different	stations	for	photo-ops	with	women	recipients	of	micro-credit	loans	and	to	watch	a	brief	demonstration	of	the	Afro-Brazilian	combat-dance	Capoeira.	As	 exhibition	 spaces,	 the	 stations	 permit	 the	 construction	 of	public	 narratives	 defining	 both	 the	 place	 of	 the	 favela	 in	contemporary	Brazil	 and	Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 as	well	 as	 the	 relationships	between	the	historically	persecuted	neighbourhoods	and	the	state.	As	administrative	centres,	the	stations	are	points	where	residents	access	certain	 state	 services	 (postal	 service,	 legal	 and	 construction	consultation)	 and	 experience	 or	 collect	 state	 benefits	 (the	 welfare	office,	 youth	 programming,	 health	 care,	 library	 and	 educational	resources).			
																																																								82	 See:	 http://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2015/05/no-complexo-do-alemao-lagarde-defende-ajuste-fiscal-contra-pobreza.html	
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Figure	7.5	–	The	Teleférico	stations	STATION	NAME	 SERVICES/INFRASTRUCTURE	 POPULATION/	HOUSEHOLDS	Bonsucesso-Tim	 Exhibition	 hall,	 administrative	 offices,	bathrooms,	integration	w/	train	station	 N/A	Adeus	 Banco	do	Brasil	bank	branch,	ATM	 1,102/345	Baiana	 POUSO	 (Post	 of	 Urban	 and	 Social	 Guidance),	ATM	 2,086/669	Alemão-Kibon	 Administrative	 office,	 post-office,	 Social	welfare	 office	 (CRAS),	 Social	 Security	 office	(INSS),	Youth	centre	(CRJ)	
14,413/4,138	
Itararé-Natura	 Community	education	classrooms	(FIRJAN)	 1,568/505	Palmeiras	 Library,	 Family	 &	 Community	 Health	 Clinic	(former	 community	 centre	 &	 workspace),	auditorium,	outdoor	terrace	w/	tourist	gift	&	refreshment	stands	
2,138/688	
	 	
7.5	The	politics	of	the	Teleférico	and	fragility	of	territory		State	 interventions	 into	 favelas	 are	 often	 associated	 with	electoral	 campaigning	 both	 in	 Brazil	 and	 elsewhere.	 While	 citizens	and	political	observers	may	be	scornful	of	vote	bank	politics—where	politicians	 arrange	 for	 some	 degree	 of	 upgrade	 in	 services	 or	paralegal	 recognition	 to	 remain	without	 threat	 of	 eviction—recently	scholars	 have	 argued	 that	 such	 strategies	 are	 the	morally	 legitimate	means	by	which	the	urban	poor	secure	their	homes,	 livelihoods,	and	rights	 as	 citizens	 (Chatterjee	 2006;	 Benjamin	 2008;	 Holston	 2008;	Ghertner	2015).	 In	such	cases	the	favela	 is	defined	by	its	 informality	and	precariousness;	and	the	absence	of	the	state—the	lack	of	or	poor	service	 provision—presents	 an	 opportunity	 to	 leverage	 votes	 for	services	or	vice	versa	(Gay	1999).		I	 propose	 that	 favela	 integration	 as	 realised	 by	 PAC-favelas	
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alters	the	political	relationship	between	the	state	and	favelas.	Above	I	demonstrated	 how	 the	 Teleférico	 operates	 as	 a	 type	 of	 highly	regulated	 and	 controlled	 state	 space	 permitting	 the	 practice	 of	territory.	This	section	focussed	on	the	politics	of	state	space.	Both	how	permanent	 infrastructure	 may	 be	 ‘returned’	 to	 and	 exploited	 for	electoral	 gain.	 Conversely,	 the	 Teleférico	 became	 a	 contested	 state	space	when	residents	and	activists	invoked	the	symbolic	intervention	as	 spectacle	 and	 false	 promise,	 thus	 exposing	 the	 fragility	 and	challenges	to	achieving	the	territory	effect.		Rio	de	Janeiro	elections	for	state	governor	were	held	in	2014.	A	challenge	 in	 all	 elections	 in	 Rio	 is	 to	 pay	 off	 criminal	 organisations.	Party	 politics	 in	 the	 favelas,	 indeed	 throughout	 the	 city,	 requires	navigating	a	complex	web	of	clientelist	relationships	between	political	parties,	 resident	 association	 leaders,	 non-party	 political	 groups	 and	religious	organisations	(Gay	1990).	With	the	emergence	of	drug	gangs	and	 more	 recently	 the	 illegal	 police-run	 milicias,	 political	 leaders	mediate	 their	 relationships	 with	 organised	 crime	 leaders	 through	civic	 actors	 and	 community	 leaders	 (Arias	 2006).	 In	 order	 to	 hold	campaign	events	and	erect	 small	billboards	around	 the	 favela	 (often	on	the	lajes	of	homes)	the	political	parties	pay	the	milicias	or	gangs.83	Exactly	how	much	the	political	party	pays	or	in	how	many	of	the	city’s	favelas	 the	practice	persists	 is	unknown,	but	 an	exposé	written	 in	O	
Globo	 the	 same	 year	 reported	 that	 according	 to	 police	 intelligence	investigating	 the	 practice,	 in	 2014	 political	 campaigns	 paid	 up	 to	R$300,000	 to	 campaign	 in	 some	 favelas,	 including	 favelas	 that	were	pacified.	 Such	 revelations	 did	 not	 surprise	 the	 already	 sceptical	 and	politically	disenchanted	voting	population,	which	was	well	aware	that																																																									83	Arias	tells	the	story	of	a	community	leader	negotiating,	on	behalf	of	the	local	gang,	exclusive	campaign	access	to	a	political	party.	This	leader	received	money	from	the	party	and	in	turn	hires	local	campaigners	with	direct	ties	to	the	gang;	except	shortly	before	 the	 election	 the	 gang	 negotiates	 a	 new	 deal	 with	 a	 competing	 party	 and	orders	all	 the	campaign	signs	switched	to	reflect	the	new	alliance	(Arias	2006,	78-79).	
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the	gangs	and	milicias	are	intimately	involved	in	local	politics.		I	have	seen	the	effects	of	not	paying	to	campaign	in	the	favelas.	During	a	preliminary	field	trip	in	2012,	I	visited	Complexo	do	Alemão	with	 a	 resident	 NGO	 worker	 and	 cultural	 activist	 during	 an	 earlier	congressional	and	municipal	campaign	season.	We	saw	thousands	of	small	 billboards	 for	 candidates	 and	 their	 parties	 on	 top	 of	 rooftops	and	 signs	 attached	 to	 homes’	 exteriors.	 He	 explained	 that	 many	residents	 receive	 a	 small	 kickback	 for	 displaying	 campaign	propaganda	on	their	homes.	I	saw	signs	for	most	of	the	major	parties	and	 many	 parties	 that	 I	 never	 heard	 of	 (Eduardo	 Paes	 of	 PMDB	ultimately	 won	 the	 Mayor’s	 Office	 with	 a	 20-party	 coalition),	 but	 I	voiced	surprise	not	 to	see	any	signs	 for	Marcelo	Freixo	of	PSOL.	The	darling	candidate	of	the	Left	in	Rio	de	Janeiro,	Freixo	made	a	national	name	for	himself	by	combating	police	corruption	and	the	milicias.	The	film	Trope	 de	 Elite	 2	 personified	 him	 through	 the	 character	 of	 State	Congressional	Representative	Fraga,	a	crusader	for	human	rights.	But	our	 guide,	 a	 musician	 who	 turned	 part	 of	 his	 own	 home	 into	 a	computer	 lab	 and	 learning	 centre	 for	 neighbourhood	 children	 and	whom	 I	would	 see	 every	 so	 often	 in	 his	 capacity	 as	 a	 youth	worker	and	 music	 teacher	 in	 the	 Alemão-Kibón	 station,	 dismissively	 called	Freixo	a	 “Zona	Sul	playboy.”	This	seemed	odd	to	me	at	 the	 time,	but	during	my	 fieldwork	 I	 heard	 other	 favela	 activists	 treat	 Freixo	with	similar	dismissiveness,	stating	that	he	did	not	understand	the	reality	of	the	favelas	or	that	he	was	a	politician	like	“the	rest	of	them.”	Freixo,	a	school	 teacher	who	rose	 in	 the	ranks	of	 the	 teachers’	union	before	entering	 politics,	 does	 live	 in	 Zona	 Sul,	 but	 in	 the	 low-key	neighbourhood	 of	 Gloria;	 and	 he	 and	 his	 party	 champion	 policies	influenced	by	a	right-to-the-city	political	framework.	When	I	brought	up	this	seeming	disconnect	between	the	ideology	of	Freixo/PSOL	and	the	expressed	attitudes	of	a	few	of	my	research	contacts	with	a	friend	who	 works	 as	 a	 economic	 and	 political	 advisor	 to	 a	 PSOL	 city	
	 262	
councilman,	 he	 lamented	 that	 the	 party	 has	 had	 great	 difficulty	 in	reaching	voters	in	the	favelas.	He	told	me	that	even	if	PSOL	candidates	were	 willing	 to	 pay	 off	 the	milicias	 and	 gangs	 (he	 assured	 me	 that	while	many	would	reject	this	as	unethical,	others	are	less	scrupulous)	the	party	simply	doesn’t	have	the	money	given	that	it	does	not	accept	donations	 from	 large	 businesses	 and	 does	 not	 run	 a	 back-campaign	with	undeclared	campaign	donations	(referred	to	as	caixa	2).		In	 2014,	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 saw	 a	 resurgence	 of	 gang	activity	 attempting	 to	 reassert	 itself	 and	 challenge	UPP	 control.	 The	
traficantes	 reportedly	 barred	 PMDB	 and	 Governor	 Pezão	 from	entering	the	Complexo,	thus	paying	to	campaign	was	not	an	option.84	Another	candidate,	the	populist	Garotinho	(then	of	the	catch-all	party	PR,	or	Party	of	the	Republic)	who	had	served	as	Governor	from	1999	to	2002,	was	campaigning	aggressively	 in	Alemão.	 I	often	heard	cars	fitted	 with	 speakers	 playing	 campaign	 jingles	 promising	 that	Garotinho	would	return	and	fight	for	the	people.	That	included	ending	the	UPP	which	he	repeatedly	declared	a	disastrous	public	policy,	but	he	had	no	favela-specific	platform	beyond	reinstating	a	cash-transfer	programme	 called	 the	 Citizen’s	 Cheque	 (Cheque	 Cidadão)	 (Caballero	2014).		Many	 of	 my	 interviewees	 feared	 what	 a	 Garotinho	administration	 would	 mean	 for	 favela-integration,	 not	 just	 the																																																									84	 I	 could	not	verify	 these	 reports—which	 I	heard	 from	both	a	 community	activist	and	 local	NGO	 founder	and	a	 state	employee	connected	 to	a	PAC	project—in	 local	news	 media.	 O	 Globo	 newspaper	 reported	 that	 Pezão	 indeed	 had	 visited	 Nova	Brasilia	 in	 the	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 for	 a	 campaign	 stop,	 which	 he	 brought	 up	defiantly	 in	 response	 to	 a	 question	 about	 violence	 in	 the	 Complexo	 prior	 to	 the	election.	However	the	same	paper	reported	that	Pezão	cancelled	at	least	one	event	in	the	Complexo	as	a	result	of	gang/UPP	violence.	Pezão	did	have	allies	among	some	resident	 association	 leaders,	 so	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 the	 gang	 was	 able	 to	 exert	complete	 control.	 However,	 association	 leader	 Luiz	 Antônio	 de	 Moura	 began	 to	receive	threats	for	his	support	of	PMDB’s	UPP	policy	months	before	the	election	and	the	LGBT	activist	who	organised	the	Complexo	do	Alemão	annual	Pride	March	was	murdered	in	December	2014	(C.	Nascimento	2014).	His	death	received	little	media	attention	but	was	considered	a	terrible	loss	among	local	community	organisers	and	human	rights	activists.	
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pacification	 campaign.85	 With	 low	 approval	 ratings	 after	 the	 2013	protests,	 violent	 police	 repression,	 and	 two	 popularly	 supported	teacher	strikes,	Pezão’s	re-election	was	far	from	secure.	The	fact	that	the	gang	was	 impeding	campaigning	 in	 favelas	as	 large	as	Complexo	do	Alemão	could	have	a	serious	effect	on	the	election	result.		As	 reported	 to	 me	 by	 community	 activists	 and	 one	 of	 the	managers	of	the	Biblioteca	Parque	in	the	Palmeira’s	station,	a	resident	association	 president	 came	 up	with	 a	 creative	 solution	 to	 the	 entry	ban.	If	Governor	Pezão	could	not	enter	The	Complexo	due	to	security	concerns,	 they	 would	 find	 another	 way	 to	 show	 the	 government’s	commitment	to	the	people	of	the	Complexo:	open	a	new	family	health	centre,	 and	 fast.	 But	 opening	 a	 new	 health	 care	 facility	 is	 not	 a	straightforward	 task.	 Under	 PAC,	 the	 state	 government	 had	 already	built	 an	 Urgent	 Care	 Centre	 in	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão.	 Family	 and	Community	Health	Centres	are	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	municipal	government,	 not	 the	 state.	 And	 as	 noted	 by	 Mayor	 Paes	 at	 the	inauguration	 of	 the	 Teleférico,	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 had	 already	reached	100	percent	coverage	by	existing	family	health	clinics	 in	the	area	 according	 to	 the	municipal	 health	 secretary	 (cited	 above).	 PAC	funds	had	been	used	to	build	Family	and	Community	Health	Centres	in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro,	 but	 only	 where	 the	 city	 has	 agreed	 to	 take	responsibility	of	maintaining	them	in	the	long	term.86																																																										85	Garotinho	had	a	history	of	negotiating	with	the	gang	fractions	when	he	served	as	Secretary	 of	 Security.	 He	 left	 PMDB	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 federal	 congress	 representative	prior	to	challenging	Governor	Pezão	in	2014.	The	anti-drug	police	sub-department	(known	as	DCOD)	accused	Garotinho	and	the	Evangelical	Pastor	Marcos	Pereira	da	Silva	 of	 colluding	with	 gang	 leaders	 to	 plan	 attacks	 and	 bus	 burnings	 around	 the	city.	Their	objective	was	allegedly	 to	mobilise	 the	Comando	Vermelho’s	 forces	 (the	gang	that	controlled	much	of	Complexo	do	Alemão	and	was	reasserting	itself	in	the	area	 under	 pacification)	 to	 undermine	 PMDB’s	 security	 policies	 and	 re-election	chances	(Corrêa	2014).	It	should	be	noted	that	the	accusations,	referring	to	violence	during	 2010,	were	 leaked	 to	 the	 press	 in	 June	 of	 2014,	 about	 five	months	 before	elections.	86	 In	 Complexo	de	Manguinhos,	 for	 example,	 the	 community	 expressed	 a	 need	 for	another	 family	 health	 centre.	 PAC	 Social	 green-lit	 the	 funds	 to	 include	 the	 new	building	 in	 the	 project	 design	 but	 when	 the	 project	 supervisors	 contacted	 the	
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An	 additional	 challenge	 was	 where	 to	 build	 the	 centre.	Appropriating	 enough	 land	 on	 which	 to	 construct	 a	 health	 centre	would	 have	 taken	 months,	 not	 weeks,	 especially	 if	 they	 were	 to	purchase	 existing	 homes	 in	 order	 to	 clear	 enough	 space.	 Therefore,	the	new	health	centre	would	have	to	be	built	on	space	already	owned	or	 administered	 by	 the	 government:	 the	 Teleférico.	 The	 largest	station,	 Palmeiras,	 contained	 the	 library	 with	 a	 computer	 learning	room,	 an	 auditorium	 and	 a	 cultural	 space	 which	 served	 dance	 and	theatre	 groups,	 adult	 learning,	 and	 general	 community	 enrichment.	Often	 referred	 to	 by	 government	 and	 civil	 society	 literature	 as	“cultural	infrastructure,”	the	Biblioteca	Parque	is	administered	by	the	State	 Ministry	 of	 Culture.	 The	 Casa	 Civil,	 essentially	 the	 governor’s	office,	determined	that	the	Ministry	of	Culture	would	cede	part	of	this	area	 to	 the	 Municipal	 Secretary	 of	 Health	 for	 a	 new	 Family	 and	Community	 Health	 Centre.	 Construction	 converting	 the	 community	enrichment	space	into	examination	rooms,	administrative	offices	and	medical	storage	closets	would	begin	immediately	and	be	completed	in	time	 for	 an	 inauguration	 almost	 perfectly	 timed	with	 elections.	 The	Community	 Health	 Centre	 would	 house	 three	 health	 teams	 serving	9,000	residents,	up	to	300	visits	per	day.	The	conversion	from	library	to	health	 clinic	would	be	at	 record	pace.	Construction	began	on	11th	September,	 the	very	same	day	 the	plan	was	made	public,	and	would	be	 complete	 within	 two	 weeks	 with	 a	 possible	 inauguration	 by	 30	September.	Elections	were	to	take	place	on	the	5th	of	October.		This	 decision	 was	 not	 without	 controversy.	 Due	 to	 the	expedited,	opaque,	 and	 irregular	process	by	which	 the	health	 centre	was	 conceived	 and	 approved,	 nobody	 except	 those	directly	 involved	in	the	decision-making	knew	what	exactly	was	going	on.	Employees	of																																																									Municipal	 Secretary	 of	 Health	 they	 were	 told	 that	 according	 to	 municipal	 data	Manguinhos	 was	 fully	 covered	 by	 existing	 centres	 and	 they	 were	 unwilling	 to	assume	responsibility	for	a	new	centre	within	the	favela.	
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the	 Secretary	 of	 Culture	 who	 worked	 in	 the	 Biblioteca	 Parque	Palmeiras	 were	 not	 informed	 of	 the	 decision	 and	 were	 confounded	when	 they	 showed	 up	 to	 work	 and	 found	 construction	 workers	unloading	 tools	 and	 materials,	 supposedly	 with	 the	 authority	 to	appropriate	library	space.		I	visited	the	library	the	day	after	construction	began	and	spoke	with	one	of	 the	 librarians	confidentially.	She	was	visibly	upset	when	we	 spoke	 and	 told	me	 that	 the	 Secretary	 of	 Culture	 only	 found	 out	about	 the	 plans	 when	 the	 librarians	 called	 frantically	 searching	 for	explanations.	But	it	was	too	late.	The	decision	came	directly	from	the	Governors’	office.	“This	here	is	a	looting!”	she	told	me,	“it’s	thievery!”		Community	 “cultural	 activists”	 immediately	mobilised	 against	what	 they	 saw	as	 an	 authoritarian	undervaluing	of	 cultural	 space	 in	the	 favela.	 On	 Facebook	 the	 plans	 were	 called	 a	 “cultural	 coup”.	Initially	 these	 activists	 decried	 the	 total	 destruction	 of	 the	 library,	resulting	 either	 from	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency	 of	 the	 plans	 or	 an	exaggeration	for	effect.	Photos	of	Governor	Pezão	circulated	with	the	demand	not	to	shut	the	library	along	with	photos	of	the	destruction	of	the	library/construction	of	the	health	centre	with	texts	criticizing	the	location	(see	figures	7.6	and	7.7).		
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Figure	7.6	–	“#CulturaSim”	
Image	 shared	 by	 resident-activists	 in	 Complexo	 do	 Alemão	 questioning	 the	
logic	 of	 installing	 a	 family	 health	 clinic	 in	 the	 library	 space	 in	 Palmeiras	
station.	 The	 text	 reads:	 “I	 support	 the	 permanence	 of	 the	 Biblioteca	 Parque	
Alemão.	The	mayor	of	Rio	wants	to	install	a	Family	Clinic	in	the	site	where	the	
library	 functions	 and	 take	 away	 the	 cultural	 space	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 a	
space	that	will	not	work.	If	the	doctors	don’t	even	come	[to	work]	at	the	UPA	
on	the	Estrada	do	Itararé,	imagine	them	climbing	the	hill…	#CulturaYes		
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Figure	7.7	–	Challenging	the	health	clinic	
A	 facebook	 post	 of	 Alan	 Brum,	 a	well	 known	 local	 activists	 and	 civil	 society	
leader	in	Complexo	do	Alemão.	Sharing	photos	of	the	construction	started	on	
the	same	day	as	the	health	clinic	was	announced,	Alan	adds,	“Straight	talk	for	
those	 who	 think	 that	 a	 Family	 Clinic	 can	 be	 built	 in	 15	 days	 on	 an	
inappropriate	site.	And	you’re	blind	if	you	don’t	see	the	political	marketing	(or	
there	 is	 $$$$$	 at	 play).	 Viva	 (o)Rio87	 and	 Luiz	 Fernando	 Pezão	 will	 have	
political	resistance.		 The	construction	of	 the	health	clinic	and	the	response	 from	local	activists	exemplifies	how	state	spaces	may	be	appropriated	 for	electoral	politics	 bypassing	 meaningful	 consultation	 with	 residents.	 The	 sudden	reclassification	of	a	portion	of	the	Biblioteca	Parque	from	library	to	health	clinic	 reinforces	 the	 stations	 as	 dominion	 of	 the	 state	 at	 the	 whim	 of	governing	 politicians.	 Resident-activists	 took	 it	 upon	 themselves	 to	unmask	political	pandering	and	challenge	what	they	see	as	inappropriate	and	 authoritarian	 “thievery”	 of	 cultural	 space,	 community	 space.	While	some	activists	suggest	that	doctors	would	not	show	up	for	work	on	the	top	of	the	hill,	interestingly	enough	when	I	spoke	to	the	clinic’s	manager	she																																																									87	Viva	Rio	is	the	OS	that	has	the	contract	to	run	the	Family	and	Community	Health	Centres	in	the	administrative	health	district	encompassing	Complexo	do	Alemão.	
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suggested	 that	 the	 Teleférico	 is	what	would	make	 it	 possible	 to	 recruit	health	professionals	to	work	in	the	middle	of	the	infamous	Complexo.	Her	response	reinforces	the	Teleférico	as	protected	infrastructure	to	operate	as	centres	of	social	services	serving	the	15	favelas	from	their	perch	on	the	hills.		
7.6	Making	room	for	feminist	analysis		In	 this	 final	 empirical	 section,	 I	 wish	 to	 examine	 how	 favela	integration	and	the	work	 it	entails	are	gendered	and	consider	how	a	feminist	 approach	 may	 benefit	 an	 analysis	 of	 territory	 and	 state	spatiality.	 Although	 my	 research	 questions	 are	 not	 couched	 within	questions	of	gender,	after	fieldwork	I	understood	that	any	analysis	of	favela	 integration	 that	 forgoes	 a	 feminist	 approach	 would	 be	incomplete.	 This	 became	 apparent	 when	 I	 perceived	 a	 highly	gendered	division	of	 labour	between	 the	 technical,	 architectural	and	engineering	planning	 fields	dominated	by	men	and	so-called	 “social”	interventions	spearheaded	and	staffed	by	women.	I	have	attempted	to	integrate	feminist	analysis	into	the	thesis	in	various	sections	in	what	otherwise	is	a	research	field	(the	state)	long	criticized	by	feminists	as	a	masculinist	academic	field	(MacKinnon	1989).	However,	at	the	risk	of	 segregating	 the	 topic	 of	 gender,	 I	 wish	 to	 devote	 a	 section	 to	 an	explicit	 feminist	 analysis	 of	 state	 interventions	 in	 the	 favelas.	What	follows	 is	 far	 from	 a	 comprehensive	 feminist	 analysis	 of	 favela	integration.	Rather	I	have	rethought	some	of	my	data	with	a	feminist	logic;	and	I	present	that	which	constructively	engages	with	literature	theorizing	state	space	and	territorial	projects.		The	 aforementioned	 gendered	 division	 of	 labour	 does	 not	come	as	a	surprise.	Men	historically	dominate	 the	 international	 field	of	 architecture,	 a	 trend	 that	 has	 been	 slow	 to	 change	 (Hanna	 1996;	Matthewson	 2012;	 Spaeth	 and	 Kosmala	 2012;	 Chang	 2014;	 Tether	
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2016).	 Curiously	 in	 Brazil,	 pursuing	 a	 degree	 in	 architecture	 was	considered	 feminine	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 masculine	 (and	misogynistic)	field	of	engineering.88	Nonetheless	the	professional	field	of	 Brazilian	 architecture	 reproduces	 the	 international	 inequality	(Rodrigues	2012;	Rubino,	Santoro,	and	Adame	2014;	S.	Ribeiro	2016);	and	 the	 gender	 imbalance	 translates	 to	 integration-urbanisation	projects	in	Rio	de	Janeiro.		A	simple	quantitative	analysis	of	the	selected	winning	projects	submitted	to	the	open	Morar	Carioca	contest	reveals	that	only	one	out	of	 the	 top	 five	 winning	 projects	 was	 led	 by	 a	 female	 architect	 (see	methodological	appendix).	Out	of	the	40	selected	projects,	women	led	only	 12.	 The	 gender	 imbalance	 between	 all	 “authoring	 architects”	 is	less	 stark.	 While	 20%	 of	 the	 lead	 architects	 were	 women,	 they	represented	41%	of	the	architectural	teams	(83:118	F:M).	A	majority	of	 the	 competing	 projects	 included	 team	 members	 from	 the	 social	sciences—sociologists,	 geographers,	 anthropologists,	 economists,	 or	social	 workers—reflecting	 Morar	 Carioca’s	 commitment	 to	community	 participation	 and	 social	 cohesion.	 The	 gender	 ratio	 was	even	 for	 theses	 posts	 (22:22).	 Thus	 project	 authority	 skews	 heavily	male,	 with	 increasing	 equality	 in	 absolute	 numbers	 down	 the	architectural	hierarchy	and	finally	an	even	division	between	men	and	women	complementing	the	design	with	“social”	expertise.		Qualitative	data	on	the	PAC-favela	interventions	also	reveals	a	division	of	labour.	Moreover	it	clarifies	what	so-called	“social”	labour	consists	of	and	suggests	that	within	the	planning	and	implementation																																																									88	This	cultural	attitude	may	have	taken	root	during	Brazil’s	push	towards	modern	industrialisation	 during	 the	 20th	 century	 in	which	men	were	 pressured	 to	 pursue	professions	 to	 industrialise	 the	 country.	 This	 attitude	 is	 still	 common	 among	conservatives	who	complain	“Brazil	needs	fewer	sociologists	and	philosophers	and	more	engineers”	(Azevedo	2011).	Some	of	my	gay	male	architect	 friends	have	told	me	of	their	hesitation,	and	their	 fathers’	disappointment	at	their	decision,	 to	study	architecture;	and	one	senior	engineer	confided	in	me	that	as	a	youth	he	wanted	to	be	an	architect	but	was	pressured	(by	his	father	and	male	friends)	to	graduate	with	a	degree	in	engineering.	Also	see	(Peccini	2015).	
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of	 projects	 such	 labour	was	devalued.	There	 is	 no	precise	 or	 official	definition	of	 the	 “social”	 side	of	 favela	 integration,	 however	we	may	conclude	 from	analysis	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 that	a	 strong	 focus	on	“the	 social”	 is	 a	 fundamental	 characteristic	 of	 the	 integration	paradigm:	 the	 social	 diagnostic	 of	 Morar	 Carioca,	 UPP	 Social	 as	complementary	 to	militarised	 occupations,	 “social	 infrastructure”	 of	PAC-favelas	with	a	PAC	Social	coordinating	team.		During	 an	 interview	 with	 the	 coordinator	 of	 PAC	 Social	 and	PAC	Social	project	manager	for	Manguinhos	and	Complexo	do	Alemão,	the	devaluation	of	the	feminized	social	was	made	obvious.	Within	the	context	of	challenges	that	their	teams	faced	based	on	the	structure	of	PAC	 Social	 within	 the	 larger	 projects,	 Renata	 and	 Nicole	 expressed	some	 frustration.	 Specifically	 I	 asked	 if	 they	 had	 experienced	 a	difference	 in	 the	 efficacy	 of	 moving	 from	 the	 Governor’s	 office	 (the	
Casa	 Civil)	 to	 EMOPE.	 I	 was	 interested	 in	 their	 responses	 because	Lea—the	 frustrated	 ex-coordinator	 of	 PAC	 Social	 in	 Complexo	 do	Alemão—had	 lamented	the	move.	According	to	Lea’s	experience,	 the	relocation	 amounted	 to	 an	 unethical	 conflict	 of	 interest.	 Their	principal	 objective	was	 to	 look	out	 for	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 residents	and	facilitate	communication	between	the	target	community	and	the	larger	project	team.	As	Lea	put	it,	“I	cared	about	making	the	process	as	least	 painful	 as	 possible	 for	 the	 residents”.	 When	 PAC	 Social	 was	based	 in	 the	 Casa	 Civil	 as	 a	 separate	 entity,	 she	 spoke	 with	 the	authority	 of	 the	 Governor.	 However	 when	 PAC	 Social	 moved	 to	EMOPE,	the	Director	of	PAC	Social	now	reported	to	the	broader	PAC	and	EMOPE	chain	of	command.	Lea:	“What	is	fucked	up	is	that	they	do	the	 construction	 and	 the	 social	 work.”	 Whereas	 previously	 Lea	considered	 herself	 a	 check	 and	 balance,	 she	 felt	 compromised	working	 in	 EMOPE	 because	 her	 job	 was	 “essentially	 to	 quickly	relocate	people	so	the	construction	could	happen	as	soon	as	possible;”	and	her	chain	of	command	ended	with	people	who	acted	 in	 the	best	
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interests	of	the	construction	companies	and	project	deadlines,	in	Lea’s	opinion.	 Nicole	 and	 Renata	 appear	 to	 agree	 with	 part	 of	 Lea’s	assessment,	although	they	put	it	more	diplomatically:		 Nicole:	 I	 think	 that	 when	 we	 were	 in	 the	 Casa	 Civil,	 the	 Secretary	
closest	to	the	Governor,	 I	 think	that	helped	to	empower	our	team.	A	
task	 or	 request	 sent	 from	 there	 to	 another	 Secretary	 had	 more	
weight.	Don’t	you	think,	Renata?	But	I	never	stopped	to	think	about	
that;	I’m	doing	it	now.	Renata:	Yes,	for	sure.	
	They	did	not,	however,	conclude	 that	 their	position	at	EMOPE	was	a	conflict	of	interest.	Rather	they	continued	to	feel	empowered	because	they	had	arrived	at	EMOPE	from	the	Casa	Civil,	and	indeed	they	saw	benefits	 of	 being	 closer	 to	 the	 project	 team.	 But	 as	 Nicole	 was	responding	 to	 a	 question	 she	 had	 admittedly	 never	 considered,	 she	understandably	contradicted	herself:		
Nicole:	I	think	that	when	we	came	here	[EMOPE],	we	came	a	bit	more	
empowered	 already.	 The	 people	 knew	us.	 They	 knew	 our	work	 and	
that	helped	us	a	lot.	In	relation	to	our	work,	I	think	being	close	to	the	
project	facilitated	our	oversight	[…]	I	think	the	format…	that	is	where	
we	need	 to	 improve.	That	 is	where	Medellín	 is	 ahead	of	us.	We	 still	
fight	a	lot	for	the	social,	whereas	in	Medellín,	the	social	team	is	seen	
as	a	necessary	team	for	the	project	to	happen.	Here,	from	the	point	
of	view	of	the	engineers,	it	seems	as	if	we	are	“the	girls	that	feel	
sorry	for	the	[favela]	resident,”	you	know	what	I	mean?	So	we	have	
to	fight	every	day,	because	it	isn’t	that	we	pity	[them].	We	are	trying	
to	guarantee	the	rights	of	the	residents!	So	I	think	that	the	difference	
to	what	we	see	in	Medellín	is	[the	quality	of	the]	relationship	between	
the	 social	and	 the	engineering.	 I	 think	 that	 the	president	of	EMOPE	
recognizes	 the	 function	 of	 the	 social,	 but	 in	 my	 opinion,	 in	 my	
evaluation,	 that	 needs	 to	 improve	 a	 bit	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 engineers	
that	are	in	the	field,	you	know?	[…]	In	an	ideal	world,	the	architects	
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and	the	social	team	would	sit	down	together	and	discuss	everything	
that	is	going	to	be	done	in	the	territory.	
Tucker:	So	that	never	happens?	The	architect	and	engineers	do	their	
work	without	consulting	the	social	team?	
Nicole:	 Sometimes,	 yes.	 And	 we	 have	 to	 go	 running	 after	 them	 in	
order	to	fix	it.	
Júlia:	Yeah,	 there	 is	always	a	meeting	 for	 the	construction	and	then	
there	 is	 a	 meeting	 between	 the	 construction	 and	 the	 social.	 They	
think	 that	 we	 shouldn’t	 participate	 in	 the	 construction	 meetings;	
because,	 let’s	say	they	make	some	changes–	and	they’re	 like,	“ah	no,	
this	 is	 just	 a	 matter	 of	 the	 [engineering]	 work.”	 But	 it	 isn’t!	
Sometimes	it	changes,	I	don’t	know,	the	degree	of	lighting	in	a	street.	
And	they	think	that	is	only	part	of	the	[engineering]	work	but	it	isn’t.	
We	have	to	let	the	residents	know	because	maybe	its	bad	for	them,	or	
maybe	it	will	be	an	improvement;	maybe	there	is	another	way.	That	
is	what	Nicole	is	saying.	
Tucker:	 So	 they	 have	 a	 different	 perspective	 than	 you	 when	 they	
visualise	the	community–	
Nicole:	Yeah.	For	them	it’s	new	to	have	someone	from	the	social	side;	
I	think	it	only	began	with	PAC.	In	the	other	programmes	that	existed,	
to	urbanise	the	favelas,	the	role	of	the	social	was	very	different	than	
it	 is	 today.	 Generally	 it	 was	 one	 person,	 a	 social	 worker,	 who	
accompanied	 the	 family.	 Just	 that.	 Today	 the	 social	 has	 a	 different	
outlook,	 a	 different	 task,	 and	 it’s	 much	 broader	 than	 it	 was	 in	
previous	programmes.	So	I	think	that’s	new	for	the	engineers.			In	 this	 exchange	 Renata	 and	 Nicole	 outline	 the	 masculinist,	 forced	separation	of	their	work.	“The	social”	is	gendered	and	marginalised	in	comparison	 to	 the	 project	 engineering.	 They	 note	 a	 division,	 which	they	 identify	 as	 a	 false	 division,	 between	 the	 technical	 design	 of	 the	intervention	 and	 the	 construction—which	 they	 refer	 to	 as	 a	 obra	(literally	 “the	 work,”	 translatable	 to	 construction	 or	 public	 works	depending	on	context)—and	the	ambiguously	defined	“social”	side	of	the	 intervention,	 which	 encompasses	 everything	 involving	 the	residents	living	in	and	around	the	site(s)	of	intervention.	In	this	sense	
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“the	 social”	 refers	 to	 community	 participation,	 advocating	 for	 the	interests	of	the	residents,	protecting	residents	rights,	and	considering	how	 the	 residents	 will	 experience	 the	 intervention	 both	 during	construction	 as	 well	 as	 the	 finished	 result.	 Additionally	 PAC	 Social	draws	up	a	framework	plan	for	the	“sustainable	development”	of	the	favela	 complexes	 post-intervention.	 Despite	 their	 sense	 of	empowerment	 from	 having	 worked	 in	 the	 Casa	 Civil,	 a	 position	considered	‘above’	all	other	state	offices	(to	use	a	spatial	metaphor	of	institutional	governance),	they	still	feel	as	if	they	are	seen	as	the	“girls	who	pity	 the	 residents”	when	 they	advocate	on	 their	behalf.	 In	 their	own	words	they	have	to	fight	[against	the	engineers	and	architects]	to	be	taken	seriously	and	to	gain	access	to	decision-making	spaces.		Renata	 and	 Nicole	 perceive	 that	 the	 engineers	 are	 not	accustomed	 to	 having	 “the	 social”	 (or	 the	 residents)	 question	 their	supposed	 technical	 decisions.	 In	 the	 past,	 ‘the	 social’	 was	 the	 social	worker,	 whose	 primary	 responsibility	 was	 with	 the	 family.	 This	historical	 division	 of	 labour	mirrors	 the	 societal	 divide	 between	 the	masculine	public	sphere	and	the	feminine	private	sphere	(MacKinnon	1989;	 Phillips	 1998).	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 the	 architects,	 the	 engineers,	the	construction	companies	have	the	strong	masculine	role	of	building	(and	 destroying).	 On	 the	 other	 hand	 “the	 social”	 reacts	 to	 the	masculine	 and	 responds	 to	 the	 private	 sphere	 needs	 of	 the	 affected	families.		That	which	is	considered	“the	social,”	be	it	the	labour	typically	carried	out	by	social	workers	in	facilitating	the	eviction	and	relocation	of	 residents,	 community	 participation	 in	 the	 planning	 process,	 and	socio-cultural	programming	that	complements	physical	infrastructure	such	 literacy	 or	 art	 classes,	 is	 often	 produced	 through	 paternalist	discourse.	 Lula’s	 conjuring	 of	 the	 image	 of	 the	 women	 with	 their	shopping	who	would	benefit	from	the	gondola	physically	materialised	at	 the	 inauguration	of	 the	Teleférico	do	Alemão	when	Dilma	pointed	
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to	 and	 named	 a	 mother	 during	 her	 inauguration	 speech.	 The	beneficiaries	are	routinely	 imagined	as	the	weak,	 infirm,	very	young,	and	very	old:	those	that	need	caring	for	and	protection.	In	the	favela	in	particular,	 childhood	 is	 considered	 in	dire	need	of	preservation,	 and	for	 good	 reason.	 A	 2013	 study	 of	 youth	 in	 pacified	 favelas	(patronizingly	titled	“We	are	the	youth	of	the	UPPs”)	found	that	12%	of	 adolescents	 under	 18	 have	 left	 school	 and	 are	 unemployed.	 That	number	increases	to	34%	of	young	adults	(aged	18-29)	(see:	“Somos	Os	 Jovens	das	UPPs”	2013).	This	statistical	category	 is	referred	to	as	
“nem-nem”	 as	 in	 they	 neither	 work	 nor	 study.	 Such	 categorisation	produces	favela	subjects	as	“lost”	and	in	need	of	“saving.”	When	Julia,	the	 public	 employee	 who	 coordinated	 the	 Biblioteca	 Parque	 in	Manguinhos,	 was	 responsible	 for	 hiring	 staff,	 she	 looked	 for	employees	who	had	a	passion	for	the	project	rather	than	those	simply	looking	for	a	job.	Many	of	the	most	qualified	and	dedicated	personnel	believed	the	project’s	potential	to	“save	the	children	from	the	traffic”	by	introducing	them	to	creative	culture	and	keeping	them	in	school.		The	presumed	life	trajectory	of	a	“nem,	nem”	in	the	favela	is	the	demonized	figure	of	the	gang	leader,	 the	drug	trafficker,	or	the	petty	thief.	Overwhelmingly	these	are	young,	black	and	mix-raced	men	and	adolescent	 boys.	 These	 are	 the	 bodies	 whose	 mobility	 is	 routinely	subject	to	friction	at	the	hands	of	the	police,	and	whose	lives	are	often	thought	 of	 as	 disposable.	 These	 bodies	 are	 rarely	 the	 discursive	subject	of	paternalist	interventions	associated	with	“the	social”	side	of	urbanisation	 and	 favela	 integration.	 They	 are	 however	 the	 target	 of	the	hyper-masculinist	and	violent	side	of	integration—the	pacification	programme.		The	 expanding	 debate	 on	 how	 and	what	 constitutes	 territory	has	included	exploration	of	how	territory	and	borders	are	made	up	of	bodies	(S.	Smith,	Swanson,	and	Gökarıksel	2016).	Similar	 to	how	the	politics	 of	 mobility	 reveals	 how	 the	 experience	 of	 moving	 through	
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space	 depends	 in	 part	 on	 social	 identity	 (race,	 class,	 gender,	 sexual	orientation,	 physical	 ability),	 the	 above	 analysis	 suggests	 that	 how	favela	residents	experience	the	state’s	effectuation	of	territory	differs	according	to	whether	their	body	is	perceived	as	a	threat	or	a	potential	benefactor.			
7.7	Conclusions	This	 chapter	 examined	 state	 space	 and	 territory	 through	 the	programme	 PAC-favelas.	 Whereas	 previous	 chapters	 focussed	 on	interventions	as	a	state	spatial	strategy	at	the	scale	of	Rio	de	Janeiro,	I	argued	 that	 coordinated	 federal	 investments	 suggest	 that	 favela-integration	produces	state	space	at	various	scales.	 In	 the	case	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro,	 the	 significant	 levels	 of	 investment	 corresponded	 to	PT’s	mandate	 to	 expand	 the	 economy	 while	 investing	 in	 social	infrastructure	 that	 benefits	 working	 class	 and	 poor	 citizens.	Simultaneously	it	served	the	political	 interests	of	both	PT	and	PMDB	to	 exemplify	 a	 new	 era	 of	 cooperative	 inter-scalar	 governance	 from	the	municipal	to	the	federal.		While	 MCMV	 “rolls	 out”	 the	 developmental	 state	 privileging	private	developers’	interests	and	largely	ignores	the	principles	of	The	Statute	of	the	City,	local	experts	worked	with	the	Ministry	of	Cities	to	influence	 the	 programme	 to	 the	 paradigm	 of	 favela-integration.	Engaging	 with	 Brenner	 and	 building	 on	 Klink,	 I	 argued	 that	 while	neoliberal	 critiques	 of	 spate	 space	 developed	 to	 explain	transformations	 in	Europe	and	North	America	are	useful	 references,	PAC	 and	 specifically	 PAC-favelas	 suggests	 that	 Brazil	 has	 not	experienced	 the	same	downshifts	 in	 scale	of	 statehood	 towards	neo-
localism.		This	 chapter	 contributes	 to	 contemporary	 discussions	 of	territory	by	examining	how	territory	 is	produced	 to	account	 for	and	
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reclaim	“lost”	or	“abandoned”	space	at	 the	urban	scale.	 I	argued	that	PAC-favelas,	 working	 through	 the	 spatial	 strategy	 of	 favela	integration,	 is	 a	 project	 of	 territory;	 that	 is	 to	 say	 the	 large-scale	intervention	aimed	to	erase	internal	frontiers	that	fragmented	the	city	and	limited	the	state’s	authoritative	governance.	While	proclaiming	a	monopoly	 of	 violence,	 or	 “peacemaking,”	 though	 pacification	 figures	prominently	and	is	featured	prominently	in	recent	scholarly	research,	I	argue	that	the	implantation	of	bureaucratic	and	social	infrastructure	is	equally	important	to	achieve	the	territory	effect.		The	 construction	 of	 the	 Teleférico,	 while	 sold	 to	 residents	within	and	without	Complexo	do	Alemão	as	a	infrastructure	of	public	transport,	was	more	successful	at	providing	the	state	office	space	than	it	was	 at	 transporting	 commuting	 residents.	 Thus,	 criticism	 that	 the	Teleférico	 do	 Alemão	 and	 similar	 architectural	 and	 infrastructural	projects	in	PAC-favelas	in	other	favelas	are	built	para	inglés	ver,	is	not	far	 off	 the	mark.	However,	 I	 argued	 that	 analysis	 of	 this	 spectacular	type	 of	 infrastructure	 is	 incomplete	 if	 it	 stops	 after	 noting	what	 the	interventions	fail	 to	do	for	the	explicit	target	population.	 In	this	case	the	 Teleférico	 fails	 to	 deliver	 greater	 mobility	 or	 freedom	 of	movement	 in	 any	 meaningful	 way	 to	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	Complexo	 do	 Alemão’s	 residents.	 However	 as	 showed	 above,	 the	Teleférico	 does	 have	 a	 number	 of	 other	 productive	 effects,	material	and	symbolic:	 a	 sanitised	highly	 controlled	mode	of	moving	 through	favela	 space,	 political	 opportunities,	 and	 corporate	 and	 social	media	branding.	As	 it	 relates	 to	 the	production	of	 territory,	 the	spectacular	nature	 of	 the	 Teleférico	 seeks	 a	 broad	 consensus	 that	 state	interventions—and	 here	 the	 effect	 arguably	 extends	 beyond	Alemão—bring	about	material	benefits	for	the	population.		Finally	this	chapter	sought	to	view	favela-integration	through	a	feminist	 lens.	The	analysis	offered	 is	exploratory.	 I	could	not	answer	whether	 design	 teams	 dominated	 by	 men	 produce	 different	
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integrating	interventions	in	the	favelas,	but	by	quantitatively	naming	the	 gendered	 imbalances	 within	 the	 Morar	 Carioca	 project	 teams,	 I	have	 demonstrated	 that	 such	 a	 question	 is	 worth	 asking.	 Moreover	the	qualitative	differentiation	between	the	feminized	“social”	and	the	masculinised	built	 interventions	and	 the	subsequent	marginalisation	of	“the	social”	signals	the	inherent	patriarchy	of	the	spatial	production	of	 the	state	and	effectuation	of	 territory.	Thus	 this	analysis	supports	calls	for	an	explicitly	feminist	framework	in	urban	studies	(B.	Parker	2016;	 Peake	 and	 Rieker	 2013)	 and	 argues	 that	 an	 intersectional	feminist	 approach	 enriches	 debates	 on	 state	 interventions	 into	 the	favelas	 and	 how	 such	 planning	 interventions	 produces	 favelas	 as	territory.	It	 is	not	my	conclusion	that	PAC-favelas	and	other	 integration	interventions	 have	 successfully	 territorialised	 the	 respective	 favelas	in	 question	 or	 favela	 space	 as	 a	 generic	 category	 of	 planning	 and	governance.	 Indeed	 the	 continued	 violent	 and	 racist/anti-poor	differential	 policing	 of	 the	 favelas,	 less-than	 democratic	 planning	processes	 that	 produce	 infrastructure	 like	 the	 Teleférico,	 the	resurgence	of	gang-police	conflicts	in	many	pacified	favelas	(including	both	Complexo	do	Alemão	and	Complexo	de	Manguinhos),	the	highly	sceptical	 attitudes	 of	 favela	 residents	 and	 activists,	 and	 the	 blatant	prioritisation	 of	 the	 spectacular	 over	 the	 basic	 necessities	 of	sanitation	 and	 health	 make	 convincing	 arguments	 that	 “favela	integration”	 fails	 as	 a	 project	 of	 territory.	However	 tempting	 it	 is	 to	condemn	state	actions	that	reinforce	hegemonic	social	relations,	such	a	 conclusion	 would	 also	 deviate	 from	 the	 concept	 of	 territory	 used	here.	Territory	is	not	a	product	or	a	resulting	condition,	but	an	action	in	 repetition	 as	 previously	 noted	 by	 Haesbaert.	 And	 in	 accordance	with	 Painter,	 these	 repetitive,	 rhythmic	 actions	 that	 are	 mediated	and/or	regulated	by	the	state	through	various	social	technologies	are	constantly	remade	because	territory	is	inherently	unstable.	Therefore,	
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rather	 than	 seeing	 a	 failure	 of	 territory	 when	 we	 examine	 the	Teleférico,	 PAC-favelas,	 the	 UPP	 or	 integration	 broadly,	 we	 must	conclude	 that	 territory	 itself	 is	 uneven,	 contested,	 and	 produced	according	to	existing	socio-spatial	inequalities	and	hegemonic	politics	and	power	dynamics.				
	 279	
Chapter	8	–	Conclusions			 A	summary	of	sorts	 is	 in	order.	However,	 in	 lieu	of	reviewing	my	arguments	point-by-point,	 I	wish	 to	revisit	 the	research	problem	as	constructed	in	Chapter	1,	and	synthesise	that	which	I	have	learned	about	 “favela	 integration.”	 Additionally,	 this	 chapter	 reflects	 on	 the	limitations	 of	 this	 research	 as	 well	 as	 its	 contributions	 to	 scholarly	knowledge.	Section	8.1	responds	directly	to	each	of	the	four	research	questions,	 summarising	 cross-chapter	 analysis	 to	 explain	 the	discursive	 production	 and	 contestation	 of	 “favela	 integration”	 as	fundamental	 to	Rio	de	 Janeiro’s	 twenty-first	 century	 transformation,	describe	how	this	integrating	paradigm	alters	the	production	of	urban	space	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 favela/cidade	 divide,	 and	 evaluate	 planning	and	governance	projects	and	policies	as	tools	of	territory	that	produce	the	 favelas	 as	 legitimate	urban	 space	and	 their	 residents	 as	 subjects	benefiting	from	state	rule.		Section	 8.2	 reviews	 the	 contributions	 I	 believe	 this	 thesis	makes	to	existing	empirical,	methodological,	and	theoretical	debates.	Empirically,	 I	 have	 made	 data-informed	 arguments	 that	 favela	integration	 is	 a	 state	 paradigm	 operating	 through	multiple	 planning	and	governance	initiatives.	While	the	majority	of	existing	critiques	of	these	 policies	 are	 programme	 or	 place-specific,	 I	 have	 analysed	 the	interventions	 of	UPP,	UPP	 Social,	Morar	 Carioca	 and	 PAC-Favelas	 as	part	of	a	dynamic	state	spatial	strategy.	This	has	permitted	a	critical	reading	across	programmes	and	across	the	city.	Methodologically	my	application	of	Lefebvre’s	triad	to	construct	an	un-sited	field	following	a	 spatial	 process	 contributes	 to	 discussions	 regarding	 spatialised	methodologies.	 Theoretically,	 I	 offer	 an	 original	 framework	 of	landscape-mobilities	 as	 applied	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 and	 contribute	 to	 the	
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emerging	 literature	 on	 state	 spatiality	 and	 territory	 by	 investigating	the	 workings	 of	 territory	 at	 the	 urban	 scale	 in	 a	 “divided	 city.”	Additionally,	however	exploratory,	my	research	indicates	that	current	debates	 on	 territory	 and	 state	 space	will	 benefit	 from	 intersectional	feminist	analysis.	Section	8.3	acknowledges	some	limitations	of	this	research.	In	particular	I	recognize	that	my	data	and	analysis	does	not	incorporate	the	perspectives	and	experiences	of	 favela	residents,	which	did	 form	part	 of	 initial	 objectives.	 Finally	 in	 Section	 8.4	 I	 consider	 what	 my	conclusions	on	 favela	 integration	might	mean	beyond	Rio	de	 Janeiro	as	well	as	implications	for	future	research	and	debate.	
8.1	Summary	of	arguments	The	first	question	proposed	in	Chapter	1	reads:		
How	is	“favela	integration”	discursively	produced	and	defined	by	the	
state	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	as	part	of	a	larger	narrative	of	urban	reform	and	
renewal?	
		 As	noted	in	Chapter	5,	there	is	no	“official”	definition	of	favela	
integration	any	level	of	government,	yet	the	term	is	the	rhetorical	crux	of	policy	documents,	political	propaganda,	and	programme	literature.	Mayor	 Eduardo	 Paes	 built	 a	 political	 campaign	 on	 the	 idea	 of	integrating	the	city—Somos	um	Rio—indicating	that	favela	integration	is	 part	 of	 a	 progressive,	 whole-scale	 urban	 transformation.	 But	 it	would	 be	 an	 error	 to	 dismiss	 the	 term	 as	 primarily	 political,	 in	 the	electoral	sense,	or	originating	in	political	discourse.	Integration	was	a	defining	 objective	 in	 the	 Favela-Bairro	 programme,	 which	 officially	began	in	1994.89	Indeed	since	Favela-Bairro,	“integration”	is	listed	as	a	
																																																								89	A	full	genealogy	of	the	idea	of	integration	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	may	point	as	far	back	to	 early	 “upgrade”	 pilot	 projects	 under	 the	 populist	 Governor	 Brizola.	 Outside	 of	‘state	 thinking,’	 one	may	 look	 to	 the	 arguments	 of	 radical	 architects	 such	 as	 John	Turner.	
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general	 objective	 of	 all	 the	 major	 favela-specific	 programmes:	 UPP,	UPP	Social,	Morar	Carioca,	and	PAC-favelas.		The	 production	 of	 favela	 integration	 through	 intellectual,	technical,	 and	 “specialist”	 texts	 works	 to	 depoliticise	 the	interventions.	 While	 these	 ‘authors’	 of	 integration	 are	 more	 than	capable	 of	 recognising	 the	 socio-political	 and	 cultural	 roots	 of	inequality	 and	 segregation	 that	 produced	 the	 favelas,	 they	nonetheless	 insist	 on	 apolitical	 technical	 solutions.	 As	 discussed	 in	Chapter	 6,	 this	 may	 actually	 be	 a	 strategy	 to	 protect	 progressive	programmes	from	falling	victim	to	partisan	manoeuvring.			 An	 intertextual	 reading	 of	 state	 discourse	 reveals	 “favela	integration”	 as	 a	 visual	 ideology	 recognising	 the	 neighbourhoods	 as	spatially	differentiated	from	the	asfalto	yet	nonetheless	legitimate	and	productive	 spaces	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro.	 This	 visual	 ideology,	 which	 I	analysed	through	a	framework	of	 landscape-mobilities,	re-orders	the	historical	 position	 of	 “the	 favela”	 in	 the	 “marvellous”	 city.	 The	integrated	city	is	marvellous	in	part	due	to,	not	in	spite	of,	the	favelas.	However,	 utopian	 visions	 of	 the	 integrated	 city	 conceal	 hegemonic	power	 relations,	 and	 achieves	 making	 the	 favelas	 marvellous	principally	 through	 spectacularisation	 of	 certain	 privileged	 favelas	and	the	fetishisation	of	state	interventions	as	“restoring	liberty”	to	or	“guaranteeing	citizenship”	of	the	favela	residents.		 A	 close	 reading	 of	 the	 state	 spatial	 projects	 of	 integration	reveal	 that	 the	 paradigm	 defines	 integration	 largely	 through	 the	facilitation	 and	 regulation	 of	 flows	 of	 people,	 goods,	 and	 services.	Some	 of	 these	 flows	 are	 relatively	 new,	 such	 as	 the	 promotion	 of	tourism.	 Other	 flows	 pre-existed	 but	 are	 now	 subject	 to	 state	regulation,	such	as	electricity	and	cable.	The	“right	to	come	and	go”	is	of	 particular	 importance	 to	 the	 discursive	 production	 of	 favela	integration,	 as	 gang	 territorialisation	 was	 constructed	 to	 have	imprisoned	 favela	 residents	 or	 subjugated	 them	 to	 an	 illegitimate	
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“parallel	 power,”	 thus	 turning	 large	 swaths	 of	 the	 city	 into	 “no	 go”	zones.			 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 planning	 interventions,	 “favela	integration”	 is	 produced	 as	 the	 logical	 evolution	 of	 [slum]	“upgrading”.	 Rather	 than	 seeking	 to	 integrate	 the	 “consolidated	favela”	 into	 the	 city	 through	 basic	 urbanisation—understood	 as	 an	inward	 looking	 strategy	 that	 provides	 infrastructural	 improvements	such	 as	 paved	 roads	 and	 sanitation	 and	 imposes	 signifiers	 of	‘formality’	 such	 as	 street	 names	 and	 house	 numbers—interventions	now	 have	 a	 “territorial”	 perspective	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 see	planning	 as	 a	 process	 and	 the	 favela	 in	 relation	 to	 its	 surroundings.	The	 ideal	 (which	 is	 institutionally	 constrained	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro)	 is	that	architects	go	beyond	the	immediate	material	‘needs’	of	the	favela	and	 include	 social	 infrastructure	 for	 the	 surrounding	 region.	Territorial	 planning	 also	 seeks	 to	 attract	 new	 types	 of	 mobilities	through	 the	 favelas	 by	 incorporating	 the	 spaces	 into	 existing	 flows	(for	example	bike	paths)	or	turning	the	favela	into	a	destination	point	of	commerce,	leisure,	or	tourist	interest.		 Similarly	the	depoliticised	“favela	integration”	may	be	read	as	a	development	 paradigm.	 Documents	 produced	 by	 government	 think	tanks	or	 international	organisations	such	as	 the	World	Bank	and	UN	Habitat	 speak	 of	 integration	 through	 a	 series	 of	 focussed	 lines	 of	actions	such	as	“housing,”	“mobility,”	“security,”	and	“local	economy.”	This	 discourse	 seems	 to	 present	 a	 ‘roadmap’	 towards	 favela	integration.	 While	 it	 often	 makes	 effort	 to	 stress	 community	participation	 and	 democratic	 decision-making,	 it	 begins	 with	 the	 a	
priori	 ideological	 assumption	 that	 “the	 state”	 can	 solve	 socio-spatial	inequality	 through	 technical	 innovations	 from	 existing	 institutions	and	 gradual	 socio-spatial	 conforming	 of	 the	 favelas	 to	 official	regulations	 and	 hegemonic	 urban	 form.	 This	 was	 reinforced,	 for	example,	when	UPP	Social	was	rolled	back	as	a	project	that	opened	up	
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the	 possibility	 of	 citizen-led	 reorganisation	 of	 state	 spatial	 relations	and	 subsequently	 restructured	 as	 a	 technocratic	 project	 akin	 to	 a	favela	think	tank	and	data	clearinghouse.			
How	 is	 the	 meaning	 of	 “integration”	 interpreted,	 represented,	
challenged,	 or	 appropriated	 by	 popular	media,	 special	 interest	 groups	
and	common	citizens?	
		 This	 thesis	 focussed	 on	 the	 discursive	 production	 of	 “favela	integration”	 largely	 through	 state	 texts,	 however	 I	 did	 argue	 that	major	media	outlets	operating	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	(often	with	a	national	presence)	and	 liberal	(but	not	subversive)	civil	society	organisations	played	 significant	 roles	 in	 facilitating	 the	 hegemonic	 consensus	 of	favela	 integration.	 Prior	 to	major	 concerted	 public	 investments	 civil	society	 advocates	 produced	 a	 liberal,	 human	 rights	 affirming	discourse	 that	 called	 for	 “peace”	 and	 reconciliation	 during	 Rio	 de	Janeiro’s	 most	 violent	 periods.	 Stopping	 short	 of	 demanding	 spatial	justice	 or	 anything	 similar	 to	 favela	 residents’	 right	 to	 the	 city,	 this	discourse	 did,	 I	 argue,	 set	 the	 stage	 for	 an	 increasingly	 desperate	middle	 class	 to	 support	 significant	 public	 investments	 targeting	 the	favelas.	 Cultural	 and	 art	 exhibitions,	 NGOs	 and	 community	 groups	working	 in	 various	 favelas	 have	 also	 insisted	 that	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	citizens	 at	 large	 confront	 and	 address	 social	 segregation	 and	inequality	 that	 worked	 to	 expunge	 the	 favelas	 from	 Rio’s	 cityscape.	Additional	 cultural	 projects	 challenge	 the	 persistent	 “ideology	 of	marginality”	 by	 showcasing	 favela	 culture	 as	 creative,	 vibrant,	 and	exciting.	While	 I	 am	 cautious	 to	make	 sweeping	 generalisations	 about	the	 “mainstream	 media,”	 outlets	 such	 as	 O	 Globo	 newspaper	championed	the	state	project	of	 favela	pacification	as	 the	 solution	 to	urban	violence	associated	with	drug	trafficking	and	organised	crime.	As	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 this	 discourse	 often	 produced	 favela	
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integration	 as	 a	 reclaiming	 of,	 and	 imposing	 law	 and	 order	 over,	spaces	that	had	been	 ‘lost’	 to	drug	gangs.	This	 is	 the	hegemonic	 idea	that	the	favela	belongs	to	the	city	rather	than	the	favela	makes	the	city.	Within	 this	 construction	 of	 the	 integrated	 city,	 the	 favela	 [and	presumably	 their	 residents]	must	 accept	 the	 same	 urban	 rules	 and	regulations	as	the	rest	of	the	asfalto,	the	“good	and	the	bad.”			 	Diverse	 community	 and	 activist	 groups	 ‘talk	 back’	 to	 the	hegemonic	discourse	of	 favela	 integration,	and	different	examples	of	resistance	 were	 discussed	 throughout	 the	 thesis.	 The	 vehicle	 of	counter-hegemonic	discourse	 is	often	social	media—blogs,	Facebook	posts,	 short	 videos,	 captioned	 photographs,	 and	 political	 cartoons—but	 also	 includes	 opinion-editorials	 and	 essays	 published	 in	mainstream	national	and	 international	media	and	 independent	news	sites,	 NGO	 or	 activist-researched	 dossiers,	 documentaries,	 books,	protests,	and	public	community	meetings.	During	the	time	I	conducted	fieldwork,	 much	 of	 the	 resistance	 was	 focussed	 on	 home	 evictions	considered	 unnecessary	 (either	 for	 unwanted	 infrastructure	 such	 as	the	Teleféricos	or	in	areas	adjacent	to	mega-event	venues);	violent	or	unfair	 processes	 of	 evictions	 (without	 fair	 notice	 or	 a	 fair	 buy-out	price);	 the	 threat	 of	 gentrification	 (mostly	 in	 Zona	 Sul	 favelas	 with	ocean	views	such	as	Vidigal	and	Babilônia);	urbanisation	projects	that	left	 unfinished	 sanitation	 works;	 and	most	 saliently,	 police	 violence	and	 abuse	 of	 power.	Many	 activists	 accused	 the	 state	 of	 following	 a	path	of	gentrification	and	tourism	rather	than	integration,	privileging	private	 sector	 interests	 such	 as	 the	 construction	 and	 utility	companies,	 and	 encouraging	 the	 formalisation	 of	 land-titles	 to	incentivise	 a	 regulated	 and	 financialised	 housing	market	 within	 the	favelas.	 This	 thesis	 did	 not	 aim	 to	 evaluate	 these	 criticisms,	 but	 I	argued	 that	 some	 interventions	 did	 aim	 to	 turn	 certain	 favelas	 into	touristic	 destination	 points,	 and	 that	 favela	 integration	 prioritised	tourist	 and	 state-actor	 mobilities	 while	 simultaneously	 targeting	
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other	mobilities—particularly	those	of	 favela	youth,	young	black	and	brown	men	presumed	to	be	petty	thieves	or	connected	to	drug	gangs,	motorcycle-taxis,	 and	 funk	 dance	 parties—for	 increased	 levels	 of	scrutiny,	harassment,	and	violence.			
In	what	ways	do	state	interventions	designed	to	“integrate”	the	favelas	
transform	urban	space?	
	 One	short	and	straightforward	way	to	answer	this	question	is,	
unevenly.	That	is	to	say	the	effects	of	the	programmes	associated	with	favela	 integration	 have	 produced	 widely	 different	 results	 when	comparing	the	same	programme	in	different	favelas	(this	is	especially	true	 of	 UPP)	 as	 well	 as	 between	 regions	 (North,	 South,	 and	 West	Zones).	One	could	also	say	that	the	effects	were	uneven	in	regards	to	temporality.	This	may	seem	somewhat	of	a	didactic	conclusion,	but	it	substantiates	theoretical	assertions	that	the	state	and	territory	are	the	
effects	of	continuous,	uneven,	contradictory,	and	contested	processes.		This	 thesis	 argued	 that	 favela	 integration	 is	 a	 state	 spatial	strategy	 of	 territory	 working	 to	 transform	 the	 favela/cidade	 divide.	The	favelas	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	are	commonly	referred	to	as	“territories”	by	 police	 authorities,	 public	 employees,	 architect-urbanists,	 policy	makers,	 journalists,	 and	 average	 citizens.	 Rarely	 is	 Copacabana	referred	 to	 as	 a	 “territory”.	 The	 public	 parks	 are	 not	 colloquially	referred	to	as	“territories.”90	This	is	a	linguistic	oddity	in	the	Brazilian																																																									90	I	cannot	recall	reading	or	hearing	the	term	invoked	by	an	urban	authority	to	refer	to	any	neighbourhood	of	the	“real	city;”	however	I	do	recall	the	term	being	used	by	indignant	 middle	 class	 residents	 during	 the	 summer	 of	 2015	 when	 street	 crime	around	 the	 beaches	 of	 Zona	 Sul	 had	 dominated	 local	 news,	 and	 the	 police	 had	responded	by	racially	and	geographically	profiling	youths,	stopping	busses	arriving	from	the	North	and	West	Zones	of	the	city	and	detaining	unaccompanied	minors.	On	social	 networks,	 one	post	 that	was	 reported	 encouraged	 residents	 to	 take	 a	 stand	and	 “defend	 the	 territory	 of	 Copacabana”	 and	 engage	 in	 vigilante	 justice.	 In	 this	instance	 this	 man	 from	 Zona	 Sul—the	 vast	 majority	 of	 such	 posts	 are	 made	 by	men—depicted	Copacabana	as	land	invaded	by	raiding	bandits.	The	beaches	of	Zona	Sul,	and	increasingly	Barra	de	Tijuca,	have	long	been	spatially	disputed	(B.	Penglase	2007;	B.	Carvalho	2007;	Freeman	2008).	The	 same	year	O	Globo	 newspaper	 ran	a	
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metropolis	similar	to	the	trickle	down	of	“marginality”	from	academic	debates	to	everyday	discourse	that	exacerbated	favela	stigma.	Favelas	are	 colloquial	 “territories”	 because	 they	 are	 the	 spatial	 other,	considered	 apart	 from	 the	 norm.	 Nobody	 refers	 to	 the	 “territory	 of	Catete”	(where	I	live)	because	it	is	territory	taken	for	granted.	Favelas,	on	the	other	hand,	are	disputed	“territories	[yet	to	incorporated]”	into	the	city.		To	 overcome	 the	 landscape	 crisis	 of	 the	 divided	 city,	 the	broken	city,	the	partitioned	city,	the	favelas	must	cease	to	be	marked	as	 territories	 of	otherness.	 The	 favelas	must	be	 seen	 (in	 the	 sense	of	landscape)	as	territory	equal	to	Copacabana,	Centro,	Tijuca,	that	is	to	say	urban	territory	that	is	not	“territory.”	Thus	favela	integration,	as	a	state	 spatial	 strategy	 in	 response	 to	 a	 landscape	 crisis,	 necessitates	the	 effectuation	 of	 territory.	 To	 do	 so	 requires	 the	 building	 of	hegemonic	 consensus	 that	 state	 power	 operates	 evenly	 across	 the	city,	that	the	state	has	not	abandoned	pockets	of	urban	space,	that	the	borders	 of	 favelas	 do	 not	 constitute	 frontiers	 of	 state	 sovereignty.	Effectuating	favelas	as	territory	(the	unnamed	sort)	means	that	while	the	 state	 may	 operate	 diversely	 in	 distinct	 spaces,	 its	 mandate	 to	govern	 is	 realised	 and	 its	 authority	 to	 do	 so	 unchallenged.	 As	 one	architect	cited	in	Chapter	5	said,	an	“ordinary”	citizen	should	be	able	to	go	to	the	favela	and	feel	like	they	are	in	the	city,	the	formal	city.	The	mechanisms	 through	 which	 this	 is	 accomplished	 are	 the	 socio-technological	 processes	 employed	 by	 the	 spatial	 projects	 of	 urban	planning	and	governance.		
How	do	techniques	of	urban	planning	and	governance	establish	favelas	
as	legitimate	urban	space	subject	to	and	benefiting	from	state	rule?																																																									column	suggesting	that	the	public	beaches	start	charging	fees	to	keep	undesirables	from	ruining	the	experience	of	upstanding	citizens,	tourists,	and	families	who	want	to	enjoy	the	beach	in	peace	and	tranquillity.   	
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	 An	 alternative	 wording	 of	 this	 question	 might	 read,	 how	 do	techniques	of	urban	planning	and	governance	produce	the	favelas	as	territory?	The	 socio-spatial	 fragmentation	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro,	 and	 the	common	sense	understanding	that	the	state	is	absent	from	the	favelas,	means	 that	 the	 appearance	 of	 state	 structure	 is	 weaker	 when	observed	 from	 the	 favelas.	 This	 has	 produced	 the	 notion	 that	 the	favelas	are	ungoverned	and	ungovernable.	A	major	challenge	of	urban	planning	and	governance	is	to	rectify	this	by	producing	the	favelas	as	just	 the	opposite.	Socio-technical	processes	such	as	GIS	map-making,	descriptive	 qualitative-quantitative	 “territorial	 panoramas,”	 and	 the	systematic	 collection	 of	 information	 related	 to	 community	organisations,	service	projects,	and	leadership	work	to	produce	favela	spaces	 as	 legible,	 and	 therefore	 governable	 by	 identifying	opportunities	 for	 interventions	 and	 integration.	 This	 information	 is	used	internally	to	 facilitate	data-informed	governance	and	externally	to	 advise	 private	 corporations	 interested	 in	 private-public	partnerships	 or	 corporate	 social	 responsibility.	 Additionally	systematised	 data	 is	 displayed	 to	 the	 general	 public	 to	 produce	 the	favelas	 as	 already	 governed	 and	 benefitting	 from	 favela	 integration.	For	 example	 the	 UPP	 Social	 publication	 of	 GIS	maps	 of	 the	 pacified	favelas	specifying	the	location	of	schools,	health	clinics,	social	service	centres,	 and	 public	 cultural	 and	 leisure	 infrastructure	 produces	 the	structural	 appearance	 of	 the	 state	 operating	 within	 and	 over	 the	favelas.	 The	 claims	 of	 community	 participation	 legitimatise	 this	process	as	democratic.			 The	material	 interventions	 of	 planning	 and	 governance	work	to	visually	and	physically	 impose	 the	appearance	of	 structured	state	governance	 operating	 evenly	 through	 the	 favelas.	 Sometimes	 such	interventions	are	works	of	spectacle,	such	as	the	Teleféricos,	which	in	addition	 to	 providing	 a	 visual	 signifier	 of	 the	 state	 from	 afar	 (para	
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inglés	 ver)	 it	 also	 secures	 the	 state	 permanent	 physical	 space	 for	bureaucracy,	events,	and	VIP	visits.	As	a	rule,	however,	interventions	target	 the	 pre-existing	 and	 mundane	 processes	 for	 more	 efficient	organisation	 and	 regulation.	 Sewage	 flows	 are	 consolidated	 and	covered,	 roads	 are	 widened	 and	 paved,	 public	 spaces	 are	 lit,	 and	electricity	 and	 cable	 provision	 are	 legalised	 and	 commoditised.	 In	larger	 favelas,	 on-site	 service	 providers	 (health,	 education,	 social	workers)	mean	that	residents	increasingly	can	‘access	the	state’	from	their	 neighbourhoods	 rather	 than	 ‘travelling	 to’	 the	 asfalto.	 These	interventions	made	up	of	various	overlapping	and	coordinated	socio-technologies	work	to	produce	the	state	effect—that	is	the	appearance	that	 [favela]	 society	 is	 separate	 from	 and	 existing	 under	 a	 state	hierarchy—through	 the	 effectuation	 of	 territory,	 that	 is	 the	appearance	that	state	sovereignty	and	governance	is	operating	evenly	across	a	bounded	space	and	that	the	favelas	are	included	in	that	space.		Not	 to	 ignore	 the	 prioritised	 monopoly	 of	 violence	 and	 the	prominent	 discourse	 of	 public	 security,	 policing	 is	 a	major	 factor	 in	producing	 a	 spatialised	 state	 structure.	 The	 repeated	 rhythmic	practice	 of	 police	 patrols	 moving	 through	 favela	 space	 gives	 the	appearance	of	uncontested	organised	and	armed	authority.	However,	in	 the	 case	 of	 favela	 pacification,	 the	 processes	 of	 favela-specific	policing—rife	 with	 abuse	 of	 authority	 and	 continued	 violent	treatment	of	favela	residents,	at	time	with	the	presumption	of	guilt—actually	work	against	the	ideal	of	deconstructing	the	strict	favela/city	binary.				 	
8.2	Contributions	of	this	research		 This	 research	 project	 has	 attempted	 to	 contribute	 to	 existing	academic	 literature	concerning	urban	development	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro	as	well	as	broader	debates	on	the	fundamentals	of	state	and	territory.	
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Below	 I	 review	 the	 methodological,	 empirical,	 and	 theoretical	contributions	of	this	thesis.		 Methodologically,	 I	 responded	 to	Knott’s	 (2009)	call	 for	more	spatialised	 methodologies.	 A	 number	 of	 factors	 have	 encouraged	ethnographers	to	move	away	from	the	traditional	bounded	field-site.	Disregarding	 for	 the	 time	being	concerns	of	globalisation	 (of	 capital,	goods,	migration),	urban	ethnographers	have	 increasingly	attempted	to	speak	to	urbanity	and	socio-economic	processes	of	the	city	beyond	the	traditional,	particularistic	and	inward-looking	neighbourhood	and	community	studies	(G.	A.	Jones	and	Rodgers	2016).	In	demonstrating	how	 the	 ethnographic	 field	 may	 be	 constructed	 using	 Lefebvre’s	spatial	 triad,	 I	 offer	 an	 example	 of	 the	 field	 as	 spatial	 process.	 This	facilitated	 my	 movement	 around	 the	 city	 (both	 physical	 and	conceptual),	 between	different	 state	 offices,	 and	public	 events	while	still	 remaining	 ‘within’	 the	 constructed	 field.	However,	 as	 I	 noted	 in	Chapter	4,	the	lack	of	embeddedness	weakens	a	claim	to	ethnography	and	should	be	accounted	for	early	on	in	the	fieldwork.		 Empirically,	 I	 have	 offered	 a	 critical	 ‘unpacking’	 of	 “favela	integration.”	Calls	to	“integrate”	informal	housing	settlements	into	the	city	 through	 systematic	 state	 intervention	 date	 back	 decades,	 but	there	has	formed	a	general	consensus	among	scholars	that	the	scale,	breadth,	 and	 methodology	 of	 current	 programmes	 and	 policies	 do	constitute	a	new	‘moment’	 in	the	socio-spatial	relationships	between	the	 state,	 the	 favela,	 and	 the	 city.	 I	 argue	 that	 this	moment	may	 be	described	as	a	state	paradigm	of	integration,	and	I	have	attempted	to	critically	interrogate	this	paradigm	throughout	the	thesis.	This	project	differs	 from	 existing	 critical	 approaches	 in	 that	 it	 does	 not	 take	 a	vertical	 programme	 or	 singular	 project	 evaluative	 approach,	 thus	limiting	 my	 analysis	 to,	 for	 example,	 Morar	 Carioca	 as	 the	 evolving	favela-specific	strategy	of	urban	planning.	Nor	does	it	privilege	favela	pacification	 above	 all	 other	 state	 projects	 targeting	 the	 favelas.	 As	 I	
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argued	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 the	 integration	 paradigm	 does	 prioritise	 a	monopoly	of	violence	in	Rio	de	Janeiro,	but	it	 is	far	from	a	singularly	defining	 objective.	 My	 approach	 allowed	 me	 to	 present	 a	 nuanced	analysis	of	UPP	Social	beyond	that	of	pacification.	Finally,	while	I	hope	that	this	thesis	may	be	read	in	dialogue	with	contemporary	research	
about	the	favelas,	urban	poverty,	violence,	and	resident	resistance;	my	conclusions	narrowly	address	the	issue	of	territory	and	how	the	state	attempts	 to	 alter	 urban	 space.	 In	 comparison	 with	 the	 research	reviewed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 I	 explicitly	 avoided	 centring	 on	 mega-event	planning	 and	 preparations.	 I	 did	 so	 with	 the	 attempt	 to	 offer	 a	historically	 grounded	 analysis	 applicable	 beyond	 the	 sites	 of	 mega-event	 development	 and	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 nuances	 of	 urban	politics	and	state	scalar	relations.			 The	theoretical	contributions	of	this	thesis	can	be	summarised	as	follows.	My	analysis	of	“favela	integration”	through	the	framework	of	 landscape-mobilities	demonstrates	a	successful	pairing	of	 the	 two	concepts,	strengthening	the	assertion	that	the	two	may	be	analysed	as	mutually	constitutive.	Relatedly,	drawing	on	Lefebvre’s	theorisation	of	abstract	space	allowed	me	to	build	on	Barbosa’s	idea	of	a	“landscape	crisis”	 as	 a	 disruptive	 spatial-political	 conflict.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Rio	 de	Janeiro	that	crisis	is	constructed	as	the	challenges	and	conflicts	arising	from	the	bifurcation	of	urban	space	and	the	production	of	the	“divided	city.”		 This	 thesis	 contributes	 to	 discussions	 of	 state	 spatiality	 and	urban	 theory	 in	 the	Global	South	without	 reducing	Rio	de	 Janeiro	 to	concerns	of	“development”	or	“modernisation.”	Specifically,	while	the	majority	 of	 research	 on	 territory	 as	 theorised	 by	 Painter	 and	Haesbaert	 has	 focussed	 on	 nation-state	 territory	 at	 the	 federal	 and	sub-regional	 scales,	 I	 have	 suggested	 that	 the	 theory	 is	 useful	 to	analyse	the	urban	state	as	well.	 In	particular	the	concept	of	territory	as	 effect	 is	 useful	 when	 theorising	 cities	 defined	 by	 socio-spatial	
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fragmentation,	such	as	when	self-built	(informal)	housing	settlements	are	 considered	 abandoned	 by	 the	 state	 and	 in	 need	 of	 an	 increased	state	 ‘presence.’	 Finally,	 my	 exploratory	 feminist	 analysis	 of	 favela	integration	 in	 Chapter	 7	 suggests	 that	 scholars	 should	 incorporate	intersectional	feminist	approaches	into	their	theorisation	of	territory,	as	 the	 effects	 of	 this	 form	of	 state	 space	 are	 very	 often	 experienced	based	 on	 social	 identity	 categories	 such	 as	 gender,	 race,	 age,	 or	sexuality.			
8.3	Limitations	of	this	research		 As	with	all	research,	this	project	responds	to	a	reduced	number	of	 focussed	 research	 questions.	 It	 does	 not	 offer	 a	 totalising	explanation	 of	 the	 state	 and	 urban	 socio-spatial	 inequality.	 While	 I	have	attempted	to	construct	a	cohesive	narrative	of	favela	integration	as	 an	 emerging	 urban	 paradigm	 of	 governance,	 various	 sections,	pieces	 of	 data,	 or	 arguments	 may	 have	 piqued	 the	 curiosity	 of	 the	reader	and	generated	questions	that	I	did	not	answer.	 Indeed	I	hope	that	was	 the	 case,	 as	 it	 indicates	 possible	 points	 of	 engagement	 and	debate.		In	 reviewing	 what	 was	 left	 unsaid	 in	 this	 thesis,	 but	 not	unconsidered	 by	 the	 project,	 what	 may	 stand	 out	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 a	systematic	 analysis	 of	 favela-resident	 perspectives	 and	 experiences.	While	 I	 have	 responded	 to	 the	 specific	 research	 questions	 posed	 in	this	 thesis’	 opening	 and	 achieved	 an	 analysis	 of	 “favela	 integration”	across	 multi-scalar	 state	 policies	 and	 programmes,	 forgoing	 a	 case-method	approach	as	discussed	in	Chapter	4	means	that	I	cannot	speak	to	 or	 theorise	 favela	 integration	 from	 the	 favela	 with	 ethnographic	authority.	This	project	initially	included	a	research	question	regarding	the	 production	 of	 the	 state	 from	 ‘below’	 and	 the	 ‘outside.’	 I	 was	motivated	 by	 the	 growing	 literature	 of	 “anthropology	 of	 the	 state”	
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(Krohn-Hansen	 and	 Nustad	 2005;	 Sharma	 and	 Gupta	 2009)	 along	with	 ethnography	 of	 the	 state	 (especially	 Ferguson	 1990;	 but	 also	Tarlo	 2003;	 Gupta	 1995;	 and	more	 recently	 Zeiderman	 2016;	 Uribe	2016).	However,	after	a	few	months	of	fieldwork	it	became	apparent	that	given	time	and	resource	limitations,	I	would	not	be	able	to	carry	out	both	 a	 systematic	 analysis	 of	 “favela	 integration”	 as	 a	 governing	paradigm	at	the	city-scale	in	addition	to	ethnography	of	the	state	from	the	 quotidian	 experience	 of	 favela	 residents.	 I	 do	 look	 forward	 to	engaging	 with	 those	 researchers	 who	 have	 conducted	 local	 and	nuanced	place-specific	projects.			 While	I	do	not	consider	it	a	limitation,	I	had	wished	to	include	more	data	 from	 the	months	 I	 spent	 following	 street	 demonstrations	and	 occupations	 during	 2013	 and	 2014.	 My	 data	 suggests	 some	interesting	 comparisons	 between	 the	 ‘general’	 urban	 dissent	 with	those	favela-specific	protests	that	occurred	in	2013;	and	I	would	also	have	 liked	 to	 discuss	 some	 targeted	 and	 strategic	 occupations	 of	private	 land	by	 favela	 residents	 in	2014	as	 strategies	of	 “integration	from	 below.”	 These	 are	 examples	 of	 data	 that	 I	 look	 forward	 to	building	 into	 future	 publications.	 It	 was	 important	 for	 me	 as	 a	researcher	 to	 acknowledge	 resident	 mobilisations	 and	 organised	resistance,	as	I	did	in	Chapters	5	and	7.	These	examples	are	presented	mostly	 as	 reactionary	 to	 state	 interventions	 rather	 than	 productive	unto	themselves.	A	project	that	showcased	the	many	forms	of	creative	and	productive	organisation	of	favela	residents	would	have	been	able	to	 theorise	 resistance	 as	 building	 alternative	 forms	 of	 power	 at	 the	
margins,	as	suggested	by	bell	hooks	reviewed	in	Chapter	2.	I	applaud	those	 researchers	 who	 have	made	 significant	 efforts	 to	 do	 just	 that	and	eagerly	anticipate	reading	their	work.	
	 293	
8.4	Looking	beyond	Rio	de	Janeiro		 At	 various	 points	 in	 this	 thesis	 I	 have	 mentioned	 the	exceptionality	of	Rio	de	Janeiro,	from	an	imperial	city	to	a	mega-event	city.	 This	 may	 lead	 some	 readers	 to	 conclude	 that	 inter-city	comparison	 may	 be	 difficult	 or	 that	 the	 conclusions	 summarised	above	are	irrelevant	elsewhere.	Should	that	be	the	case,	I	respond	that	while	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 is	 indeed	 an	 exceptional	 city,	 and	 while	 this	research	took	place	during	an	exceptional	period	of	history,91	there	is	nothing	 exceptional	 about	 “favela	 integration.”	 The	 socio-spatial	fragmentation	 of	 the	 city	 between	 the	 formal	 and	 informal	 is	 a	common	observation	and	research	problem	throughout	many	cities	in	the	 Global	 South.	 Moreover	 the	 idea	 (expressed	 through	 policy	 and	planning)	that	self-built	housing	settlements	have	become	permanent	in	the	cityscape	and	should	therefore	be	incorporated	in	to	the	official,	or	 formal,	 fold	 of	 urban	 planning	 and	 governance	 is	 neither	 unique	nor	original	to	Rio	de	Janeiro.	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	1	and	various	points	 throughout	 empirical	 analysis,	 Medellín	 was	 a	 reference	 and	inspiration	 of	 “favela	 integration.”	 Likewise,	 Rio’s	 experience	 with	Favela-Bairro,	 Morar	 Carioca,	 and	 PAC-favelas	 are	 held	 up	 as	exemplary	 by	 the	 national	 government	 and	 seen	 as	 referential	 for	other	 cities.	 The	 involvement	 of	 international	 organisations	 such	 as	UN	Habitat	and	the	Inter-American	Development	Bank	and	the	bright	spotlight	 of	 the	 international	 press	 during	 the	 past	 ten	 years	 of	economic	 growth,	 urban	 renewal	 and	mega-events	 have	meant	 that	
																																																								91	The	deepening	economic	and	political	crises	that	began	in	2015—perhaps	as	early	as	2013	 if	we	historicise	 the	trajectory	of	 impeaching	President	Dilma	finalised	on	31	August	2016,	a	process	many	believe	 to	constitute	a	parliamentary	coup—may	signify	that	the	moment	passed,	rather	ironically,	on	the	eve	of	the	Olympic	Games.	As	I	write	these	conclusions,	national	newspapers	are	reporting	that	the	State	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro	 will	 declare	 bankruptcy	 before	 the	 end	 of	 2016,	 and	 rumours	 are	spreading	 among	municipal	 workers	 that	 the	 city	may	 follow	 suit.	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	may	be	facing	at	a	new	moment	of	exception,	that	of	crisis	capitalism.	
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“favela	 integration”	 was	 discussed,	 praised,	 and	 critiqued	 on	 an	international	scale.		 Given	the	above	there	are	a	number	of	opportunities	for	future	research,	but	I	will	limit	my	suggestions	here	to	two.	First	is	following	the	 “comparative	 gesture”	 advocated	 by	 Robinson	 (2011).	 Medellín	seems	 an	 obvious	 choice	 given	 the	 similarities	 in	 the	 discursive	production	of	the	problem—a	violent	city	divided	between	the	formal	and	 the	 gang-controlled	 informal—and	 the	 solution,	 democratic	planning	and	governance	that	 incorporates	the	 favelas/comunas	 into	the	 formal	 urban	 socio-spatial	 fabric.	 A	 sizable	 body	 of	 critical	research	on	“social	urbanism”	would	facilitate	a	comparative	research	project	 (for	 example:	 Samper	 Escobar	 2010;	 Dávila	 2013;	 Maclean	2015;	 Ivo	 and	 Magnavita	 2016).	 A	 similar	 opportunity	 would	 be	through	 the	 lens	 of	 policy	 mobilities.	 As	 mentioned,	 Medellín’s	‘miraculous	 success’	 was	 useful	 to	 garner	 support	 for	 significant	public	 investment	 in	 the	 favelas	 and	 served	 as	 a	 place	 of	 reference	during	the	designing	of	integration	projects.	Dozens	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	politicians,	policy	makers,	and	 technocrats	visited	Medellín	on	state-organised	 education	 trips.	 However,	 as	 one	 architect	 at	 the	 IAB	reminded	me,	there	was	a	similar	round	of	visits	from	Colombia	to	Rio	de	Janeiro	during	the	success	of	Favela-Bairro.	Beyond	the	Medellín–Rio	dynamic,	 one	 could	 ‘follow’	different	elements	of	 the	 integration	paradigm	around	Latin	America	and	the	Global	South.		 Second,	as	this	project	did	not	offer	an	ethnographic	account	of	territory	 and	 “favela	 integration”	 from	 the	 experience	 of	 favela	residents,	 that	 also	 seems	 like	 an	 obvious	 and	 immediate	 research	opportunity.	 While	 this	 could	 be	 approached	 from	 a	 number	 of	directions,	 readers	 interested	 in	 governmentality	 will	 have	 noticed	multiple	 points	 during	 empirical	 analysis	 that	 could	 have	 discussed	the	 various	 ways	 state	 spatial	 projects	 of	 integration	 attempt	 to	organise	and	colonise	pre-existing	micro-relations	of	power	and	local	
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techniques	 of	 spatial	 organisation.	 I	would	 additionally	 suggest	 that	researchers	play	close	attention	to	counter-hegemonic	alternatives	to	“favela	 integration”	 as	 proposed	 by	 the	 state.	 Beyond	 reactionary	resistance—important	 without	 doubt	 but	 also	 widely	 studied	 by	Brazilian	and	international	academics—original	research	could	focus	on	 how	 new	 forms	 of	 spatial	 power	 relations	 are	 consciously	 being	built	 in	 the	 urban	 peripheries	 and	 how	 residents	 either	 attempt	 to	negotiate	with	state	structure	or	keep	state	power	away	from	certain	local	practices	and	processes.	Such	examples	may	be	studied	from	the	radical	position	of	autonomist	development	and	planning	 (see	Souza	2000)	 as	 counter-hegemonic	 integration	 strategies,	 or	 perhaps	strategies	of	liberating	disintegration.	
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Methodological	appendix		
Details	of	discourse	analysis		
	
Seven	stages	of	discourse	analysis	(Waitt	2010,	adopted	from	Rose	2007)		 Strategy	 Summary	1	 Choice	 of	 source	materials	or	text	 Source	selections	should	follow	research	objectives,	and	may	 be	 categorised	 into	 genres	 (for	 example,	 official	planning	 documents,	 political	 rhetoric,	 news	 articles,	academic	 commentary,	 interview	 transcripts,	 and	citizen/civil	 society	media).	 The	 relationships	 between	different	 source	materials	 are	 important	 as	meaning	 is	often	 created	 from	 those	 relationships,	 called	
intertextuality.	One	should	seek	out	‘rich’	texts	that	offer	the	 opportunity	 to	 conduct	 rigorous	 analysis	 of	experience,	attitude,	practices	and	subjectivity.	2	 Suspend	pre-existing	categories:	 become	reflexive	 This	 stage	 follows	 Foucault’s	 argument	 that	 one	 must	suspend	 preconceptions	 in	 order	 to	 show	 how	knowledge	 is	 socially	 constructed	 through	 discourse.	Reflexivity	 refers	 to	 the	 researcher	 recognizing	 their	own	 positionality	 and	 how	 their	 personal	 background,	identity,	 experiences	 and	 ideologies	 affect	 how	 they	engage	research	subjects	and	interpret	data.		3	 Familiarisation:	absorbing	yourself	in	and	 thinking	critically	 about	 the	social	 context	 of	your	texts	
This	 step	 might	 be	 compared	 to	 ‘due-diligence’,	 or	situating	 the	 data	 and	 discourse	within	 existing	 socio-historical	 processes.	 This	 includes	 thinking	 critically	about	 power	 dynamics	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	the	 author(s)	 of	 the	 text	 and	 the	 audience,	 the	pragmatic	 construction	 (what	 technologies	were	 used)	and	 dissemination	 of	 the	 text	 (how/where	 does	 the	audience	‘consume’	the	text),	and	interrogating	the	text	content	 and	 relationship	 to	 the	 audience	 (Waitt	provides	 a	 series	 of	 questions	 as	 starting	 points	 (229-230)).	4	 Coding:	 once	 for	organisation	 and	again	 for	interpretation	
Coding	 is	 the	 practice	 through	 which	 the	 researcher	may	 begin	 to	 systematise	 analysis	 through	categorisation.	One	may	begin	with	descriptive	category	labels	 (e.g.	 context,	 practices,	 attitudes,	 and	experiences)	 or	 with	 the	 more	 quantitative	 content	analysis	 (following	 Rose	 2007).	 This	 initial	 round	 of	coding	 assists	 the	 researcher	 in	 categorizing	 various	themes	 and	 subsequently	 locating	 them	 within	 and	across	 the	 sources	 analysed.	 The	 second	 round	 of	analytical	 coding	 facilitates	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	data	through	abstraction	or	reduction.		5	 Power,	 knowledge,	and	 persuasion:	investigate	 your	texts	 for	 effects	 of	‘truth’	
This	 stage	 is	 concerned	 with	 identifying	 ‘discursive	structures’	 that	 produce	 truth.	 This	 follows	 Foucault’s	(1980)	 theory	 that	 truth	 is	 produced	 through	 power	relations.	 Once	 knowledge	 is	 established	 as	 truth	 it	becomes	naturalised	and	serves	a	disciplinary	purpose.	Discourse	analysis	means	to	deconstruct	truth	(or	‘truth	effects’)	 by	 exposing	 the	 processes	 through	 which	
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knowledge	 is	 constructed	 and	 then	 naturalised	 as	‘common	sense’.	[As	an	aside,	this	is	where	many	critical	urbanists	 may	 blur	 the	 line	 between	 Foucauldian	 and	Gramcian	 discourse	 analysis,	 as	 mentioned	 by	 Lees	(2004),	 because	 naturalisation	 of	 truth	 through	discursive	 structures	 may	 be	 useful	 in	 an	 analysis	 of	hegemony].	6	 Rupture	 and	resilience:	 take	notice	 of	inconsistencies	within	your	texts	
Discourse,	 especially	 taking	 note	 of	 the	 relationships	between	 different	 texts	 and	 sources,	 is	 neither	monolithic	 nor	 flawlessly	 cohesive.	 Dissonance,	contradictions,	and	ambiguities	provide	productive	data	that	should	be	accounted	for	and	critically	analysed.	7	 Silence:	 silence	 as	discourse	 and	discourses	 that	silence	
Researches	 should	 ask	whose	 ‘voices’	 are	 silent	within	the	 texts	 (largely	 relying	 on	 social	 identities	 of	 class,	race,	 sexuality,	 nationality,	 age	 etc…).	 Silence	 indicates	which	actors	are	socially	 (in)validated	 to	speak	and	be	heard/ignored.	 Additionally,	 researchers	 should	 be	aware	of	which	discourse	becomes	‘dominant’	or	which	is	a	‘privileged	discourse’,	reproducing	power	dynamics.			
Genres	and	texts	for	discourse	analysis		
Genres	and	texts	for	
discourse	analysis	
	
Genre	 Examples	of	texts	Government	reports	(technical	documents)	 Rio	de	Janeiro	Master	Planning	Documents;	Morar	Carioca	policy	and	programme	documents	(detailing	programme	aims/functions/structure)	favela-intervention	technical	planning	documents	(Morar	Carioca	and	PAC-favelas	schematic	designs	and	text	planning	documents);		Political/state	propaganda	 Mayor	Eduardo	Paes	campaign	propaganda;	official	statements	by	UPP	commanders	and	Rio	de	Janeiro	Secretary	of	Security;	state	media	representations	of	interventions	(e.g.	state-curated	art	exhibitions	representing	urban	renewal	and	favela	integration);	Summer	Olympic	Candidature	File.	Academic/expert	knowledge	 Public	debates	and	seminars;	programme/project	evaluations;	academic/public	intellectual	commentary;	international	org/bank	reports;	News/popular	media	 ‘Mainstream’	news	coverage	of	topics	related	to	favela	integration;	select	international	media;	song	lyrics	and	poetry;	‘Grassroots’/citizen	media	 Blogs,	papers,	reports,	press	releases	produced	by	activists,	NGOs,	resident	groups			
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Interviewees	and	Informants	Interviews	and	in-dept	conversations	with	informants92	
Name	 Title	Michelle		 Associate	Architect	w/	firm	contracted	by	Morar	Carioca	Roberto		 UPP	Social,	IPP	Special	Projects,	President’s	office	Lea		 PAC	Social	coordinator	(former)	Antonio		 Director	of	Special	Projects,	IPP	Marcelo		 Activist	from	Complexo	do	Alemão,	NGO	worker	Jorge	Barbosa	 Founder-Observatório	de	Favelas,	Prof.	of	Geo	at	UFF	Renata	 Director,	PAC	Social	Nicole	 Coordinator,	PAC	Social	Bruna	 Gestão	Territorial,	UPP	Social	Carolina	 Gestão	Institucional,	UPP	Social	Carla	 Assistente	de	Equipe,	UPP	Social	Rosane	 Gestora	de	Equipe,	UPP	Social	Nathalie	 Project	Assistant,	UN	Habitat,	UPP	Social		Rayne	 Country	Director,	UN	Habitat	Peterson		 UPP	Social	Pedro	da	Luz	Moreira	 President	Brazilian	Architects	Association-RJ	Eduarda	de	la	Rocque	 President	IPP	Fede	 Lead	architect,	Morar	Carioca	project	Jorge	Jauregui	 Lead	architect	for	PAC-favelas,	Favela-Bairro	Gustavo	 Director	of	CSR	&	Communications,	Supervia	(Teleférico)	Tatiana	 Supervia,	CSR	(Teleférico)	Jailson	de	Souza	e	Silva	 Founder,	Observatório	de	Favelas,	Prof	Geo	at	UERJ,	subsecretary	human	rights	RJ	State	(former),	Ibase	Morar	Carioca	civil	society	supervisor	Julia	 Cultural	Project	Coord.	Biblioteca	Parque	Alemão	(telefércio)	Fernanda	 Head	of	Family	Clinic,	Estação	Palmeiras	in	teleférico	station	Alan	Brun	 Founder,	Instituto	Raizes	em	Movimento																																																									92	All	 names	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 gender	have	been	 changed	 except	 for	well-known	and	 public	 figures,	 or	 programme	 directors	 who	 consented	 to	 having	 their	 name	used	and	who	would	otherwise	be	recognised	by	their	title.	
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(Alemão	activist),	technical	manager	PAC-favelas	Alemão)	Roger		 Gestor	de	Equipe,	UPP	Social	Luciano	 President	Resident	Association	of	Morar	Carioca	site	José	 Vice-President	Resident	Association	of	Morar	Carioca	site			
Methods	to	analyse	gender	composition	of	Morar	Carioca	
Concurso	project	teams		The	 Morar	 Carioca	 public	 contest	 selected	 5	 projects	 as	winners	with	 honours	 and	 an	 additional	 35	 as	winners.	 The	 gender	ratio	 of	 the	 winning	 teams	 were	 calculated	 in	 order	 to	 test	 the	hypothesis	that:	i)	 lead	 architects	 or	 winning	 teams	 were	 disproportionately	male	 ii)	 overall	makeup	 of	winning	 teams	were	 disproportionately	male	 iii)	 non-architect	 “social	 labour”	 (e.g.	 social	 worker)	 was	disproportionately	conducted	by	women.		In	 order	 to	 examine	 the	 gendered	make-up	 of	 the	 selected	 project-teams:	Morar	 Carioca	 published	 a	 large	 coffee-table-size	 volume	 of	 all	 the	projects	 entered	 titled	 the	 Catalogue	 of	 Methodological	 Proposals.	Each	 proposal	 included	 a	 list	 of	 team	members	 categorised	 as	 lead	architect,	 “authoring”	 architects,	 and	 additional	 technical	 and	specialised	 “collaborators”.	 All	 members	 are	 listed	 by	 name	 and	profession.	 Each	 team	 member’s	 gender	 was	 deduced	 from	 the	corresponding	 profession,	 the	 majority	 of	 which	 are	 linguistically	
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coded	 to	 indicate	 the	 subject’s	 gender	 (e.g.	 arquiteto/arquiteta,	sociólogo/socióloga	and	so	on).	 In	 the	 cases	where	 the	profession	 is	linguistically	 gender-neutral	 (for	 example	 social	 worker	 or	economist),	 gender	was	deduced	 through	 the	 subject’s	name,	which,	as	 a	 general	 rule,	 follow	 a	 strict	 gender-binary	 in	 Brazilian	Portuguese.	The	 following	 table	displays	 the	collected	data.	The	gender	of	the	lead	architect	is	displayed,	as	are	the	masculine-to-feminine	ratios	of	 the	 general	 architecture	 teams	 (the	 “authoring	 architects”),	 any	team-members	whose	profession	is	listed	to	indicate	a	social	function	(that	is	non-technical/legal	role)	and	the	total	for	each	project.	What	I	have	 highlighted	 as	 “social”	 role	 includes	 social	 science	 professions	(geographer,	 sociologist,	 economist,	 anthropologist,	 and	 social	psychologist	are	the	most	frequent	in	this	data	set).			 Lead	architect	 Architect-authors	M:F	 Social	M:F		Total	M:F	Selected	w/	Honours	 	 	 	 	1	 F	 2:3	 0:1	 11:8	2	 M	 3:2	 n/a	 6:6	3	 M	 3:6	 1:1	 10:9	4	 M	 3:0	 0:2	 8:5	5	 M	 1:1	 1:0	 9:1	Selected	 	 	 	 	6	 F	 4:5	 0:1	 6:10	7	 M	 2:2	 0:1	 7:5	8	 M	 4:1	 1:1	 5:2	9	 M	 2:1	 1:0	 12:3	10	 M	 1:1	 0:1	 8:4	11	 F	 0:2	 n/a	 0:2	12	 M	 1:1	 n/a	 4:2	
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13	 F	 1:2	 n/a	 3:4	14	 M	 5:4	 n/a	 7:4	15	 M	 5:2	 0:1	 8:7	16	 M	 2:0	 n/a	 4:1	17	 F	 2:3	 3:1	 13:7	18	 M	 2:0	 2:0	 7:1	19	 F	 0:2	 n/a	 2:2	20	 M	 3:0	 n/a	 3:5	21	 M	 2:2	 n/a	 7:4	22	 M	 4:2	 n/a	 5:3	23	 M	 2:5	 1:0	 9:9	24	 M	 4:0	 2:0	 9:0	25	 M	 3:2	 1:3	 8:11	26	 F	 11:5	 3:1	 17:8	27	 M	 6:1	 1:0	 9:4	28	 F	 2:3	 0:1	 4:7	29	 F	 4:3	 n/a	 6:4	30	 M	 3:0	 n/a	 10:0	31	 M	 3:0	 n/a	 6:1	32	 F	 1:2	 0:1	 3:4	33	 M	 5:1	 1:1	 16:2	34	 F	 2:4	 1:2	 6:6	35	 M	 6:2	 0:1	 10:4	36	 F	 2:3	 0:1	 6:4	37	 M	 2:2	 1:0	 7:4	38	 M	 3:2	 2:0	 9:5	39	 M	 4:3	 n/a	 4:4	40	 M	 3:3	 0:1	 7:5		 	 	 	 	
Total	 28:12	 118:83	 22:22	 291:177		
